Summary Consideration: The drafting team corrected a typographical error in the last paragraph of the interpretation, but did not make any other modifications to the interpretation based on the comments submitted.

Correction:

TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 explicitly provide that the inclusion of planned (including maintenance) outages of any bulk electric equipment at demand levels for which the planned outages are performed is required.

Segment	Organization	Comment
1	Ameren Services Company	TPL-002-0 Requirement R.1.3.2: Do Not Approve. Comments: The proposed interpretation of R1.3.2 does not answer the following basic question with respect to the TPL standards: Does including contingent outages as part of the defined operating state exceed the contingency requirements specified in Table 1 of the TPL standards? Defining contingent outages in the assumed system operating state is not consistent with FAC or TPL standards. FAC-010 specifies in Requirement R2.1 In the pre-contingency state with all Facilities in service TPL-002-0 Requirement R1 provides the general description for the reliability assessment of the system. R1 states that the system shall be studied under the contingency conditions as defined in Category B of Table 1. How does the interpretation address the inconsistency of modeling contingent outages as critical system conditions outside of Table 1? Could a Transmission facility outages in their critical system conditions? The contentious application of "critical system conditions" did not apply to the specification of a base case dispatch scenario. The Planning Coordinator performed a First Contingency Incremental Transfer Capability (FCITC) analysis which modeled non-firm transactions to replace contingent generation outages. Does compliance with TLP-002 require sufficient import capability to provide access to external generation capacity for which there are not explicit capacity or transmission reservations at the discretion of the Planning Coordinator? FAC-012-1, Transfer Capability Methodology, requires that the Planning Coordinator (Authority) to document its current methodology used for developing its inter-regional and intra-regional Transfer Capability S(Transfer Capability Methodology). Does this interpretation suggest that the Planning Coordinator has the requirement or responsibility to define a minimum level of transfer capability. Is it the intent of this interpretation that a Planning Coordinator's transfer capability methodology be applied to TPL standards compliance?

116-390 Village Blvd. Princeton, NJ 08540 609.452.8060 | www.nerc.com

Segment	Organization	Comment
		Planning Coordinator: which of the current standards establishes a requirement that the Planning Coordinator develop a methodology to determine base case dispatch scenarios or gives the Planning Coordinator the authority to prescribe dispatch assumptions?
Response: We the matter of the interview		s, which address R1.3.2. However, most of the questions posed go well beyond the subject
the Functional Mc comments, our in	del, a standards reference d	ned in TPL-002 and TPL-003, and the standard itself gives no basis for defining it. Neither does ocument, provide any guidance. While this is understandably what Ameren is seeking in their le a direct answer. However, we were able to articulate a process for obtaining the specificity
the planning proc implied by a com Coordinator <i>did n</i> Coordinator's asso	ess, including the specification mon sense reading of the sta <i>ot</i> have this authority. Each essment as well as each Trar	terpretation supports the Planning Coordinator's supervisory role in directing the coordination of on of any methodologies to be used by Transmission Planners in its area. Such authority is also andard itself. Assume that the standard was written with the understanding that the Planning of its Transmission Planners would be free to make adopt their own methods, and the Planning nemission Planner's assessment would be invalid on its face due solely to the lack of coordination. Planning Coordinator <i>and</i> its Transmission Planners.)
based upon speci	fic sub-requirements in R1.3	npliance Monitor, the RE determines what a "valid assessment" means when evaluating studies selected by the Planning Coordinator and the Transmission Planner. If a PC has Transmission ust coordinate among themselves on compliance matters."
1	American Transmission Company, LLC	The interpretation applies to only the Planning Coordinator while the standard R1 applies to both the Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner. ATC believes that the proposed interpretation is assigning greater authority onto the Planning Coordinator than the requirement specifies. Lastly, ATC believe that the Functional Model Reference Document should not be used for an interpretation. (What happens if the Functional Model document is changed so that it no long supports an interpretation?)
interpretation is a	ssigning greater authority or	s, which address R1.3.2. We respectively disagree with ATC's statement that "the proposed not the Planning Coordinator than the requirement specifies (emphasis added)." The relationship numbers is not specified <i>in any requirement in TPL-002 or TPL-003</i> .
the planning proc a reference docur Appendix 3A, p. 3	ess, including the specification nent, and as such it may be	terpretation supports the Planning Coordinator's supervisory role in directing the coordination of on of any methodologies to be used by Transmission Planners in its area. The Functional Model is used to support the interpretation of a Reliability Standard. See NERC's <i>Rules of Procedures</i> , pecific Functional Model version 3, not the current Functional Model, so our interpretation would

Segment	Organization	Comment	
that the standard Planners would be assessment would	was written with the underst	nse reading of the standard itself, even without a reference to the Functional Model. Assume tanding that the Planning Coordinator <i>did not</i> have this authority. Each of its Transmission own methods, and the Planning Coordinator's assessment as well as each Transmission Planner's blely to the lack of coordination. (Remember that M1 and M2 apply to both the Planning	
1	Duke Energy Carolina	Thank you for the opportunity to vote on this interpretation. We agreed with the September 12, 2007 Interpretation of Requirement 1.3.2, but do not agree with the March 13, 2008 Interpretation of Requirement 1.3.2, which places selection of critical system conditions under the authority of the Planning Coordinator. We agreed with the September 12, 2007 Interpretation of Requirement 1.3.12, and also agree with the March 13, 2008 Interpretation of Requirement 1.3.12.	
-	hank you for your comments	5. However, since you offer no explanation as to why you disagree with R1.3.2, we can offer no	
response. 1	Entergy Corporation	There are requirements in the standard that we feel are applied equally to the Transmission Planner and the Planning Coordinator. We believe that the interpretation erroneously attributes approval authority to the PC and the RE that is not called out for in the standard.	
	Response: We thank you for your comments. The relationship between the Planning Coordinator and the Transmission Planner is not specified in any of the requirements in TPL-002 or TPL-003.		
the planning proce a reference docum Appendix 3A, p. 3	The Functional Model language cited in the interpretation supports the Planning Coordinator's supervisory role in directing the coordination of the planning process, including the specification of any methodologies to be used by Transmission Planners in its area. The Functional Model is a reference document, and as such it may be used to support the interpretation of a Reliability Standard. See NERC's <i>Rules of Procedures</i> , Appendix 3A, p. 34. We have referenced a specific Functional Model version 3, not the current Functional Model, so our interpretation would not change if the Functional Model changed.		
that the standard Planners would be assessment would	Such authority is also implied by a common sense reading of the standard itself, even without a reference to the Functional Model. Assume that the standard was written with the understanding that the Planning Coordinator <i>did not</i> have this authority. Each of its Transmission Planners would be free to make and adopt its own methods, and the Planning Coordinator's assessment as well as each Transmission Planner's assessment would be invalid on its face due solely to the lack of coordination. (Remember that M1 and M2 apply to both the Planning Coordinator <i>and</i> its Transmission Planners.)		
1	Gainesville Regional Utilities	I suggest the first sentence ending be changed from "are required" to "are performed within the discretion of the Planning Authority/Transmission Planner." This change will return the standard to its original interpretation concerning this matter and keep the volume of work hopefully within achievable limits. Secondly, the second sentence raised a concern that a planned outage should be considered a contingency which totally goes against the NERC	

Segment	Organization	Comment
		Glossary of Terms. You must allow some necessary system adjustments to accommodate this
		condition before running any contingency studies.
sentence which we R.1.3.12 is a requi modeling of planne	ould make the consideration irement, and as such, cannot ed outages; such modeling r	which address R1.3.12. We respectfully disagree with your suggested change in the first of planned outages within the discretion of the Planning Authority/Transmission Planner. t be optional or discretionary. However, the requirement does not specify a method for the nethods are within the discretion of the Planning Authority [Planning Coordinator] to specify, and all its Transmission Planners.
		cond sentence. We stated that a "planned outage is <u>not</u> [emphasis added] a "contingency" and e included prior to any contingency assessment.
1	Manitoba Hydro	Manitoba Hydro agrees with the interpretation outlined in TPL-003-0 R1.3.12; however, Manitoba Hydro does not agree with the interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 R1.3.2. The standard puts the onus of defining critical system conditions on the PA/TP. The revised interpretation creates confusion as it is now unclear as to whether the PA/TP or RE as Compliance monitor is to determine the critical system conditions.
Planning Coordina the RE determines Planning Coordina	tor has the authority to spec what a "valid assessment" i	We respectfully disagree with your conclusion regarding our interpretation of R1.3.2. The ify "critical system conditions." As we stated in the interpretation "As the Compliance Monitor, means when evaluating studies based upon specific sub-requirements in R1.3 selected by the inner. If a PC has Transmission Planners in more than one region, the REs must coordinate
1	Northeast Utilities	There remains a necessary level of coordination between the Transmission Planner and Planning Authority to determine generation dispatch and planned outage scenarios to be used in system assessments. The revised interpretation disregards the important role of the Transmission Planner, which the Standards themselves do not. Additionally, we believe NERC has not followed its Reliability Standards Development Procedure (Version 6.1) which in Step 9, First Ballot section, the last paragraph states; however, one or more members submit negative votes with reasons, regardless whether those reasons are resolved or not, a second ballot shall be conducted. NERC failed to follow this step. Further, in Step 9, Second Ballot section, the 3rd paragraph states; In the second ballot step, no revisions to the standard are permitted; as such revisions would not have been subject to public comment. However, if the Standards Committee determines that revisions proposed during the ballot process would likely provide an opportunity to achieve consensus on the standard, then such revisions may be made and the draft standard posted for public comment again beginning with Step 6 and continuing with subsequent steps. NERC has revised the interpretations (contrary to the 1st sentence) and has not posted for public comment again beginning with Step 6 (contrary to the 2nd). It did not seem necessary to revise interpretations for which, from an 86.7% quorum, 88.1% voted

Segment	Organization	Comment
		affirmative.
		which addresses R1.3.2. We respectfully disagree that we have disregarded the role of the ified the relationship between the Planning Coordinator and the Transmission Planner.
elected to revise th received do not aff cause the team to revise our interpret does not require th	e original interpretation inst ect the standard drafting tea withdraw and revise the sta tation. Although the standar	
1	Omaha Public Power District	The first sentence of the revised interpretation of TPL-002 and TPL-003 R1.3.12 is actually not a complete sentence, and as a result, it is impossible to understand it. The revised interpretation therefore should not be approved in its current form. Did the Planning Committee intend to insert the words "performed is" before the word "required" in the first sentence?
as shown: "TPL-00	02-0 and TPL-003-0 explicitly	ypographical error, and we will modify the first sentence by inserting the phrase "performed is" y provide that the inclusion of planned (including maintenance) outages of any bulk electric uned outages are <u>performed is</u> required.
1	Pacific Gas and Electric Company	While I agree with Interpretation 1 in that TPL standards are not meant for planning for resource adequacy. We do not necessarily disagree with Interpretation 2 because it seems to describe a planning methodology. I voted affirmative because NERC Standard is to specify what the requirements are and not how to meet them.
Response: No res	sponse is required.	
1	Sacramento Municipal Utility District	In explaining the revised interpretation for R1.3.2, that, "selection of a credible generation dispatch for the modeling of critical system conditions is within the discretion of the Planning Authority", the interpretation dilutes the discretion given in subsequent paragraphs. Specifically, it states the "Planning Coordinator would formulate critical system conditions" and that the "the RE determines what a "valid assessment" means". The word 'formulate' is much weaker than what is stated in the requirement R1.3.2 - "as deemed appropriate" by the planning coordinator/transmission planner. The new interpretation implies that until the 'regional entity' (WECC) approves our assessment, it is not valid. I do not believe that is the requirement. The new interpretation goes beyond the stated requirement. Determining a valid assessment should stay independent of who (PA or RE) is doing it.
		Our statement that the "Planning Coordinator would formulate critical system conditions" is not selection of critical generation dispatch for the modeling of critical system conditions is within the

Segment Organization

Comment

discretion of the Planning Authority." Neither is the "would formulate" language any weaker that the "as deem appropriate" language in R.1.3.2. We have not altered this requirement. The Planning Coordinator would formulate the critical system conditions it deemed appropriate.

With regards to the second comment regarding the role of the Regional Entity, in a sense an RE does "approve" a Planning Coordinator's assessment since by not issuing a compliance violation, it has determined that measures M1 and M2 are satisfied; i.e., that the assessment is valid and that it has been properly reported. (Some REs may provide affirmative approval, so that a Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner knows that its assessment has been approved). However, an RE's obligation to determine whether an assessment is "valid" does not allow the RE to micromanage the assessments it reviews. For example, it cannot reject a corrective plan (e.g., the proposed construction of new facilities) because it believes another plan would be more cost effective. If the proposed corrective plan fulfills the standard's requirements, it is not reviewable by the RE.

Finally, we did not state that an RE performed assessments as your last sentence implies.

1	Salt River Project	R1.3.2. Cover critical system conditions and study years as deemed appropriate by the
		responsible entity. Although SRP agrees that the Planning Authority (PA) shall have the
		discretion in choosing the appropriate conditions to study for their system(s), we disagree with
		the language as stated. There is no definition of how or what a PA shall do in the
		"methodology." Methodology is not described in any Standard to this point. Therefore, how
		could compliance be measured? Methodology needs to be described or enumerated to be
		applied in Standards and for compliance. R1.3.12. Include the planned (including maintenance)
		outage of any bulk electric equipment (including protection systems or their components) at
		those demand levels for which planned (including maintenance) outages are performed. SRP
		agrees with the revised interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 R1.3.12 as developed by
		the NERC Planning Committee on March 12, 2008.

Response: We thank you for your comment. We agree that a methodology for defining "critical system conditions" is not part of TPL-002 and TPL-003. The reference to "methodology in the interpretation comes from the Functional Model language we cited, and that citation states that the Planning Coordinator "provides...Transmission Planners ...methodologies and tools for the simulation of the transmission system." We further state that a "PC's selection of "critical system conditions" fall within the purview of "methodology." We use this citation to establish the Planning Coordinators authority for specifying "critical system conditions" which it determines are appropriate. The standards to do not require a methodology, and our interpretation does not require one.

-	Southern Indiana Gas	The following revised interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.12 was
	and Electric Co.	developed by the NERC Planning Committee on March 13, 2008: TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0
		explicitly provide that the inclusion of planned (including maintenance) outages of any bulk
		electric equipment at demand levels for which the planned outages are required. For studies
		that include planned outages, compliance with the contingency assessment for TPL- 002-0 and
		TPL-003-0 as outlined in Table 1 would include any necessary system adjustments which might

Segment	Organization	Comment
		be required to accommodate planned outages since a planned outage is not a "contingency" as defined in the NERC Glossary of Terms Used in Standards. Vectren requests that consideration be given to change the verbiage; "include any necessary system adjustments" to include the word "reasonable" or some other similar word to limit the system adjustments. The suggested verbiage would then read "include any reasonable and necessary system adjustments". Vectren does not believe that the word "necessary" provides enough limitation to the adjustments that should be considered. If the system adjustment necessary to eliminate an overload caused by the planned outage combined with contingency assessment requires an unreasonable amount of generation redispatch or the dropping of firm load, there should be some ability for the Transmission Planner or the Planning Authority to make the determination that the adjustment is unreasonable and another remedy for the overload must be explored. Your consideration in this matter is appreciated.
additional interpre possible "necessar accomplish this go considered a "nece In support of this Coordinator or Tra adjustment" for a	tative value. The language p y system adjustment" prior t al, nor do we believe it is re- essary system adjustment wh conclusion, consider TPL-002 insmission Planner attempted	which addresses R1.3.12. We do not believe that the addition of the word "reasonable" has bosed by Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Co. is an attempt to remove load shedding as a o modeling a contingency assessment. We do not believe that the word "reasonable" will quired. It is not required because we do not believe that load shedding would ever be hich might be required to accommodate planned outages" as our interpretation states. 2. It does not permit the loss of demand except as noted in footnote "b." If a Planning d to "pass" TPL-002 by <i>a priori</i> load shedding under the guise of a "necessary system <i>ye</i> shed load in order to comply with a standard that does not permit load shedding, and we to find it invalid.
1	Tucson Electric Power Co.	The language in the Request for Interpretation is not clear. TEP requests clarification as to how planned outages are to be addressed. We believe planned outages, to the extent they may be known, should be treated as post-N-1 with system adjusted similar to the first event in a Category C 3 event wherein system adjustment is allowed following the outage. A distinction in the case of a planned outage may be made in that system adjustment would be implemented prior to taking the outage. In either case, system adjustment may include running generation, arming load shed for subsequent single contingencies, and/or other appropriate measures in preparation for the next event. This is important, as longer-term planned outages would include those outages needed to get system upgrades built and commissioned. Outages required to implement system upgrades should not be subjected to the same requirements as conditions with all facilities in service.
any necessary sys	tem adjustments, the system	which addresses R1.3.12. Planned outages are modeled such that after the planned outage <i>and</i> is able to withstand a Category B event with Category B results. Therefore, the "necessary re taken <i>before</i> the planned outage.

Segment Organization

Comment

Although a Category C 3 contemplates system adjustments *after* the first Category B event, it is not the same as a planned outage followed by a Category B event. For a Category C 3 event, the system adjustments may be "in progress" and not fully completed before the next Category B event occurs, whereas for planned outages those adjustments have been completed. Finally, a Category C 3 event permits the interruption of customers, whereas a Category B does not except as noted in footnote "b." If a planned outage were followed by a Category B event, no load loss except as noted in footnote "b" would be permitted.

2	British Columbia	R1.3.2 The first sentence of the response is acceptable, although it could be made clearer. We
	Transmission Corporation	suggest that the appropriate response to the question would be: R1.3.2 does not require
		multiple contingent generating unit outages as part of the possible generation dispatch
		scenarios. However, it also does not preclude this if the Planning Coordinator deems that
		consideration of such condition is appropriate. The last paragraph is unacceptable because it
		states that the Compliance Monitor determines what a "valid assessment" means. This is
		incorrect. The TPL standard states what a valid assessment includes. The Compliance Monitor
		role is to audit whether the PC's assessment includes the elements of a "valid assessment" and
		prescribed in the standard. R1.3.12 The statement made in the 13 March response is a correct
		statement. However, we do not understand the question, but do not believe the 13 March
		response answers the question. Since we do not understand the question, we do not know
		what an appropriate response would be.

Response: We thank you for your comment, which addresses R1.3.2 and R1.3.12. With regards to R1.3.2, we disagree with your statement that the Compliance Monitor does not determine whether an assessment is "valid." That is what its auditing of compliance requires.

However, an RE's obligation to determine whether an assessment is "valid" does not allow the RE to micromanage the assessments it reviews. For example, it cannot reject a corrective plan (e.g., the proposed construction of new facilities) because it believes another plan would be more cost effective. If the proposed corrective plan fulfills the standard's requirements, it is not reviewable by the RE.

British Columbia Transmission Corporation said it did not understand the question posed in R1.3.12. While it was in the interpretation, we have restated below:

Ameren also asks how the inclusion of planned outages should be interpreted with respect to the contingency definitions specified in Table 1 for Categories B and C. Specifically, Ameren asks if R1.3.12 requires that the system be planned to be operated during those conditions associated with planned outages consistent with the performance requirements described in Table 1 plus any unidentified outage.

2	Midwest ISO, Inc.	The Re-interpretation states in part: ** For studies that include planned outages, compliance
		with the contingency assessment for TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 as outlined in Table 1 would
		include any necessary system adjustments which might be required to accommodate planned
		outages since a planned outage is not a "contingency" as defined in the NERC Glossary of

Segment	Organization	Comment
		Terms Used in Standards. ** With regard to the revised interpretation, the Midwest ISO does
		not agree with the revised interpretation and at a minimum recommends the following
		modification in double quotation marks, for the reasons described below. For studies that
		include planned outages, compliance with the contingency assessment for TPL-002-0 and TPL-
		003-0 as outlined in Table 1 may include any necessary system adjustments which might be
		required to accommodate planned outages since a planned outage is not a "contingency" as
		defined in the NERC Glossary of Terms Used in Standards. ""In the alternative, if the PA or TP
		elected not to model in planning studies all available system adjustments and instead opted to
		upgrade the system to meet system performance, this would be acceptable under the
		requirements of the standard."" By stating that compliance would include any necessary system
		adjustments, this could be interpreted as non-compliance if in the discretion of the TP or PA,
		planning studies tested the system without applying all available system adjustments and
		therefore resulted in the construction of a more reliable system. It is inconceivable that NERC
		would judge an entity non-compliant with reliability standards for developing a more reliable
		system. Midwest ISO further believes strongly that the original interpretation was appropriate
		in articulating the discretion that TPs and PAs must have in planning their systems to be able to reasonably accommodate planned outages. Planning is performed years in advance in order
		that the system operator in real time will have a system that will perform reliably. All systems
		should be planned to be robust enough so that reasonable planned outages can be taken
		during typical maintenance periods (e.g. spring and fall) without the need for excessive
		redispatch or other operating steps merely to be able to withstand the next contingency. Large
		systems that include multiple separate sub-systems in close electrical proximity and with
		potentially redispatchable generation involving many different generation owners, must be
		planned to accommodate multiple planned outages on these adjoining systems. The Planning
		Authority over such a system must have the discretion to determine based on planning data
		and operating experience whether or not the interconnected system under its authority is
		robust enough to be able to take reasonable planned outages in several interconnected sub-
		systems with adequate reliability margin, and without having to resort to excessive redispatch
		or other operating steps in order to accommodate such planned outages. The PA may consider
		as excessive, for example, having to redispatch large amounts of base-load generation, or
		generation that does not belong to the entity taking the planned outage, or having to
		redispatch for a large number of separate possible planned outage conditions. The original
		interpretation appropriately supports this kind of discretion on the part of the PA.
		ts. The requested added language ("In the alternative, if the PA or TP elected not to model in
planning studies a	anning studies all available system adjustments and instead opted to upgrade the system to meet system performance, this would be	

planning studies all available system adjustments and instead opted to upgrade the system to meet system performance, this would be acceptable under the requirements of the standard.") is unacceptable for two reasons. First, our interpretation does not require "all available

Segment	Organization	Comment
		essary system adjustments which might be required to accommodate the planned outages."
Second, the alterr	native language addresses a	corrective plan (i.e., upgrade the system) and not the performance of the system. It is important
hat a standard no	ot comingle a corrective plan	with a performance requirement. The improper modeling of system adjustments is not made
acceptable by an i	upgrade that may not have I	peen required if system adjustments had been properly modeled.
3	Ameren Services	TPL-002-0 Requirement R.1.3.2 : Do Not Approve. The proposed interpretation of R1.3.2 does
	Company	not answer the following basic question with respect to the TPL standards: Does including
		contingent outages as part of the defined operating state exceed the contingency requirements
		specified in Table 1 of the TPL standards? Defining contingent outages in the assumed system
		operating state is not consistent with FAC or TPL standards. FAC-010 specifies in Requirement
		R2.1. In the pre-contingency state with all Facilities in service TPL-002-0 Requirement R1
		provides the general description for the reliability assessment of the system. R1 states that the
		system shall be studied under the contingency conditions as defined in Category B of Table 1.
		How does the interpretation address the inconsistency of modeling contingent outages as
		critical system conditions outside of Table 1? Could a Transmission Planner or Planning
		Coordinator (Authority) specify one or more contingent transmission facility outages in their
		critical system conditions? The contentious application of "critical system conditions" did not
		apply to the specification of a base case dispatch scenario. The Planning Coordinator performed
		a First Contingency Incremental Transfer Capability (FCITC) analysis which modeled non-firm
		transactions to replace contingent generation outages. Does compliance with TLP-002 require
		sufficient import capability to provide access to external generation capacity for which there are
		not explicit capacity or transmission reservations at the discretion of the Planning Coordinator?
		• FAC-012-1, Transfer Capability Methodology, requires that the Planning Coordinator
		(Authority) to document its current methodology used for developing its inter-regional and
		intra-regional Transfer Capabilities (Transfer Capability Methodology). Does this interpretation
		suggest that the Planning Coordinator has the requirement or responsibility to define a
		minimum level of transfer capability? Is it the intent of this interpretation that a Planning
		Coordinator's transfer capability methodology be applied to TPL standards compliance? • The
		draft interpretation states that the selection of a credible generation dispatch for modeling of
		critical system conditions is within the discretion of the Planning Coordinator: which of the
		current standards establishes a requirement that the Planning Coordinator develop a methodology to determine base case dispatch scenarios or gives the Planning Coordinator the
		authority to prescribe dispatch assumptions?
Deenemeet M/a +	hank you for your commont	s, which address R1.3.2. However, most of the questions posed go well beyond the subject

Response: We thank you for your comments, which address R1.3.2. However, most of the questions posed go well beyond the subject matter of the interpretation.

The term "critical system conditions" is undefined in TPL-002 and TPL-003, and the standard itself gives no basis for defining it. Neither does

Segment Organization

Comment

the Functional Model, a standards reference document, provide any guidance. While this is understandably what Ameren is seeking in their comments, our interpretation could not provide a direct answer. However, we were able to articulate a process for obtaining the specificity desired by Ameren, which we reiterate below.

The Functional Model language cited in the interpretation supports the Planning Coordinator's supervisory role in directing the coordination of the planning process, including the specification of any methodologies to be used by Transmission Planners in its area. Such authority is also implied by a common sense reading of the standard itself. Assume that the standard was written with the understanding that the Planning Coordinator *did not* have this authority. Each of its Transmission Planners would be free to make and adopt its own methods, and the Planning Coordinator's assessment as well as each Transmission Planner's assessment would be invalid on its face due solely to the lack of coordination. (Remember that M1 and M2 apply to both the Planning Coordinator *and* its Transmission Planners.)

As we stated in the interpretation "As the Compliance Monitor, the RE determines what a "valid assessment" means when evaluating studies based upon specific sub-requirements in R1.3 selected by the Planning Coordinator and the Transmission Planner. If a PC has Transmission Planners in more than one region, the REs must coordinate among themselves on compliance matters."

3	BC Hydro and Power Authority	Integrated system planning roles and responsibilities in British Columbia (BC) are under review.	
Response: No re	esponse is required.		
3	Consumers Energy	While the intent seems clear the following sentence from the last paragraph is not: "TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 explicitly provide that the inclusion of planned (including maintenance) outages of any bulk electric equipment at demand levels for which the planned outages are required." (What does the "are required" refer to, "inclusion" or "outages"?)	
		There appears to be a typographical error it the cited first sentence, and we will modify the first	
	sentence by inserting the phrase "performed is" as shown: "TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 explicitly provide that the inclusion of planned (including		
maintenance) outa	ages of any bulk electric equi	pment at demand levels for which the planned outages are performed is required.	
3	Manitoba Hydro	Manitoba Hydro agrees with the interpretation outlined in TPL-003-0 R1.3.12; however, Manitoba Hydro does not agree with the interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 R1.3.2. The standard puts the onus of defining critical system conditions on the PA/TP. The revised interpretation creates confusion as it is now unclear as to whether the PA/TP or RE as Compliance monitor is to determine the critical system conditions.	
Response: We thank you for your comments. We respectfully disagree with your conclusion regarding our interpretation of R1.3.2. The Planning Coordinator has the authority to specify "critical system conditions." As we stated in the interpretation "As the Compliance Monitor, the RE determines what a "valid assessment" means when evaluating studies based upon specific sub-requirements in R1.3 selected by the Planning Coordinator and the Transmission Planner. If a PC has Transmission Planners in more than one region, the REs must coordinate among themselves on compliance matters."			
3	MidAmerican Energy Co.	We believe the critical conditions for the Transmission Planner planning should be determined	

Segment	Organization	Comment
		by the Transmission Planner while we agree that the Planning Coordinator should determine
		the critical conditions for the Planning Coordinator's area.
Response: We the	nank you for your comment,	which addresses R1.3.2. However, the comment is illogical unless the Planning Coordinator and
the Transmission F	Planner are one and the sam	е.
3	Orlando Utilities Commission	AMEREN: 1.3.2: Recommend Affirmative vote. AMEREN: 1.3.12: Recommend Negative Vote. Comment: The revised interpretation left out the discretion on behalf of the TP or PC. The discretion of the TP and/or PC should remain part of the interpretation since it would be impractical to perform long term studies with every possible planned outage included. The discretion part allows the TP and/or the PC to include those outages that are of significant duration and not study those that are of short duration. There are other standards and practices under which outages are reviewed so that the system is operated reliability and mandated that additional study is done under the TPL standard for even a short outage is impractical and provides no reliability gain. To address our concern we recommend replacing the first sentence; "TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 explicitly provide that the inclusion of planned (including maintenance) outages of any bulk electric equipment at demand levels for which the planned outages are required." With the first sentence from the first interpretation: "TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 explicitly provide that the inclusion of planned (including maintenance) outages of any bulk electric equipment at demand levels for which the planned outages are performed
		are within the discretion of the Planning Authority/Transmission Planner." The second sentence
		is excellent and we agree that it addressed the question asked.
the Planning Coord requirement does	dinator or Transmission Plani not specify a method for the	We respectfully disagree that the consideration of planned outages is somehow discretionary by ner. R.1.3.12 is a requirement, and as such, cannot be optional or discretionary. However, the modeling of planned outages; such modeling methods are within the discretion of the Planning d those methods should be consistently used by all its Transmission Planners.
3	Salt River Project	R1.3.2. Cover critical system conditions and study years as deemed appropriate by the responsible entity. Although SRP agrees that the Planning Authority (PA) shall have the discretion in choosing the appropriate conditions to study for their system(s), we disagree with the language as stated. There is no definition of how or what a PA shall do in the "methodology." Methodology is not described in any Standard to this point. Therefore, how could compliance be measured? Methodology needs to be described or enumerated to be applied in Standards and for compliance. R1.3.12. Include the planned (including maintenance) outage of any bulk electric equipment (including protection systems or their components) at those demand levels for which planned (including maintenance) outages are performed. SRP agrees with the revised interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 R1.3.12 as developed by the NERC Planning Committee on March 12, 2008.
Response: We th	nank you for your comment.	We agree that a methodology for defining "critical system conditions" is not part of TPL-002

Segment	Organization	Comment
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	in the interpretation comes from the Functional Model language we cited, and that citation
		Transmission Plannersmethodologies and tools for the simulation of the transmission
system." We furth	ner state that a "PC's selectio	n of "critical system conditions" fall within the purview of "methodology." We use this citation to
establish the Plann	ning Coordinators authority for	or specifying "critical system conditions" which it determines are appropriate. The standards do
not require a meth	nodology and our interpretati	on does not require one.
3	Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Co.	The following revised interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.12 was developed by the NERC Planning Committee on March 13, 2008: TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 explicitly provide that the inclusion of planned (including maintenance) outages of any bulk electric equipment at demand levels for which the planned outages are required. For studies that include planned outages, compliance with the contingency assessment for TPL- 002-0 and TPL-003-0 as outlined in Table 1 would include any necessary system adjustments which might be required to accommodate planned outages since a planned outage is not a "contingency" as defined in the NERC Glossary of Terms Used in Standards. Vectren requests that consideration be given to change the verbiage; "include any necessary system adjustments" to include the word "reasonable" or some other similar word to limit the system adjustments. The suggested verbiage would then read "include any reasonable and necessary system adjustments". Vectren does not believe that the word "necessary" provides enough limitation to the adjustments that should be considered. If the system adjustment necessary to eliminate an overload caused by the planned outage combined with contingency assessment requires an unreasonable amount of generation redispatch or the dropping of firm load, there should be some ability for the
		Transmission Planner or the Planning Authority to make the determination that the adjustment is unreasonable and another remedy for the overload must be explored. Your consideration in
Bosponso: Mo H	hank you for your comment	this matter is appreciated. which addresses R1.3.12. We do not believe that the addition of the word "reasonable" has
additional interpre possible "necessar accomplish this go	tative value. The language p y system adjustment" prior t pal, nor do we believe it is rec	bosed by Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Co. is an attempt to remove load shedding as a o modeling a contingency assessment. We do not believe that the word "reasonable" will quired. It is not required because we do not believe that load shedding would ever be which might be required to accommodate planned outages" as our interpretation states.
Coordinator or Tra adjustment" for a	insmission Planner attempted	. It does not permit the loss of demand except as noted in footnote "b." If a Planning to "pass" TPL-002 by <i>a priori</i> load shedding under the guise of a "necessary system have shed load in order to comply with a standard that does not permit load shedding, and we to find it invalid.
3	Wisconsin Electric Power Marketing	We agree with the principle that the TP and TO needs to apply discretion to the contingent topology of the cases, but the actual wording in the standard does not seem to allow that discretion.

Segment	Organization	Comment
-	5 5	We believe that it is addressing our interpretation of R1.3.12, but are unsure. We do not state
that R1.3.12 is dis	scretionary in our revised inte	
4	Wisconsin Energy Corp.	We agree with the principle that the TP and TO needs to apply discretion to the contingent topology of the cases, but the actual wording in the standard does not seem to allow that discretion.
		We believe that it is addressing our interpretation of R1.3.12, but are unsure. We do not state
	scretionary in our revised inte	
5	City of Tallahassee	While I agree with the Revised Interpretation, I have to vote no because of the text before it that would gain teeth if this were approved. "As the Compliance Monitor, the RE determines what a "valid assessment" means when evaluating studies based upon specific sub-requirements in R1.3 selected by the Planning Coordinator and the Transmission Planner." The Standard does NOT state "that the Compliance Monitor (or RE) has to approve the 'valid assessment". The Assessment is up to the PC and TP. The text quoted above IMPLIES that the RE must approve the assessment. If that is the case, put in a standard change request. The RE can only check that the assessment exists. If they don't like it, they can make a recommendation to change it, but it is not a compliance issue. IF the text was true, I should be able to submit my assessment for evaluation without risking a compliance violation for asking for the approval that you imply is needed. The Compliance folks at the RE have told me that if we ask a question and it is a violation, we would get investigated and reported. I have to have an assessment (or procedure) and follow it, but the RE doesn't have to like it. If they don't like it, they can make a SUGGESTION, but not find non-compliance.
determine whether whether an assess plan (e.g., the pro-	er an assessment is "valid." T sment is "valid" does not allo pposed construction of new fa	With regards to R1.3.2, we disagree with your statement that the Compliance Monitor does not that is what its auditing of compliance requires. However, an RE's obligation to determine w the RE to micromanage the assessments it reviews. For example, it cannot reject a corrective inclusion because it believes another plan would be more cost effective. If the proposed nts, it is not reviewable by the RE.
5	City Water, Light & Power of Springfield	The interpretation states that "The selection of a credible generation dispatch for the modeling under critical system conditions is within the direction of the Planning Authority." Under the proposed Version 4 of the NERC Functional Model, there is no longer a Planning Authority/Planning Coordinator. This interpretation means nothing if there is no longer a Planning Authority/Planning Coordinator.
		Version 4 of the Functional Model is not approved; in fact, it was just posted for public
	e results have not yet been re	
5	Dominion Energy	The original interpretation put the responsibility of determining the critical system condition on

Segment	Organization	Comment
		both the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner. Local Transmission Owners should retain the ability to have internal planning criteria for their local systems and are not precluded from doing so by the Functional Model, Version 3. This interpretation appears to preclude that and would remove the Transmission Planner as a responsible party in determining this critical system condition.
criteria than requi	ired by a standard. That is a	5. Our interpretation does not preclude a Transmission Planner from adopting stricter planning ny Transmission Planner's prerogative. However, with regard to the assumptions for critical or's area <i>associated with compliance with a NERC standard</i> , those are formulated by the Planning
5	Manitoba Hydro	Manitoba Hydro agrees with the interpretation outlined in TPL-003-0 R1.3.12; however, Manitoba Hydro does not agree with the interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 R1.3.2. The standard puts the onus of defining critical system conditions on the PA/TP. The revised interpretation creates confusion as it is now unclear as to whether the PA/TP or RE as Compliance monitor is to determine the critical system conditions.
Planning Coordina the RE determine Planning Coordina	ator has the authority to spec s what a "valid assessment"	s. We respectfully disagree with your conclusion regarding our interpretation of R1.3.2. The cify "critical system conditions." As we stated in the interpretation "As the Compliance Monitor, means when evaluating studies based upon specific sub-requirements in R1.3 selected by the anner. If a PC has Transmission Planners in more than one region, the REs must coordinate
5	Salt River Project	R1.3.2. Cover critical system conditions and study years as deemed appropriate by the responsible entity. Although SRP agrees that the Planning Authority (PA) shall have the discretion in choosing the appropriate conditions to study for their system(s), we disagree with the language as stated. There is no definition of how or what a PA shall do in the "methodology". Methodology is not described in any Standard to this point. Therefore, how could compliance be measured? Methodology needs to be described or enumerated to be applied in Standards and for compliance. R.3.12. Include the planned (including maintenance) outage of any bulk electric equipment (including protection systems or their components) at those demand levels for which planned (including maintenance) outages are performed. SRP agrees with the revised interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 R1.3.12 as developed by the NERC Planning Committee on March 12, 2008.
	hank you for your comment. ity cannot be provided by an	What Salt River Project is seeking is a greater specificity in R1.3.2 and R1.3.12. However, such interpretation
5	Southern California Edison Co.	Interpretation. Interpretation of R1.3.2 addresses the question raised by Ameren. Interpretation R1.3.12 does not fully address question posed by Ameren which led to some discussion during our internal review process.

Segment	Organization	Comment
Response: We d	cannot respond to this comm	ent since no specific reason was given.
5	Wisconsin Electric Power Co.	We agree with the principle that the TP and TO needs to apply discretion to the contingent topology of the cases, but the actual wording in the standard does not seem to allow that discretion.
	hank you for your comment. scretionary in our revised inte	We believe that it is addressing our interpretation of R1.3.12, but are unsure. We do not state protection.
6	Dominion Resources, Inc.	We do not support the removal of Transmission Planner.
	cannot respond to the commented provide a reason.	ent because we do not understand what part of the interpretation the comment references. In
6	Manitoba Hydro	Manitoba Hydro agrees with the interpretation outlined in TPL-003-0 R1.3.12; however, Manitoba Hydro does not agree with the interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 R1.3.2. The standard puts the onus of defining critical system conditions on the PA/TP. The revised interpretation creates confusion as it is now unclear as to whether the PA/TP or RE as Compliance monitor is to determine the critical system conditions.
Planning Coordina the RE determines Planning Coordina	ator has the authority to spec s what a "valid assessment" r	. We respectfully disagree with your conclusion regarding our interpretation of R1.3.2. The ify "critical system conditions." As we stated in the interpretation "As the Compliance Monitor, means when evaluating studies based upon specific sub-requirements in R1.3 selected by the nner. If a PC has Transmission Planners in more than one region, the REs must coordinate
6	Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Co.	The following revised interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.12 was developed by the NERC Planning Committee on March 13, 2008: TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 explicitly provide that the inclusion of planned (including maintenance) outages of any bulk electric equipment at demand levels for which the planned outages are required. For studies that include planned outages, compliance with the contingency assessment for TPL- 002-0 and TPL-003-0 as outlined in Table 1 would include any necessary system adjustments which might be required to accommodate planned outages since a planned outage is not a "contingency" as defined in the NERC Glossary of Terms Used in Standards. Vectren requests that consideration be given to change the verbiage; "include any necessary system adjustments" to include the word "reasonable" or some other similar word to limit the system adjustments. The suggested verbiage would then read "include any reasonable and necessary system adjustments". Vectren does not believe that the word "necessary" provides enough limitation to the adjustments that should be considered. If the system adjustment necessary to eliminate an overload caused by the planned outage combined with contingency assessment requires an unreasonable amount of generation redispatch or the dropping of firm load, there should be some ability for the Transmission Planner or the Planning Authority to make the determination that the adjustment

Segment	Organization	Comment
		is unreasonable and another remedy for the overload must be explored. Your consideration in
		this matter is appreciated.
additional interpre possible "necessar accomplish this go considered a "nece	tative value. The language pry system adjustment" prior to bal, nor do we believe it is re- essary system adjustments v	which addresses R1.3.12. We do not believe that the addition of the word "reasonable" has bosed by Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Co. is an attempt to remove load shedding as a o modeling a contingency assessment. We do not believe that the word "reasonable" will quired. It is not required because we do not believe that load shedding would ever be which might be required to accommodate planned outages" as our interpretation states.
		d to "pass" TPL-002 by <i>a priori</i> load shedding under the guise of a "necessary system
adjustment" for a		ve shed load in order to comply with a standard that does not permit load shedding, and we
9	Commonwealth of	The interpretation says "Planning Authority/Transmission Provider". The "and/or" can be read
	Massachusetts	as either an "and" or an "or'. The difference is that the entities have to either come to a mutual
	Department of Public	agreement or can make independent assessments. Although it is thought that it will generally
	Utilities	be a mutual decision, we think this is an issue that the two entities can work out how they
		address and doesn't need to be dictated by the standard. Therefore we think the interpretation
		should have the "and/or" replaced with an "or".
Response: We t interpretation.	hank you for your comment,	but it appears that your comment refers to the original interpretation of R1.3.2, not our revised