

May 12, 2020

VIA ELECTRONIC FILING

Michael Law
President and Chief Executive Officer
Alberta Electric System Operator
2500, 330 - 5 Avenue SW
Calgary, Alberta
T2P 0L4

RE: *North American Electric Reliability Corporation*

Dear Mr. Law:

The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (“NERC”) hereby submits Notice of Filing of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation of Erratum to Reliability Standard TPL-001-5. NERC requests, to the extent necessary, a waiver of any applicable filing requirements with respect to this filing.

NERC understands the AESO may adopt the proposed reliability standards subject to Alberta legislation, principally as established in the *Transmission Regulation* (“the T Reg.”). Briefly, it is NERC’s understanding that the T Reg. requires the following with regard to the adoption in Alberta of a NERC Reliability Standard:

1. The AESO must consult with those market participants that it considers are likely to be directly affected.
2. The AESO must forward the proposed reliability standards to the Alberta Utilities Commission for review, along with the AESO’s recommendation that the Commission approve or reject them.
3. The Commission must follow the recommendation of the AESO that the Commission approve or reject the proposed reliability standards unless an interested person satisfies the Commission that the AESO’s recommendation is “technically deficient” or “not in the public interest.”

Further, NERC has been advised by the AESO that the AESO practice with respect to the adoption of a NERC Reliability Standard includes a review of the NERC Reliability Standard for applicability to Alberta legislation and electric industry practice. NERC has been advised that, while the objective is to adhere as closely as possible to the requirements of the NERC Reliability Standard, each NERC Reliability

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Standard approved in Alberta (called an “Alberta reliability standard”) generally varies from the similar and related NERC Reliability Standard.

NERC requests the AESO consider the adoption of Erratum to Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 as set forth in the filing in Alberta as an “Alberta reliability standard(s),” subject to the required procedures and legislation of Alberta.

Please contact the undersigned if you have any questions concerning this filing.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Lauren Perotti

Lauren Perotti
*Senior Counsel for the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation*

Enclosure

**BEFORE THE
ALBERTA ELECTRIC SYSTEM OPERATOR**

**NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC)
RELIABILITY CORPORATION)**

**NOTICE OF FILING OF THE
NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION OF ERRATUM TO
RELIABILITY STANDARD TPL-001-5**

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	NOTICES AND COMMUNICATIONS	2
II.	BACKGROUND.....	2
III.	ERRATUM	3
IV.	CONCLUSION	Error! Bookmark not defined.

Exhibit A: Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-001-5.1 (clean)

Exhibit B: Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-001-5.1 (redline to TPL-001-5)

**BEFORE THE
ALBERTA ELECTRIC SYSTEM OPERATOR**

**NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC)
RELIABILITY CORPORATION)**

**NOTICE OF FILING OF THE
NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION OF ERRATUM TO
RELIABILITY STANDARD TPL-001-5**

The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (“NERC”) hereby submits an erratum to Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 — Transmission System Planning Performance Requirements. Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 was submitted on December 14, 2018.

Consistent with NERC’s Reliability Standards numbering convention, the proposed errata version is numbered Reliability Standard TPL-001-5.1. **Exhibit A** consists of a clean version of the proposed Reliability Standard and **Exhibit B** shows the proposed redline change.

I. NOTICES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Notices and communications with respect to this filing may be addressed to the following:

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II. BACKGROUND

On December 14, 2018, NERC submitted a Notice of Filing of Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 — Transmission System Planning Performance Requirements, the associated implementation plan, violation risk factors and violation severity levels, and the retirement of currently effective Reliability Standard TPL-001-4.¹ Under the approved implementation plan, where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is 36 months after the effective date of the applicable governmental authority’s order approving the standard, or as otherwise provided by the applicable governmental authority. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is 36 months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees, or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction. There are later phased-in compliance dates for certain requirements.

¹ *Notice of Filing of NERC for Approval of Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-001-5*, (December 7, 2018) [TPL-001-5 Filing].

NERC has since identified an error in Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 Requirement R2, Part 2.7; specifically, a cross-reference had not been updated when the referenced Requirement Part was revised. Pursuant to Section 12.0 of the NERC *Standard Processes Manual*,² the NERC Standards Committee agreed on April 22, 2020 that the correction could be made under the process for correcting errata.

III. ERRATUM

Among other revisions, Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 revised Requirement R2, Part 2.1. The revisions included: (i) deleting Part 2.1.3 of TPL-001-4; (ii) renumbering Part 2.1.4, relating to sensitivity analysis, to Part 2.1.3; and (iii) adding a new Part 2.1.4.³ In Requirement R2, Part 2.7, however, the reference to Requirement R2, Part 2.1.4 was not updated to reflect the renumbering of this Requirement Part in TPL-001-5.

As written, Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 Requirement R2, Part 2.7 references Requirements R2, Parts 2.1.4 and 2.4.3. Requirement R2, Part 2.7 should instead reference Requirement R2, Parts 2.1.3 and 2.4.3, which are the two Requirement R2 Parts in TPL-001-5 that refer to sensitivity cases. The proposed erratum is shown below:

-
- 2.7.** For planning events shown in Table 1, when the analysis indicates an inability of the System to meet the performance requirements in Table 1, the Planning Assessment shall include Corrective Action Plan(s) addressing how the performance requirements will be met. Revisions to the Corrective Action Plan(s) are allowed in subsequent Planning Assessments, but the planned System shall continue to meet the performance requirements in Table 1. Corrective Action Plan(s) do not need to be developed solely to meet the performance requirements for a single sensitivity case analyzed in accordance with Requirements R2, Parts 2.1.4~~3~~ and 2.4.3. The Corrective Action Plan(s) shall:

² The NERC *Standard Processes Manual*, Appendix 3A to the NERC Rules of Procedure, is available at https://www.nerc.com/comm/SC/Documents/Appendix_3A_StandardsProcessesManual.pdf.

³ See TPL-001-5 Filing, *supra*, at 27-28 and Exhibit A (redline of TPL-001-5 to TPL-001-4).

Correction of this cross-reference is necessary to avoid potential confusion regarding the “single sensitivity case[s]” for which Corrective Action Plans need not be developed in Reliability Standard TPL-001-5.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Lauren A. Perotti

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May 12, 2020

Exhibit A

Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-001-5.1 (clean)

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Transmission System Planning Performance Requirements
2. **Number:** TPL-001-5
3. **Purpose:** Establish Transmission system planning performance requirements within the planning horizon to develop a Bulk Electric System (BES) that will operate reliably over a broad spectrum of System conditions and following a wide range of probable Contingencies.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. **Functional Entity**
 - Planning Coordinator.
 - Transmission Planner.
5. **Effective Date:** See Implementation Plan.

B. Requirements and Measures

- R1. Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall maintain System models within its respective area for performing the studies needed to complete its Planning Assessment. The models shall use data consistent with that provided in accordance with the MOD-032 standard, supplemented by other sources as needed, including items represented in the Corrective Action Plan, and shall represent projected System conditions. This establishes Category P0 as the normal System condition in Table 1. *[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
 - 1.1. System models shall represent:
 - 1.1.1. Existing Facilities.
 - 1.1.2. New planned Facilities and changes to existing Facilities.
 - 1.1.3. Real and reactive Load forecasts.
 - 1.1.4. Known commitments for Firm Transmission Service and Interchange.
 - 1.1.5. Resources (supply or demand side) required for Load.
- M1. Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall provide evidence, in electronic or hard copy format, that it is maintaining System models within its respective area, using data consistent with MOD-032, including items represented in the Corrective Action Plan, representing projected System conditions, and that the models represent the required information in accordance with Requirement R1.
- R2. Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall prepare an annual Planning Assessment of its portion of the BES. This Planning Assessment shall use current or qualified past studies (as indicated in Requirement R2, Part 2.6), document assumptions, and document summarized results of the steady state analyses, short

circuit analyses, and Stability analyses. *[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*

- 2.1.** For the Planning Assessment, the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon portion of the steady state analysis shall be assessed annually and be supported by current annual studies or qualified past studies as indicated in Requirement R2, Part 2.6. Qualifying studies need to include the following conditions:
- 2.1.1.** System peak Load for either Year One or year two, and for year five.
- 2.1.2.** System Off-Peak Load for one of the five years.
- 2.1.3.** For each of the studies described in Requirement R2, Parts 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, sensitivity case(s) shall be utilized to demonstrate the impact of changes to the basic assumptions used in the model. To accomplish this, the sensitivity analysis in the Planning Assessment must vary one or more of the following conditions by a sufficient amount to stress the System within a range of credible conditions that demonstrate a measurable change in System response :
- Real and reactive forecasted Load.
 - Expected transfers.
 - Expected in service dates of new or modified Transmission Facilities.
 - Reactive resource capability.
 - Generation additions, retirements, or other dispatch scenarios.
 - Controllable Loads and Demand Side Management.
 - Duration or timing of known Transmission outages.
- 2.1.4.** When known outage(s) of generation or Transmission Facility(ies) are planned in the Near-Term Planning Horizon, the impact of selected known outages on System performance shall be assessed. These known outage(s) shall be selected for assessment consistent with a documented outage coordination procedure or technical rationale by the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner. Known outage(s) shall not be excluded solely based upon outage duration. The assessment shall be performed for the P0 and P1 categories identified in Table 1 with the System peak or Off-Peak conditions that the System is expected to experience when the known outage(s) are planned. This assessment shall include, at a minimum known outages expected to produce more severe System impacts on the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner’s portion of the BES. Past or current studies may support the selection of known outage(s), if the study(s) has comparable post-Contingency System conditions and

configuration such as those following P3 or P6 category events in Table 1.

- 2.1.5.** When an entity's spare equipment strategy could result in the unavailability of major Transmission equipment that has a lead time of one year or more (such as a transformer), the impact of this possible unavailability on System performance shall be assessed. Based upon this assessment, an analysis shall be performed for the P0, P1, and P2 categories identified in Table 1 with the conditions that the System is expected to experience during the possible unavailability of the long lead time equipment.
- 2.2.** For the Planning Assessment, the Long-Term Transmission Planning Horizon portion of the steady state analysis shall be assessed annually and be supported by the following annual current study, supplemented with qualified past studies as indicated in Requirement R2, Part 2.6:

 - 2.2.1.** A current study assessing expected System peak Load conditions for one of the years in the Long-Term Transmission Planning Horizon and the rationale for why that year was selected.
- 2.3.** The short circuit analysis portion of the Planning Assessment shall be conducted annually addressing the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon and can be supported by current or past studies as qualified in Requirement R2, Part 2.6. The analysis shall be used to determine whether circuit breakers have interrupting capability for Faults that they will be expected to interrupt using the System short circuit model with any planned generation and Transmission Facilities in service which could impact the study area.
- 2.4.** For the Planning Assessment, the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon portion of the Stability analysis shall be assessed annually and be supported by current or past studies as qualified in Requirement R2, Part 2.6. The following studies are required:

 - 2.4.1.** System peak Load for one of the five years. System peak Load levels shall include a Load model which represents the expected dynamic behavior of Loads that could impact the study area, considering the behavior of induction motor Loads. An aggregate System Load model which represents the overall dynamic behavior of the Load is acceptable.
 - 2.4.2.** System Off-Peak Load for one of the five years.
 - 2.4.3.** For each of the studies described in Requirement R2, Parts 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, sensitivity case(s) shall be utilized to demonstrate the impact of changes to the basic assumptions used in the model. To accomplish this, the sensitivity analysis in the Planning Assessment must vary one or more of the following conditions by a sufficient amount to stress

the System within a range of credible conditions that demonstrate a measurable change in performance:

- Load level, Load forecast, or dynamic Load model assumptions.
- Expected transfers.
- Expected in service dates of new or modified Transmission Facilities.
- Reactive resource capability.
- Generation additions, retirements, or other dispatch scenarios.

2.4.4. When known outage(s) of generation or Transmission Facility(ies) are planned in the Near-Term Planning Horizon, the impact of selected known outages on System performance shall be assessed. These known outage(s) shall be selected for assessment consistent with a documented outage coordination procedure or technical rationale by the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner. Known outage(s) shall not be excluded solely based upon outage duration. The assessment shall be performed for the P1 categories identified in Table 1 with the System peak or Off-Peak conditions that the System is expected to experience when the known outage(s) are planned. This assessment shall include, at a minimum, those known outages expected to produce more severe System impacts on the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner's portion of the BES. Past or current studies may support the selection of known outage(s), if the study(s) has comparable post-Contingency System conditions and configuration such as those following P3 or P6 category events in Table 1.

2.4.5. When an entity's spare equipment strategy could result in the unavailability of major Transmission equipment that has a lead time of one year or more (such as a transformer), the impact of this possible unavailability on System performance shall be assessed. Based upon this assessment, an analysis shall be performed for the selected P1 and P2 category events identified in Table 1 for which the unavailability is expected to produce more severe System impacts on its portion of the BES. The analysis shall simulate the conditions that the System is expected to experience during the possible unavailability of the long lead time equipment.

2.5. For the Planning Assessment, the Long-Term Transmission Planning Horizon portion of the Stability analysis shall be assessed to address the impact of proposed material generation additions or changes in that timeframe and be supported by current or past studies as qualified in Requirement R2, Part 2.6 and shall include documentation to support the technical rationale for determining material changes.

- 2.6.** Past studies may be used to support the Planning Assessment if they meet the following requirements:
- 2.6.1.** For steady state, short circuit, or Stability analysis: the study shall be five calendar years old or less, unless a technical rationale can be provided to demonstrate that the results of an older study are still valid.
 - 2.6.2.** For steady state, short circuit, or Stability analysis: no material changes have occurred to the System represented in the study. Documentation to support the technical rationale for determining material changes shall be included.
- 2.7.** For planning events shown in Table 1, when the analysis indicates an inability of the System to meet the performance requirements in Table 1, the Planning Assessment shall include Corrective Action Plan(s) addressing how the performance requirements will be met. Revisions to the Corrective Action Plan(s) are allowed in subsequent Planning Assessments, but the planned System shall continue to meet the performance requirements in Table 1. Corrective Action Plan(s) do not need to be developed solely to meet the performance requirements for a single sensitivity case analyzed in accordance with Requirements R2, Parts 2.1.3 and 2.4.3. The Corrective Action Plan(s) shall:
- 2.7.1.** List System deficiencies and the associated actions needed to achieve required System performance. Examples of such actions include:
 - Installation, modification, retirement, or removal of Transmission and generation Facilities and any associated equipment.
 - Installation, modification, or removal of Protection Systems or Remedial Action Schemes.
 - Installation or modification of automatic generation tripping as a response to a single or multiple Contingency to mitigate Stability performance violations.
 - Installation or modification of manual and automatic generation runback/tripping as a response to a single or multiple Contingency to mitigate steady state performance violations.
 - Use of Operating Procedures specifying how long they will be needed as part of the Corrective Action Plan.
 - Use of rate applications, DSM, new technologies, or other initiatives.
 - 2.7.2.** Include actions to resolve performance deficiencies identified in multiple sensitivity studies or provide a rationale for why actions were not necessary.

evaluation of possible actions designed to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the consequences and adverse impacts of the event(s) shall be conducted.

- 3.3.** Contingency analyses for Requirement R3, Parts 3.1 and 3.2 shall:
 - 3.3.1.** Simulate the removal of all elements that the Protection System and other automatic controls are expected to disconnect for each Contingency without operator intervention. The analyses shall include the impact of subsequent:
 - 3.3.1.1.** Tripping of generators where simulations show generator bus voltages or high side of the generation step up (GSU) voltages are less than known or assumed minimum generator steady state or ride through voltage limitations. Include in the assessment any assumptions made.
 - 3.3.1.2.** Tripping of Transmission elements where relay loadability limits are exceeded.
 - 3.3.2.** Simulate the expected automatic operation of existing and planned devices designed to provide steady state control of electrical system quantities when such devices impact the study area. These devices may include equipment such as phase-shifting transformers, load tap changing transformers, and switched capacitors and inductors.
 - 3.4.** Those planning events in Table 1 that are expected to produce more severe System impacts on its portion of the BES shall be identified, and a list of those Contingencies to be evaluated for System performance in Requirement R3, Part 3.1 created. The rationale for those Contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information.
 - 3.4.1.** The Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner shall coordinate with adjacent Planning Coordinators and Transmission Planners to ensure that Contingencies on adjacent Systems which may impact their Systems are included in the Contingency list.
 - 3.5.** Those extreme events in Table 1 that are expected to produce more severe System impacts shall be identified and a list created of those events to be evaluated in Requirement R3, Part 3.2. The rationale for those Contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information.
- M3.** Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall provide dated evidence, such as electronic or hard copies of the studies utilized in preparing the Planning Assessment, in accordance with Requirement R3.
- R4.** For the Stability portion of the Planning Assessment, as described in Requirement R2, Parts 2.4 and 2.5, each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall perform the Contingency analyses listed in Table 1. The studies shall be based on computer simulation models using data provided in Requirement R1. *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*

- 4.1.** Studies shall be performed for planning events to determine whether the BES meets the performance requirements in Table 1 based on the Contingency list created in Requirement R4, Part 4.4.
 - 4.1.1.** For planning event P1: No generating unit shall pull out of synchronism. A generator being disconnected from the System by fault clearing action or by a Remedial Action Scheme is not considered pulling out of synchronism.
 - 4.1.2.** For planning events P2 through P7: When a generator pulls out of synchronism in the simulations, the resulting apparent impedance swings shall not result in the tripping of any Transmission system elements other than the generating unit and its directly connected Facilities.
 - 4.1.3.** For planning events P1 through P7: Power oscillations shall exhibit acceptable damping as established by the Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner.
- 4.2.** Studies shall be performed to assess the impact of the extreme events which are identified by the list created in Requirement R4, Part 4.5. If the analysis concludes there is Cascading caused by the occurrence of extreme events, an evaluation of possible actions designed to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the consequences of the event (s) shall be conducted.
- 4.3.** Contingency analyses for Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 and 4.2 shall :
 - 4.3.1.** Simulate the removal of all elements that the Protection System and other automatic controls are expected to disconnect for each Contingency without operator intervention. The analyses shall include the impact of subsequent:
 - 4.3.1.1.** Successful high speed (less than one second) reclosing and unsuccessful high speed reclosing into a Fault where high speed reclosing is utilized.
 - 4.3.1.2.** Tripping of generators where simulations show generator bus voltages or high side of the GSU voltages are less than known or assumed generator low voltage ride through capability. Include in the assessment any assumptions made.
 - 4.3.1.3.** Tripping of Transmission lines and transformers where transient swings cause Protection System operation based on generic or actual relay models.
 - 4.3.2.** Simulate the expected automatic operation of existing and planned devices designed to provide dynamic control of electrical system quantities when such devices impact the study area. These devices may include equipment such as generation exciter control and power

system stabilizers, static var compensators, power flow controllers, and DC Transmission controllers.

- 4.4.** Those planning events in Table 1 that are expected to produce more severe System impacts on its portion of the BES, shall be identified, and a list created of those Contingencies to be evaluated in Requirement R4, Part 4.1. The rationale for those Contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information.
 - 4.4.1.** Each Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner shall coordinate with adjacent Planning Coordinators and Transmission Planners to ensure that Contingencies on adjacent Systems which may impact their Systems are included in the Contingency list.
- 4.5.** Those extreme events in Table 1 that are expected to produce more severe System impacts shall be identified and a list created of those events to be evaluated in Requirement R4, Part 4.2. The rationale for those Contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information.
- M4.** Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall provide dated evidence, such as electronic or hard copies of the studies utilized in preparing the Planning Assessment in accordance with Requirement R4.
- R5.** Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall have criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage limits, post-Contingency voltage deviations, and the transient voltage response for its System. For transient voltage response, the criteria shall at a minimum, specify a low voltage level and a maximum length of time that transient voltages may remain below that level. *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- M5.** Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall provide dated evidence such as electronic or hard copies of the documentation specifying the criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage limits, post-Contingency voltage deviations, and the transient voltage response for its System in accordance with Requirement R5.
- R6.** Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall define and document, within their Planning Assessment, the criteria or methodology used in the analysis to identify System instability for conditions such as Cascading, voltage instability, or uncontrolled islanding. *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- M6.** Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall provide dated evidence, such as electronic or hard copies of documentation specifying the criteria or methodology used in the analysis to identify System instability for conditions such as Cascading, voltage instability, or uncontrolled islanding that was utilized in preparing the Planning Assessment in accordance with Requirement R6.
- R7.** Each Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with each of its Transmission Planners, shall determine and identify each entity's individual and joint responsibilities for

performing the required studies for the Planning Assessment. *[Violation Risk Factor: Low] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*

- M7.** Each Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with each of its Transmission Planners, shall provide dated documentation on roles and responsibilities, such as meeting minutes, agreements, and e-mail correspondence that identifies that agreement has been reached on individual and joint responsibilities for performing the required studies and Assessments in accordance with Requirement R7.
- R8.** Each Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner shall distribute its Planning Assessment results to adjacent Planning Coordinators and adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completing its Planning Assessment, and to any functional entity that has a reliability related need and submits a written request for the information within 30 days of such a request. *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
 - 8.1.** If a recipient of the Planning Assessment results provides documented comments on the results, the respective Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- M8.** Each Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner shall provide evidence, such as email notices, documentation of updated web pages, postal receipts showing recipient and date; or a demonstration of a public posting, that it has distributed its Planning Assessment results to adjacent Planning Coordinators and adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 days of having completed its Planning Assessment, and to any functional entity who has indicated a reliability need within 30 days of a written request and that the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner has provided a documented response to comments received on Planning Assessment results within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments in accordance with Requirement R8.

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority: “Compliance Enforcement Authority” means NERC or the Regional Entity, or any entity as otherwise designated by an Applicable Governmental Authority, in their respective roles of monitoring and/or enforcing compliance with mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards in their respective jurisdictions.

1.2. Evidence Retention: The following evidence retention period(s) identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full-time period since the last audit.

The applicable entity shall keep data identified in Measures M1 through M8 or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

- Each Responsible Entity shall retain evidence of each requirement in this standard for three calendar years.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program: As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, “Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program” refers to the identification of the processes that will be used to evaluate data or information for the purpose of assessing performance or outcomes with the associated Reliability Standard.

1.4. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Timeframe:

Not applicable.

1.5. Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Processes:

- Compliance Audits
- Self-Certifications
- Spot Checks
- Compliance Violation Investigations
- Self-Report
- Complaints

1.6. Additional Compliance Information

None.

Violation Severity Levels

R #	Violation Severity Levels			
	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1.	The responsible entity's System model failed to represent one of the Requirement R1, Parts 1.1.1 through 1.1.5.	The responsible entity's System model failed to represent two of the Requirement R1, Parts 1.1.1 through 1.1.5.	The responsible entity's System model failed to represent three of the Requirement R1, Parts 1.1.1 through 1.1.5.	The responsible entity's System model failed to represent four or more of the Requirement R1, Parts 1.1.1 through 1.1.5. OR The responsible entity's System model did not represent projected System conditions as described in Requirement R1. OR The responsible entity's System model did not use data consistent with that provided in accordance with the MOD-032 standard and other sources, including items represented in the Corrective Action Plan.
R2.	The responsible entity failed to comply with Requirement R2, Part 2.6.	The responsible entity failed to comply with Requirement R2, Part 2.3 or Part 2.8.	The responsible entity failed to comply with one of the following Parts of Requirement R2: Part 2.1,	The responsible entity failed to comply with two or more of the following Parts of

R #	Violation Severity Levels			
	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			Part 2.2, Part 2.4, Part 2.5, or Part 2.7.	Requirement R2: Part 2.1, Part 2.2, Part 2.4, or Part 2.7. OR The responsible entity does not have a completed annual Planning Assessment.
R3.	The responsible entity did not identify planning events as described in Requirement R3, Part 3.4 or extreme events as described in Requirement R3, Part 3.5.	The responsible entity did not perform studies as specified in Requirement R3, Part 3.1 to determine that the BES meets the performance requirements for one of the categories (P2 through P7) in Table 1. OR The responsible entity did not perform studies as specified in Requirement R3, Part 3.2 to assess the impact of extreme events.	The responsible entity did not perform studies as specified in Requirement R3, Part 3.1 to determine that the BES meets the performance requirements for two of the categories (P2 through P7) in Table 1. OR The responsible entity did not perform Contingency analysis as described in Requirement R3, Part 3.3.	The responsible entity did not perform studies as specified in Requirement R3, Part 3.1 to determine that the BES meets the performance requirements for three or more of the categories (P2 through P7) in Table 1. OR The responsible entity did not perform studies to determine that the BES meets the performance requirements for the P0 or P1 categories in Table 1. OR

R #	Violation Severity Levels			
	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
				The responsible entity did not base its studies on computer simulation models using data provided in Requirement R1.
R4.	The responsible entity did not identify planning events as described in Requirement R4, Part 4.4 or extreme events as described in Requirement R4, Part 4.5.	The responsible entity did not perform studies as specified in Requirement R4, Part 4.1 to determine that the BES meets the performance requirements for one of the categories (P1 through P7) in Table 1. OR The responsible entity did not perform studies as specified in Requirement R4, Part 4.2 to assess the impact of extreme events.	The responsible entity did not perform studies as specified in Requirement R4, Part 4.1 to determine that the BES meets the performance requirements for two of the categories (P1 through P7) in Table 1. OR The responsible entity did not perform Contingency analysis as described in Requirement R4, Part 4.3.	The responsible entity did not perform studies as specified in Requirement R4, Part 4.1 to determine that the BES meets the performance requirements for three or more of the categories (P1 through P7) in Table 1. OR The responsible entity did not base its studies on computer simulation models using data provided in Requirement R1.
R5.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity does not have criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage limits, post-Contingency voltage

R #	Violation Severity Levels				Severe VSL
	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL		
					deviations, or the transient voltage response for its System.
R6.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity failed to define and document the criteria or methodology for System instability used within its analysis as described in Requirement R6.
R7.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	The Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with each of its Transmission Planners, failed to determine and identify individual or joint responsibilities for performing required studies.
R8	The responsible entity distributed its Planning Assessment results to adjacent Planning Coordinators and adjacent Transmission Planners but it was more than 90 days but less than or equal to 120	The responsible entity distributed its Planning Assessment results to adjacent Planning Coordinators and adjacent Transmission Planners but it was more than 120 days but less than or equal to 130	The responsible entity distributed its Planning Assessment results to adjacent Planning Coordinators and adjacent Transmission Planners but it was more than 130 days but less than or equal to 140	The responsible entity distributed its Planning Assessment results to adjacent Planning Coordinators and adjacent Transmission Planners but it was more than 140 days following its completion.	

R #	Violation Severity Levels			
	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
	<p>days following its completion.</p> <p>OR,</p> <p>The responsible entity distributed its Planning Assessment results to functional entities having a reliability related need who requested the Planning Assessment in writing but it was more than 30 days but less than or equal to 40 days following the request.</p>	<p>days following its completion.</p> <p>OR,</p> <p>The responsible entity distributed its Planning Assessment results to functional entities having a reliability related need who requested the Planning Assessment in writing but it was more than 40 days but less than or equal to 50 days following the request.</p>	<p>days following its completion.</p> <p>OR,</p> <p>The responsible entity distributed its Planning Assessment results to functional entities having a reliability related need who requested the Planning Assessment in writing but it was more than 50 days but less than or equal to 60 days following the request.</p>	<p>OR</p> <p>The responsible entity did not distribute its Planning Assessment results to adjacent Planning Coordinators and adjacent Transmission Planners.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The responsible entity distributed its Planning Assessment results to functional entities having a reliability related need who requested the Planning Assessment in writing but it was more than 60 days following the request.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The responsible entity did not distribute its Planning Assessment results to functional entities having a reliability related need who requested the Planning Assessment in writing.</p>

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Associated Documents

None.

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
0	April 1, 2005	Effective Date	New
0	February 8, 2005	BOT Approval	Revised
0	June 3, 2005	Fixed reference in M1 to read TPL-001-0 R2.1 and TPL-001-0 R2.2	Errata
0	July 24, 2007	Corrected reference in M1. to read TPL-001-0 R1 and TPL-001-0 R2.	Errata
0.1	October 29, 2008	BOT adopted errata changes; updated version number to "0.1"	Errata
0.1	May 13, 2009	FERC Approved – Updated Effective Date and Footer	Revised
1	Approved by Board of Trustees February 17, 2011	Revised footnote 'b' pursuant to FERC Order RM06-16-009	Revised (Project 2010-11)
2	August 4, 2011	Revision of TPL-001-1; includes merging and upgrading requirements of TPL-001-0, TPL-002-0, TPL-003-0, and TPL-004-0 into one, single, comprehensive, coordinated standard: TPL-001-2; and retirement of TPL-005-0 and TPL-006-0.	Project 2006-02 – complete revision
2	August 4, 2011	Adopted by Board of Trustees	
1	April 19, 2012	FERC issued Order 762 remanding TPL-001-1, TPL-002-1b, TPL-003-1a, and TPL-004-1. FERC also issued a NOPR proposing to remand TPL-001-2. NERC has been directed to revise footnote 'b' in accordance with the directives of Order Nos. 762 and 693.	
3	February 7, 2013	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	

TPL-001-5.1 — Transmission System Planning Performance Requirements

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
		TPL-001-3 was created after the Board of Trustees approved the revised footnote 'b' in TPL-002-2b, which was balloted and appended to: TPL-001-0.1, TPL-002-0b, TPL-003-0a, and TPL-004-0.	
4	February 7, 2013	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees. TPL-001-4 was adopted by the Board of Trustees as TPL-001-3, but a discrepancy in numbering was identified and corrected prior to filing with the regulatory agencies.	
4	October 17, 2013	FERC Order issued approving TPL-001-4 (Order effective December 23, 2013).	
4	May 7, 2014	NERC Board of Trustees adopted change to VRF in Requirement 1 from Medium to High.	Revision
4	November 26, 2014	FERC issued a letter order approving change to VRF in Requirement 1 from Medium to High.	
5	November 7, 2018	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Revised to address reliability issues as identified in FERC Order No. 754 and Order No. 786 directives and update the references to the MOD Reliability Standards in TPL-001.
5.	January 23, 2020	FERC Order issued approving TPL-001-5. Docket No. RM19-10-000.	
5.1	TBD	Approved by the Standards Committee	Errata

Table 1 — Steady State & Stability Performance Planning Events

Steady State & Stability:

- a. The System shall remain stable. Cascading and uncontrolled islanding shall not occur.
- b. Consequential Load Loss as well as generation loss is acceptable as a consequence of any event excluding P0.
- c. Simulate the removal of all elements that Protection Systems and other controls are expected to automatically disconnect for each event.
- d. Simulate Normal Clearing unless otherwise specified.
- e. Planned System adjustments such as Transmission configuration changes and re-dispatch of generation are allowed if such adjustments are executable within the time duration applicable to the Facility Ratings.

Steady State Only:

- f. Applicable Facility Ratings shall not be exceeded.
- g. System steady state voltages and post-Contingency voltage deviations shall be within acceptable limits as established by the Planning Coordinator and the Transmission Planner.
- h. Planning event P0 is applicable to steady state only.
- i. The response of voltage sensitive Load that is disconnected from the System by end-user equipment associated with an event shall not be used to meet steady state performance requirements.

Stability Only:

- j. Transient voltage response shall be within acceptable limits established by the Planning Coordinator and the Transmission Planner.

TPL-001-5.1 — Transmission System Planning Performance Requirements

Category	Initial Condition	Event ¹	Fault Type ²	BES Level ³	Interruption of Firm Transmission Service Allowed ⁴	Non-Sequential Load Loss Allowed		
P0 No Contingency	Normal System	None	N/A	EHV, HV	No	No		
P1 Single Contingency	Normal System	Loss of one of the following: 1. Generator 2. Transmission Circuit 3. Transformer ⁵ 4. Shunt Device ⁶ 5. Single Pole of a DC line	3∅	EHV, HV	No ⁹	No ¹²		
			SLG	EHV, HV	No ⁹	No ¹²		
							1. Opening of a line section w/o a fault ⁷	N/A
							2. Bus Section Fault	SLG
P2 Single Contingency	Normal System	3. Internal Breaker Fault ⁸ (non-Bus-tie Breaker)	SLG	EHV	No ⁹	No		
			SLG	EHV, HV	Yes	Yes		
							4. Internal Breaker Fault (Bus-tie Breaker) ⁸	SLG

Category	Initial Condition	Event ¹	Fault Type ²	BES Level ³	Interruption of Firm Transmission Service Allowed ⁴	Non-Sequential Load Loss Allowed
P3 Multiple Contingency	Loss of generator unit followed by System adjustments ⁹	Loss of one of the following: 1. Generator 2. Transmission Circuit 3. Transformer ⁵ 4. Shunt Device ⁶ 5. Single pole of a DC line	3Ø	EHV, HV	No ⁹	No ¹²
			SLG			
P4 Multiple Contingency (Fault plus stuck breaker ¹⁰)	Normal System	Loss of multiple elements caused by a stuck breaker ¹⁰ (non-Bus-tie Breaker) attempting to clear a Fault on one of the following: 1. Generator 2. Transmission Circuit 3. Transformer ⁵ 4. Shunt Device ⁶ 5. Bus Section 6. Loss of multiple elements caused by a stuck breaker ¹⁰ (Bus-tie Breaker) attempting to clear a Fault on the associated bus	SLG	EHV	No ⁹	No
				HV	Yes	Yes
			SLG	EHV, HV	Yes	Yes

Category	Initial Condition	Event ¹	Fault Type ²	BES Level ³	Interruption of Firm Transmission Service Allowed ⁴	Non-Sequential Load Loss Allowed
P5 Multiple Contingency (Fault plus non-redundant component of a Protection System failure to operate)	Normal System	Delayed Fault Clearing due to the failure of a non-redundant component of a Protection System ¹³ protecting the Faulted element to operate as designed, for one of the following: 1. Generator 2. Transmission Circuit 3. Transformer ⁵ 4. Shunt Device ⁶ 5. Bus Section	SLG	EHV	No ⁹	No
				HV	Yes	Yes
P6 Multiple Contingency (Two overlapping singles)	Loss of one of the following followed by System adjustments. ⁹ 1. Transmission Circuit 2. Transformer ⁵ 3. Shunt Device ⁶ 4. Single pole of a DC line	Loss of one of the following: 1. Transmission Circuit 2. Transformer ⁵ 3. Shunt Device ⁶ 4. Single pole of a DC line	3∅	EHV, HV	Yes	Yes
				SLG	EHV, HV	Yes

TPL-001-5.1 – Transmission System Planning Performance Requirements

Category	Initial Condition	Event ¹	Fault Type ²	BES Level ³	Interruption of Firm Transmission Service Allowed ⁴	Non-Sequential Load Loss Allowed
P7 Multiple Contingency (Common Structure)	Normal System	The loss of: 1. Any two adjacent (vertically or horizontally) circuits on common structure ¹¹ 2. Loss of a bipolar DC line	SLG	EHV, HV	Yes	Yes

Table 1 – Steady State & Stability Performance Extreme Events

Table 1 – Steady State & Stability Performance Extreme Events	
<p>Steady State & Stability</p> <p>For all extreme events evaluated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Simulate the removal of all elements that Protection Systems and automatic controls are expected to disconnect for each Contingency. b. Simulate Normal Clearing unless otherwise specified. 	
<p>Steady State</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Loss of a single generator, Transmission Circuit, single pole of a DC Line, shunt device, or transformer forced out of service followed by another single generator, Transmission Circuit, single pole of a different DC Line, shunt device, or transformer forced out of service prior to System adjustments. 2. Local area events affecting the Transmission System such as: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Loss of a tower line with three or more circuits.¹¹ b. Loss of all Transmission lines on a common Right-of-Way¹¹. c. Loss of a switching station or substation (loss of one voltage level plus transformers). d. Loss of all generating units at a generating station. e. Loss of a large Load or major Load center. 3. Wide area events affecting the Transmission System based on System topology such as: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Loss of two generating stations resulting from conditions such as: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> i. Loss of a large gas pipeline into a region or multiple regions that have significant gas-fired generation. 	<p>Stability</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. With an initial condition of a single generator, Transmission circuit, single pole of a DC line, shunt device, or transformer forced out of service, apply a 3\emptyset fault on another single generator, Transmission circuit, single pole of a different DC line, shunt device, or transformer prior to System adjustments. 2. Local or wide area events affecting the Transmission System such as: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. 3\emptyset fault on generator with stuck breaker¹⁰ resulting in Delayed Fault Clearing. b. 3\emptyset fault on Transmission circuit with stuck breaker¹⁰ resulting in Delayed Fault Clearing. c. 3\emptyset fault on transformer with stuck breaker¹⁰ resulting in Delayed Fault Clearing. d. 3\emptyset fault on bus section with stuck breaker¹⁰ resulting in Delayed Fault Clearing. e. 3\emptyset fault on generator with failure of a non-redundant component of a Protection System¹³ resulting in Delayed Fault Clearing. f. 3\emptyset fault on Transmission circuit with failure of a non-redundant component of a Protection System¹³ resulting in Delayed Fault Clearing.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ii. Loss of the use of a large body of water as the cooling source for generation. iii. Wildfires. iv. Severe weather, e.g., hurricanes, tornadoes, etc. v. A successful cyber attack. vi. Shutdown of a nuclear power plant(s) and related facilities for a day or more for common causes such as problems with similarly designed plants. b. Other events based upon operating experience that may result in wide area disturbances. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> g. 3Ø fault on transformer with failure of a non-redundant component of a Protection System¹³ resulting in Delayed Fault Clearing. h. 3Ø fault on bus section with failure of a non-redundant component of a Protection System¹³ resulting in Delayed Fault Clearing. i. 3Ø internal breaker fault. j. Other events based upon operating experience, such as consideration of initiating events that experience suggests may result in wide area disturbances
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**Table 1 – Steady State & Stability Performance Footnotes
(Planning Events and Extreme Events)**

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. If the event analyzed involves BES elements at multiple System voltage levels, the lowest System voltage level of the element(s) removed for the analyzed event determines the stated performance criteria regarding allowances for interruptions of Firm Transmission Service and Non-Consequential Load Loss. 2. Unless specified otherwise, simulate Normal Clearing of faults. Single line to ground (SLG) or three-phase (3\emptyset) are the fault types that must be evaluated in Stability simulations for the event described. A 3\emptyset or a double line to ground fault study indicating the criteria are being met is sufficient evidence that a SLG condition would also meet the criteria. 3. Bulk Electric System (BES) level references include extra-high voltage (EHV) Facilities defined as greater than 300kV and high voltage (HV) Facilities defined as the 300kV and lower voltage Systems. The designation of EHV and HV is used to distinguish between stated performance criteria allowances for interruption of Firm Transmission Service and Non-Consequential Load Loss. 4. Curtailment of Conditional Firm Transmission Service is allowed when the conditions and/or events being studied formed the basis for the Conditional Firm Transmission Service. 5. For non-generator step up transformer outage events, the reference voltage, as used in footnote 1, applies to the low-side winding (excluding tertiary windings). For generator and Generator Step Up transformer outage events, the reference voltage applies to the BES connected voltage (high-side of the Generator Step Up transformer). Requirements which are applicable to transformers also apply to variable frequency transformers and phase shifting transformers. 6. Requirements which are applicable to shunt devices also apply to FACTS devices that are connected to ground. 7. Opening one end of a line section without a fault on a normally networked Transmission circuit such that the line is possibly serving Load radial from a single source point. 8. An internal breaker fault means a breaker failing internally, thus creating a System fault which must be cleared by protection on both sides of the breaker. 9. An objective of the planning process should be to minimize the likelihood and magnitude of interruption of Firm Transmission Service following Contingency events. Curtailment of Firm Transmission Service is allowed both as a System adjustment (as identified in the column entitled 'Initial Condition') and a corrective action when achieved through the appropriate re-dispatch of resources obligated to re-dispatch, where it can be demonstrated that Facilities, internal and external to the Transmission Planner's planning region, remain within applicable Facility Ratings and the re-dispatch does not result in any Non-Consequential Load Loss. Where limited options for re-dispatch exist, sensitivities associated with the availability of those resources should be considered.

**Table 1 – Steady State & Stability Performance Footnotes
(Planning Events and Extreme Events)**

10. A stuck breaker means that for a gang-operated breaker, all three phases of the breaker have remained closed. For an independent pole operated (IPO) or an independent pole tripping (IPT) breaker, only one pole is assumed to remain closed. A stuck breaker results in Delayed Fault Clearing.
11. Excludes circuits that share a common structure (Planning event P7, Extreme event steady state 2a) or common Right-of-Way (Extreme event, steady state 2b) for 1 mile or less.
12. An objective of the planning process is to minimize the likelihood and magnitude of Non-Consequential Load Loss following planning events. In limited circumstances, Non-Consequential Load Loss may be needed throughout the planning horizon to ensure that BES performance requirements are met. However, when Non-Consequential Load Loss is utilized under footnote 12 within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon to address BES performance requirements, such interruption is limited to circumstances where the Non-Consequential Load Loss meets the conditions shown in Attachment 1. In no case can the planned Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 exceed 75 MW for US registered entities. The amount of planned Non-Consequential Load Loss for a non-US Registered Entity should be implemented in a manner that is consistent with, or under the direction of, the applicable governmental authority or its agency in the non-US jurisdiction.
13. For purposes of this standard, non-redundant components of a Protection System to consider are as follows:
 - a. A single protective relay which responds to electrical quantities, without an alternative (which may or may not respond to electrical quantities) that provides comparable Normal Clearing times;
 - b. A single communications system associated with protective functions, necessary for correct operation of a communication-aided protection scheme required for Normal Clearing (an exception is a single communications system that is both monitored and reported at a Control Center);
 - c. A single station dc supply associated with protective functions required for Normal Clearing (an exception is a single station dc supply that is both monitored and reported at a Control Center for both low voltage and open circuit);
 - d. A single control circuitry (including auxiliary relays and lockout relays) associated with protective functions, from the dc supply through and including the trip coil(s) of the circuit breakers or other interrupting devices, required for Normal Clearing (the trip coil may be excluded if it is both monitored and reported at a Control Center).

Attachment 1

I. Stakeholder Process

During each Planning Assessment before the use of Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 is allowed as an element of a Corrective Action Plan in the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon of the Planning Assessment, the Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator shall ensure that the utilization of footnote 12 is reviewed through an open and transparent stakeholder process. The responsible entity can utilize an existing process or develop a new process. The process must include the following:

1. Meetings must be open to affected stakeholders including applicable regulatory authorities or governing bodies responsible for retail electric service issues
2. Notice must be provided in advance of meetings to affected stakeholders including applicable regulatory authorities or governing bodies responsible for retail electric service issues and include an agenda with:
 - a. Date, time, and location for the meeting
 - b. Specific location(s) of the planned Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12
 - c. Provisions for a stakeholder comment period
3. Information regarding the intended purpose and scope of the proposed Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 (as shown in Section II below) must be made available to meeting participants
4. A procedure for stakeholders to submit written questions or concerns and to receive written responses to the submitted questions and concerns
5. A dispute resolution process for any question or concern raised in #4 above that is not resolved to the stakeholder's satisfaction

An entity does not have to repeat the stakeholder process for a specific application of footnote 12 utilization with respect to subsequent Planning Assessments unless conditions spelled out in Section II below have materially changed for that specific application.

II. Information for Inclusion in Item #3 of the Stakeholder Process

The responsible entity shall document the planned use of Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 which must include the following:

1. Conditions under which Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 would be necessary:
 - a. System Load level and estimated annual hours of exposure at or above that Load level

- b. Applicable Contingencies and the Facilities outside their applicable rating due to that Contingency
2. Amount of Non-Consequential Load Loss with:
 - a. The estimated number and type of customers affected
 - b. An explanation of the effect of the use of Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 on the health, safety, and welfare of the community
3. Estimated frequency of Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 based on historical performance
4. Expected duration of Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 based on historical performance
5. Future plans to alleviate the need for Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12
6. Verification that TPL Reliability Standards performance requirements will be met following the application of footnote 12
7. Alternatives to Non-Consequential Load Loss considered and the rationale for not selecting those alternatives under footnote 12
8. Assessment of potential overlapping uses of footnote 12 including overlaps with adjacent Transmission Planners and Planning Coordinators

III. Instances for which Regulatory Review of Non-Consequential Load Loss under Footnote 12 is Required

Before a Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 is allowed as an element of a Corrective Action Plan in Year One of the Planning Assessment, the Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator must ensure that the applicable regulatory authorities or governing bodies responsible for retail electric service issues do not object to the use of Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 if either:

1. The voltage level of the Contingency is greater than 300 kV
 - a. If the Contingency analyzed involves BES Elements at multiple System voltage levels, the lowest System voltage level of the element(s) removed for the analyzed Contingency determines the stated performance criteria regarding allowances for Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12, or
 - b. For a non-generator step up transformer outage Contingency, the 300 kV limit applies to the low-side winding (excluding tertiary windings). For a generator or generator step up transformer outage Contingency, the 300 kV limit applies to the BES connected voltage (high-side of the Generator Step Up transformer)

2. The planned Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 is greater than or equal to 25 MW

Once assurance has been received that the applicable regulatory authorities or governing bodies responsible for retail electric service issues do not object to the use of Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12, the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner must submit the information outlined in items II.1 through II.8 above to the ERO for a determination of whether there are any Adverse Reliability Impacts caused by the request to utilize footnote 12 for Non-Consequential Load Loss.

Exhibit B

Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-001-5.1 (redline to TPL-001-5)

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Transmission System Planning Performance Requirements
2. **Number:** TPL-001-5
3. **Purpose:** Establish Transmission system planning performance requirements within the planning horizon to develop a Bulk Electric System (BES) that will operate reliably over a broad spectrum of System conditions and following a wide range of probable Contingencies.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. **Functional Entity**
 - Planning Coordinator.
 - Transmission Planner.
5. **Effective Date:** See Implementation Plan.

B. Requirements and Measures

- R1. Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall maintain System models within its respective area for performing the studies needed to complete its Planning Assessment. The models shall use data consistent with that provided in accordance with the MOD-032 standard, supplemented by other sources as needed, including items represented in the Corrective Action Plan, and shall represent projected System conditions. This establishes Category P0 as the normal System condition in Table 1. *[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
 - 1.1. System models shall represent:
 - 1.1.1. Existing Facilities.
 - 1.1.2. New planned Facilities and changes to existing Facilities.
 - 1.1.3. Real and reactive Load forecasts.
 - 1.1.4. Known commitments for Firm Transmission Service and Interchange.
 - 1.1.5. Resources (supply or demand side) required for Load.
- M1. Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall provide evidence, in electronic or hard copy format, that it is maintaining System models within its respective area, using data consistent with MOD-032, including items represented in the Corrective Action Plan, representing projected System conditions, and that the models represent the required information in accordance with Requirement R1.
- R2. Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall prepare an annual Planning Assessment of its portion of the BES. This Planning Assessment shall use current or qualified past studies (as indicated in Requirement R2, Part 2.6), document assumptions, and document summarized results of the steady state analyses, short

circuit analyses, and Stability analyses. *[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*

- 2.1.** For the Planning Assessment, the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon portion of the steady state analysis shall be assessed annually and be supported by current annual studies or qualified past studies as indicated in Requirement R2, Part 2.6. Qualifying studies need to include the following conditions:
- 2.1.1.** System peak Load for either Year One or year two, and for year five.
- 2.1.2.** System Off-Peak Load for one of the five years.
- 2.1.3.** For each of the studies described in Requirement R2, Parts 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, sensitivity case(s) shall be utilized to demonstrate the impact of changes to the basic assumptions used in the model. To accomplish this, the sensitivity analysis in the Planning Assessment must vary one or more of the following conditions by a sufficient amount to stress the System within a range of credible conditions that demonstrate a measurable change in System response :
- Real and reactive forecasted Load.
 - Expected transfers.
 - Expected in service dates of new or modified Transmission Facilities.
 - Reactive resource capability.
 - Generation additions, retirements, or other dispatch scenarios.
 - Controllable Loads and Demand Side Management.
 - Duration or timing of known Transmission outages.
- 2.1.4.** When known outage(s) of generation or Transmission Facility(ies) are planned in the Near-Term Planning Horizon, the impact of selected known outages on System performance shall be assessed. These known outage(s) shall be selected for assessment consistent with a documented outage coordination procedure or technical rationale by the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner. Known outage(s) shall not be excluded solely based upon outage duration. The assessment shall be performed for the P0 and P1 categories identified in Table 1 with the System peak or Off-Peak conditions that the System is expected to experience when the known outage(s) are planned. This assessment shall include, at a minimum known outages expected to produce more severe System impacts on the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner’s portion of the BES. Past or current studies may support the selection of known outage(s), if the study(s) has comparable post-Contingency System conditions and

configuration such as those following P3 or P6 category events in Table 1.

- 2.1.5.** When an entity's spare equipment strategy could result in the unavailability of major Transmission equipment that has a lead time of one year or more (such as a transformer), the impact of this possible unavailability on System performance shall be assessed. Based upon this assessment, an analysis shall be performed for the P0, P1, and P2 categories identified in Table 1 with the conditions that the System is expected to experience during the possible unavailability of the long lead time equipment.
- 2.2.** For the Planning Assessment, the Long-Term Transmission Planning Horizon portion of the steady state analysis shall be assessed annually and be supported by the following annual current study, supplemented with qualified past studies as indicated in Requirement R2, Part 2.6:
 - 2.2.1.** A current study assessing expected System peak Load conditions for one of the years in the Long-Term Transmission Planning Horizon and the rationale for why that year was selected.
- 2.3.** The short circuit analysis portion of the Planning Assessment shall be conducted annually addressing the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon and can be supported by current or past studies as qualified in Requirement R2, Part 2.6. The analysis shall be used to determine whether circuit breakers have interrupting capability for Faults that they will be expected to interrupt using the System short circuit model with any planned generation and Transmission Facilities in service which could impact the study area.
- 2.4.** For the Planning Assessment, the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon portion of the Stability analysis shall be assessed annually and be supported by current or past studies as qualified in Requirement R2, Part 2.6. The following studies are required:
 - 2.4.1.** System peak Load for one of the five years. System peak Load levels shall include a Load model which represents the expected dynamic behavior of Loads that could impact the study area, considering the behavior of induction motor Loads. An aggregate System Load model which represents the overall dynamic behavior of the Load is acceptable.
 - 2.4.2.** System Off-Peak Load for one of the five years.
 - 2.4.3.** For each of the studies described in Requirement R2, Parts 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, sensitivity case(s) shall be utilized to demonstrate the impact of changes to the basic assumptions used in the model. To accomplish this, the sensitivity analysis in the Planning Assessment must vary one or more of the following conditions by a sufficient amount to stress

the System within a range of credible conditions that demonstrate a measurable change in performance:

- Load level, Load forecast, or dynamic Load model assumptions.
- Expected transfers.
- Expected in service dates of new or modified Transmission Facilities.
- Reactive resource capability.
- Generation additions, retirements, or other dispatch scenarios.

2.4.4. When known outage(s) of generation or Transmission Facility(ies) are planned in the Near-Term Planning Horizon, the impact of selected known outages on System performance shall be assessed. These known outage(s) shall be selected for assessment consistent with a documented outage coordination procedure or technical rationale by the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner. Known outage(s) shall not be excluded solely based upon outage duration. The assessment shall be performed for the P1 categories identified in Table 1 with the System peak or Off-Peak conditions that the System is expected to experience when the known outage(s) are planned. This assessment shall include, at a minimum, those known outages expected to produce more severe System impacts on the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner's portion of the BES. Past or current studies may support the selection of known outage(s), if the study(s) has comparable post-Contingency System conditions and configuration such as those following P3 or P6 category events in Table 1.

2.4.5. When an entity's spare equipment strategy could result in the unavailability of major Transmission equipment that has a lead time of one year or more (such as a transformer), the impact of this possible unavailability on System performance shall be assessed. Based upon this assessment, an analysis shall be performed for the selected P1 and P2 category events identified in Table 1 for which the unavailability is expected to produce more severe System impacts on its portion of the BES. The analysis shall simulate the conditions that the System is expected to experience during the possible unavailability of the long lead time equipment.

2.5. For the Planning Assessment, the Long-Term Transmission Planning Horizon portion of the Stability analysis shall be assessed to address the impact of proposed material generation additions or changes in that timeframe and be supported by current or past studies as qualified in Requirement R2, Part 2.6 and shall include documentation to support the technical rationale for determining material changes.

- 2.6.** Past studies may be used to support the Planning Assessment if they meet the following requirements:
- 2.6.1.** For steady state, short circuit, or Stability analysis: the study shall be five calendar years old or less, unless a technical rationale can be provided to demonstrate that the results of an older study are still valid.
 - 2.6.2.** For steady state, short circuit, or Stability analysis: no material changes have occurred to the System represented in the study. Documentation to support the technical rationale for determining material changes shall be included.
- 2.7.** For planning events shown in Table 1, when the analysis indicates an inability of the System to meet the performance requirements in Table 1, the Planning Assessment shall include Corrective Action Plan(s) addressing how the performance requirements will be met. Revisions to the Corrective Action Plan(s) are allowed in subsequent Planning Assessments, but the planned System shall continue to meet the performance requirements in Table 1. Corrective Action Plan(s) do not need to be developed solely to meet the performance requirements for a single sensitivity case analyzed in accordance with Requirements R2, Parts 2.1.43 and 2.4.3. The Corrective Action Plan(s) shall:
- 2.7.1.** List System deficiencies and the associated actions needed to achieve required System performance. Examples of such actions include:
 - Installation, modification, retirement, or removal of Transmission and generation Facilities and any associated equipment.
 - Installation, modification, or removal of Protection Systems or Remedial Action Schemes.
 - Installation or modification of automatic generation tripping as a response to a single or multiple Contingency to mitigate Stability performance violations.
 - Installation or modification of manual and automatic generation runback/tripping as a response to a single or multiple Contingency to mitigate steady state performance violations.
 - Use of Operating Procedures specifying how long they will be needed as part of the Corrective Action Plan.
 - Use of rate applications, DSM, new technologies, or other initiatives.
 - 2.7.2.** Include actions to resolve performance deficiencies identified in multiple sensitivity studies or provide a rationale for why actions were not necessary.

evaluation of possible actions designed to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the consequences and adverse impacts of the event(s) shall be conducted.

- 3.3.** Contingency analyses for Requirement R3, Parts 3.1 and 3.2 shall:
 - 3.3.1.** Simulate the removal of all elements that the Protection System and other automatic controls are expected to disconnect for each Contingency without operator intervention. The analyses shall include the impact of subsequent:
 - 3.3.1.1.** Tripping of generators where simulations show generator bus voltages or high side of the generation step up (GSU) voltages are less than known or assumed minimum generator steady state or ride through voltage limitations. Include in the assessment any assumptions made.
 - 3.3.1.2.** Tripping of Transmission elements where relay loadability limits are exceeded.
 - 3.3.2.** Simulate the expected automatic operation of existing and planned devices designed to provide steady state control of electrical system quantities when such devices impact the study area. These devices may include equipment such as phase-shifting transformers, load tap changing transformers, and switched capacitors and inductors.
 - 3.4.** Those planning events in Table 1 that are expected to produce more severe System impacts on its portion of the BES shall be identified, and a list of those Contingencies to be evaluated for System performance in Requirement R3, Part 3.1 created. The rationale for those Contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information.
 - 3.4.1.** The Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner shall coordinate with adjacent Planning Coordinators and Transmission Planners to ensure that Contingencies on adjacent Systems which may impact their Systems are included in the Contingency list.
 - 3.5.** Those extreme events in Table 1 that are expected to produce more severe System impacts shall be identified and a list created of those events to be evaluated in Requirement R3, Part 3.2. The rationale for those Contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information.
- M3.** Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall provide dated evidence, such as electronic or hard copies of the studies utilized in preparing the Planning Assessment, in accordance with Requirement R3.
- R4.** For the Stability portion of the Planning Assessment, as described in Requirement R2, Parts 2.4 and 2.5, each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall perform the Contingency analyses listed in Table 1. The studies shall be based on computer simulation models using data provided in Requirement R1. *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*

- 4.1.** Studies shall be performed for planning events to determine whether the BES meets the performance requirements in Table 1 based on the Contingency list created in Requirement R4, Part 4.4.
 - 4.1.1.** For planning event P1: No generating unit shall pull out of synchronism. A generator being disconnected from the System by fault clearing action or by a Remedial Action Scheme is not considered pulling out of synchronism.
 - 4.1.2.** For planning events P2 through P7: When a generator pulls out of synchronism in the simulations, the resulting apparent impedance swings shall not result in the tripping of any Transmission system elements other than the generating unit and its directly connected Facilities.
 - 4.1.3.** For planning events P1 through P7: Power oscillations shall exhibit acceptable damping as established by the Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner.
- 4.2.** Studies shall be performed to assess the impact of the extreme events which are identified by the list created in Requirement R4, Part 4.5. If the analysis concludes there is Cascading caused by the occurrence of extreme events, an evaluation of possible actions designed to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the consequences of the event (s) shall be conducted.
- 4.3.** Contingency analyses for Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 and 4.2 shall :
 - 4.3.1.** Simulate the removal of all elements that the Protection System and other automatic controls are expected to disconnect for each Contingency without operator intervention. The analyses shall include the impact of subsequent:
 - 4.3.1.1.** Successful high speed (less than one second) reclosing and unsuccessful high speed reclosing into a Fault where high speed reclosing is utilized.
 - 4.3.1.2.** Tripping of generators where simulations show generator bus voltages or high side of the GSU voltages are less than known or assumed generator low voltage ride through capability. Include in the assessment any assumptions made.
 - 4.3.1.3.** Tripping of Transmission lines and transformers where transient swings cause Protection System operation based on generic or actual relay models.
 - 4.3.2.** Simulate the expected automatic operation of existing and planned devices designed to provide dynamic control of electrical system quantities when such devices impact the study area. These devices may include equipment such as generation exciter control and power

system stabilizers, static var compensators, power flow controllers, and DC Transmission controllers.

- 4.4.** Those planning events in Table 1 that are expected to produce more severe System impacts on its portion of the BES, shall be identified, and a list created of those Contingencies to be evaluated in Requirement R4, Part 4.1. The rationale for those Contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information.

 - 4.4.1.** Each Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner shall coordinate with adjacent Planning Coordinators and Transmission Planners to ensure that Contingencies on adjacent Systems which may impact their Systems are included in the Contingency list.
- 4.5.** Those extreme events in Table 1 that are expected to produce more severe System impacts shall be identified and a list created of those events to be evaluated in Requirement R4, Part 4.2. The rationale for those Contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information.
- M4.** Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall provide dated evidence, such as electronic or hard copies of the studies utilized in preparing the Planning Assessment in accordance with Requirement R4.
- R5.** Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall have criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage limits, post-Contingency voltage deviations, and the transient voltage response for its System. For transient voltage response, the criteria shall at a minimum, specify a low voltage level and a maximum length of time that transient voltages may remain below that level. *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- M5.** Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall provide dated evidence such as electronic or hard copies of the documentation specifying the criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage limits, post-Contingency voltage deviations, and the transient voltage response for its System in accordance with Requirement R5.
- R6.** Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall define and document, within their Planning Assessment, the criteria or methodology used in the analysis to identify System instability for conditions such as Cascading, voltage instability, or uncontrolled islanding. *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- M6.** Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall provide dated evidence, such as electronic or hard copies of documentation specifying the criteria or methodology used in the analysis to identify System instability for conditions such as Cascading, voltage instability, or uncontrolled islanding that was utilized in preparing the Planning Assessment in accordance with Requirement R6.
- R7.** Each Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with each of its Transmission Planners, shall determine and identify each entity's individual and joint responsibilities for

- performing the required studies for the Planning Assessment. *[Violation Risk Factor: Low] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- M7.** Each Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with each of its Transmission Planners, shall provide dated documentation on roles and responsibilities, such as meeting minutes, agreements, and e-mail correspondence that identifies that agreement has been reached on individual and joint responsibilities for performing the required studies and Assessments in accordance with Requirement R7.
- R8.** Each Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner shall distribute its Planning Assessment results to adjacent Planning Coordinators and adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completing its Planning Assessment, and to any functional entity that has a reliability related need and submits a written request for the information within 30 days of such a request. *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- 8.1.** If a recipient of the Planning Assessment results provides documented comments on the results, the respective Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- M8.** Each Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner shall provide evidence, such as email notices, documentation of updated web pages, postal receipts showing recipient and date; or a demonstration of a public posting, that it has distributed its Planning Assessment results to adjacent Planning Coordinators and adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 days of having completed its Planning Assessment, and to any functional entity who has indicated a reliability need within 30 days of a written request and that the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner has provided a documented response to comments received on Planning Assessment results within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments in accordance with Requirement R8.

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority: “Compliance Enforcement Authority” means NERC or the Regional Entity, or any entity as otherwise designated by an Applicable Governmental Authority, in their respective roles of monitoring and/or enforcing compliance with mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards in their respective jurisdictions.

1.2. Evidence Retention: The following evidence retention period(s) identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full-time period since the last audit.

The applicable entity shall keep data identified in Measures M1 through M8 or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

- Each Responsible Entity shall retain evidence of each requirement in this standard for three calendar years.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program: As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, “Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program” refers to the identification of the processes that will be used to evaluate data or information for the purpose of assessing performance or outcomes with the associated Reliability Standard.

1.4. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Timeframe:

Not applicable.

1.5. Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Processes:

- Compliance Audits
- Self-Certifications
- Spot Checks
- Compliance Violation Investigations
- Self-Report
- Complaints

1.6. Additional Compliance Information

None.

Violation Severity Levels

R #	Violation Severity Levels			
	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1.	The responsible entity's System model failed to represent one of the Requirement R1, Parts 1.1.1 through 1.1.5.	The responsible entity's System model failed to represent two of the Requirement R1, Parts 1.1.1 through 1.1.5.	The responsible entity's System model failed to represent three of the Requirement R1, Parts 1.1.1 through 1.1.5.	The responsible entity's System model failed to represent four or more of the Requirement R1, Parts 1.1.1 through 1.1.5. OR The responsible entity's System model did not represent projected System conditions as described in Requirement R1. OR The responsible entity's System model did not use data consistent with that provided in accordance with the MOD-032 standard and other sources, including items represented in the Corrective Action Plan.
R2.	The responsible entity failed to comply with Requirement R2, Part 2.6.	The responsible entity failed to comply with Requirement R2, Part 2.3 or Part 2.8.	The responsible entity failed to comply with one of the following Parts of Requirement R2: Part 2.1,	The responsible entity failed to comply with two or more of the following Parts of

R #	Violation Severity Levels			
	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			Part 2.2, Part 2.4, Part 2.5, or Part 2.7.	Requirement R2: Part 2.1, Part 2.2, Part 2.4, or Part 2.7. OR The responsible entity does not have a completed annual Planning Assessment.
R3.	The responsible entity did not identify planning events as described in Requirement R3, Part 3.4 or extreme events as described in Requirement R3, Part 3.5.	The responsible entity did not perform studies as specified in Requirement R3, Part 3.1 to determine that the BES meets the performance requirements for one of the categories (P2 through P7) in Table 1. OR The responsible entity did not perform studies as specified in Requirement R3, Part 3.2 to assess the impact of extreme events.	The responsible entity did not perform studies as specified in Requirement R3, Part 3.1 to determine that the BES meets the performance requirements for two of the categories (P2 through P7) in Table 1. OR The responsible entity did not perform Contingency analysis as described in Requirement R3, Part 3.3.	The responsible entity did not perform studies as specified in Requirement R3, Part 3.1 to determine that the BES meets the performance requirements for three or more of the categories (P2 through P7) in Table 1. OR The responsible entity did not perform studies to determine that the BES meets the performance requirements for the P0 or P1 categories in Table 1. OR

R #	Violation Severity Levels			
	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
				The responsible entity did not base its studies on computer simulation models using data provided in Requirement R1.
R4.	The responsible entity did not identify planning events as described in Requirement R4, Part 4.4 or extreme events as described in Requirement R4, Part 4.5.	The responsible entity did not perform studies as specified in Requirement R4, Part 4.1 to determine that the BES meets the performance requirements for one of the categories (P1 through P7) in Table 1. OR The responsible entity did not perform studies as specified in Requirement R4, Part 4.2 to assess the impact of extreme events.	The responsible entity did not perform studies as specified in Requirement R4, Part 4.1 to determine that the BES meets the performance requirements for two of the categories (P1 through P7) in Table 1. OR The responsible entity did not perform Contingency analysis as described in Requirement R4, Part 4.3.	The responsible entity did not perform studies as specified in Requirement R4, Part 4.1 to determine that the BES meets the performance requirements for three or more of the categories (P1 through P7) in Table 1. OR The responsible entity did not base its studies on computer simulation models using data provided in Requirement R1.
R5.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity does not have criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage limits, post-Contingency voltage

R #	Violation Severity Levels				Severe VSL
	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL		
					deviations, or the transient voltage response for its System.
R6.	N/A	N/A	N/A		The responsible entity failed to define and document the criteria or methodology for System instability used within its analysis as described in Requirement R6.
R7.	N/A	N/A	N/A		The Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with each of its Transmission Planners, failed to determine and identify individual or joint responsibilities for performing required studies.
R8	The responsible entity distributed its Planning Assessment results to adjacent Planning Coordinators and adjacent Transmission Planners but it was more than 90 days but less than or equal to 120	The responsible entity distributed its Planning Assessment results to adjacent Planning Coordinators and adjacent Transmission Planners but it was more than 120 days but less than or equal to 130	The responsible entity distributed its Planning Assessment results to adjacent Planning Coordinators and adjacent Transmission Planners but it was more than 130 days but less than or equal to 140		The responsible entity distributed its Planning Assessment results to adjacent Planning Coordinators and adjacent Transmission Planners but it was more than 140 days following its completion.

R #	Violation Severity Levels			
	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
	<p>days following its completion.</p> <p>OR,</p> <p>The responsible entity distributed its Planning Assessment results to functional entities having a reliability related need who requested the Planning Assessment in writing but it was more than 30 days but less than or equal to 40 days following the request.</p>	<p>days following its completion.</p> <p>OR,</p> <p>The responsible entity distributed its Planning Assessment results to functional entities having a reliability related need who requested the Planning Assessment in writing but it was more than 40 days but less than or equal to 50 days following the request.</p>	<p>days following its completion.</p> <p>OR,</p> <p>The responsible entity distributed its Planning Assessment results to functional entities having a reliability related need who requested the Planning Assessment in writing but it was more than 50 days but less than or equal to 60 days following the request.</p>	<p>OR</p> <p>The responsible entity did not distribute its Planning Assessment results to adjacent Planning Coordinators and adjacent Transmission Planners.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The responsible entity distributed its Planning Assessment results to functional entities having a reliability related need who requested the Planning Assessment in writing but it was more than 60 days following the request.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The responsible entity did not distribute its Planning Assessment results to functional entities having a reliability related need who requested the Planning Assessment in writing.</p>

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Associated Documents

None.

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
0	April 1, 2005	Effective Date	New
0	February 8, 2005	BOT Approval	Revised
0	June 3, 2005	Fixed reference in M1 to read TPL-001-0 R2.1 and TPL-001-0 R2.2	Errata
0	July 24, 2007	Corrected reference in M1. to read TPL-001-0 R1 and TPL-001-0 R2.	Errata
0.1	October 29, 2008	BOT adopted errata changes; updated version number to "0.1"	Errata
0.1	May 13, 2009	FERC Approved – Updated Effective Date and Footer	Revised
1	Approved by Board of Trustees February 17, 2011	Revised footnote 'b' pursuant to FERC Order RM06-16-009	Revised (Project 2010-11)
2	August 4, 2011	Revision of TPL-001-1; includes merging and upgrading requirements of TPL-001-0, TPL-002-0, TPL-003-0, and TPL-004-0 into one, single, comprehensive, coordinated standard: TPL-001-2; and retirement of TPL-005-0 and TPL-006-0.	Project 2006-02 – complete revision
2	August 4, 2011	Adopted by Board of Trustees	
1	April 19, 2012	FERC issued Order 762 remanding TPL-001-1, TPL-002-1b, TPL-003-1a, and TPL-004-1. FERC also issued a NOPR proposing to remand TPL-001-2. NERC has been directed to revise footnote 'b' in accordance with the directives of Order Nos. 762 and 693.	
3	February 7, 2013	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	

TPL-001-5.1 — Transmission System Planning Performance Requirements

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
		TPL-001-3 was created after the Board of Trustees approved the revised footnote 'b' in TPL-002-2b, which was balloted and appended to: TPL-001-0.1, TPL-002-0b, TPL-003-0a, and TPL-004-0.	
4	February 7, 2013	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees. TPL-001-4 was adopted by the Board of Trustees as TPL-001-3, but a discrepancy in numbering was identified and corrected prior to filing with the regulatory agencies.	
4	October 17, 2013	FERC Order issued approving TPL-001-4 (Order effective December 23, 2013).	
4	May 7, 2014	NERC Board of Trustees adopted change to VRF in Requirement 1 from Medium to High.	Revision
4	November 26, 2014	FERC issued a letter order approving change to VRF in Requirement 1 from Medium to High.	
5	November 7, 2018	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Revised to address reliability issues as identified in FERC Order No. 754 and Order No. 786 directives and update the references to the MOD Reliability Standards in TPL-001.
5.	January 23, 2020	FERC Order issued approving TPL-001-5. Docket No. RM19-10-000.	
<u>5.1</u>	<u>TBD</u>	<u>Approved by the Standards Committee</u>	<u>Errata</u>

Table 1 – Steady State & Stability Performance Planning Events

Steady State & Stability:

- a. The System shall remain stable. Cascading and uncontrolled islanding shall not occur.
- b. Consequential Load Loss as well as generation loss is acceptable as a consequence of any event excluding P0.
- c. Simulate the removal of all elements that Protection Systems and other controls are expected to automatically disconnect for each event.
- d. Simulate Normal Clearing unless otherwise specified.
- e. Planned System adjustments such as Transmission configuration changes and re-dispatch of generation are allowed if such adjustments are executable within the time duration applicable to the Facility Ratings.

Steady State Only:

- f. Applicable Facility Ratings shall not be exceeded.
- g. System steady state voltages and post-Contingency voltage deviations shall be within acceptable limits as established by the Planning Coordinator and the Transmission Planner.
- h. Planning event P0 is applicable to steady state only.
- i. The response of voltage sensitive Load that is disconnected from the System by end-user equipment associated with an event shall not be used to meet steady state performance requirements.

Stability Only:

- j. Transient voltage response shall be within acceptable limits established by the Planning Coordinator and the Transmission Planner.

Category	Initial Condition	Event ¹	Fault Type ²	BES Level ³	Interruption of Firm Transmission Service Allowed ⁴	Non-Consequential Load Loss Allowed		
P0 No Contingency	Normal System	None	N/A	EHV, HV	No	No		
P1 Single Contingency	Normal System	Loss of one of the following: 1. Generator 2. Transmission Circuit 3. Transformer ⁵ 4. Shunt Device ⁶ 5. Single Pole of a DC line	3∅	EHV, HV	No ⁹	No ¹²		
			SLG	EHV, HV	No ⁹	No ¹²		
							1. Opening of a line section w/o a fault ⁷	N/A
							2. Bus Section Fault	SLG
P2 Single Contingency	Normal System	3. Internal Breaker Fault ⁸ (non-Bus-tie Breaker) 4. Internal Breaker Fault (Bus-tie Breaker) ⁸	SLG	EHV, HV	Yes	Yes		
			SLG	EHV, HV	No ⁹	No		
							1. Opening of a line section w/o a fault ⁷	N/A

Category	Initial Condition	Event ¹	Fault Type ²	BES Level ³	Interruption of Firm Transmission Service Allowed ⁴	Non- Consequential Load Loss Allowed
P3 Multiple Contingency	Loss of generator unit followed by System adjustments ⁹	Loss of one of the following: 1. Generator 2. Transmission Circuit 3. Transformer ⁵ 4. Shunt Device ⁶ 5. Single pole of a DC line	3Ø	EHV, HV	No ⁹	No ¹²
			SLG			
P4 Multiple Contingency (Fault plus stuck breaker ¹⁰)	Normal System	Loss of multiple elements caused by a stuck breaker ¹⁰ (non-Bus-tie Breaker) attempting to clear a Fault on one of the following: 1. Generator 2. Transmission Circuit 3. Transformer ⁵ 4. Shunt Device ⁶ 5. Bus Section 6. Loss of multiple elements caused by a stuck breaker ¹⁰ (Bus-tie Breaker) attempting to clear a Fault on the associated bus	SLG	EHV	No ⁹	No
				HV	Yes	Yes
			SLG	EHV, HV	Yes	Yes

Category	Initial Condition	Event ¹	Fault Type ²	BES Level ³	Interruption of Firm Transmission Service Allowed ⁴	Non-Sequential Load Loss Allowed
P5 Multiple Contingency (Fault plus non-redundant component of a Protection System failure to operate)	Normal System	Delayed Fault Clearing due to the failure of a non-redundant component of a Protection System ¹³ protecting the Faulted element to operate as designed, for one of the following: 1. Generator 2. Transmission Circuit 3. Transformer ⁵ 4. Shunt Device ⁶ 5. Bus Section	SLG	EHV	No ⁹	No
				HV	Yes	Yes
P6 Multiple Contingency (Two overlapping singles)	Loss of one of the following followed by System adjustments. ⁹ 1. Transmission Circuit 2. Transformer ⁵ 3. Shunt Device ⁶ 4. Single pole of a DC line	Loss of one of the following: 1. Transmission Circuit 2. Transformer ⁵ 3. Shunt Device ⁶ 4. Single pole of a DC line	3Ø	EHV, HV	Yes	Yes
				SLG	EHV, HV	Yes

TPL-001-5.1 – Transmission System Planning Performance Requirements

Category	Initial Condition	Event ¹	Fault Type ²	BES Level ³	Interruption of Firm Transmission Service Allowed ⁴	Non-Sequential Load Loss Allowed
P7 Multiple Contingency (Common Structure)	Normal System	The loss of: 1. Any two adjacent (vertically or horizontally) circuits on common structure ¹¹ 2. Loss of a bipolar DC line	SLG	EHV, HV	Yes	Yes

Table 1 – Steady State & Stability Performance Extreme Events

Steady State & Stability	
<p>For all extreme events evaluated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Simulate the removal of all elements that Protection Systems and automatic controls are expected to disconnect for each Contingency. b. Simulate Normal Clearing unless otherwise specified. 	
Steady State	Stability
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Loss of a single generator, Transmission Circuit, single pole of a DC Line, shunt device, or transformer forced out of service followed by another single generator, Transmission Circuit, single pole of a different DC Line, shunt device, or transformer forced out of service prior to System adjustments. 2. Local area events affecting the Transmission System such as: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Loss of a tower line with three or more circuits.¹¹ b. Loss of all Transmission lines on a common Right-of-Way¹¹. c. Loss of a switching station or substation (loss of one voltage level plus transformers). d. Loss of all generating units at a generating station. e. Loss of a large Load or major Load center. 3. Wide area events affecting the Transmission System based on System topology such as: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Loss of two generating stations resulting from conditions such as: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> i. Loss of a large gas pipeline into a region or multiple regions that have significant gas-fired generation. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. With an initial condition of a single generator, Transmission circuit, single pole of a DC line, shunt device, or transformer forced out of service, apply a 3\emptyset fault on another single generator, Transmission circuit, single pole of a different DC line, shunt device, or transformer prior to System adjustments. 2. Local or wide area events affecting the Transmission System such as: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. 3\emptyset fault on generator with stuck breaker¹⁰ resulting in Delayed Fault Clearing. b. 3\emptyset fault on Transmission circuit with stuck breaker¹⁰ resulting in Delayed Fault Clearing. c. 3\emptyset fault on transformer with stuck breaker¹⁰ resulting in Delayed Fault Clearing. d. 3\emptyset fault on bus section with stuck breaker¹⁰ resulting in Delayed Fault Clearing. e. 3\emptyset fault on generator with failure of a non-redundant component of a Protection System¹³ resulting in Delayed Fault Clearing. f. 3\emptyset fault on Transmission circuit with failure of a non-redundant component of a Protection System¹³ resulting in Delayed Fault Clearing.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ii. Loss of the use of a large body of water as the cooling source for generation. iii. Wildfires. iv. Severe weather, e.g., hurricanes, tornadoes, etc. v. A successful cyber attack. vi. Shutdown of a nuclear power plant(s) and related facilities for a day or more for common causes such as problems with similarly designed plants. <p>b. Other events based upon operating experience that may result in wide area disturbances.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> g. 3Ø fault on transformer with failure of a non-redundant component of a Protection System¹³ resulting in Delayed Fault Clearing. h. 3Ø fault on bus section with failure of a non-redundant component of a Protection System¹³ resulting in Delayed Fault Clearing. i. 3Ø internal breaker fault. j. Other events based upon operating experience, such as consideration of initiating events that experience suggests may result in wide area disturbances
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**Table 1 – Steady State & Stability Performance Footnotes
(Planning Events and Extreme Events)**

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. If the event analyzed involves BES elements at multiple System voltage levels, the lowest System voltage level of the element(s) removed for the analyzed event determines the stated performance criteria regarding allowances for interruptions of Firm Transmission Service and Non-Consequential Load Loss. 2. Unless specified otherwise, simulate Normal Clearing of faults. Single line to ground (SLG) or three-phase (3\emptyset) are the fault types that must be evaluated in Stability simulations for the event described. A 3\emptyset or a double line to ground fault study indicating the criteria are being met is sufficient evidence that a SLG condition would also meet the criteria. 3. Bulk Electric System (BES) level references include extra-high voltage (EHV) Facilities defined as greater than 300kV and high voltage (HV) Facilities defined as the 300kV and lower voltage Systems. The designation of EHV and HV is used to distinguish between stated performance criteria allowances for Interruption of Firm Transmission Service and Non-Consequential Load Loss. 4. Curtailment of Conditional Firm Transmission Service is allowed when the conditions and/or events being studied formed the basis for the Conditional Firm Transmission Service. 5. For non-generator step up transformer outage events, the reference voltage, as used in footnote 1, applies to the low-side winding (excluding tertiary windings). For generator and Generator Step Up transformer outage events, the reference voltage applies to the BES connected voltage (high-side of the Generator Step Up transformer). Requirements which are applicable to transformers also apply to variable frequency transformers and phase shifting transformers. 6. Requirements which are applicable to shunt devices also apply to FACTS devices that are connected to ground. 7. Opening one end of a line section without a fault on a normally networked Transmission circuit such that the line is possibly serving Load radial from a single source point. 8. An internal breaker fault means a breaker failing internally, thus creating a System fault which must be cleared by protection on both sides of the breaker. 9. An objective of the planning process should be to minimize the likelihood and magnitude of interruption of Firm Transmission Service following Contingency events. Curtailment of Firm Transmission Service is allowed both as a System adjustment (as identified in the column entitled 'Initial Condition') and a corrective action when achieved through the appropriate re-dispatch of resources obligated to re-dispatch, where it can be demonstrated that Facilities, internal and external to the Transmission Planner's planning region, remain within applicable Facility Ratings and the re-dispatch does not result in any Non-Consequential Load Loss. Where limited options for re-dispatch exist, sensitivities associated with the availability of those resources should be considered.

**Table 1 – Steady State & Stability Performance Footnotes
(Planning Events and Extreme Events)**

10. A stuck breaker means that for a gang-operated breaker, all three phases of the breaker have remained closed. For an independent pole operated (IPO) or an independent pole tripping (IPT) breaker, only one pole is assumed to remain closed. A stuck breaker results in Delayed Fault Clearing.
11. Excludes circuits that share a common structure (Planning event P7, Extreme event steady state 2a) or common Right-of-Way (Extreme event, steady state 2b) for 1 mile or less.
12. An objective of the planning process is to minimize the likelihood and magnitude of Non-Consequential Load Loss following planning events. In limited circumstances, Non-Consequential Load Loss may be needed throughout the planning horizon to ensure that BES performance requirements are met. However, when Non-Consequential Load Loss is utilized under footnote 12 within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon to address BES performance requirements, such interruption is limited to circumstances where the Non-Consequential Load Loss meets the conditions shown in Attachment 1. In no case can the planned Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 exceed 75 MW for US registered entities. The amount of planned Non-Consequential Load Loss for a non-US Registered Entity should be implemented in a manner that is consistent with, or under the direction of, the applicable governmental authority or its agency in the non-US jurisdiction.
13. For purposes of this standard, non-redundant components of a Protection System to consider are as follows:
 - a. A single protective relay which responds to electrical quantities, without an alternative (which may or may not respond to electrical quantities) that provides comparable Normal Clearing times;
 - b. A single communications system associated with protective functions, necessary for correct operation of a communication-aided protection scheme required for Normal Clearing (an exception is a single communications system that is both monitored and reported at a Control Center);
 - c. A single station dc supply associated with protective functions required for Normal Clearing (an exception is a single station dc supply that is both monitored and reported at a Control Center for both low voltage and open circuit);
 - d. A single control circuitry (including auxiliary relays and lockout relays) associated with protective functions, from the dc supply through and including the trip coil(s) of the circuit breakers or other interrupting devices, required for Normal Clearing (the trip coil may be excluded if it is both monitored and reported at a Control Center).

Attachment 1

I. Stakeholder Process

During each Planning Assessment before the use of Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 is allowed as an element of a Corrective Action Plan in the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon of the Planning Assessment, the Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator shall ensure that the utilization of footnote 12 is reviewed through an open and transparent stakeholder process. The responsible entity can utilize an existing process or develop a new process. The process must include the following:

1. Meetings must be open to affected stakeholders including applicable regulatory authorities or governing bodies responsible for retail electric service issues
2. Notice must be provided in advance of meetings to affected stakeholders including applicable regulatory authorities or governing bodies responsible for retail electric service issues and include an agenda with:
 - a. Date, time, and location for the meeting
 - b. Specific location(s) of the planned Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12
 - c. Provisions for a stakeholder comment period
3. Information regarding the intended purpose and scope of the proposed Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 (as shown in Section II below) must be made available to meeting participants
4. A procedure for stakeholders to submit written questions or concerns and to receive written responses to the submitted questions and concerns
5. A dispute resolution process for any question or concern raised in #4 above that is not resolved to the stakeholder's satisfaction

An entity does not have to repeat the stakeholder process for a specific application of footnote 12 utilization with respect to subsequent Planning Assessments unless conditions spelled out in Section II below have materially changed for that specific application.

II. Information for Inclusion in Item #3 of the Stakeholder Process

The responsible entity shall document the planned use of Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 which must include the following:

1. Conditions under which Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 would be necessary:
 - a. System Load level and estimated annual hours of exposure at or above that Load level

- b. Applicable Contingencies and the Facilities outside their applicable rating due to that Contingency
2. Amount of Non-Consequential Load Loss with:
 - a. The estimated number and type of customers affected
 - b. An explanation of the effect of the use of Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 on the health, safety, and welfare of the community
3. Estimated frequency of Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 based on historical performance
4. Expected duration of Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 based on historical performance
5. Future plans to alleviate the need for Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12
6. Verification that TPL Reliability Standards performance requirements will be met following the application of footnote 12
7. Alternatives to Non-Consequential Load Loss considered and the rationale for not selecting those alternatives under footnote 12
8. Assessment of potential overlapping uses of footnote 12 including overlaps with adjacent Transmission Planners and Planning Coordinators

III. Instances for which Regulatory Review of Non-Consequential Load Loss under Footnote 12 is Required

Before a Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 is allowed as an element of a Corrective Action Plan in Year One of the Planning Assessment, the Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator must ensure that the applicable regulatory authorities or governing bodies responsible for retail electric service issues do not object to the use of Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 if either:

1. The voltage level of the Contingency is greater than 300 kV
 - a. If the Contingency analyzed involves BES Elements at multiple System voltage levels, the lowest System voltage level of the element(s) removed for the analyzed Contingency determines the stated performance criteria regarding allowances for Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12, or
 - b. For a non-generator step up transformer outage Contingency, the 300 kV limit applies to the low-side winding (excluding tertiary windings). For a generator or generator step up transformer outage Contingency, the 300 kV limit applies to the BES connected voltage (high-side of the Generator Step Up transformer)

2. The planned Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 is greater than or equal to 25 MW

Once assurance has been received that the applicable regulatory authorities or governing bodies responsible for retail electric service issues do not object to the use of Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12, the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner must submit the information outlined in items II.1 through II.8 above to the ERO for a determination of whether there are any Adverse Reliability Impacts caused by the request to utilize footnote 12 for Non-Consequential Load Loss.