

## Energy Emergency Alert 3 Report Template

Instructions:

To be submitted to [disturbance.reports@peakrc.com](mailto:disturbance.reports@peakrc.com) within two business days of the incident per Attachment 1-EOP-002 Energy Emergency Alerts section B 3.6 Reporting:

*Any time an Alert 3 is declared, the Energy Deficient Entity shall submit the report enclosed in this Attachment to its respective Reliability Coordinator within two business days of downgrading or termination of the alert. Upon receiving the report, the Reliability Coordinator shall review it for completeness and immediately forward it to the NERC staff for posting on the NERC website. The Reliability Coordinator shall present this report to the Reliability Coordinator Working Group at its next scheduled meeting.*

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### Energy Emergency Alert 3 Report

A Deficient Balancing Authority or Load Serving Entity declaring an Energy Emergency Alert 3 must complete the following report. Upon completion of this report, it is to be sent to the Reliability Coordinator for review within two business days of the incident.

#### Requesting Balancing Authority:

California Independent System Operator (CISO) is the BAA for the San Diego Gas & Electric (SDGE) service territory. The Peak RC declared an EEA-3 for SDGE, the CISO did not request the declaration.

#### Entity experiencing energy deficiency (if different from Balancing Authority):

As stated above, the Peak RC determined SDGE was the deficient entity.

#### Date/Time Implemented:

9/20/2015 at 1305 pacific daylight time (PDT) (Per WECCnet message)

#### Date/Time Released:

9/20/2015 by 1501 pacific daylight time (PDT) (Per WECCnet message)

#### Declared Deficiency Amount (MW):

. The Peak RC issued a Reliability Directive to the CISO to shed 150 MW firm load in the SDGE area because the SDGE Import Limit was above 95%, but less than 100%, of the limit calculated by Peak RC ROSE Voltage Stability Analysis (VSA) tool. The SDGE Import Limit is an IROL.

**Total energy supplied by other Balancing Authority during the Alert 3 period:**

The CISO BAA was not energy deficient.

**Conditions that precipitated call for “Energy Deficiency Alert 3”:**

At approximately 11:46 PDT Otay Mesa 1X3 combined cycle generating station come off line due to emissions issues. Plant loading prior to this time was approximately 490 MW (at approximately 11:31)

This situation coupled with the increasing load in San Diego, result in area import approaching/ exceeding 95% IROL limit. Peak RC issued a Reliability Directive at 13:02 to the ISO to shed 150 MW firm load in the San Diego area by 13:12 and declared an EEA-3; ISO called on available San Diego area interruptible load (approximately 18 MW) and directed SDGE to shed 150 MW of firm load.

**If “Energy Deficiency Alert 3” had not been called, would firm load be cut? If no, explain:**

The load was shed based on exceeding 95% of the SDGE Import Limit per the Peak RC VSA tool and the resultant Reliability Directive from the Peak RC. The ISO BAA was not energy deficient at the time and did not request an EEA-3.

**Explain what action was taken in each step to avoid calling for “Energy Deficiency Alert 3”:**

- 1. All generation capable of being on line in the time frame of the energy deficiency was on line (including quick start and peaking units) without regard to cost.**

Multiple units were ordered on line in the SDGE area in response to the loss of Otay Mesa generating station.

- 2. All firm and nonfirm purchases were made regardless of cost.**

The ISO BAA was not energy deficient, generation requirement was locational (SDGE area) import energy into the SDGE area would compound the problem.

- 3. All nonfirm sales were recalled within provisions of the sale agreement.**

The CISO BAA was not energy deficient.

- 4. Interruptible load was curtailed where either advance notice restrictions were met or the interruptible load was considered part of spinning reserve.**

ISO called upon available interruptible load in SDG&E area which was approximately 18 MW

5. Available load reduction programs were exercised (public appeals, voltage reductions, etc.).  
Public appeals in the SDGE service territory were not implemented due to the sudden nature of this event (loss of Otay Mesa generating station).

6. Operating Reserves being utilized.  
Generation in the SDGE area was increased, the ISO BAA did not deploy system wide contingency reserves

Comments:

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