Exhibit A

Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-3 Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events

Exhibit A

Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-3 Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events Clean

A. Introduction

- 1. Title: Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events
- **2. Number:** TPL-007-3
- **3. Purpose:** Establish requirements for Transmission system planned performance during geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) events.
- 4. Applicability:

4.1. Functional Entities:

- **4.1.1.** Planning Coordinator with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2;
- **4.1.2.** Transmission Planner with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2;
- 4.1.3. Transmission Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2; and
- 4.1.4. Generator Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2.
- 4.2. Facilities:
 - **4.2.1.** Facilities that include power transformer(s) with a high side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV.
- 5. Effective Date: See Implementation Plan for TPL-007-3.
- **Background:** During a GMD event, geomagnetically-induced currents (GIC) may cause transformer hot-spot heating or damage, loss of Reactive Power sources, increased Reactive Power demand, and Misoperation(s), the combination of which may result in voltage collapse and blackout.

The only difference between TPL-007-3 and TPL-007-2 is that TPL-007-3 adds a Canadian Variance to address regulatory practices/processes within Canadian jurisdictions and to allow the use of Canadian-specific data and research to define and implement alternative GMD event(s) that achieve at least an equivalent reliability objective of that in TPL-007-2.

B. Requirements and Measures

R1. Each Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with its Transmission Planner(s), shall identify the individual and joint responsibilities of the Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner(s) in the Planning Coordinator's planning area for maintaining models, performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, and implementing process(es) to obtain GMD measurement data as specified in this standard. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- M1. Each Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with its Transmission Planners, shall provide documentation on roles and responsibilities, such as meeting minutes, agreements, copies of procedures or protocols in effect between entities or between departments of a vertically integrated system, or email correspondence that identifies an agreement has been reached on individual and joint responsibilities for maintaining models, performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, and implementing process(es) to obtain GMD measurement data in accordance with Requirement R1.
- R2. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall maintain System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M2. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence in either electronic or hard copy format that it is maintaining System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.
- **R3.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System during the GMD events described in Attachment 1. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- **M3.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence, such as electronic or hard copies of the criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System in accordance with Requirement R3.

Benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s)

- R4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall complete a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment of the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon at least once every 60 calendar months. This benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall use a study or studies based on models identified in Requirement R2, document assumptions, and document summarized results of the steady state analysis. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **4.1.** The study or studies shall include the following conditions:
 - **4.1.1.** System On-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon; and
 - **4.1.2.** System Off-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon.

- **4.2.** The study or studies shall be conducted based on the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1 to determine whether the System meets the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1.
- **4.3.** The benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, and adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later.
 - **4.3.1.** If a recipient of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment provides documented comments on the results, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- M4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have dated evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment meeting all of the requirements in Requirement R4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, and adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later, as specified in Requirement R4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments in accordance with Requirement R4.
- **R5.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide GIC flow information to be used for the benchmark thermal impact assessment of transformers specified in Requirement R6 to each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns an applicable Bulk Electric System (BES) power transformer in the planning area. The GIC flow information shall include: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **5.1.** The maximum effective GIC value for the worst case geoelectric field orientation for the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1. This value shall be provided to the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.

- **5.2.** The effective GIC time series, GIC(t), calculated using the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1 in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area. GIC(t) shall be provided within 90 calendar days of receipt of the written request and after determination of the maximum effective GIC value in Part 5.1.
- **M5.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided the maximum effective GIC values to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area as specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided GIC(t) in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.
- **R6.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A per phase or greater. The benchmark thermal impact assessment shall: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - 6.1. Be based on the effective GIC flow information provided in Requirement R5;
 - 6.2. Document assumptions used in the analysis;
 - **6.3.** Describe suggested actions and supporting analysis to mitigate the impact of GICs, if any; and
 - **6.4.** Be performed and provided to the responsible entities, as determined in Requirement R1, within 24 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1.
- **M6.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its benchmark thermal impact assessment for all of its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A per phase or greater, and shall have evidence such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided its thermal impact assessment to the responsible entities as specified in Requirement R6.
- **R7.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, that concludes through the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment conducted in Requirement R4 that their System does not meet the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1, shall develop a Corrective

Action Plan (CAP) addressing how the performance requirements will be met. The CAP shall: [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- **7.1.** List System deficiencies and the associated actions needed to achieve required System performance. Examples of such actions include:
 - Installation, modification, retirement, or removal of Transmission and generation Facilities and any associated equipment.
 - Installation, modification, or removal of Protection Systems or Remedial Action Schemes.
 - Use of Operating Procedures, specifying how long they will be needed as part of the CAP.
 - Use of Demand-Side Management, new technologies, or other initiatives.
- **7.2.** Be developed within one year of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.
- **7.3.** Include a timetable, subject to revision by the responsible entity in Part 7.4, for implementing the selected actions from Part 7.1. The timetable shall:
 - **7.3.1.** Specify implementation of non-hardware mitigation, if any, within two years of development of the CAP; and
 - **7.3.2.** Specify implementation of hardware mitigation, if any, within four years of development of the CAP.
- **7.4.** Be revised if situations beyond the control of the responsible entity determined in Requirement R1 prevent implementation of the CAP within the timetable for implementation provided in Part 7.3. The revised CAP shall document the following, and be updated at least once every 12 calendar months until implemented:
 - **7.4.1.** Circumstances causing the delay for fully or partially implementing the selected actions in Part 7.1;
 - **7.4.2.** Description of the original CAP, and any previous changes to the CAP, with the associated timetable(s) for implementing the selected actions in Part 7.1; and
 - **7.4.3.** Revisions to the selected actions in Part 7.1, if any, including utilization of Operating Procedures if applicable, and the updated timetable for implementing the selected actions.
- **7.5.** Be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission Planner(s), and functional entities referenced in the CAP within 90 calendar days of development or revision, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of development or revision, whichever is later.

- **7.5.1.** If a recipient of the CAP provides documented comments on the results, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- M7. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, that concludes, through the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment conducted in Requirement R4, that the responsible entity's System does not meet the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1 shall have evidence such as dated electronic or hard copies of its CAP including timetable for implementing selected actions, as specified in Requirement R7. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has revised its CAP if situations beyond the responsible entity's control prevent implementation of the CAP within the timetable specified. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its CAP or relevant information, if any, (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission Planner(s), and functional entities referenced in the CAP within 90 calendar days of development or revision, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of development or revision, whichever is later as specified in Requirement R7. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its CAP within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments, in accordance with Requirement R7.

Supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s)

- R8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall complete a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment of the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon at least once every 60 calendar months. This supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall use a study or studies based on models identified in Requirement R2, document assumptions, and document summarized results of the steady state analysis. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **8.1.** The study or studies shall include the following conditions:
 - **8.1.1.** System On-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon; and
 - **8.1.2.** System Off-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon.

- **8.2.** The study or studies shall be conducted based on the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1 to determine whether the System meets the performance requirements for the steady state planning supplemental GMD event contained in Table 1.
- **8.3.** If the analysis concludes there is Cascading caused by the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1, an evaluation of possible actions designed to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the consequences and adverse impacts of the event(s) shall be conducted.
- **8.4.** The supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later.
 - **8.4.1.** If a recipient of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment provides documented comments on the results, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- M8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have dated evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment meeting all of the requirements in Requirement R8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its supplemental GMD Vulnerability: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later, as specified in Requirement R8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments in accordance with Requirement R8.
- **R9.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide GIC flow information to be used for the supplemental thermal impact assessment of transformers specified in Requirement R10 to each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns an applicable Bulk Electric System (BES) power transformer in the planning area. The GIC flow information shall include: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- **9.1.** The maximum effective GIC value for the worst case geoelectric field orientation for the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1. This value shall be provided to the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.
- **9.2.** The effective GIC time series, GIC(t), calculated using the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1 in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area. GIC(t) shall be provided within 90 calendar days of receipt of the written request and after determination of the maximum effective GIC value in Part 9.1.
- M9. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided the maximum effective GIC values to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area as specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided GIC(t) in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.
- **R10.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A per phase or greater. The supplemental thermal impact assessment shall: [*Violation Risk Factor: Medium*] [*Time Horizon: Long-term Planning*]
 - **10.1.** Be based on the effective GIC flow information provided in Requirement R9;
 - 10.2. Document assumptions used in the analysis;
 - **10.3.** Describe suggested actions and supporting analysis to mitigate the impact of GICs, if any; and
 - **10.4.** Be performed and provided to the responsible entities, as determined in Requirement R1, within 24 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1.
- **M10.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its supplemental thermal impact assessment for all of its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A per phase or greater, and shall have evidence such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided its supplemental thermal impact assessment to the responsible entities as specified in Requirement R10.

GMD Measurement Data Processes

- **R11.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall implement a process to obtain GIC monitor data from at least one GIC monitor located in the Planning Coordinator's planning area or other part of the system included in the Planning Coordinator's GIC System model. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M11. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its GIC monitor location(s) and documentation of its process to obtain GIC monitor data in accordance with Requirement R11.
- **R12.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall implement a process to obtain geomagnetic field data for its Planning Coordinator's planning area. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M12. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its process to obtain geomagnetic field data for its Planning Coordinator's planning area in accordance with Requirement R12.

C. Compliance

- 1. Compliance Monitoring Process
 - **1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority:** "Compliance Enforcement Authority" means NERC or the Regional Entity, or any entity as otherwise designated by an Applicable Governmental Authority, in their respective roles of monitoring and/or enforcing compliance with mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards in their respective jurisdictions.
 - **1.2.** Evidence Retention: The following evidence retention period(s) identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full-time period since the last audit.

The applicable entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

- For Requirements R1, R2, R3, R5, R6, R9, and R10, each responsible entity shall retain documentation as evidence for five years.
- For Requirements R4 and R8, each responsible entity shall retain documentation of the current GMD Vulnerability Assessment and the preceding GMD Vulnerability Assessment.

- For Requirement R7, each responsible entity shall retain documentation as evidence for five years or until all actions in the Corrective Action Plan are completed, whichever is later.
- For Requirements R11 and R12, each responsible entity shall retain documentation as evidence for three years.
- **1.3.** Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program: As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, "Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program" refers to the identification of the processes that will be used to evaluate data or information for the purpose of assessing performance or outcomes with the associated Reliability Standard.

Table 1: Steady State Planning GMD Event

Steady State:

- a. Voltage collapse, Cascading and uncontrolled islanding shall not occur.
- b. Generation loss is acceptable as a consequence of the steady state planning GMD events.
- c. Planned System adjustments such as Transmission configuration changes and re-dispatch of generation are allowed if such adjustments are executable within the time duration applicable to the Facility Ratings.

Category	Initial Condition	Event	Interruption of Firm Transmission Service Allowed	Load Loss Allowed
Benchmark GMD Event - GMD Event with Outages	 System as may be postured in response to space weather information¹, and then GMD event² 	Reactive Power compensation devices and other Transmission Facilities removed as a result of Protection System operation or Misoperation due to harmonics during the GMD event	Yes ³	Yes ³
Supplemental GMD Event - GMD Event with Outages	 System as may be postured in response to space weather information¹, and then GMD event² 	Reactive Power compensation devices and other Transmission Facilities removed as a result of Protection System operation or Misoperation due to harmonics during the GMD event	Yes	Yes
	Table	1: Steady State Performance Footnot	es	

- 1. The System condition for GMD planning may include adjustments to posture the System that are executable in response to space weather information.
- 2. The GMD conditions for the benchmark and supplemental planning events are described in Attachment 1.
- 3. Load loss as a result of manual or automatic Load shedding (e.g., UVLS) and/or curtailment of Firm Transmission Service may be used to meet BES performance requirements during studied GMD conditions. The likelihood and magnitude of Load loss or curtailment of Firm Transmission Service should be minimized.

Violation Severity Levels

R #		Violation Severity Levels				
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL		
R1.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with its Transmission Planner(s), failed to determine and identify individual or joint responsibilities of the Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner(s) in the Planning Coordinator's planning area for maintaining models, performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, and implementing process(es) to obtain GMD measurement data as specified in this standard.		
R2.	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not maintain either System models or GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the studies	The responsible entity did not maintain both System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the studies		

R #		Violation Severity Levels			
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
			needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.	needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.	
R3.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not have criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System during the GMD events described in Attachment 1 as required.	
R4.	The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 60 calendar months and less than or equal to 64 calendar months since the last benchmark GMD	The responsible entity's completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy one of the elements listed in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.3; OR	The responsible entity's completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy two of the elements listed in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.3; OR	The responsible entity's completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy three of the elements listed in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.3; OR	
	Vulnerability Assessment.	The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 64 calendar months and less than or equal to 68 calendar months since the	The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 68 calendar months and less than or equal to 72 calendar months since the	The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 72 calendar months since the last benchmark	

R #		Violation Severity Levels			
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
		last benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	last benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	GMD Vulnerability Assessment; OR The responsible entity does not have a completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	
R5.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 90 calendar days and less than or equal to 100 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 100 calendar days and less than or equal to 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity did not provide the maximum effective GIC value to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area; OR The responsible entity did not provide the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), upon written request.	
R6.	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for 5% or less or one of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for more than 5% up to (and including) 10% or two of its solely owned and jointly	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for more than 10% up to (and including) 15% or three of its solely owned and	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for more than 15% or more than three of its solely owned and jointly owned	

R #	Violation Severity Levels			
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
	transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 24 calendar months and less than or equal to 26 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1.	owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 26 calendar months and less than or equal to 28 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1; OR The responsible entity failed to include one of the	jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 28 calendar months and less than or equal to 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1; OR The responsible entity failed to include two of the	applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1; OR The responsible entity failed to include three of the required elements as listed

R #		Violation Severity Levels			
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
		required elements as listed in Requirement R6, Parts 6.1 through 6.3.	required elements as listed in Requirement R6, Parts 6.1 through 6.3.	in Requirement R6, Parts 6.1 through 6.3.	
R7.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with one of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with two of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with three of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with four or more of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5; OR The responsible entity did not have a Corrective Action Plan as required by Requirement R7.	
R8.	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy one of elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy two of elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy three of the elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy four of the elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	

R #		Violation Se	verity Levels	
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
	than 60 calendar months and less than or equal to 64 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	than 64 calendar months and less than or equal to 68 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	than 68 calendar months and less than or equal to 72 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	than 72 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment; OR The responsible entity does not have a completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.
R9.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 90 calendar days and less than or equal to 100 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 100 calendar days and less than or equal to 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity did not provide the maximum effective GIC value to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area; OR The responsible entity did not provide the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), upon written request.
R10.	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for 5% or less or one of its	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for more than 5% up to (and	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for more than 10% up to	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for more than 15% or more

R #	Violation Severity Levels			
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
	solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 24 calendar months and less than or equal to 26 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1.	including) 10% or two of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 26 calendar months and less than or equal to 28 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1 OR	(and including) 15% or three of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 28 calendar months and less than or equal to 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1; OR	than three of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1; OR

R #		Violation Severity Levels				
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL		
		The responsible entity failed to include one of the required elements as listed in Requirement R10, Parts 10.1 through 10.3.	The responsible entity failed to include two of the required elements as listed in Requirement R10, Parts 10.1 through 10.3.	The responsible entity failed to include three of the required elements as listed in Requirement R10, Parts 10.1 through 10.3.		
R11.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not implement a process to obtain GIC monitor data from at least one GIC monitor located in the Planning Coordinator's planning area or other part of the system included in the Planning Coordinator's GIC System Model.		
R12.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not implement a process to obtain geomagnetic field data for its Planning Coordinator's planning area.		

D. Regional Variances

D.A. Regional Variance for Canadian Jurisdictions

This Variance shall be applicable in those Canadian jurisdictions where the Variance has been approved for use by the applicable governmental authority or has otherwise become effective in the jurisdiction.

All references to "Attachment 1" in the standard are replaced with "Attachment 1 or Attachment 1-CAN."

In addition, this Variance replaces Requirement R7, Part 7.3 with the following:

- **D.A.7.3.** Include a timetable, subject to revision by the responsible entity in Part 7.4, for implementing the selected actions from Part 7.1. The timetable shall:
 - **D.A.7.3.1.** Specify implementation of non-hardware mitigation, if any, within two years of the later of the development of the CAP or receipt of regulatory approvals, if required; and
 - **D.A.7.3.2.** Specify implementation of hardware mitigation, if any, within four years of the later of the development of the CAP or receipt of regulatory approvals, if required.

E. Associated Documents

Attachment 1 Attachment 1-CAN

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	December 17, 2014	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	New
2	November 9, 2017	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	Revised to respond to directives in FERC Order No. 830.
2	November 25, 2018	FERC Order issued approving TPL-007-2. Docket No. RM18-8-000	
3	February 7, 2019	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	Canadian Variance

Attachment 1

Calculating Geoelectric Fields for the Benchmark and Supplemental GMD Events

The benchmark GMD event¹ defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows that are needed to conduct a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment. It is composed of the following elements: (1) a reference peak geoelectric field amplitude of 8 V/km derived from statistical analysis of historical magnetometer data; (2) scaling factors to account for local geomagnetic latitude; (3) scaling factors to account for local earth conductivity; and (4) a reference geomagnetic field time series or waveform to facilitate time-domain analysis of GMD impact on equipment.

The supplemental GMD event is composed of similar elements as described above, except (1) the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude is 12 V/km over a localized area; and (2) the geomagnetic field time series or waveform includes a local enhancement in the waveform.²

The regional geoelectric field peak amplitude used in GMD Vulnerability Assessment, E_{peak} , can be obtained from the reference geoelectric field value of 8 V/km for the benchmark GMD event (1) or 12 V/km for the supplemental GMD event (2) using the following relationships:

$$E_{peak} = 8 \times \alpha \times \beta_b (V/km) \tag{1}$$

$$E_{peak} = 12 \times \alpha \times \beta_s (V/km)$$
⁽²⁾

where, α is the scaling factor to account for local geomagnetic latitude, and β is a scaling factor to account for the local earth conductivity structure. Subscripts *b* and *s* for the β scaling factor denote association with the benchmark or supplemental GMD events, respectively.

Scaling the Geomagnetic Field

The benchmark and supplemental GMD events are defined for geomagnetic latitude of 60° and must be scaled to account for regional differences based on geomagnetic latitude. Table 2 provides a scaling factor correlating peak geoelectric field to geomagnetic latitude. Alternatively, the scaling factor α is computed with the empirical expression:

$$\alpha = 0.001 \times e^{(0.115 \times L)} \tag{3}$$

where, L is the geomagnetic latitude in degrees and $0.1 \le \alpha \le 1$.

¹ The Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description, May 2016 is available on the Related Information webpage for TPL-007-1: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/TPL0071RD/Benchmark_clean_May12_complete.pdf</u>.

² The extent of local enhancements is on the order of 100 km in North-South (latitude) direction but longer in East-West (longitude) direction. The local enhancement in the geomagnetic field occurs over the time period of 2-5 minutes. Additional information is available in the Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description, October 2017 white paper on the Project 2013-03 Geomagnetic Disturbance Mitigation project webpage: http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.

For large planning areas that cover more than one scaling factor from Table 2, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment should be based on a peak geoelectric field that is:

- calculated by using the most conservative (largest) value for α; or
- calculated assuming a non-uniform or piecewise uniform geomagnetic field.

Table 2: Geomagnetic Field Scaling Factors for the Benchmark and Supplemental GMD Events		
Geomagnetic Latitude (Degrees)	Scaling Factor1 (α)	
≤ 40	0.10	
45	0.2	
50	0.3	
54	0.5	
56	0.6	
57	0.7	
58	0.8	
59	0.9	
≥ 60	1.0	

Scaling the Geoelectric Field

The benchmark GMD event is defined for the reference Quebec earth model described in Table 4. The peak geoelectric field, E_{peak}, used in a GMD Vulnerability Assessment may be obtained by either:

- Calculating the geoelectric field for the ground conductivity in the planning area and the reference geomagnetic field time series scaled according to geomagnetic latitude, using a procedure such as the plane wave method described in the NERC GMD Task Force GIC Application Guide;³ or
- Using the earth conductivity scaling factor β from Table 3 that correlates to the ground conductivity map in Figure 1 or Figure 2. Along with the scaling factor α from equation (3) or Table 2, β is applied to the reference geoelectric field using equation (1 or 2, as applicable) to obtain the regional geoelectric field peak amplitude E_{peak} to be used in GMD Vulnerability Assessments. When a ground conductivity model is not available, the planning entity should use the largest β factor of adjacent physiographic regions or a technically justified value.

³ Available at the NERC GMD Task Force project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Pages/Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Task-Force-(GMDTF)-2013.aspx</u>.

The earth models used to calculate Table 3 for the United States were obtained from publicly available information published on the U. S. Geological Survey website.⁴ The models used to calculate Table 3 for Canada were obtained from Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) and reflect the average structure for large regions. A planner can also use specific earth model(s) with documented justification and the reference geomagnetic field time series to calculate the β factor(s) as follows:

$$\beta_b = E/8$$
 for the benchmark GMD event (4)

$$\beta_s = E/12$$
 for the supplemental GMD (5)

where, *E* is the absolute value of peak geoelectric in V/km obtained from the technically justified earth model and the reference geomagnetic field time series.

For large planning areas that span more than one β scaling factor, the most conservative (largest) value for β may be used in determining the peak geoelectric field to obtain conservative results. Alternatively, a planner could perform analysis using a non-uniform or piecewise uniform geoelectric field.

Applying the Localized Peak Geoelectric Field in the Supplemental GMD Event

The peak geoelectric field of the supplemental GMD event occurs in a localized area.⁵ Planners have flexibility to determine how to apply the localized peak geoelectric field over the planning area in performing GIC calculations. Examples of approaches are:

- Apply the peak geoelectric field (12 V/km scaled to the planning area) over the entire planning area;
- Apply a spatially limited (12 V/km scaled to the planning area) peak geoelectric field (e.g., 100 km in North-South latitude direction and 500 km in East-West longitude direction) over a portion(s) of the system, and apply the benchmark GMD event over the rest of the system; or
- Other methods to adjust the benchmark GMD event analysis to account for the localized geoelectric field enhancement of the supplemental GMD event.

⁴ Available at <u>http://geomag.usgs.gov/conductivity/</u>.

⁵ See the Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Description white paper located on the Project 2013-03 Geomagnetic Disturbance Mitigation project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.




Figure 1: Physiographic Regions of the Continental United States⁶



Figure 2: Physiographic Regions of Canada

⁶ Additional map detail is available at the U.S. Geological Survey: <u>http://geomag.usgs.gov/</u>.

Table 3: Geoe	electric Field Scaling Fa	actors
Earth model	Scaling Factor Benchmark Event (β _b)	Scaling Factor Supplemental Event (βs)
AK1A	0.56	0.51
AK1B	0.56	0.51
AP1	0.33	0.30
AP2	0.82	0.78
BR1	0.22	0.22
CL1	0.76	0.73
CO1	0.27	0.25
CP1	0.81	0.77
CP2	0.95	0.86
FL1	0.76	0.73
CS1	0.41	0.37
IP1	0.94	0.90
IP2	0.28	0.25
IP3	0.93	0.90
IP4	0.41	0.35
NE1	0.81	0.77
PB1	0.62	0.55
PB2	0.46	0.39
PT1	1.17	1.19
SL1	0.53	0.49
SU1	0.93	0.90
BOU	0.28	0.24
FBK	0.56	0.56
PRU	0.21	0.22
BC	0.67	0.62
PRAIRIES	0.96	0.88
SHIELD	1.0	1.0
ATLANTIC	0.79	0.76

Rationale: Scaling factors in Table 3 are dependent upon the frequency content of the reference storm. Consequently, the benchmark GMD event and the supplemental GMD event may produce different scaling factors for a given earth model.

The scaling factor associated with the benchmark GMD event for the Florida earth model (FL1) has been updated based on the earth model published on the USGS public website.

Table 4: Reference Earth Model (Quebec)	
Layer Thickness (km)	Resistivity (Ω-m)
15	20,000
10	200
125	1,000
200	100
∞	3

Reference Geomagnetic Field Time Series or Waveform for the Benchmark GMD $\mathsf{Event}^{\scriptscriptstyle 7}$

The geomagnetic field measurement record of the March 13-14 1989 GMD event, measured at the NRCan Ottawa geomagnetic observatory, is the basis for the reference geomagnetic field waveform to be used to calculate the GIC time series, GIC(t), required for transformer thermal impact assessment.

The geomagnetic latitude of the Ottawa geomagnetic observatory is 55°; therefore, the amplitudes of the geomagnetic field measurement data were scaled up to the 60° reference geomagnetic latitude (see Figure 3) such that the resulting peak geoelectric field amplitude computed using the reference earth model was 8 V/km (see Figures 4 and 5). The sampling rate for the geomagnetic field waveform is 10 seconds.⁸ To use this geoelectric field time series when a different earth model is applicable, it should be scaled with the appropriate benchmark conductivity scaling factor β_{b} .

⁷ Refer to the Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description white paper for details on the determination of the reference geomagnetic field waveform: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/TPL0071RI.aspx</u>.

⁸ The data file of the benchmark geomagnetic field waveform is available on the Related Information webpage for TPL-007-1: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/TPL0071RI.aspx</u>.




Figure 3: Benchmark Geomagnetic Field Waveform Red Bn (Northward), Blue Be (Eastward)




Figure 4: Benchmark Geoelectric Field Waveform E_E (Eastward)




Figure 5: Benchmark Geoelectric Field Waveform E_N (Northward)


Reference Geomagnetic Field Time Series or Waveform for the Supplemental GMD Event^9


The geomagnetic field measurement record of the March 13-14, 1989 GMD event, measured at the NRCan Ottawa geomagnetic observatory, is the basis for the reference geomagnetic field waveform to be used to calculate the GIC time series, GIC(t), required for transformer thermal impact assessment for the supplemental GMD event. The supplemental GMD event waveform differs from the benchmark GMD event waveform in that the supplemental GMD event waveform has a local enhancement.

The geomagnetic latitude of the Ottawa geomagnetic observatory is 55°; therefore, the amplitudes of the geomagnetic field measurement data were scaled up to the 60° reference geomagnetic latitude (see Figure 6) such that the resulting peak geoelectric field amplitude computed using the reference earth model was 12 V/km (see Figure7). The sampling rate for the geomagnetic field waveform is 10 seconds.¹⁰ To use this geoelectric field time series when a different earth model is applicable, it should be scaled with the appropriate supplemental conductivity scaling factor β_s .

⁹ Refer to the Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description white paper for details on the determination of the reference geomagnetic field waveform: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

¹⁰ The data file of the benchmark geomagnetic field waveform is available on the NERC GMD Task Force project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Pages/Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Task-Force-(GMDTF)-2013.aspx</u>.








Figure 7: Supplemental Geoelectric Field Waveform Blue E_N (Northward), Red E_E (Eastward)

Attachment 1-CAN

Attachment 1-CAN provides an alternative that a Canadian entity may use in lieu of the benchmark or supplemental GMD event(s) defined in Attachment 1 for performing GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s).

A Canadian entity may use the provisions of Attachment 1-CAN if it has regionally specific information that provides a technically justified means to re-define a 1-in-100 year GMD planning event(s) within its planning area.

Information for the Alternative Methodology

GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s) require the use of geophysical and engineering models. Canadian-specific data is available and growing. Ongoing research allows for more accurate characterization of regional parameters used in these models. Such Canadian-specific data includes geomagnetic field, earth conductivity, and geomagnetically induced current measurements that can be used for modeling and simulation validation.

Information used to calculate geoelectric fields for the benchmark and supplemental GMD events shall be clearly documented and technically justified. For example, the factors involved in the calculation of geoelectric fields are geomagnetic field variations and an earth transfer function(s).^[1] Technically justified information used in modelling geomagnetic field variations may include: technical documents produced by governmental entities such as Natural Resources Canada; technical papers published in peer-reviewed journals; and data sets gathered using sound scientific principles. An earth transfer function may rely on magnetotelluric measurements or earth conductivity models.

Modeling assumptions shall also be clearly documented and technically justified. An entity may use sensitivity analysis to identify how the assumptions affect the results.

A simplified model may be used to perform a GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), as long as the model is more conservative than a more detailed model.

When interpreting assessment results, the entity shall consider the maturity of the modeling, toolset, and techniques applied.

Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Events

The 1-in-100 year planning event shall be based on regionally specific data and technically justifiable statistical analyses (e.g., extreme value theory) and applied to the benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s).


For the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), an entity shall consider the large-scale spatial structure of the GMD event. For the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), an

^[1] The "earth transfer function" is the relationship between the electric fields and magnetic field variations at the surface of the earth.

entity shall consider the small-scale spatial structure of the GMD event (e.g., using magnetometer measurements or realistic electrojet calculations).

Guidelines and Technical Basis

The diagram below provides an overall view of the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process:



The requirements in this standard cover various aspects of the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process.

Benchmark GMD Event (Attachment 1)

The benchmark GMD event defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows that are needed to conduct a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment. The *Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description*, May 2016¹¹ white paper includes the event description, analysis, and example calculations.

Supplemental GMD Event (Attachment 1)

The supplemental GMD event defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows that are needed to conduct a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment. The *Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description*, October 2017¹² white paper includes the event description and analysis.

Requirement R2

A GMD Vulnerability Assessment requires a GIC System model, which is a dc representation of the System, to calculate GIC flow. In a GMD Vulnerability Assessment, GIC simulations are used to determine transformer Reactive Power absorption and transformer thermal response. Details for developing the GIC System model are provided in the NERC GMD Task Force guide: *Application Guide for Computing Geomagnetically-Induced Current in the Bulk Power System*, December 2013.¹³

Underground pipe-type cables present a special modeling situation in that the steel pipe that encloses the power conductors significantly reduces the geoelectric field induced into the

¹¹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/TPL0071RI.aspx</u>.

¹² <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

¹³ http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GIC%20Application %20Guide%202013 approved.pdf.

conductors themselves, while they remain a path for GIC. Solid dielectric cables that are not enclosed by a steel pipe will not experience a reduction in the induced geoelectric field. A planning entity should account for special modeling situations in the GIC system model, if applicable.

Requirement R4

The *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,¹⁴ December 2013 developed by the NERC GMD Task Force provides technical information on GMD-specific considerations for planning studies.

Requirement R5

The benchmark thermal impact assessment of transformers specified in Requirement R6 is based on GIC information for the benchmark GMD Event. This GIC information is determined by the planning entity through simulation of the GIC System model and must be provided to the entity responsible for conducting the thermal impact assessment. GIC information should be provided in accordance with Requirement R5 each time the GMD Vulnerability Assessment is performed since, by definition, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes a documented evaluation of susceptibility to localized equipment damage due to GMD.

The maximum effective GIC value provided in Part 5.1 is used for the benchmark thermal impact assessment. Only those transformers that experience an effective GIC value of 75 A or greater per phase require evaluation in Requirement R6.

GIC(t) provided in Part 5.2 is used to convert the steady state GIC flows to time-series GIC data for the benchmark thermal impact assessment of transformers. This information may be needed by one or more of the methods for performing a benchmark thermal impact assessment. Additional information is in the following section and the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,¹⁵ October 2017.

The peak GIC value of 75 Amps per phase has been shown through thermal modeling to be a conservative threshold below which the risk of exceeding known temperature limits established by technical organizations is low.

Requirement R6

The benchmark thermal impact assessment of a power transformer may be based on manufacturer-provided GIC capability curves, thermal response simulation, thermal impact screening, or other technically justified means. Approaches for conducting the assessment are presented in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper ERO Enterprise-Endorsed*

¹⁴ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning</u> %20Guide approved.pdf.

¹⁵ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

*Implementation Guidance*¹⁶ for this requirement. This ERO-Endorsed document is posted on the NERC Compliance Guidance¹⁷ webpage.

Transformers are exempt from the benchmark thermal impact assessment requirement if the effective GIC value for the transformer is less than 75 A per phase, as determined by a GIC analysis of the System. Justification for this criterion is provided in the *Screening Criterion for Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,¹⁸ October 2017. A documented design specification exceeding this value is also a justifiable threshold criterion that exempts a transformer from Requirement R6.

The benchmark threshold criteria and its associated transformer thermal impact must be evaluated on the basis of effective GIC. Refer to the white papers for additional information.

Requirement R7

Technical considerations for GMD mitigation planning, including operating and equipment strategies, are available in Chapter 5 of the *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,¹⁹ December 2013. Additional information is available in the *2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk-Power System*, ²⁰ February 2012.

Requirement R8

The *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,²¹ December 2013 developed by the NERC GMD Task Force provides technical information on GMD-specific considerations for planning studies.

The supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment process is similar to the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment process described under Requirement R4.

Requirement R9

The supplemental thermal impact assessment specified of transformers in Requirement R10 is based on GIC information for the supplemental GMD Event. This GIC information is determined by the planning entity through simulation of the GIC System model and must be provided to the entity responsible for conducting the thermal impact assessment. GIC information should be provided in accordance with Requirement R9 each time the GMD Vulnerability Assessment is performed since, by definition, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes a documented evaluation of susceptibility to localized equipment damage due to GMD.

¹⁶ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/guidance/EROEndorsedImplementationGuidance/TPL-007-1_Transformer_Thermal_Impact_</u> <u>Assessment_White_Paper.pdf</u>.

¹⁷ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/guidance/Pages/default.aspx</u>.

¹⁸ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

¹⁹ http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning %20Guide_approved.pdf.

²⁰ http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/2012GMD.pdf.

²¹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning</u> %20Guide approved.pdf.

The maximum effective GIC value provided in Part 9.1 is used for the supplemental thermal impact assessment. Only those transformers that experience an effective GIC value of 85 A or greater per phase require evaluation in Requirement R10.

GIC(t) provided in Part 9.2 is used to convert the steady state GIC flows to time-series GIC data for the supplemental thermal impact assessment of transformers. This information may be needed by one or more of the methods for performing a supplemental thermal impact assessment. Additional information is in the following section.

The peak GIC value of 85 Amps per phase has been shown through thermal modeling to be a conservative threshold below which the risk of exceeding known temperature limits established by technical organizations is low.

Requirement R10

The supplemental thermal impact assessment of a power transformer may be based on manufacturer-provided GIC capability curves, thermal response simulation, thermal impact screening, or other technically justified means. Approaches for conducting the assessment are presented in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper ERO Enterprise-Endorsed Implementation Guidance*²² discussed in the Requirement R6 section above. A later version of the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,²³ October 2017, has been developed to include updated information pertinent to the supplemental GMD event and supplemental thermal impact assessment.

Transformers are exempt from the supplemental thermal impact assessment requirement if the effective GIC value for the transformer is less than 85 A per phase, as determined by a GIC analysis of the System. Justification for this criterion is provided in the revised *Screening Criterion for Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,²⁴ October 2017. A documented design specification exceeding this value is also a justifiable threshold criterion that exempts a transformer from Requirement R10.

The supplemental threshold criteria and its associated transformer thermal impact must be evaluated on the basis of effective GIC. Refer to the white papers for additional information.

Requirement R11

Technical considerations for GIC monitoring are contained in Chapter 6 of the 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk-Power System, ²⁵ February 2012. GIC monitoring is generally performed by Hall effect transducers that are attached to the neutral of the wye-grounded transformer. Data from GIC monitors is useful for model validation and situational awareness.

²² <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/guidance/EROEndorsedImplementationGuidance/TPL-007-1 Transformer Thermal Impact</u> <u>Assessment White Paper.pdf</u>.

²³ http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.

²⁴ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

²⁵ http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/2012GMD.pdf.


Responsible entities consider the following in developing a process for obtaining GIC monitor data:

- Monitor locations. An entity's operating process may be constrained by location of existing GIC monitors. However, when planning for additional GIC monitoring installations consider that data from monitors located in areas found to have high GIC based on system studies may provide more useful information for validation and situational awareness purposes. Conversely, data from GIC monitors that are located in the vicinity of transportation systems using direct current (e.g., subways or light rail) may be unreliable.
- Monitor specifications. Capabilities of Hall effect transducers, existing and planned, should be considered in the operating process. When planning new GIC monitor installations, consider monitor data range (e.g., -500 A through + 500 A) and ambient temperature ratings consistent with temperatures in the region in which the monitor will be installed.
- **Sampling Interval.** An entity's operating process may be constrained by capabilities of existing GIC monitors. However, when possible specify data sampling during periods of interest at a rate of 10 seconds or faster.
- **Collection Periods.** The process should specify when the entity expects GIC data to be collected. For example, collection could be required during periods where the Kp index is above a threshold, or when GIC values are above a threshold. Determining when to discontinue collecting GIC data should also be specified to maintain consistency in data collection.
- Data format. Specify time and value formats. For example, Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) (MM/DD/YYYY HH:MM:SS) and GIC Value (Ampere). Positive (+) and negative (-) signs indicate direction of GIC flow. Positive reference is flow from ground into transformer neutral. Time fields should indicate the sampled time rather than system or SCADA time if supported by the GIC monitor system.
- **Data retention.** The entity's process should specify data retention periods, for example 1 year. Data retention periods should be adequately long to support availability for the entity's model validation process and external reporting requirements, if any.
- Additional information. The entity's process should specify collection of other information necessary for making the data useful, for example monitor location and type of neutral connection (e.g., three-phase or single-phase).

Requirement R12

Magnetometers measure changes in the earth's magnetic field. Entities should obtain data from the nearest accessible magnetometer. Sources of magnetometer data include:

• Observatories such as those operated by U.S. Geological Survey and Natural Resources Canada, see figure below for locations:²⁶



- Research institutions and academic universities;
- Entities with installed magnetometers.

Entities that choose to install magnetometers should consider equipment specifications and data format protocols contained in the latest version of the *INTERMAGNET Technical Reference Manual*, Version 4.6, 2012.²⁷

²⁶ <u>http://www.intermagnet.org/index-eng.php</u>.

²⁷ http://www.intermagnet.org/publications/intermag_4-6.pdf.

Rationale

During development of TPL-007-1, text boxes were embedded within the standard to explain the rationale for various parts of the standard. The text from the rationale text boxes was moved to this section upon approval of TPL-007-1 by the NERC Board of Trustees. In developing TPL-007-2, the SDT has made changes to the sections below only when necessary for clarity. Changes are marked with brackets [].

Rationale for Applicability:

Instrumentation transformers and station service transformers do not have significant impact on geomagnetically-induced current (GIC) flows; therefore, these transformers are not included in the applicability for this standard.

Terminal voltage describes line-to-line voltage.

Rationale for R1:

In some areas, planning entities may determine that the most effective approach to conduct a GMD Vulnerability Assessment is through a regional planning organization. No requirement in the standard is intended to prohibit a collaborative approach where roles and responsibilities are determined by a planning organization made up of one or more Planning Coordinator(s).

Rationale for R2:

A GMD Vulnerability Assessment requires a GIC System model to calculate GIC flow which is used to determine transformer Reactive Power absorption and transformer thermal response. Guidance for developing the GIC System model is provided in the *Application Guide Computing Geomagnetically-Induced Current in the Bulk-Power System*,²⁸ December 2013, developed by the NERC GMD Task Force.

The System model specified in Requirement R2 is used in conducting steady state power flow analysis that accounts for the Reactive Power absorption of power transformer(s) due to GIC in the System.

The GIC System model includes all power transformer(s) with a high side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV. The model is used to calculate GIC flow in the network.

The projected System condition for GMD planning may include adjustments to the System that are executable in response to space weather information. These adjustments could include, for example, recalling or postponing maintenance outages.

The Violation Risk Factor (VRF) for Requirement R2 is changed from Medium to High. This change is for consistency with the VRF for approved standard TPL-001-4 Requirement R1, which is proposed for revision in the NERC filing dated August 29, 2014 (Docket No. RM12-1-000). NERC guidelines require consistency among Reliability Standards.

²⁸ http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GIC%20Application %20Guide%202013 approved.pdf.

Rationale for R3:

Requirement R3 allows a responsible entity the flexibility to determine the System steady state voltage criteria for System steady state performance in Table 1. Steady state voltage limits are an example of System steady state performance criteria.

Rationale for R4:

The GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes steady state power flow analysis and the supporting study or studies using the models specified in Requirement R2 that account for the effects of GIC. Performance criteria are specified in Table 1.

At least one System On-Peak Load and at least one System Off-Peak Load must be examined in the analysis.

Distribution of GMD Vulnerability Assessment results provides a means for sharing relevant information with other entities responsible for planning reliability. Results of GIC studies may affect neighboring systems and should be taken into account by planners.

The *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,²⁹ December 2013 developed by the NERC GMD Task Force provides technical information on GMD-specific considerations for planning studies. The provision of information in Requirement R4, Part 4.3, shall be subject to the legal and regulatory obligations for the disclosure of confidential and/or sensitive information.

Rationale for R5:

This GIC information is necessary for determining the thermal impact of GIC on transformers in the planning area and must be provided to entities responsible for performing the thermal impact assessment so that they can accurately perform the assessment. GIC information should be provided in accordance with Requirement R5 as part of the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process since, by definition, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes documented evaluation of susceptibility to localized equipment damage due to GMD.

The maximum effective GIC value provided in Part 5.1 is used for transformer thermal impact assessment.

GIC(t) provided in Part 5.2 can alternatively be used to convert the steady state GIC flows to timeseries GIC data for transformer thermal impact assessment. This information may be needed by one or more of the methods for performing a thermal impact assessment. Additional guidance is available in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,³⁰ October 2017.

A Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that desires GIC(t) may request it from the planning entity. The planning entity shall provide GIC(t) upon request once GIC has been calculated, but

²⁹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning</u> %20Guide approved.pdf.

³⁰ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

no later than 90 calendar days after receipt of a request from the owner and after completion of Requirement R5, Part 5.1.

The provision of information in Requirement R5 shall be subject to the legal and regulatory obligations for the disclosure of confidential and/or sensitive information.

Rationale for R6:

The transformer thermal impact screening criterion has been revised from 15 A per phase to 75 A per phase [for the benchmark GMD event]. Only those transformers that experience an effective GIC value of 75 A per phase or greater require evaluation in Requirement R6. The justification is provided in the *Screening Criterion for Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,³¹ October 2017.

The thermal impact assessment may be based on manufacturer-provided GIC capability curves, thermal response simulation, thermal impact screening, or other technically justified means. The transformer thermal assessment will be repeated or reviewed using previous assessment results each time the planning entity performs a GMD Vulnerability Assessment and provides GIC information as specified in Requirement R5. Approaches for conducting the assessment are presented in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,³² October 2017.

Thermal impact assessments are provided to the planning entity, as determined in Requirement R1, so that identified issues can be included in the GMD Vulnerability Assessment (R4), and the Corrective Action Plan (R7) as necessary.

Thermal impact assessments of non-BES transformers are not required because those transformers do not have a wide-area effect on the reliability of the interconnected Transmission system.

The provision of information in Requirement R6, Part 6.4, shall be subject to the legal and regulatory obligations for the disclosure of confidential and/or sensitive information.

Rationale for R7:

The proposed requirement addresses directives in Order No. 830 for establishing Corrective Action Plan (CAP) deadlines associated with GMD Vulnerability Assessments. In Order No. 830, FERC directed revisions to TPL-007 such that CAPs are developed within one year from the completion of GMD Vulnerability Assessments (P 101). Furthermore, FERC directed establishment of implementation deadlines after the completion of the CAP as follows (P 102):

- Two years for non-hardware mitigation; and
- Four years for hardware mitigation.

The objective of Part 7.4 is to provide awareness to potentially impacted entities when implementation of planned mitigation is not achievable within the deadlines established in Part

³¹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

³² http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.

7.3. Examples of situations beyond the control of the of the responsible entity (see Section 7.4) include, but are not limited to:

- Delays resulting from regulatory/legal processes, such as permitting;
- Delays resulting from stakeholder processes required by tariff;
- Delays resulting from equipment lead times; or

Delays resulting from the inability to acquire necessary Right-of-Way.

Rationale for Table 3:

Table 3 has been revised to use the same ground model designation, FL1, as is being used by USGS. The calculated scaling factor for FL1 is 0.74. [The scaling factor associated with the benchmark GMD event for the Florida earth model (FL1) has been updated to 0.76 in TPL-007-2 based on the earth model published on the USGS public website.]

Rationale for R8 – R10:

The proposed requirements address directives in Order No. 830 for revising the benchmark GMD event used in GMD Vulnerability Assessments (P 44, P 47-49). The requirements add a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment based on the supplemental GMD event that accounts for localized peak geoelectric fields.

Rationale for R11 – R12:

The proposed requirements address directives in Order No. 830 for requiring responsible entities to collect GIC monitoring and magnetometer data as necessary to enable model validation and situational awareness (P 88; P. 90-92). GMD measurement data refers to GIC monitor data and geomagnetic field data in Requirements R11 and R12, respectively. See the Guidelines and Technical Basis section of this standard for technical information.

The objective of Requirement R11 is for entities to obtain GIC data for the Planning Coordinator's planning area or other part of the system included in the Planning Coordinator's GIC System model to inform GMD Vulnerability Assessments. Technical considerations for GIC monitoring are contained in Chapter 9 of the 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk-Power System (NERC 2012 GMD Report). GIC monitoring is generally performed by Hall effect transducers that are attached to the neutral of the transformer and measure dc current flowing through the neutral.

The objective of Requirement R12 is for entities to obtain geomagnetic field data for the Planning Coordinator's planning area to inform GMD Vulnerability Assessments. Magnetometers provide geomagnetic field data by measuring changes in the earth's magnetic field. Sources of geomagnetic field data include:

- Observatories such as those operated by U.S. Geological Survey, Natural Resources Canada, research organizations, or university research facilities;
- Installed magnetometers; and
- Commercial or third-party sources of geomagnetic field data.

Geomagnetic field data for a Planning Coordinator's planning area is obtained from one or more of the above data sources located in the Planning Coordinator's planning area, or by obtaining a geomagnetic field data product for the Planning Coordinator's planning area from a government or research organization. The geomagnetic field data product does not need to be derived from a magnetometer or observatory within the Planning Coordinator's planning area.

Exhibit A

Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-3 Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events Redline

A. Introduction

- **1. Title:** Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events
- **2. Number:** TPL-007-2<u>3</u>
- **3. Purpose:** Establish requirements for Transmission system planned performance during geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) events.
- 4. Applicability:

4.1. Functional Entities:

- **4.1.1.** Planning Coordinator with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2;
- **4.1.2.** Transmission Planner with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2;
- 4.1.3. Transmission Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2; and
- 4.1.4. Generator Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2.
- 4.2. Facilities:
 - **4.2.1.** Facilities that include power transformer(s) with a high side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV.
- 5. Effective Date: See Implementation Plan for TPL-007-23.
- **Background:** During a GMD event, geomagnetically-induced currents (GIC) may cause transformer hot-spot heating or damage, loss of Reactive Power sources, increased Reactive Power demand, and Misoperation(s), the combination of which may result in voltage collapse and blackout.

The only difference between TPL-007-3 and TPL-007-2 is that TPL-007-3 adds a Canadian Variance to address regulatory practices/processes within Canadian jurisdictions and to allow the use of Canadian-specific data and research to define and implement alternative GMD event(s) that achieve at least an equivalent reliability objective of that in TPL-007-2.

B. Requirements and Measures

R1. Each Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with its Transmission Planner(s), shall identify the individual and joint responsibilities of the Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner(s) in the Planning Coordinator's planning area for maintaining models, performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, and implementing process(es) to obtain GMD measurement data as specified in this standard. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- M1. Each Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with its Transmission Planners, shall provide documentation on roles and responsibilities, such as meeting minutes, agreements, copies of procedures or protocols in effect between entities or between departments of a vertically integrated system, or email correspondence that identifies an agreement has been reached on individual and joint responsibilities for maintaining models, performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, and implementing process(es) to obtain GMD measurement data in accordance with Requirement R1.
- R2. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall maintain System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M2. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence in either electronic or hard copy format that it is maintaining System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.
- **R3.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System during the GMD events described in Attachment 1. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- **M3.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence, such as electronic or hard copies of the criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System in accordance with Requirement R3.

Benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s)

- R4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall complete a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment of the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon at least once every 60 calendar months. This benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall use a study or studies based on models identified in Requirement R2, document assumptions, and document summarized results of the steady state analysis. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **4.1.** The study or studies shall include the following conditions:
 - **4.1.1.** System On-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon; and
 - **4.1.2.** System Off-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon.

- **4.2.** The study or studies shall be conducted based on the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1 to determine whether the System meets the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1.
- **4.3.** The benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, and adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later.
 - **4.3.1.** If a recipient of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment provides documented comments on the results, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- M4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have dated evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment meeting all of the requirements in Requirement R4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, and adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later, as specified in Requirement R4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments in accordance with Requirement R4.
- **R5.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide GIC flow information to be used for the benchmark thermal impact assessment of transformers specified in Requirement R6 to each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns an applicable Bulk Electric System (BES) power transformer in the planning area. The GIC flow information shall include: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **5.1.** The maximum effective GIC value for the worst case geoelectric field orientation for the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1. This value shall be provided to the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.

- **5.2.** The effective GIC time series, GIC(t), calculated using the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1 in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area. GIC(t) shall be provided within 90 calendar days of receipt of the written request and after determination of the maximum effective GIC value in Part 5.1.
- **M5.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided the maximum effective GIC values to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area as specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided GIC(t) in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.
- **R6.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A per phase or greater. The benchmark thermal impact assessment shall: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - 6.1. Be based on the effective GIC flow information provided in Requirement R5;
 - 6.2. Document assumptions used in the analysis;
 - **6.3.** Describe suggested actions and supporting analysis to mitigate the impact of GICs, if any; and
 - **6.4.** Be performed and provided to the responsible entities, as determined in Requirement R1, within 24 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1.
- **M6.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its benchmark thermal impact assessment for all of its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A per phase or greater, and shall have evidence such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided its thermal impact assessment to the responsible entities as specified in Requirement R6.
- **R7.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, that concludes through the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment conducted in Requirement R4 that their System does not meet the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1, shall develop a Corrective

Action Plan (CAP) addressing how the performance requirements will be met. The CAP shall: [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- **7.1.** List System deficiencies and the associated actions needed to achieve required System performance. Examples of such actions include:
 - Installation, modification, retirement, or removal of Transmission and generation Facilities and any associated equipment.
 - Installation, modification, or removal of Protection Systems or Remedial Action Schemes.
 - Use of Operating Procedures, specifying how long they will be needed as part of the CAP.
 - Use of Demand-Side Management, new technologies, or other initiatives.
- **7.2.** Be developed within one year of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.
- **7.3.** Include a timetable, subject to revision by the responsible entity in Part 7.4, for implementing the selected actions from Part 7.1. The timetable shall:
 - **7.3.1.** Specify implementation of non-hardware mitigation, if any, within two years of development of the CAP; and
 - **7.3.2.** Specify implementation of hardware mitigation, if any, within four years of development of the CAP.
- **7.4.** Be revised if situations beyond the control of the responsible entity determined in Requirement R1 prevent implementation of the CAP within the timetable for implementation provided in Part 7.3. The revised CAP shall document the following, and be updated at least once every 12 calendar months until implemented:
 - **7.4.1.** Circumstances causing the delay for fully or partially implementing the selected actions in Part 7.1;
 - **7.4.2.** Description of the original CAP, and any previous changes to the CAP, with the associated timetable(s) for implementing the selected actions in Part 7.1; and
 - **7.4.3.** Revisions to the selected actions in Part 7.1, if any, including utilization of Operating Procedures if applicable, and the updated timetable for implementing the selected actions.
- **7.5.** Be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission Planner(s), and functional entities referenced in the CAP within 90 calendar days of development or revision, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of development or revision, whichever is later.

- **7.5.1.** If a recipient of the CAP provides documented comments on the results, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- **M7.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, that concludes, through the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment conducted in Requirement R4, that the responsible entity's System does not meet the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1 shall have evidence such as dated electronic or hard copies of its CAP including timetable for implementing selected actions, as specified in Requirement R7. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has revised its CAP if situations beyond the responsible entity's control prevent implementation of the CAP within the timetable specified. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its CAP or relevant information, if any, (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission Planner(s), and functional entities referenced in the CAP within 90 calendar days of development or revision, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of development or revision, whichever is later as specified in Requirement R7. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its CAP within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments, in accordance with Requirement R7.

Supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s)

- R8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall complete a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment of the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon at least once every 60 calendar months. This supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall use a study or studies based on models identified in Requirement R2, document assumptions, and document summarized results of the steady state analysis. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - 8.1. The study or studies shall include the following conditions:
 - **8.1.1.** System On-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon; and
 - **8.1.2.** System Off-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon.

- **8.2.** The study or studies shall be conducted based on the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1 to determine whether the System meets the performance requirements for the steady state planning supplemental GMD event contained in Table 1.
- **8.3.** If the analysis concludes there is Cascading caused by the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1, an evaluation of possible actions designed to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the consequences and adverse impacts of the event(s) shall be conducted.
- **8.4.** The supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later.
 - **8.4.1.** If a recipient of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment provides documented comments on the results, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- **M8.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have dated evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment meeting all of the requirements in Requirement R8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its supplemental GMD Vulnerability: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later, as specified in Requirement R8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments in accordance with Requirement R8.
- **R9.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide GIC flow information to be used for the supplemental thermal impact assessment of transformers specified in Requirement R10 to each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns an applicable Bulk Electric System (BES) power transformer in the planning area. The GIC flow information shall include: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- **9.1.** The maximum effective GIC value for the worst case geoelectric field orientation for the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1. This value shall be provided to the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.
- **9.2.** The effective GIC time series, GIC(t), calculated using the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1 in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area. GIC(t) shall be provided within 90 calendar days of receipt of the written request and after determination of the maximum effective GIC value in Part 9.1.
- M9. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided the maximum effective GIC values to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area as specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided GIC(t) in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.
- **R10.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A per phase or greater. The supplemental thermal impact assessment shall: [*Violation Risk Factor: Medium*] [*Time Horizon: Long-term Planning*]
 - **10.1.** Be based on the effective GIC flow information provided in Requirement R9;
 - 10.2. Document assumptions used in the analysis;
 - **10.3.** Describe suggested actions and supporting analysis to mitigate the impact of GICs, if any; and
 - **10.4.** Be performed and provided to the responsible entities, as determined in Requirement R1, within 24 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1.
- **M10.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its supplemental thermal impact assessment for all of its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A per phase or greater, and shall have evidence such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided its supplemental thermal impact assessment to the responsible entities as specified in Requirement R10.

GMD Measurement Data Processes

- **R11.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall implement a process to obtain GIC monitor data from at least one GIC monitor located in the Planning Coordinator's planning area or other part of the system included in the Planning Coordinator's GIC System model. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M11. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its GIC monitor location(s) and documentation of its process to obtain GIC monitor data in accordance with Requirement R11.
- **R12.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall implement a process to obtain geomagnetic field data for its Planning Coordinator's planning area. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M12. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its process to obtain geomagnetic field data for its Planning Coordinator's planning area in accordance with Requirement R12.

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

- **1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority:** "Compliance Enforcement Authority" means NERC or the Regional Entity, or any entity as otherwise designated by an Applicable Governmental Authority, in their respective roles of monitoring and/or enforcing compliance with mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards in their respective jurisdictions.
- **1.2.** Evidence Retention: The following evidence retention period(s) identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full-time period since the last audit.

The applicable entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

- For Requirements R1, R2, R3, R5, R6, R9, and R10, each responsible entity shall retain documentation as evidence for five years.
- For Requirements R4 and R8, each responsible entity shall retain documentation of the current GMD Vulnerability Assessment and the preceding GMD Vulnerability Assessment.

- For Requirement R7, each responsible entity shall retain documentation as evidence for five years or until all actions in the Corrective Action Plan are completed, whichever is later.
- For Requirements R11 and R12, each responsible entity shall retain documentation as evidence for three years.
- **1.3.** Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program: As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, "Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program" refers to the identification of the processes that will be used to evaluate data or information for the purpose of assessing performance or outcomes with the associated Reliability Standard.

Table 1: Steady State Planning GMD Event

Steady State:

- a. Voltage collapse, Cascading and uncontrolled islanding shall not occur.
- b. Generation loss is acceptable as a consequence of the steady state planning GMD events.
- c. Planned System adjustments such as Transmission configuration changes and re-dispatch of generation are allowed if such adjustments are executable within the time duration applicable to the Facility Ratings.

Category	Initial Condition	Event	Interruption of Firm Transmission Service Allowed	Load Loss Allowed	
Benchmark GMD Event - GMD Event with Outages	 System as may be postured in response to space weather information¹, and then GMD event² 	Reactive Power compensation devices and other Transmission Facilities removed as a result of Protection System operation or Misoperation due to harmonics during the GMD event	Yes ³	Yes ³	
Supplemental GMD Event - GMD Event with Outages	 System as may be postured in response to space weather information¹, and then GMD event² 	Reactive Power compensation devices and other Transmission Facilities removed as a result of Protection System operation or Misoperation due to harmonics during the GMD event	Yes	Yes	
	Table 1: Steady State Performance Footnotes				

- 1. The System condition for GMD planning may include adjustments to posture the System that are executable in response to space weather information.
- 2. The GMD conditions for the benchmark and supplemental planning events are described in Attachment 1.
- 3. Load loss as a result of manual or automatic Load shedding (e.g., UVLS) and/or curtailment of Firm Transmission Service may be used to meet BES performance requirements during studied GMD conditions. The likelihood and magnitude of Load loss or curtailment of Firm Transmission Service should be minimized.

Violation Severity Levels

R #		Violation Severity Levels				
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL		
R1.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with its Transmission Planner(s), failed to determine and identify individual or joint responsibilities of the Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner(s) in the Planning Coordinator's planning area for maintaining models, performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, and implementing process(es) to obtain GMD measurement data as specified in this standard.		
R2.	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not maintain either System models or GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the studies	The responsible entity did not maintain both System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the studies		

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
			needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.	needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.	
R3.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not have criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System during the GMD events described in Attachment 1 as required.	
R4.	The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 60 calendar months and less than or equal to 64 calendar months since the last benchmark GMD	The responsible entity's completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy one of the elements listed in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.3; OR	The responsible entity's completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy two of the elements listed in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.3; OR	The responsible entity's completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy three of the elements listed in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.3; OR	
	Vulnerability Assessment.	The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 64 calendar months and less than or equal to 68 calendar months since the	The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 68 calendar months and less than or equal to 72 calendar months since the	The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 72 calendar months since the last benchmark	

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
		last benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	last benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	GMD Vulnerability Assessment; OR The responsible entity does not have a completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	
R5.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 90 calendar days and less than or equal to 100 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 100 calendar days and less than or equal to 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity did not provide the maximum effective GIC value to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area; OR The responsible entity did not provide the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), upon written request.	
R6.	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for 5% or less or one of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for more than 5% up to (and including) 10% or two of its solely owned and jointly	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for more than 10% up to (and including) 15% or three of its solely owned and	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for more than 15% or more than three of its solely owned and jointly owned	

R #	Violation Severity Levels			
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
	transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 24 calendar months and less than or equal to 26 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1.	owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 26 calendar months and less than or equal to 28 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1; OR The responsible entity failed to include one of the	jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 28 calendar months and less than or equal to 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1; OR The responsible entity failed to include two of the	applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1; OR The responsible entity failed to include three of the required elements as listed

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
		required elements as listed in Requirement R6, Parts 6.1 through 6.3.	required elements as listed in Requirement R6, Parts 6.1 through 6.3.	in Requirement R6, Parts 6.1 through 6.3.	
R7.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with one of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with two of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with three of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with four or more of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5; OR The responsible entity did not have a Corrective Action Plan as required by Requirement R7.	
R8.	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy one of elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy two of elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy three of the elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy four of the elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
	than 60 calendar months and less than or equal to 64 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	than 64 calendar months and less than or equal to 68 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	than 68 calendar months and less than or equal to 72 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	than 72 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment; OR The responsible entity does not have a completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	
R9.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 90 calendar days and less than or equal to 100 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 100 calendar days and less than or equal to 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity did not provide the maximum effective GIC value to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area; OR The responsible entity did not provide the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), upon written request.	
R10.	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for 5% or less or one of its	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for more than 5% up to (and	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for more than 10% up to	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for more than 15% or more	

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
	solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 24 calendar months and less than or equal to 26 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1.	including) 10% or two of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 26 calendar months and less than or equal to 28 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1 OR	(and including) 15% or three of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 28 calendar months and less than or equal to 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1; OR	than three of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1; OR	

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
		The responsible entity failed to include one of the required elements as listed in Requirement R10, Parts 10.1 through 10.3.	The responsible entity failed to include two of the required elements as listed in Requirement R10, Parts 10.1 through 10.3.	The responsible entity failed to include three of the required elements as listed in Requirement R10, Parts 10.1 through 10.3.	
R11.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not implement a process to obtain GIC monitor data from at least one GIC monitor located in the Planning Coordinator's planning area or other part of the system included in the Planning Coordinator's GIC System Model.	
R12.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not implement a process to obtain geomagnetic field data for its Planning Coordinator's planning area.	

D. Regional Variances

None.

D.A. Regional Variance for Canadian Jurisdictions

This Variance shall be applicable in those Canadian jurisdictions where the Variance has been approved for use by the applicable governmental authority or has otherwise become effective in the jurisdiction.

<u>All references to "Attachment 1" in the standard are replaced with "Attachment 1 or Attachment 1-CAN."</u>

In addition, this Variance replaces Requirement R7, Part 7.3 with the following:

- **D.A.7.3.** Include a timetable, subject to revision by the responsible entity in Part 7.4, for implementing the selected actions from Part 7.1. The timetable shall:
 - D.A.7.3.1. Specify implementation of non-hardware mitigation, if any, within two years of the later of the development of the CAP or receipt of regulatory approvals, if required; and
 - **D.A.7.3.2.** Specify implementation of hardware mitigation, if any, within four years of the later of the development of the CAP or receipt of regulatory approvals, if required.

E. Associated Documents

Attachment 1

Attachment 1-CAN

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	December 17, 2014	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	New
2	November 9, 2017	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	Revised to respond to directives in FERC Order No. 830.
2	November 25, 2018	FERC Order issued approving TPL-007-2. Docket No. RM18-8-000	
<u>3</u>	<u>February 7, 2019</u>	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	<u>Canadian</u> <u>Variance</u>

Attachment 1

Calculating Geoelectric Fields for the Benchmark and Supplemental GMD Events

The benchmark GMD event¹ defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows that are needed to conduct a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment. It is composed of the following elements: (1) a reference peak geoelectric field amplitude of 8 V/km derived from statistical analysis of historical magnetometer data; (2) scaling factors to account for local geomagnetic latitude; (3) scaling factors to account for local earth conductivity; and (4) a reference geomagnetic field time series or waveform to facilitate time-domain analysis of GMD impact on equipment.

The supplemental GMD event is composed of similar elements as described above, except (1) the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude is 12 V/km over a localized area; and (2) the geomagnetic field time series or waveform includes a local enhancement in the waveform.²

The regional geoelectric field peak amplitude used in GMD Vulnerability Assessment, E_{peak} , can be obtained from the reference geoelectric field value of 8 V/km for the benchmark GMD event (1) or 12 V/km for the supplemental GMD event (2) using the following relationships:

$$E_{peak} = 8 \times \alpha \times \beta_b (V/km) \tag{1}$$

$$E_{peak} = 12 \times \alpha \times \beta_s (V/km)$$
⁽²⁾

where, α is the scaling factor to account for local geomagnetic latitude, and β is a scaling factor to account for the local earth conductivity structure. Subscripts *b* and *s* for the β scaling factor denote association with the benchmark or supplemental GMD events, respectively.

Scaling the Geomagnetic Field

The benchmark and supplemental GMD events are defined for geomagnetic latitude of 60° and must be scaled to account for regional differences based on geomagnetic latitude. Table 2 provides a scaling factor correlating peak geoelectric field to geomagnetic latitude. Alternatively, the scaling factor α is computed with the empirical expression:

$$\alpha = 0.001 \times e^{(0.115 \times L)} \tag{3}$$

where, L is the geomagnetic latitude in degrees and $0.1 \le \alpha \le 1$.

¹ The Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description, May 2016 is available on the Related Information webpage for TPL-007-1: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/TPL0071RD/Benchmark_clean_May12_complete.pdf</u>.

² The extent of local enhancements is on the order of 100 km in North-South (latitude) direction but longer in East-West (longitude) direction. The local enhancement in the geomagnetic field occurs over the time period of 2-5 minutes. Additional information is available in the Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description, October 2017 white paper on the Project 2013-03 Geomagnetic Disturbance Mitigation project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

For large planning areas that cover more than one scaling factor from Table 2, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment should be based on a peak geoelectric field that is:

- calculated by using the most conservative (largest) value for α; or
- calculated assuming a non-uniform or piecewise uniform geomagnetic field.

Table 2: Geomagnetic Field Scaling Factors for the Benchmark and Supplemental GMD Events		
Geomagnetic Latitude (Degrees)	Scaling Factor1 (α)	
≤ 40	0.10	
45	0.2	
50	0.3	
54	0.5	
56	0.6	
57	0.7	
58	0.8	
59	0.9	
≥ 60	1.0	

Scaling the Geoelectric Field

The benchmark GMD event is defined for the reference Quebec earth model described in Table 4. The peak geoelectric field, E_{peak}, used in a GMD Vulnerability Assessment may be obtained by either:

- Calculating the geoelectric field for the ground conductivity in the planning area and the reference geomagnetic field time series scaled according to geomagnetic latitude, using a procedure such as the plane wave method described in the NERC GMD Task Force GIC Application Guide;³ or
- Using the earth conductivity scaling factor β from Table 3 that correlates to the ground conductivity map in Figure 1 or Figure 2. Along with the scaling factor α from equation (3) or Table 2, β is applied to the reference geoelectric field using equation (1 or 2, as applicable) to obtain the regional geoelectric field peak amplitude E_{peak} to be used in GMD Vulnerability Assessments. When a ground conductivity model is not available, the planning entity should use the largest β factor of adjacent physiographic regions or a technically justified value.

³ Available at the NERC GMD Task Force project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Pages/Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Task-Force-(GMDTF)-2013.aspx</u>.

The earth models used to calculate Table 3 for the United States were obtained from publicly available information published on the U. S. Geological Survey website.⁴ The models used to calculate Table 3 for Canada were obtained from Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) and reflect the average structure for large regions. A planner can also use specific earth model(s) with documented justification and the reference geomagnetic field time series to calculate the β factor(s) as follows:

$$\beta_b = E/8$$
 for the benchmark GMD event (4)

$$\beta_s = E/12$$
 for the supplemental GMD (5)

where, *E* is the absolute value of peak geoelectric in V/km obtained from the technically justified earth model and the reference geomagnetic field time series.

For large planning areas that span more than one β scaling factor, the most conservative (largest) value for β may be used in determining the peak geoelectric field to obtain conservative results. Alternatively, a planner could perform analysis using a non-uniform or piecewise uniform geoelectric field.

Applying the Localized Peak Geoelectric Field in the Supplemental GMD Event

The peak geoelectric field of the supplemental GMD event occurs in a localized area.⁵ Planners have flexibility to determine how to apply the localized peak geoelectric field over the planning area in performing GIC calculations. Examples of approaches are:

- Apply the peak geoelectric field (12 V/km scaled to the planning area) over the entire planning area;
- Apply a spatially limited (12 V/km scaled to the planning area) peak geoelectric field (e.g., 100 km in North-South latitude direction and 500 km in East-West longitude direction) over a portion(s) of the system, and apply the benchmark GMD event over the rest of the system; or
- Other methods to adjust the benchmark GMD event analysis to account for the localized geoelectric field enhancement of the supplemental GMD event.

⁴ Available at <u>http://geomag.usgs.gov/conductivity/</u>.

⁵ See the Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Description white paper located on the Project 2013-03 Geomagnetic Disturbance Mitigation project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.




Figure 1: Physiographic Regions of the Continental United States⁶



Figure 2: Physiographic Regions of Canada

⁶ Additional map detail is available at the U.S. Geological Survey: <u>http://geomag.usgs.gov/</u>.

Table 3: Geoelectric Field Scaling Factors				
Earth model	Scaling Factor Benchmark Event (β _b)	Scaling Factor Supplemental Event (βs)		
AK1A	0.56	0.51		
AK1B	0.56	0.51		
AP1	0.33	0.30		
AP2	0.82	0.78		
BR1	0.22	0.22		
CL1	0.76	0.73		
CO1	0.27	0.25		
CP1	0.81	0.77		
CP2	0.95	0.86		
FL1	0.76	0.73		
CS1	0.41	0.37		
IP1	0.94	0.90		
IP2	0.28	0.25		
IP3	0.93	0.90		
IP4	0.41	0.35		
NE1	0.81	0.77		
PB1	0.62	0.55		
PB2	0.46	0.39		
PT1	1.17	1.19		
SL1	0.53	0.49		
SU1	0.93	0.90		
BOU	0.28	0.24		
FBK	0.56	0.56		
PRU	0.21	0.22		
BC	0.67	0.62		
PRAIRIES	0.96	0.88		
SHIELD	1.0	1.0		
ATLANTIC	0.79	0.76		

Rationale: Scaling factors in Table 3 are dependent upon the frequency content of the reference storm. Consequently, the benchmark GMD event and the supplemental GMD event may produce different scaling factors for a given earth model.

The scaling factor associated with the benchmark GMD event for the Florida earth model (FL1) has been updated based on the earth model published on the USGS public website.

Table 4: Reference Earth Model (Quebec)			
Layer Thickness (km)	Resistivity (Ω-m)		
15	20,000		
10	200		
125	1,000		
200	100		
∞	3		

Reference Geomagnetic Field Time Series or Waveform for the Benchmark GMD $\mathsf{Event}^{\scriptscriptstyle 7}$

The geomagnetic field measurement record of the March 13-14 1989 GMD event, measured at the NRCan Ottawa geomagnetic observatory, is the basis for the reference geomagnetic field waveform to be used to calculate the GIC time series, GIC(t), required for transformer thermal impact assessment.

The geomagnetic latitude of the Ottawa geomagnetic observatory is 55°; therefore, the amplitudes of the geomagnetic field measurement data were scaled up to the 60° reference geomagnetic latitude (see Figure 3) such that the resulting peak geoelectric field amplitude computed using the reference earth model was 8 V/km (see Figures 4 and 5). The sampling rate for the geomagnetic field waveform is 10 seconds.⁸ To use this geoelectric field time series when a different earth model is applicable, it should be scaled with the appropriate benchmark conductivity scaling factor β_{b} .

⁷ Refer to the Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description white paper for details on the determination of the reference geomagnetic field waveform: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/TPL0071RI.aspx</u>.

⁸ The data file of the benchmark geomagnetic field waveform is available on the Related Information webpage for TPL-007-1: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/TPL0071RI.aspx</u>.




Figure 3: Benchmark Geomagnetic Field Waveform Red Bn (Northward), Blue Be (Eastward)




Figure 4: Benchmark Geoelectric Field Waveform E_E (Eastward)




Figure 5: Benchmark Geoelectric Field Waveform E_N (Northward)


Reference Geomagnetic Field Time Series or Waveform for the Supplemental GMD \textsc{Event}^9


The geomagnetic field measurement record of the March 13-14, 1989 GMD event, measured at the NRCan Ottawa geomagnetic observatory, is the basis for the reference geomagnetic field waveform to be used to calculate the GIC time series, GIC(t), required for transformer thermal impact assessment for the supplemental GMD event. The supplemental GMD event waveform differs from the benchmark GMD event waveform in that the supplemental GMD event waveform has a local enhancement.

The geomagnetic latitude of the Ottawa geomagnetic observatory is 55°; therefore, the amplitudes of the geomagnetic field measurement data were scaled up to the 60° reference geomagnetic latitude (see Figure 6) such that the resulting peak geoelectric field amplitude computed using the reference earth model was 12 V/km (see Figure7). The sampling rate for the geomagnetic field waveform is 10 seconds.¹⁰ To use this geoelectric field time series when a different earth model is applicable, it should be scaled with the appropriate supplemental conductivity scaling factor β_s .

⁹ Refer to the Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description white paper for details on the determination of the reference geomagnetic field waveform: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

¹⁰ The data file of the benchmark geomagnetic field waveform is available on the NERC GMD Task Force project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Pages/Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Task-Force-(GMDTF)-2013.aspx</u>.








Figure 7: Supplemental Geoelectric Field Waveform Blue E_N (Northward), Red E_E (Eastward)

Attachment 1-CAN

Attachment 1-CAN provides an alternative that a Canadian entity may use in lieu of the benchmark or supplemental GMD event(s) defined in Attachment 1 for performing GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s).

A Canadian entity may use the provisions of Attachment 1-CAN if it has regionally specific information that provides a technically justified means to re-define a 1-in-100 year GMD planning event(s) within its planning area.

Information for the Alternative Methodology

<u>GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s) require the use of geophysical and engineering models.</u> <u>Canadian-specific data is available and growing. Ongoing research allows for more accurate characterization of regional parameters used in these models. Such Canadian-specific data includes geomagnetic field, earth conductivity, and geomagnetically induced current measurements that can be used for modeling and simulation validation.</u>

Information used to calculate geoelectric fields for the benchmark and supplemental GMD events shall be clearly documented and technically justified. For example, the factors involved in the calculation of geoelectric fields are geomagnetic field variations and an earth transfer function(s).^[1] Technically justified information used in modelling geomagnetic field variations may include: technical documents produced by governmental entities such as Natural Resources Canada; technical papers published in peer-reviewed journals; and data sets gathered using sound scientific principles. An earth transfer function may rely on magnetotelluric measurements or earth conductivity models.

Modeling assumptions shall also be clearly documented and technically justified. An entity may use sensitivity analysis to identify how the assumptions affect the results.

A simplified model may be used to perform a GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), as long as the model is more conservative than a more detailed model.

When interpreting assessment results, the entity shall consider the maturity of the modeling, toolset, and techniques applied.

Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Events

The 1-in-100 year planning event shall be based on regionally specific data and technically justifiable statistical analyses (e.g., extreme value theory) and applied to the benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s).


For the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), an entity shall consider the large-scale spatial structure of the GMD event. For the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), an

^[1] The "earth transfer function" is the relationship between the electric fields and magnetic field variations at the surface of the earth.

entity shall consider the small-scale spatial structure of the GMD event (e.g., using magnetometer measurements or realistic electrojet calculations).

Guidelines and Technical Basis

The diagram below provides an overall view of the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process:



The requirements in this standard cover various aspects of the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process.

Benchmark GMD Event (Attachment 1)

The benchmark GMD event defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows that are needed to conduct a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment. The *Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description*, May 2016¹¹ white paper includes the event description, analysis, and example calculations.

Supplemental GMD Event (Attachment 1)

The supplemental GMD event defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows that are needed to conduct a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment. The *Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description*, October 2017¹² white paper includes the event description and analysis.

Requirement R2

A GMD Vulnerability Assessment requires a GIC System model, which is a dc representation of the System, to calculate GIC flow. In a GMD Vulnerability Assessment, GIC simulations are used to determine transformer Reactive Power absorption and transformer thermal response. Details for developing the GIC System model are provided in the NERC GMD Task Force guide: *Application Guide for Computing Geomagnetically-Induced Current in the Bulk Power System*, December 2013.¹³

Underground pipe-type cables present a special modeling situation in that the steel pipe that encloses the power conductors significantly reduces the geoelectric field induced into the

¹¹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/TPL0071RI.aspx</u>.

¹² <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

¹³ http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GIC%20Application %20Guide%202013 approved.pdf.

conductors themselves, while they remain a path for GIC. Solid dielectric cables that are not enclosed by a steel pipe will not experience a reduction in the induced geoelectric field. A planning entity should account for special modeling situations in the GIC system model, if applicable.

Requirement R4

The *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,¹⁴ December 2013 developed by the NERC GMD Task Force provides technical information on GMD-specific considerations for planning studies.

Requirement R5

The benchmark thermal impact assessment of transformers specified in Requirement R6 is based on GIC information for the benchmark GMD Event. This GIC information is determined by the planning entity through simulation of the GIC System model and must be provided to the entity responsible for conducting the thermal impact assessment. GIC information should be provided in accordance with Requirement R5 each time the GMD Vulnerability Assessment is performed since, by definition, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes a documented evaluation of susceptibility to localized equipment damage due to GMD.

The maximum effective GIC value provided in Part 5.1 is used for the benchmark thermal impact assessment. Only those transformers that experience an effective GIC value of 75 A or greater per phase require evaluation in Requirement R6.

GIC(t) provided in Part 5.2 is used to convert the steady state GIC flows to time-series GIC data for the benchmark thermal impact assessment of transformers. This information may be needed by one or more of the methods for performing a benchmark thermal impact assessment. Additional information is in the following section and the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,¹⁵ October 2017.

The peak GIC value of 75 Amps per phase has been shown through thermal modeling to be a conservative threshold below which the risk of exceeding known temperature limits established by technical organizations is low.

Requirement R6

The benchmark thermal impact assessment of a power transformer may be based on manufacturer-provided GIC capability curves, thermal response simulation, thermal impact screening, or other technically justified means. Approaches for conducting the assessment are presented in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper ERO Enterprise-Endorsed*

¹⁴ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning</u> <u>%20Guide_approved.pdf</u>.

¹⁵ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

*Implementation Guidance*¹⁶ for this requirement. This ERO-Endorsed document is posted on the NERC Compliance Guidance¹⁷ webpage.

Transformers are exempt from the benchmark thermal impact assessment requirement if the effective GIC value for the transformer is less than 75 A per phase, as determined by a GIC analysis of the System. Justification for this criterion is provided in the *Screening Criterion for Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,¹⁸ October 2017. A documented design specification exceeding this value is also a justifiable threshold criterion that exempts a transformer from Requirement R6.

The benchmark threshold criteria and its associated transformer thermal impact must be evaluated on the basis of effective GIC. Refer to the white papers for additional information.

Requirement R7

Technical considerations for GMD mitigation planning, including operating and equipment strategies, are available in Chapter 5 of the *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,¹⁹ December 2013. Additional information is available in the *2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk-Power System*, ²⁰ February 2012.

Requirement R8

The *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,²¹ December 2013 developed by the NERC GMD Task Force provides technical information on GMD-specific considerations for planning studies.

The supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment process is similar to the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment process described under Requirement R4.

Requirement R9

The supplemental thermal impact assessment specified of transformers in Requirement R10 is based on GIC information for the supplemental GMD Event. This GIC information is determined by the planning entity through simulation of the GIC System model and must be provided to the entity responsible for conducting the thermal impact assessment. GIC information should be provided in accordance with Requirement R9 each time the GMD Vulnerability Assessment is performed since, by definition, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes a documented evaluation of susceptibility to localized equipment damage due to GMD.

¹⁶ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/guidance/EROEndorsedImplementationGuidance/TPL-007-1_Transformer_Thermal_Impact_</u> <u>Assessment_White_Paper.pdf</u>.

¹⁷ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/guidance/Pages/default.aspx.</u>

¹⁸ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

¹⁹ http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning %20Guide_approved.pdf.

²⁰ http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/2012GMD.pdf.

²¹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning</u> %20Guide approved.pdf.

The maximum effective GIC value provided in Part 9.1 is used for the supplemental thermal impact assessment. Only those transformers that experience an effective GIC value of 85 A or greater per phase require evaluation in Requirement R10.

GIC(t) provided in Part 9.2 is used to convert the steady state GIC flows to time-series GIC data for the supplemental thermal impact assessment of transformers. This information may be needed by one or more of the methods for performing a supplemental thermal impact assessment. Additional information is in the following section.

The peak GIC value of 85 Amps per phase has been shown through thermal modeling to be a conservative threshold below which the risk of exceeding known temperature limits established by technical organizations is low.

Requirement R10

The supplemental thermal impact assessment of a power transformer may be based on manufacturer-provided GIC capability curves, thermal response simulation, thermal impact screening, or other technically justified means. Approaches for conducting the assessment are presented in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper ERO Enterprise-Endorsed Implementation Guidance*²² discussed in the Requirement R6 section above. A later version of the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,²³ October 2017, has been developed to include updated information pertinent to the supplemental GMD event and supplemental thermal impact assessment.

Transformers are exempt from the supplemental thermal impact assessment requirement if the effective GIC value for the transformer is less than 85 A per phase, as determined by a GIC analysis of the System. Justification for this criterion is provided in the revised *Screening Criterion for Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,²⁴ October 2017. A documented design specification exceeding this value is also a justifiable threshold criterion that exempts a transformer from Requirement R10.

The supplemental threshold criteria and its associated transformer thermal impact must be evaluated on the basis of effective GIC. Refer to the white papers for additional information.

Requirement R11

Technical considerations for GIC monitoring are contained in Chapter 6 of the 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk-Power System, ²⁵ February 2012. GIC monitoring is generally performed by Hall effect transducers that are attached to the neutral of the wye-grounded transformer. Data from GIC monitors is useful for model validation and situational awareness.

²² <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/guidance/EROEndorsedImplementationGuidance/TPL-007-1 Transformer Thermal Impact</u> <u>Assessment White Paper.pdf</u>.

²³ http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.

²⁴ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

²⁵ http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/2012GMD.pdf.


Responsible entities consider the following in developing a process for obtaining GIC monitor data:

- Monitor locations. An entity's operating process may be constrained by location of existing GIC monitors. However, when planning for additional GIC monitoring installations consider that data from monitors located in areas found to have high GIC based on system studies may provide more useful information for validation and situational awareness purposes. Conversely, data from GIC monitors that are located in the vicinity of transportation systems using direct current (e.g., subways or light rail) may be unreliable.
- Monitor specifications. Capabilities of Hall effect transducers, existing and planned, should be considered in the operating process. When planning new GIC monitor installations, consider monitor data range (e.g., -500 A through + 500 A) and ambient temperature ratings consistent with temperatures in the region in which the monitor will be installed.
- **Sampling Interval.** An entity's operating process may be constrained by capabilities of existing GIC monitors. However, when possible specify data sampling during periods of interest at a rate of 10 seconds or faster.
- **Collection Periods.** The process should specify when the entity expects GIC data to be collected. For example, collection could be required during periods where the Kp index is above a threshold, or when GIC values are above a threshold. Determining when to discontinue collecting GIC data should also be specified to maintain consistency in data collection.
- Data format. Specify time and value formats. For example, Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) (MM/DD/YYYY HH:MM:SS) and GIC Value (Ampere). Positive (+) and negative (-) signs indicate direction of GIC flow. Positive reference is flow from ground into transformer neutral. Time fields should indicate the sampled time rather than system or SCADA time if supported by the GIC monitor system.
- **Data retention.** The entity's process should specify data retention periods, for example 1 year. Data retention periods should be adequately long to support availability for the entity's model validation process and external reporting requirements, if any.
- Additional information. The entity's process should specify collection of other information necessary for making the data useful, for example monitor location and type of neutral connection (e.g., three-phase or single-phase).

Requirement R12

Magnetometers measure changes in the earth's magnetic field. Entities should obtain data from the nearest accessible magnetometer. Sources of magnetometer data include:

• Observatories such as those operated by U.S. Geological Survey and Natural Resources Canada, see figure below for locations:²⁶



- Research institutions and academic universities;
- Entities with installed magnetometers.

Entities that choose to install magnetometers should consider equipment specifications and data format protocols contained in the latest version of the *INTERMAGNET Technical Reference Manual*, Version 4.6, 2012.²⁷

²⁶ <u>http://www.intermagnet.org/index-eng.php</u>.

²⁷ http://www.intermagnet.org/publications/intermag_4-6.pdf.

Rationale

During development of TPL-007-1, text boxes were embedded within the standard to explain the rationale for various parts of the standard. The text from the rationale text boxes was moved to this section upon approval of TPL-007-1 by the NERC Board of Trustees. In developing TPL-007-2, the SDT has made changes to the sections below only when necessary for clarity. Changes are marked with brackets [].

Rationale for Applicability:

Instrumentation transformers and station service transformers do not have significant impact on geomagnetically-induced current (GIC) flows; therefore, these transformers are not included in the applicability for this standard.

Terminal voltage describes line-to-line voltage.

Rationale for R1:

In some areas, planning entities may determine that the most effective approach to conduct a GMD Vulnerability Assessment is through a regional planning organization. No requirement in the standard is intended to prohibit a collaborative approach where roles and responsibilities are determined by a planning organization made up of one or more Planning Coordinator(s).

Rationale for R2:

A GMD Vulnerability Assessment requires a GIC System model to calculate GIC flow which is used to determine transformer Reactive Power absorption and transformer thermal response. Guidance for developing the GIC System model is provided in the *Application Guide Computing Geomagnetically-Induced Current in the Bulk-Power System*,²⁸ December 2013, developed by the NERC GMD Task Force.

The System model specified in Requirement R2 is used in conducting steady state power flow analysis that accounts for the Reactive Power absorption of power transformer(s) due to GIC in the System.

The GIC System model includes all power transformer(s) with a high side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV. The model is used to calculate GIC flow in the network.

The projected System condition for GMD planning may include adjustments to the System that are executable in response to space weather information. These adjustments could include, for example, recalling or postponing maintenance outages.

The Violation Risk Factor (VRF) for Requirement R2 is changed from Medium to High. This change is for consistency with the VRF for approved standard TPL-001-4 Requirement R1, which is proposed for revision in the NERC filing dated August 29, 2014 (Docket No. RM12-1-000). NERC guidelines require consistency among Reliability Standards.

²⁸ http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GIC%20Application %20Guide%202013 approved.pdf.

Rationale for R3:

Requirement R3 allows a responsible entity the flexibility to determine the System steady state voltage criteria for System steady state performance in Table 1. Steady state voltage limits are an example of System steady state performance criteria.

Rationale for R4:

The GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes steady state power flow analysis and the supporting study or studies using the models specified in Requirement R2 that account for the effects of GIC. Performance criteria are specified in Table 1.

At least one System On-Peak Load and at least one System Off-Peak Load must be examined in the analysis.

Distribution of GMD Vulnerability Assessment results provides a means for sharing relevant information with other entities responsible for planning reliability. Results of GIC studies may affect neighboring systems and should be taken into account by planners.

The *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,²⁹ December 2013 developed by the NERC GMD Task Force provides technical information on GMD-specific considerations for planning studies. The provision of information in Requirement R4, Part 4.3, shall be subject to the legal and regulatory obligations for the disclosure of confidential and/or sensitive information.

Rationale for R5:

This GIC information is necessary for determining the thermal impact of GIC on transformers in the planning area and must be provided to entities responsible for performing the thermal impact assessment so that they can accurately perform the assessment. GIC information should be provided in accordance with Requirement R5 as part of the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process since, by definition, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes documented evaluation of susceptibility to localized equipment damage due to GMD.

The maximum effective GIC value provided in Part 5.1 is used for transformer thermal impact assessment.

GIC(t) provided in Part 5.2 can alternatively be used to convert the steady state GIC flows to timeseries GIC data for transformer thermal impact assessment. This information may be needed by one or more of the methods for performing a thermal impact assessment. Additional guidance is available in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,³⁰ October 2017.

A Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that desires GIC(t) may request it from the planning entity. The planning entity shall provide GIC(t) upon request once GIC has been calculated, but

²⁹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning</u> %20Guide approved.pdf.

³⁰ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

no later than 90 calendar days after receipt of a request from the owner and after completion of Requirement R5, Part 5.1.

The provision of information in Requirement R5 shall be subject to the legal and regulatory obligations for the disclosure of confidential and/or sensitive information.

Rationale for R6:

The transformer thermal impact screening criterion has been revised from 15 A per phase to 75 A per phase [for the benchmark GMD event]. Only those transformers that experience an effective GIC value of 75 A per phase or greater require evaluation in Requirement R6. The justification is provided in the *Screening Criterion for Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,³¹ October 2017.

The thermal impact assessment may be based on manufacturer-provided GIC capability curves, thermal response simulation, thermal impact screening, or other technically justified means. The transformer thermal assessment will be repeated or reviewed using previous assessment results each time the planning entity performs a GMD Vulnerability Assessment and provides GIC information as specified in Requirement R5. Approaches for conducting the assessment are presented in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,³² October 2017.

Thermal impact assessments are provided to the planning entity, as determined in Requirement R1, so that identified issues can be included in the GMD Vulnerability Assessment (R4), and the Corrective Action Plan (R7) as necessary.

Thermal impact assessments of non-BES transformers are not required because those transformers do not have a wide-area effect on the reliability of the interconnected Transmission system.

The provision of information in Requirement R6, Part 6.4, shall be subject to the legal and regulatory obligations for the disclosure of confidential and/or sensitive information.

Rationale for R7:

The proposed requirement addresses directives in Order No. 830 for establishing Corrective Action Plan (CAP) deadlines associated with GMD Vulnerability Assessments. In Order No. 830, FERC directed revisions to TPL-007 such that CAPs are developed within one year from the completion of GMD Vulnerability Assessments (P 101). Furthermore, FERC directed establishment of implementation deadlines after the completion of the CAP as follows (P 102):

- Two years for non-hardware mitigation; and
- Four years for hardware mitigation.

The objective of Part 7.4 is to provide awareness to potentially impacted entities when implementation of planned mitigation is not achievable within the deadlines established in Part

³¹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

³² http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.

7.3. Examples of situations beyond the control of the of the responsible entity (see Section 7.4) include, but are not limited to:

- Delays resulting from regulatory/legal processes, such as permitting;
- Delays resulting from stakeholder processes required by tariff;
- Delays resulting from equipment lead times; or

Delays resulting from the inability to acquire necessary Right-of-Way.

Rationale for Table 3:

Table 3 has been revised to use the same ground model designation, FL1, as is being used by USGS. The calculated scaling factor for FL1 is 0.74. [The scaling factor associated with the benchmark GMD event for the Florida earth model (FL1) has been updated to 0.76 in TPL-007-2 based on the earth model published on the USGS public website.]

Rationale for R8 – R10:

The proposed requirements address directives in Order No. 830 for revising the benchmark GMD event used in GMD Vulnerability Assessments (P 44, P 47-49). The requirements add a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment based on the supplemental GMD event that accounts for localized peak geoelectric fields.

Rationale for R11 – R12:

The proposed requirements address directives in Order No. 830 for requiring responsible entities to collect GIC monitoring and magnetometer data as necessary to enable model validation and situational awareness (P 88; P. 90-92). GMD measurement data refers to GIC monitor data and geomagnetic field data in Requirements R11 and R12, respectively. See the Guidelines and Technical Basis section of this standard for technical information.

The objective of Requirement R11 is for entities to obtain GIC data for the Planning Coordinator's planning area or other part of the system included in the Planning Coordinator's GIC System model to inform GMD Vulnerability Assessments. Technical considerations for GIC monitoring are contained in Chapter 9 of the 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk-Power System (NERC 2012 GMD Report). GIC monitoring is generally performed by Hall effect transducers that are attached to the neutral of the transformer and measure dc current flowing through the neutral.

The objective of Requirement R12 is for entities to obtain geomagnetic field data for the Planning Coordinator's planning area to inform GMD Vulnerability Assessments. Magnetometers provide geomagnetic field data by measuring changes in the earth's magnetic field. Sources of geomagnetic field data include:

- Observatories such as those operated by U.S. Geological Survey, Natural Resources Canada, research organizations, or university research facilities;
- Installed magnetometers; and
- Commercial or third-party sources of geomagnetic field data.

Geomagnetic field data for a Planning Coordinator's planning area is obtained from one or more of the above data sources located in the Planning Coordinator's planning area, or by obtaining a geomagnetic field data product for the Planning Coordinator's planning area from a government or research organization. The geomagnetic field data product does not need to be derived from a magnetometer or observatory within the Planning Coordinator's planning area.

Exhibit B

Implementation Plan

NERC

Implementation Plan

Project 2018-01 Canadian-Specific Revisions to TPL-007-2

Applicable Standard(s)

• TPL-007-3- Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events

Requested Retirement(s)

- TPL-007-1 Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events
- TPL-007-2 Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events

Prerequisite Standard(s)

None

Applicable Entities

- Planning Coordinator with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard;
- Transmission Planner with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard;
- Transmission Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard; and
- Generator Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard.

Section 4.2 states that the standard applies to facilities that include power transformer(s) with a high side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV.

Terms in the NERC Glossary of Terms

There are no new, modified, or retired terms.

Background

In January 2018, NERC submitted for regulatory approval Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. This standard was developed in response to certain directives of the United States Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) from Order No. 830 (September 22, 2016), approving Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 and its associated five-year Implementation Plan and directing certain modifications.

In May 2018, a Standard Authorization Request was submitted identifying a need for a Canadianspecific Variance to the TPL-007-2 standard. Specifically, the Standard Authorization Request sought to provide an option for Canadian Registered Entities to define alternative Benchmark GMD Events and/or Supplemental GMD Events specific to their unique topology.



Reliability Standard TPL-007-3 adds a Variance for Canadian entities. The Canadian Variance replaces, in its entirety, Requirement R7, Part 7.3 of the continent-wide standard for Canadian entities and adds an alternate methodology for GMD Vulnerability Assessments, as described in Attachment 1-CAN. None of the continent-wide Requirements have been changed.

Effective Date and Phased-In Compliance Dates

The effective date for the proposed Reliability Standard is provided below. Where the standard drafting team identified the need for a longer implementation period for compliance with a particular section of a proposed Reliability Standard (e.g., an entire Requirement or a portion thereof), the additional time for compliance with that section is specified below. The phased-in compliance date for those particular sections represents the date that entities must begin to comply with that particular section of the Reliability Standard, even where the Reliability Standard goes into effect at an earlier date.

Reliability Standard TPL-007-3

United States

The standard shall become effective on the later of: (1) the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2; or (2) the first day of the first calendar quarter after the date TPL-007-3 is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.

This implementation plan incorporates by reference the phased-in compliance dates of the TPL-007-2 implementation plan (see Attachment 1).

All Other Jurisdictions

Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is three (3) months after the effective date of the applicable governmental authority's order approving the standard, or as otherwise provided for by the applicable governmental authority.

Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is three (3) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees, or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

This implementation plan incorporates by reference the phased-in compliance dates of the TPL-007-2 implementation plan (see Attachment 1), except that the phased-in compliance dates described therein shall be based on the effective date of TPL-007-3.

Attachment 1-TPL-007-2 Implementation Plan

Implementation Plan

Project 2013-03 Geomagnetic Disturbance Mitigation Reliability Standard TPL-007-2

Applicable Standard

• TPL-007-2 - Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events

Requested Retirement

• TPL-007-1 - Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events

Prerequisite Standard

None

Applicable Entities

- Planning Coordinator with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard;
- Transmission Planner with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard;
- Transmission Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard; and
- Generator Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard.

Section 4.2 states that the standard applies to facilities that include power transformer(s) with a high-side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV.

Terms in the NERC Glossary of Terms

There are no new, modified, or retired terms.

Background

On September 22, 2016, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued Order No. 830 approving Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 and its associated five-year Implementation Plan. In the Order, FERC also directed NERC to develop certain modifications to the standard. FERC established a deadline of 18 months from the effective date of Order No. 830 for completing the revisions, which is May 2018.

General Considerations

This Implementation Plan is intended to integrate the new requirements in TPL-007-2 with the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process that is being implemented through approved TPL-007-1. At the time of the May 2018 filing deadline, many requirements in approved standard TPL-007-1 that lead

to completion of the geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) Vulnerability Assessment will be in effect. Furthermore, many entities may be taking steps to complete studies or assessments that are required by future enforceable requirements in TPL-007-1. The Implementation Plan phases in the requirements in TPL-007-2 based on the effective date of TPL-007-2, as follows:

- Effective Date before January 1, 2021. Implementation timeline supports applicable entities completing new requirements for supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments concurrently with requirements for the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment (concurrent effective dates).
- Effective Date on or after January 1, 2021. Implementation timeline supports applicable entities completing the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessments before new requirements for supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments become effective.

Effective Date

The effective date for the proposed Reliability Standard is provided below. Where the standard drafting team identified the need for a longer implementation period for compliance with a particular section of the proposed Reliability Standard (e.g., an entire Requirement or a portion thereof), the additional time for compliance with that section is specified below. These phased-in compliance dates represent the dates that entities must begin to comply with that particular section of the Reliability Standard, even where the Reliability Standard goes into effect at an earlier date.

Standard TPL-007-2

Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is three (3) months after the effective date of the applicable governmental authority's order approving the standard, or as otherwise provided for by the applicable governmental authority.

Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is three (3) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees, or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

Phased-In Compliance Dates

If TPL-007-2 becomes effective before January 1, 2021

Implementation timeline supports applicable entities completing new requirements for supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments concurrently with requirements for the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment (concurrent effective dates).

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R1 and R2

Entities shall be required to comply with Requirements R1 and R2 upon the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirement R5

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirements R5 until six (6) months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirement R9

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirement R9 until six (6) months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R11 and R12

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirements R11 and R12 until 24 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R6 and R10

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirements R6 and R10 until 30 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R3, R4, and R8

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirements R3, R4, and R8 until 42 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirement R7

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirement R7 until 54 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

If TPL-007-2 becomes effective on or after January 1, 2021

Implementation timeline supports applicable entities completing the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessments before new requirements for supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments become effective.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R1, R2, R5, and R6

Entities shall be required to comply with Requirements R1, R2, R5, and R6 upon the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R3 and R4

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirements R3 and R4 until 12 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R7, R11, and R12

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirements R7, R11, and R12 until 24 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirement R9

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirement R9 until 36 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirement R10

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirement R10 until 60 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirement R8

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirement R8 until 72 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Retirement Date

Standard TPL-007-1

Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 shall be retired immediately prior to the effective date of TPL-007-2 in the particular jurisdiction in which the revised standard is becoming effective.

Initial Performance of Periodic Requirements

Transmission Owners and Generator Owners are not required to comply with Requirement R6 prior to the compliance date for Requirement R6, regardless of when geomagnetically-induced current (GIC) flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1 is received.

Transmission Owners and Generator Owners are not required to comply with Requirement R10 prior to the compliance date for Requirement R10, regardless of when GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1 is received.

Exhibit C

Summary of Development History and Complete Record of Development

Summary of Development History

Summary of Development History

The development record for proposed Reliability Standards TPL-007-3 is summarized below.

I. Overview of the Standard Drafting Team

When evaluating a proposed Reliability Standard, the Commission is expected to give "due weight" to the technical expertise of the ERO.¹ The technical expertise of the ERO is derived from the standard drafting team selected to lead each project in accordance with Section 4.3 of the NERC Standards Process Manual.² For this project, the standard drafting team consisted of industry experts, all with a diverse set of experiences. A roster of the Standard Drafting team members is included in **Exhibit E**.

II. Standard Development History

A. Standard Authorization Request Development

On February 27, 2018, a Standards Authorization Request ("SAR") was submitted seeking to develop a variance to Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. The SAR sought to develop a variance that would: (i) allow Canadian jurisdictions to define and implement alternative benchmark and supplemental GMD events for performing GMD Vulnerability Assessments; and (ii) account for regulatory approval process in place in some Canadian jurisdictions to implement capital improvements identified in Corrective Action Plans. Project 2018-01- Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2 was initiated to consider the recommendations in the SAR. The SAR was accepted by the Standards Committee ("SC") on March 14, 2018 and posted for a 30-day

¹ Section 215(d)(2) of the Federal Power Act; 16 U.S.C. § 824(d)(2) (2012).

² The NERC *Standard Processes Manual* is available at

 $http://www.nerc.com/comm/SC/Documents/Appendix_3A_StandardsProcessesManual.pdf.$

formal comment period from March 30, 2018 through April 30, 2018.³ . The updated SAR was accepted by the SC on June 13, 2018.

B. First Posting – Informal Comment Period

A draft TPL-007 Canadian Variance was posted for a 28-day informal comment period from August 10, 2018 through September 6, 2018. There were nine sets of responses, including comments from approximately 36 different individuals from approximately 28 companies representing all 10 of the industry segments.⁴

C. Second Posting – Formal Comment Period, Initial Ballots and Non-binding Polls

NERC posted a draft of proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-3 (TPL-007-2 including the Canadian Variance) along with the associated implementation plan, VRFs, and VSLs for a 45-day formal comment period from October 2, 2018 through November 15, 2018, with parallel initial ballots held during the last 10 days of the comment period from November 6, 2018 through November 15, 2018.⁵ The initial ballot for proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-3 received 77.54 percent quorum and 100 percent weighted segment approval. The associated implementation plan received 79.1 percent quorum and 100 percent weighted segment approval. There were 8 sets of responses, including comments from approximately 41 different individuals from approximately 30 companies, representing all 10 industry segments.⁶

https://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Project201801CanadianspecificRevisionstoTPL0072/2018-01_Response_to_Comments_SAR_07262018.pdf

⁴ NERC, *Consideration of Comments*, Project 2018-01Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2, (September 2018), available at

https://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Project201801CanadianspecificRevisionstoTPL0072/TPL-007-20/ 20% 28Canadian(/ 20 Varianaa)/ 20 Canaidantian(/ 20 Standard) 20 Standard)

 $3\% 20\% 28 Canadian\% 20 Variance\% 29 _Consideration\% 20 of\% 20 Comments.pdf.$

³ NERC, *Consideration of Comments*, Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2, (April 2018), available at

⁵ The initial ballots were extended an additional day reach quorum and closed November 16, 2018. As no changes were necessary to the VRFs and VSLs carried forward from TPL-007-2, the VRFs and VSLs were not posted for non-binding poll.

⁶ NERC, *Consideration of Comments*, Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2, November 15, 2018), available at

D. Final Ballot

Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-3 was posted for a 10-day final ballot period from November 29, 2018 through December 10, 2018. The final ballot for proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-3 reached quorum at 80.43 percent of the ballot pool, and the standard received sufficient affirmative votes for approval, with100 percentweighted segment approval. The ballot for the associated implementation plan for proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-3 reached quorum at 82.09 percent of the ballot pool and received sufficient affirmative votes for approval, receiving 100 weighted segment approval.

E. Errata to Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-3

On January 23, 2019, the Standards Committee approved clarifying changes regarding the applicability of the Variance in Canadian jurisdictions.

F. Board of Trustees Adoption

Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-3 was adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees on February 7, 2019.⁷

https://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Project201801CanadianspecificRevisionstoTPL0072/Project%202018-01_Consideration%20of%20Comments-FB.pdf.

⁷ See February 7, 2019 NERC Board of Trustees Agenda Package (Item 6.b),

 $https://www.nerc.com/gov/bot/Agenda\%20 highlights\%20 and\%20 Mintues\%202013/Board_of_Trustees_Open_Meeting_Agenda_Package-February_7_2019.pdf$

Complete Record of Development

Home > Program Areas & Departments > Standards > Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2

Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2

Related Files | Project 2013-03 Geomagnetic Disturbance Mitigation

Status

Final ballots for **TPL-007-3 (Canadian Variance) – Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events and the associated Implementation Plan** concluded at 8 **p.m. Eastern, Monday, December 10, 2018.**

Reliability Standard TPL-007-3 adds a Variance for Canadian entities. The Canadian Variance replaces, in its entirety, Requirement R7, Part 7.3 of the continent-wide standard for Canadian entities and adds an alternate methodology for GMD Vulnerability Assessments, as described in Attachment 1-CAN. **None of the continent-wide Requirements have been changed.**

Background

Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 – Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events was approved by industry in 2017 and filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission on January 22, 2018 and the Canadian authorities on February 27, 2018. The first version of the standard, TPL-007-1, requires entities to assess the impact to their systems from a defined event referred to as the "Benchmark GMD Event." The second version of the standard adds new Requirements R8, R9, and R10 to require responsible entities to assess the potential implications of a "Supplemental GMD Event" on their equipment and systems in accordance with the FERC's directives in Order No. 830. On June 13, 2018, the Standards Committee approved a SAR and appointed a standard drafting team (SDT) to make Canadian-specific revisions to TPL-007-2.

Standard(s) Affected: TPL-007-2 – Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events

Purpose/Industry Need

The purpose of this project is to enable the option for Canadian Registered Entities to leverage operating experience, observed GMD effects, and on-going research efforts for defining alternative Benchmark GMD Events and/or Supplemental GMD Events that appropriately reflect their specific geographical and geological characteristics. This project also addresses regulatory frameworks specific to Canadian jurisdictions.

Draft	Actions	Dates	Results	Consideration of Comments
TPL-007-3 (Canadian Variance) Clean (34) Redline (35)	Errata Change: On January 23, 2019, the Standards Committee approved clarifying			

	changes regarding the applicability in Canadian jurisdictions			
Final TPL-007-3 (Canadian Variance) Clean (26) Redline to Last Approved (27)	Final Ballot Info (31) Vote	11/29/18 – 12/10/18	Ballot Results <u>TPL-007-3</u> (32) <u>Implementation</u> <u>Plan</u> (33)	
Implementation Plan Clean (28) Redline (29) to Last Posted VRF/VSL Justification (30)				
<u>TPL-007-3 (Canadian</u> <u>Variance)</u> Clean (15) Redline (16) to TPL-007-2 Implementation Plan (17)	Initial Ballot Info (20) Vote	11/06/18 - 11/15/18* The ballots were extended an additional day to reach quorum and closed November 16, 2018	Ballot Results <u>TPL-007-3</u> (21) <u>Implementation</u> <u>Plan</u> (22)	
VRF/VSL Justification (18)	Comment Period Info (23)	10/02/18 - 11/15/18	<u>Comments Received</u> (24)	Consideration of Comments(25)

Supporting Materials Unofficial Comment Form (Word) (19)	<u>Submit</u> <u>Comments</u>			
	<u>Join Ballot</u> <u>Pools</u>	10/02/18 - 10/31/18		
Proposed TPL-007-2 Canadian Variance (10) Supporting Materials Unofficial Comment Form (Word) (11)	Comment Period <u>Info</u> (12) <u>Submit</u> <u>Comments</u>	08/10/18 - 09/06/18	Comments Received (13)	Consideration of Comments (14)
The updated Standard	s Authorization	Request was acce 2018	pted by the Standards	Committee on June 13,
Standards Authorization Request Clean (8) Redline (9)	Accepted by the Standards Committee	June 13, 2018		
The first draft of the	Standards Auth	orization Request March 14, 20		andards Committee on
Standards Authorization Request (3)	Comment Period	03/30/18 -	Comments Received (6)	Consideration of Comments (7)
Supporting Materials	<u>Info</u> (5)	04/30/18		
<u>Unofficial Comment</u> <u>Form (Word)</u> (4)	<u>Submit</u> <u>Comments</u>			
SAR Drafting Team Nominations	Nomination Period	03/30/18 - 04/12/18*		
Supporting Materials	Info (2)	extended through 04/19/18		
Unofficial Nomination Form (Word) (1)	Submit Nominations			

Unofficial Nomination Form

Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2

Do not use this form for submitting nominations. Use the <u>electronic form</u> to submit nominations by **8 p.m. Eastern, Thursday, April 12, 2018**. This unofficial version is provided to assist nominees in compiling the information necessary to submit the electronic form.

Additional information about this project is available on the <u>Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions</u> to <u>TPL-007-2</u> page. If you have questions, contact Standards Developer, <u>Mat Bunch</u> (via email) or at (404) 446-9785.

By submitting a nomination form, you are indicating your willingness and agreement to actively participate in face-to-face meetings and conference calls.

Previous drafting or review team experience is beneficial, but not required. A brief description of the desired qualifications, expected commitment, and other pertinent information is included below.

Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2

The purpose of this project is to enable the option for Canadian Registered Entities to leverage operating experience, observed GMD effects, and on-going research efforts for defining alternative Benchmark GMD Events and/or Supplemental GMD Events that appropriately reflect their specific geographical and geological characteristics.

Standards affected:

<u>TPL-007-2</u> – Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events

Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 – Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events was approved by industry in 2017 and filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission on January 22, 2018 and the Canadian authorities on February 27, 2018. The first version of the standard, <u>TPL-007-1</u>, requires entities to assess the impact to their systems from a defined event referred to as the "Benchmark GMD Event." The second version of the standard adds new Requirements R8, R9, and R10 to require responsible entities to assess the potential implications of a "Supplemental GMD Event" on their equipment and systems in accordance with the FERC's directives in <u>Order No. 830</u>.

The time commitment for these projects is expected to be up to two face-to-face meetings per quarter (on average two full working days each meeting) with conference calls scheduled as needed to meet the agreed-upon timeline the review or drafting team sets forth. Team members may also have side projects, either individually or by subgroup, to present to the larger team for discussion and review. Lastly, an important component of the review and drafting team effort is outreach. Members of the team will be expected to conduct industry outreach during the development process to support a successful project outcome.



Name:		
Organization:		
Address:		
Telephone:		
E-mail:		
Please briefly descri Drafting Team (Bio)	be your experience and qualifications to serve on the requested Standard	
	a member of any NERC drafting team, please list each team here: any active SAR or standard drafting team.	
	ber of the following SAR or standard drafting team(s):	
If you previously worked on any NERC drafting team please identify the team(s): No prior NERC SAR or standard drafting team. Prior experience on the following team(s): 		
Select each NERC Revolutering:	egion in which you have experience relevant to the Project for which you are	
Texas RE	NPCC SPP RE RF WECC SERC NA – Not Applicable	



Select each Industry Segment that you represent:		
1 — Transmission Owners		
2 — RTOs, ISOs		
3 — Load-serving Entities		
4 — Transmission-dependent Utilities		
5 — Electric Generators		
6 — Electricity Brokers, Aggregators, an	d Marketers	
7 — Large Electricity End Users		
8 — Small Electricity End Users		
9 — Federal, State, and Provincial Regu	latory or other Government Entities	
10 — Regional Reliability Organizations and Regional Entities		
NA – Not Applicable		
Select each Function ¹ in which you have cu	rrent or prior expertise:	
Balancing Authority	Transmission Operator	
Compliance Enforcement Authority	Transmission Owner	
Distribution Provider	Transmission Planner	
Generator Operator Transmission Service Provider		
Generator Owner	Purchasing-selling Entity	
Interchange Authority	Reliability Coordinator	
Load-serving Entity	Reliability Assurer	
Market Operator	Resource Planner	
Planning Coordinator		

¹ These functions are defined in the NERC <u>Functional Model</u>, which is available on the NERC web site.

Provide the names and contact information for two references who could attest to your technical qualifications and your ability to work well in a group:			
Name:		Telephone:	
Organization:		E-mail:	
Name:		Telephone:	
Organization:		E-mail:	
Provide the name and contact information of your immediate supervisor or a member of your management who can confirm your organization's willingness to support your active participation.			
Name:		Telephone:	
Title:		Email:	

Standards Announcement

Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2

Nomination Period Open through April 12, 2018

Now Available

Nominations are being sought for Standards Authorization Request drafting team members through **8 p.m. Eastern, Thursday, April 12, 2018**.

Use the <u>electronic form</u> to submit a nomination. If you experience any difficulties in using the electronic form, contact <u>Nasheema Santos</u>. An unofficial Word version of the nomination form is posted on the <u>Drafting Team Vacancies</u> page and the <u>project page</u>.

By submitting a nomination form, you are indicating your willingness and agreement to actively participate in face-to-face meetings and conference calls.

The time commitment for this project is expected to be two face-to-face meetings per quarter (on average two full working days each meeting) with conference calls scheduled as needed to meet the agreed upon timeline the team sets forth. Team members may also have side projects, either individually or by sub-group, to present for discussion and review. Lastly, an important component of the team effort is outreach. Members of the team will be expected to conduct industry outreach during the development process to support a successful ballot.

Previous drafting or periodic review team experience is beneficial, but not required. See the project page and unofficial nomination form for additional information.

Next Steps

The Standards Committee is expected to appoint members to the team in May 2018. Nominees will be notified shortly after they have been selected.

For information on the Standards Development Process, refer to the Standard Processes Manual.

For more information or assistance, contact Standards Developer, Mat Bunch (via email) or at (404) 446-9785.

North American Electric Reliability Corporation 3353 Peachtree Rd, NE Suite 600, North Tower Atlanta, GA 30326 404-446-2560 | <u>www.nerc.com</u>

RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

Standard Authorization Request (SAR)

Complete and please email this form, with attachment(s) to: <u>sarcomm@nerc.net</u>

The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) welcomes suggestions to improve the reliability of the bulk power system through improved Reliability Standards.

Requested information					
SAR Title:		Canadian-specific Revision to proposed standard TPL-007-2 (Transmission			n
		System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events)			
Date Submitted	1: /	February 27, 2018			
SAR Requester					
Name:	Helen Lainis	(IESO) and Payam Fa	arahbakhsh	(Hydro One)	
Organization:		port of additional CE		mbers from Ontario (IESO and Hydro One) rs including Manitoba Hydro, Hydro Québe	-
	Helen:			Helen:	
Telephone:	905-855-410)6	Email:	helen.lainis@ieso.ca	
relephone.	Payam:		Linan.	Payam:	
	416-345-5			Payam.Farahbakhsh@HydroOne.com	
SAR Type (Chec		apply)			
New Stan				ninent Action/ Confidential Issue (SPM	
	o Existing Star			ection 10)	
		Glossary Term		ance development or revision	
		sting Standard		er (Please specify) t (Check all that apply to help NERC	
	· · ·	u stanuaru uevelopii	ient projec		
prioritize development)Regulatory InitiationEmerging Risk (Reliability Issues SteeringCommittee) IdentifiedReliability Standard Development Plan		Enh	RC Standing Committee Identified anced Periodic Review Initiated Istry Stakeholder Identified		
Industry Need (What Bulk Electric System (BES) reliability benefit does the proposed project provide?):					
The need for this SAR is to enable the option for Canadian Registered Entities to leverage operating					
experience, observed GMD effects and on-going research efforts for defining alternative Benchmark					
GMD Events and/or Supplemental GMD Events specific to their unique topology.					
Registered Entities from Ontario, Québec, Manitoba and Saskatchewan have indicated support for a revision to be included in TPL-007-2 as an option for Canadian Registered Entities to pursue. At a minimum, Registered Entities in Ontario (Hydro One and IESO) have indicated that this proposed					

revision would be used to define and implement an alternative Benchmark GMD Event and/or Supplemental GMD Event that appropriately reflects their specific geographical and geological characteristics.

Purpose or Goal (How does this proposed project provide the reliability-related benefit described above?):

The goal is to enable Canadian Registered Entities to define and implement alternative Benchmark GMD Events and/or Supplemental GMD Events that appropriately reflects the specific geographical and geological characteristics of the Canadian provinces, including those located on the Canadian Shield, a vast area of igneous rock exhibiting low electrical conductivity, through leveraging ongoing research efforts, operating experience, and observed GMD effects:

- Registered Canadian entities from Canadian provinces (most prominently Manitoba, Ontario and Québec) located on the Canadian Shield, are currently working to develop a Benchmark GMD Event and/or Supplemental GMD Event that takes into account their unique topology.
- These Canadian Registered Entities have been researching the impact of GMD on their power systems for several years now, and have been collaborating with Natural Resources Canada to collect and analyze Canadian magnetometer data for their respective provinces.

Project Scope (Define the parameters of the proposed project):

Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 should be revised to allow Canadian jurisdictions to define and implement alternative Benchmark GMD Events and/or Supplemental GMD Events that are different from the ones defined in TPL-007-2 appropriate for a continent wide standard.

The Benchmark GMD Event and/or Supplemental GMD Event described in TPL-007-2 should be options to pursue for Canadian Registered Entities for performing GMD Vulnerability Assessments.

Implementation of Benchmark GMD Events and/or Supplemental GMD Events by Canadian Registered Entities should be subject to approval by applicable Canadian governmental authority or their agencies.

Detailed Description (Describe the proposed deliverable(s) with sufficient detail for a drafting team to execute the project. If you propose a new or substantially revised Reliability Standard or definition, provide: (1) a technical justification¹which includes a discussion of the reliability-related benefits of developing a new or revised Reliability Standard or definition, and (2) a technical foundation document (*e.g.* research paper) to guide development of the Standard or definition):

NERC has spent a substantial amount of time and effort working with experts across the industry to develop scientifically sound Benchmark GMD Events defined in TPL-007-2 appropriate for a continent wide standard.

¹ The NERC Rules of Procedure require a technical justification for new or substantially revised Reliability Standards. Please attach pertinent information to this form before submittal to NERC.

The research and development in this field continues to evolve, and more remains to be learned, new assessment tools need to be developed and assessment models need to be verified. In Canada, there is on-going work being done on this subject. We request that TPL-007-2 provide the flexibility for Canadian jurisdictions to leverage their expertise and to build on their research and on GMD impact assessment methodologies to define alternative Benchmark GMD Events and/or Supplemental GMD Events targeted to their unique topology.

The Canadian Shield is a sprawling rock formation that stretches across nearly all of Québec, much of Ontario and Manitoba, the northern portion of Saskatchewan and the northeast corner of Alberta. This geological formation blocks current from being dissipated into the Earth, making these Canadian provinces more susceptible to solar storms.

As such, Registered Entities from several Canadian shield provinces have been researching the impact of GMD on the reliable operation of their BES for years. For example, Hydro One Networks Inc., has been conducting this work in Ontario, Manitoba Hydro has been conducting this work in Manitoba and Hydro Québec has been conducted this work in Québec. A list of several technical publications could be provided upon request of the SDT to demonstrate the depth of Hydro One's, Manitoba Hydro's, Hydro Québec's and other jurisdictions' technical research and expertise in modeling and analyzing GMD impacts. These references also describe significant development efforts on tools and operating processes to support planned transmission system performance during GMD events.

Natural Resources Canada has published their calculations of extreme value statistics for a 1-50 and 1-100 year geomagnetic storm based on data from 13 Natural Resources Canada geomagnetic observatories, and Natural Resources Canada and Registered Entities from Canadian shield provinces have been collaborating to collect and analyze Canadian magnetometer data for their respective provinces.

Cost Impact Assessment, if known (Provide a paragraph describing the potential cost impacts associated with the proposed project):

The cost implications of addressing a Benchmark GMD Event and/or Supplemental GMD Event is expected to be more significant for the Canadian shield provinces than for those registered entities in the lower 48 state portion of the United States. Furthermore, any capital investment must be approved by the applicable provincial regulatory authority. Consequently, it is essential that the requirements of the standard appropriately reflect conditions that exist in affected Canadian provinces. To this end, Registered Entities from these provinces are working with Natural Resources Canada and are using their own inputs to develop a Benchmark GMD Event and/or Supplemental GMD Event based on empirical data that will form the basis for seeking approval for any required investments with their respective regulatory authorities.

Please describe any unique characteristics of the BES facilities that may be impacted by this proposed standard development project (*e.g.* Dispersed Generation Resources): Not Applicable

To assist the NERC Standards Committee in appointing a drafting team with the appropriate members, please indicate to which Functional Entities the proposed standard(s) should apply (*e.g.* Transmission Operator, Reliability Coordinator, etc. See the most recent version of the NERC Functional Model for definitions):

Canadian Registered Entities that meet the applicability specified in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 of the proposed TPL-007-2 Reliability Standard.

Do you know of any consensus building activities² in connection with this SAR? If so, please provide any recommendations or findings resulting from the consensus building activity.

The revision would be used, at a minimum, by IESO and Hydro One to avoid needing to seek remand to TPL-007-2 in Ontario, Canada. Working with CEA, IESO and Hydro One have engaged other Canadian Registered Entities to solicit feedback. Registered entities from Manitoba, Québec and Saskatchewan are supportive of a to TPL-007-2 as an option for Canadian Registered Entities to pursue. No Canadian Entity has voiced opposition to such a revision.

Are there any related standards or SARs that should be assessed for impact as a result of this proposed project? If so which standard(s) or project number(s)?

No

Are there alternatives (e.g. guidelines, white paper, alerts, etc.) that have been considered or could meet the objectives? If so, please list the alternatives.

		Reliability Principles
Does	this	proposed standard development project support at least one of the following Reliability
Princ	iple	s (Reliability Interface Principles)? Please check all those that apply.
\square	1.	Interconnected bulk power systems shall be planned and operated in a coordinated manner
\square		to perform reliably under normal and abnormal conditions as defined in the NERC Standards.
	2.	The frequency and voltage of interconnected bulk power systems shall be controlled within
		defined limits through the balancing of real and reactive power supply and demand.
	3.	Information necessary for the planning and operation of interconnected bulk power systems
\boxtimes		shall be made available to those entities responsible for planning and operating the systems
		reliably.
	4.	Plans for emergency operation and system restoration of interconnected bulk power systems
		shall be developed, coordinated, maintained and implemented.
	5.	Facilities for communication, monitoring and control shall be provided, used and maintained
		for the reliability of interconnected bulk power systems.
	6.	Personnel responsible for planning and operating interconnected bulk power systems shall be
		trained, qualified, and have the responsibility and authority to implement actions.

² Consensus building activities are occasionally conducted by NERC and/or project review teams. They typically are conducted to obtain industry inputs prior to proposing any standard development project to revise, or develop a standard or definition.

		Reliability Principles
\boxtimes	7.	The security of the interconnected bulk power systems shall be assessed, monitored and
\square		maintained on a wide area basis.
	8.	Bulk power systems shall be protected from malicious physical or cyber-attacks.

Market Interface Principles	
Does the proposed standard development project comply with all of the following	Enter
Market Interface Principles?	(yes/no)
 A reliability standard shall not give any market participant an unfair competitive advantage. 	YES
A reliability standard shall neither mandate nor prohibit any specific market structure.	YES
A reliability standard shall not preclude market solutions to achieving compliand with that standard.	e YES
4. A reliability standard shall not require the public disclosure of commercially sensitive information. All market participants shall have equal opportunity to access commercially non-sensitive information that is required for compliance with reliability standards.	YES

Identified Existing or Potential Regional or Interconnection Variances		
Region(s)/ Explanation		
Interconnection		
e.g. NPCC		

For Use by NERC Only

SAR Status Tracking (Check off as appropriate)	
 Draft SAR reviewed by NERC Staff Draft SAR presented to SC for acceptance DRAFT SAR approved for posting by the SC 	 Final SAR endorsed by the SC SAR assigned a Standards Project by NERC SAR denied or proposed as Guidance document

Version History

Version	Date	Owner	Change Tracking
1	June 3, 2013		Revised
1	August 29, 2014	Standards Information Staff	Updated template
2	January 18, 2017	Standards Information Staff	Revised

2 June 28, 2017 Standards Information Stat	f Updated template
--	--------------------

Unofficial Comment Form

Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007

Do not use this form for submitting comments. Use the <u>electronic form</u> to submit comments on the **Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007 Standard Authorization Request (SAR)**. Comments must be submitted by **8 p.m. Eastern, Monday, April 30, 2018**.

Documents and information about this project are available on the <u>project page</u>. If you have questions, contact Standards Developer, <u>Mat Bunch</u> (via email) or at (404) 446-9785.

Background

Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 – Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events was approved by industry in 2017 and filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission on January 22, 2018 and the Canadian authorities on February 27, 2018. The first version of the standard, <u>TPL-007-1</u>, requires entities to assess the impact to their systems from a defined event referred to as the "Benchmark GMD Event." The second version of the standard adds new Requirements R8, R9, and R10 to require responsible entities to assess the potential implications of a "Supplemental GMD Event" on their equipment and systems in accordance with the FERC's directives in <u>Order No. 830</u>.

More information and historical information can be found on the <u>Project 2013-03 Geomagnetic</u> <u>Disturbance Mitigation</u> project page.

Purpose/Industry Need

This posting is soliciting comment on the SAR.

The purpose of this project is to enable the option for Canadian Registered Entities to leverage operating experience, observed GMD effects, and on-going research efforts for defining alternative Benchmark GMD Events and/or Supplemental GMD Events that appropriately reflect their specific geographical and geological characteristics Background Information





1. Do you agree with the scope and objectives of the SAR? If not, please explain why you do not agree and, if possible, provide specific language revisions that would make it acceptable to you.

	Yes
	No
Со	mments:

2. What factors should the SAR drafting team consider to support reliability across the North American interconnected power grid? If possible, provide specific example(s) and supporting rationale.

Comments:

3. If you have any other comments on this SAR that you haven't already mentioned above, please provide them here:

Comments:

Standards Announcement

Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2 Standard Authorization Request

Formal Comment Period Open through April 30, 2018

Now Available

A 30-day formal comment period on the Standard Authorization Request (SAR) for Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2 is open through **8 p.m. Eastern, Monday, April 30, 2018**.

Commenting

Use the <u>Standards Balloting and Commenting System (SBS)</u> to submit comments. If you experience issues navigating the SBS, contact <u>Nasheema Santos</u>. An unofficial Word version of the comment form is posted on the project page>.

- If you are having difficulty accessing the SBS due to a forgotten password, incorrect credential error messages, or system lock-out, contact NERC IT support directly at https://support.nerc.net/ (Monday Friday, 8 a.m. 5 p.m. Eastern).
- Passwords expire every **6 months** and must be reset.
- The SBS is not supported for use on mobile devices.
- Please be mindful of ballot and comment period closing dates. We ask to **allow at least 48 hours** for NERC support staff to assist with inquiries. Therefore, it is recommended that users try logging into their SBS accounts **prior to the last day** of a comment/ballot period.

Next Steps

The drafting team will review all responses received during the comment period and determine the next steps of the project.

For more information on the Standards Development Process, refer to the <u>Standard Processes</u> <u>Manual</u>.

For more information or assistance, contact Standards Developer, <u>Mat Bunch</u> (via email) or at (404) 446-9785.

North American Electric Reliability Corporation 3353 Peachtree Rd, NE Suite 600, North Tower Atlanta, GA 30326 404-446-2560 | www.nerc.com

RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

Comment Report

There were 9 sets of responses, including comments from approximately 38 different people from approximately 29 companies representing 10 of the Industry Segments as shown in the table on the following pages.

Questions

1. Do you agree with the scope and objectives of the SAR? If not, please explain why you do not agree and, if possible, provide specific language revisions that would make it acceptable to you.

2. What factors should the SAR drafting team consider to support reliability across the North American interconnected power grid? If possible, provide specific example(s) and supporting rationale.

3. If you have any other comments on this SAR that you haven't already mentioned above, please provide them here:

Organization Name	Name	Segment(s)	Region	Group Name	Group Member Name	Group Member Organization	Group Member Segment(s)	Group Member Region
Northeast Power Coordinating Council	Ruida Shu	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10	NPCC	RSC	Guy V. Zito	Northeast Power Coordinating Council	10	NPCC
						New Brunswick Power	2	NPCC
					Wayne Sipperly	New York Power Authority	4	NPCC
					Glen Smith	Entergy Services	4	NPCC
					Brian Robinson	Utility Services	5	NPCC
				Bruce Metruck	New York Power Authority	6	NPCC	
				Alan Adamson	New York State Reliability Council	7	NPCC	
				Edward Bedder	Orange & Rockland Utilities	1	NPCC	
				David Burke	Orange & Rockland Utilities	3	NPCC	
					Michele Tondalo	UI	1	NPCC
				Laura Mcleod	NB Power	1	NPCC	
				David Ramkalawan	Ontario Power Generation Inc.	5	NPCC	
				Helen Lainis	IESO	2	NPCC	
				Michael Schiavone	National Grid	1	NPCC	
					Michael Jones	National Grid	3	NPCC
					Silvia Mitchell	NextEra Energy - Florida Power and Light Co.	6	NPCC

Michael Forte	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison	1	NPCC
Peter Yost	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	3	NPCC
Sean Cavote	PSEG	4	NPCC
Sean Bodkin	Dominion - Dominion Resources, Inc.	6	NPCC
Chantal Mazza	Hydro Quebec	2	NPCC
Kathleen Goodman	ISO-NE	2	NPCC
Paul Malozewski	Hydro One Networks, Inc.	3	NPCC
Caroline Dupuis	Hydro Quebec	1	NPCC
Quintin Lee	Eversource Energy	1	NPCC
Gregory Campoli	New York Independent System Operator	2	NPCC
Dermot Smyth	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	1,5	NPCC
Dermot Smyth	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	1,5	NPCC
Salvatore Spagnolo	New York Power Authority	1	NPCC
Shivaz Chopra	New York Power Authority	6	NPCC
David Kiguel	Independent	NA - Not Applicable	NPCC

1. Do you agree with the scope and object language revisions that would make it ac	ctives of the SAR? If not, please explain why you do not agree and, if possible, provide specific ceptable to you.
Aaron Cavanaugh - Bonneville Power Ac	Iministration - 1,3,5,6 - WECC
Answer	No
Document Name	
Comment	
conductivity variation adjustments for the be	nark event is needed because the existing standard accounts for latitude, longitude and the earth's enchmark and supplemental benchmark event. BPA believes it is not clear what would be achieved by ian entities since the existing benchmark event is based on the 1989 event that blacked out the Quebec
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Nicolas Turcotte - Hydro-Qu?bec TransE	nergie - 1
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
We agree with the scope and objectives of a GMD scenario targeting our specific transm	the SAR. Based on its strong experience and long historical records, we are qualified to define a pertinent ission grid
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Ruida Shu - Northeast Power Coordinati	ng Council - 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 - NPCC, Group Name RSC
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
We fully agrees with the scope and objectiv define a pertinent GMD scenario targeting of	es of the SAR. Based on the past experience and long historical records, Canadian Entities qualified to our specific transmission grid.

Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Payam Farahbakhsh - Hydro One Networ	rks, Inc 1,3
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
TPL-007-2, specifically R7.3 that introduce	also recommend the drafting team consider adding review of the revisions made to Requirement 7 in ced fixed timelines for implementation of potential Corrective Action Plans. Requiring fixed timelines s, especially in cases where capital investment maybe required, may not be compatible with existing ctions.
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
David Ramkalawan - Ontario Power Gene	eration Inc 5
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
We agree with the scope and objectives of t	he SAR.
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Leonard Kula - Independent Electricity S	ystem Operator - 2
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	

Dislikes 0			
Response			
Glen Farmer - Avista - Avista Corporation	n - 1,3,5		
Answer	Yes		
Document Name			
Comment			
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			
Amy Casuscelli - Xcel Energy, Inc 1,3,5	5,6 - MRO,WECC,SPP RE		
Answer	Yes		
Document Name			
Comment			
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			
Richard Jackson - U.S. Bureau of Reclan	nation - 1,5		
Answer	Yes		
Document Name			
Comment			
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			

2. What factors should the SAR drafting team consider to support reliability across the North American interconnected power grid? If possible, provide specific example(s) and supporting rationale.					
Richard Jackson - U.S. Bureau of Reclamation - 1,5					
Iswer					
Document Name					
Comment					
N/A					
Likes 0					
Dislikes 0					
Response					
Payam Farahbakhsh - Hydro One Netwo	rks, Inc 1,3				
Answer					
Document Name					
Comment					
We support consideration of the following	factors in developing the Canadian variance of TPL-007:				
1. A risk-based approach to mitigating t	he risk of GMD to reliable operation of BES;				
2. A risk-based approach, from an asset	management perspective, to mitigate the risk to applicable transformers, subject to flow of GIC;				
 A forward looking Standard that reco evolving; 	gnizes that the understanding/knowledge of the GMD phenomena, its modeling and assessment is				
A result-based Standard that does not dictate a specific GMD assessment methodology; and					
u	that the first line of defense in mitigating GMD risk is achieved by developing, maintaining and required by EOP-010-1. TPL-007 must consider these existing operating measures in assessing risks				
Likes 0					
Dislikes 0					
Response					

Ruida Shu - Northeast Power Coordinatin	ng Council - 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 - NPCC, Group Name RSC		
Answer			
Document Name			
Comment			
The main factors discussed in TP-007 and o	other factors specific to Canada.		
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			
Nicolas Turcotte - Hydro-Qu?bec TransE	nergie - 1		
Answer			
Document Name			
Comment			
he main factors discussed in TP-007 and other factors specific to Canada.			
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			
Aaron Cavanaugh - Bonneville Power Ad	ministration - 1,3,5,6 - WECC		
Answer			
Document Name			
Comment			
No comment			
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			
Leonard Kula - Independent Electricity System Operator - 2			

Answer					
Document Name					
Comment					
The specific geographical and geological characteristics of the Canadian provinces should be considered. Canadian registered entities should be able to leverage their operating experience, observed GMD effects and results of on-going research specific to their unique topology.					
Likes 0					
Dislikes 0					
Response					

3. If you have any other comments on this SAR that you haven't already mentioned above, please provide them here:					
Aaron Cavanaugh - Bonneville Power Administration - 1,3,5,6 - WECC					
Answer					
Document Name					
Comment					
While BPA does not understand the need for impact to the North American interconnected	or the SAR, BPA acknowledges that if the Canadian provinces deem it necessary, there will be no negative ad power grid.				
Likes 0					
Dislikes 0					
Response					
Nicolas Turcotte - Hydro-Qu?bec Trans	Energie - 1				
Answer					
Document Name					
Comment					
Canada has a long experience on GMD and	d should be able to apply the objectives of the reliability standard in the context of Canadian utilities.				
Likes 0					
Dislikes 0					
Response					
Ruida Shu - Northeast Power Coordinati	ng Council - 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 - NPCC, Group Name RSC				
Answer					
Document Name					
Comment					
Canada has a long experience on GMD and	d should be able to apply the objectives of the reliability standard in the context of Canadian utilities.				
Likes 0					
Dislikes 0					
Response					

Payam Farahbakhsh - Hydro One Networks, Inc 1,3				
Answer				
Document Name				
Comment				
There is also an opportunity to require that required by EOP-010-1.	results of GMD vulnerability assessments be considered in the maintenance of the GMD Operating Plans			
Likes 0				
Dislikes 0				
Response				
Richard Jackson - U.S. Bureau of Reclan	nation - 1,5			
Answer				
Document Name				
Comment				
N/A				
Likes 0				
Dislikes 0				
Response				
David Ramkalawan - Ontario Power Gene	eration Inc 5			
Answer				
Document Name				
Comment				
Review/Reconsideration of previously provi	ded comments by SDT from Canadian entities.			
Likes 0				
Dislikes 0				
Response				

Response to Comments Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2

Background

NERC received a Standard Authorization Request (SAR) proposing an option for Canadian Registered Entities to leverage operating experience, observed Geomagnetic Disturbance (GMD) effects, and ongoing research efforts for defining alternative benchmark GMD events and/or supplemental GMD events specific to their unique topology.

NERC posted the SAR for formal comment period on March 30, 2018, and industry comments significantly supported the SAR as written. The SAR drafting team (SAR DT) reviewed the comments and made clarifying changes regarding the implementation of Corrective Action Plan(s) requiring capital investments.

The SAR DT appreciates all comments in support of the SAR as written as well as any minority or adverse comments provided, the responses to which are below. All comments received can be accessed via the <u>NERC Standards Balloting & Commenting System</u>.

Comment

BPA does not believe an additional benchmark event is needed because the existing standard accounts for latitude, longitude and the earth's conductivity variation adjustments for the benchmark and supplemental benchmark event. BPA believes it is not clear what would be achieved by creating a new benchmark event for Canadian entities since the existing benchmark event is based on the 1989 event that blacked out the Quebec system.

Response

The SAR does not specify that the project will create a new Benchmark GMD Event for Canada. The project will make revisions to allow Canadian Registered Entities to take into account specific data that has been gathered for the range of latitude and longitude in their jurisdiction, as well as the specifics in the earth's conductivity.

Comment

While BPA does not understand the need for the SAR, BPA acknowledges that if the Canadian provinces deem it necessary, there will be no negative impact to the North American interconnected power grid.

Response

The SAR DT contends that any Variance created will meet the reliability objectives of continent-wide standard and adhere to the NERC Standard Processes Manual and the NERC Rules of Procedure.



Comment

The SAR DT agrees with the scope of the SAR. We also recommend the drafting team consider adding review of the revisions made to Requirement 7 in TPL-007-2, specifically R7.3 that introduced fixed timelines for implementation of potential Corrective Action Plans. Requiring fixed timelines for implementing Corrective Action Plans, especially in cases where capital investment maybe required, may not be compatible with existing electricity regulations in Canadian jurisdictions.

Response

The SAR DT agrees that considerations for implementing Corrective Action Plans should be addressed, including a review Requirement R7.

Standard Authorization Request (SAR)

Complete and please email this form, with attachment(s) to: <u>sarcomm@nerc.net</u>

The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) welcomes suggestions to improve the reliability of the bulk power system through improved Reliability Standards.

-	1	Requeste	d inform	ation		
SAR Title:		Canadian-specific Revision to proposed standard TPL-007-2 (Transmission				
		System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events)				
Date Submitted	: /	February 27, 2018				
SAR Requester						
Name: Helen Lainis (II		(IESO) and Payam Fa	arahbakhsh	(Hydro One)		
Organization:	Canadian Electricity Association ("CEA") Members from Ontario (IESO and Hydro One) with the support of additional CEA Members including Manitoba Hydro, Hydro Québe and SaskPower.					
	Helen:			Helen:		
Telephone:	905-855-410)6	Email:	helen.lainis@ieso.ca		
relephone.	Payam:		Linan.	Payam:		
	416-345-5			Payam.Farahbakhsh@HydroOne.cor	n	
SAR Type (Chec		apply)				
New Stan			Imminent Action/ Confidential Issue (SPM			
Revision to Existing Standard			Section 10)			
Add, Modify or Retire a Glossary Term			Variance development or revision			
Withdraw/retire an Existing Standard Other (Please specify) Justification for this proposed standard development project (Check all that apply to help NE				· · · · ·		
prioritize develo	• •	d standard developm	ient projec	t (Check all that apply to help NERC		
	y Initiation			RC Standing Committee Identified		
	•	ty Issues Steering	Enhanced Periodic Review Initiated			
Committee) Ide			🕅 Indu	Industry Stakeholder Identified		
		velopment Plan		-	-1 - 2)	
				nefit does the proposed project provi		
				egistered Entities to leverage operating	-	
experience, observed GMD effects and on-going research efforts for defining alternative Benchmark						
GMD Events and/or Supplemental GMD Events specific to their unique topology.						
Registered Entities from Ontario, Québec, Manitoba and Saskatchewan have indicated support for a						
-				in Registered Entities to pursue. At a	~~	
				O) have indicated that this proposed		

revision would be used to define and implement an alternative Benchmark GMD Event and/or Supplemental GMD Event that appropriately reflects their specific geographical and geological characteristics.

Purpose or Goal (How does this proposed project provide the reliability-related benefit described above?):

The goal is to enable Canadian Registered Entities to define and implement alternative Benchmark GMD Events and/or Supplemental GMD Events that appropriately reflects the specific geographical and geological characteristics of the Canadian provinces, including those located on the Canadian Shield, a vast area of igneous rock exhibiting low electrical conductivity, through leveraging ongoing research efforts, operating experience, and observed GMD effects:

- Registered Canadian entities from Canadian provinces (most prominently Manitoba, Ontario and Québec) located on the Canadian Shield, are currently working to develop a Benchmark GMD Event and/or Supplemental GMD Event that takes into account their unique topology.
- These Canadian Registered Entities have been researching the impact of GMD on their power systems for several years now, and have been collaborating with Natural Resources Canada to collect and analyze Canadian magnetometer data for their respective provinces.

Project Scope (Define the parameters of the proposed project):

Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 should be revised to allow Canadian jurisdictions to define and implement alternative Benchmark GMD Events and/or Supplemental GMD Events that are different from the ones defined in TPL-007-2 appropriate for a continent wide standard.

The Benchmark GMD Event and/or Supplemental GMD Event described in TPL-007-2 should be options to pursue for Canadian Registered Entities for performing GMD Vulnerability Assessments.

Implementation of Benchmark GMD Events and/or Supplemental GMD Events by Canadian Registered Entities should be subject to approval by applicable regulatory authorities in Canada.

The drafting team should consider that the implementation of Corrective Action Plan(s) to mitigate GMD risks that require capital investment will be subject to approval by applicable regulatory authorities in Canada.

The project should consider whether Canadian-specific language is needed in Requirement R7 to align with the regulatory practices/processes in Canada for approving Corrective Action Plan(s) requiring capital investments.

Detailed Description (Describe the proposed deliverable(s) with sufficient detail for a drafting team to execute the project. If you propose a new or substantially revised Reliability Standard or definition, provide: (1) a technical justification¹which includes a discussion of the reliability-related benefits of developing a new or revised Reliability Standard or definition, and (2) a technical foundation document (*e.g.* research paper) to guide development of the Standard or definition):

NERC has spent a substantial amount of time and effort working with experts across the industry to develop scientifically sound Benchmark GMD Events defined in TPL-007-2 appropriate for a continent wide standard.

The research and development in this field continues to evolve, and more remains to be learned, new assessment tools need to be developed and assessment models need to be verified. In Canada, there is on-going work being done on this subject. We request that TPL-007-2 provide the flexibility for Canadian jurisdictions to leverage their expertise and to build on their research and on GMD impact assessment methodologies to define alternative Benchmark GMD Events and/or Supplemental GMD Events targeted to their unique topology.

The Canadian Shield is a sprawling rock formation that stretches across nearly all of Québec, much of Ontario and Manitoba, the northern portion of Saskatchewan and the northeast corner of Alberta. This geological formation blocks current from being dissipated into the Earth, making these Canadian provinces more susceptible to solar storms.

As such, Registered Entities from several Canadian shield provinces have been researching the impact of GMD on the reliable operation of their BES for years. For example, Hydro One Networks Inc., has been conducting this work in Ontario, Manitoba Hydro has been conducting this work in Manitoba and Hydro Québec has been conducted this work in Québec. A list of several technical publications could be provided upon request of the SDT to demonstrate the depth of Hydro One's, Manitoba Hydro's, Hydro Québec's and other jurisdictions' technical research and expertise in modeling and analyzing GMD impacts. These references also describe significant development efforts on tools and operating processes to support planned transmission system performance during GMD events.

Natural Resources Canada has published their calculations of extreme value statistics for a 1-50 and 1-100 year geomagnetic storm based on data from 13 Natural Resources Canada geomagnetic observatories, and Natural Resources Canada and Registered Entities from Canadian shield provinces have been collaborating to collect and analyze Canadian magnetometer data for their respective provinces.

Cost Impact Assessment, if known (Provide a paragraph describing the potential cost impacts associated with the proposed project):

¹ The NERC Rules of Procedure require a technical justification for new or substantially revised Reliability Standards. Please attach pertinent information to this form before submittal to NERC.

The cost implications of addressing a Benchmark GMD Event and/or Supplemental GMD Event is expected to be more significant for the Canadian shield provinces than for those registered entities in the lower 48 state portion of the United States. Furthermore, any capital investment must be approved by the applicable provincial regulatory authority. Consequently, it is essential that the requirements of the standard appropriately reflect conditions that exist in affected Canadian provinces. To this end, Registered Entities from these provinces are working with Natural Resources Canada and are using their own inputs to develop a Benchmark GMD Event and/or Supplemental GMD Event based on empirical data that will form the basis for seeking approval for any required investments with their respective regulatory authorities.

Please describe any unique characteristics of the BES facilities that may be impacted by this proposed standard development project (*e.g.* Dispersed Generation Resources):

Not Applicable

To assist the NERC Standards Committee in appointing a drafting team with the appropriate members, please indicate to which Functional Entities the proposed standard(s) should apply (*e.g.* Transmission Operator, Reliability Coordinator, etc. See the most recent version of the NERC Functional Model for definitions):

Canadian Registered Entities that meet the applicability specified in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 of the proposed TPL-007-2 Reliability Standard.

Do you know of any consensus building activities² in connection with this SAR? If so, please provide any recommendations or findings resulting from the consensus building activity.

The revision would be used, at a minimum, by IESO and Hydro One to avoid needing to seek remand to TPL-007-2 in Ontario, Canada. Working with CEA, IESO and Hydro One have engaged other Canadian Registered Entities to solicit feedback. Registered entities from Manitoba, Québec and Saskatchewan are supportive of a revision to TPL-007-2 as an option for Canadian Registered Entities to pursue. No Canadian Entity has voiced opposition to such a revision.

Are there any related standards or SARs that should be assessed for impact as a result of this proposed project? If so which standard(s) or project number(s)?

No

Are there alternatives (e.g. guidelines, white paper, alerts, etc.) that have been considered or could meet the objectives? If so, please list the alternatives.

² Consensus building activities are occasionally conducted by NERC and/or project review teams. They typically are conducted to obtain industry inputs prior to proposing any standard development project to revise, or develop a standard or definition.

	Reliability Principles
Does	this proposed standard development project support at least one of the following Reliability
Princ	iples (<u>Reliability Interface Principles</u>)? Please check all those that apply.
\square	1. Interconnected bulk power systems shall be planned and operated in a coordinated manner
	to perform reliably under normal and abnormal conditions as defined in the NERC Standards.
	2. The frequency and voltage of interconnected bulk power systems shall be controlled within
	defined limits through the balancing of real and reactive power supply and demand.
	3. Information necessary for the planning and operation of interconnected bulk power systems
\square	shall be made available to those entities responsible for planning and operating the systems
	reliably.
	4. Plans for emergency operation and system restoration of interconnected bulk power systems
	shall be developed, coordinated, maintained and implemented.
	5. Facilities for communication, monitoring and control shall be provided, used and maintained
	for the reliability of interconnected bulk power systems.
	6. Personnel responsible for planning and operating interconnected bulk power systems shall be
	trained, qualified, and have the responsibility and authority to implement actions.
\square	7. The security of the interconnected bulk power systems shall be assessed, monitored and
	maintained on a wide area basis.
	8. Bulk power systems shall be protected from malicious physical or cyber-attacks.

Market Interface Principles				
Does the proposed standard development project comply with all of the following				
Market Interface Principles?				
 A reliability standard shall not give any market participant an unfair competitiv advantage. 	YES			
A reliability standard shall neither mandate nor prohibit any specific market structure.	YES			
 A reliability standard shall not preclude market solutions to achieving complian with that standard. 	nce YES			
 A reliability standard shall not require the public disclosure of commercially sensitive information. All market participants shall have equal opportunity to access commercially non-sensitive information that is required for compliance with reliability standards. 	YES			

Identified Existing or Potential Regional or Interconnection Variances				
Region(s)/	Explanation			
Interconnection				
e.g. NPCC				

For Use by NERC Only

SAR Status Tracking (Check off as appropriate)				
 Draft SAR reviewed by NERC Staff Draft SAR presented to SC for acceptance DRAFT SAR approved for posting by the SC 	 Final SAR endorsed by the SC SAR assigned a Standards Project by NERC SAR denied or proposed as Guidance document 			

Version History

Version	Date	Owner	Change Tracking
1	June 3, 2013		Revised
1	August 29, 2014	Standards Information Staff	Updated template
2	January 18, 2017	Standards Information Staff	Revised
2	June 28, 2017	Standards Information Staff	Updated template

Standard Authorization Request (SAR)

Complete and please email this form, with attachment(s) to: <u>sarcomm@nerc.net</u>

The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) welcomes suggestions to improve the reliability of the bulk power system through improved Reliability Standards.

Requested information						
SAR Title:		Canadian-specific Revision to proposed standard TPL-007-2 (Transmission				
		System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events)				
Date Submitted	: /	February 27, 2018				
SAR Requester						
Name:	Helen Lainis (IESO) and Payam Farahbakhsh (Hydro One)					
Organization:	Canadian Electricity Association ("CEA") Members from Ontario (IESO and Hydro One), with the support of additional CEA Members including Manitoba Hydro, Hydro Québec and SaskPower.					
	Helen:			Helen:		
Telephone:	905-855-410)6	Email:	helen.lainis@ieso.ca		
relephone:	Payam:		Linan.	Payam:		
	416-345-5			Payam.Farahbakhsh@HydroOne.cor	n	
SAR Type (Chec		apply)				
New Standard			Imminent Action/ Confidential Issue (SPM			
Revision to Existing Standard			Section 10)			
Add, Modify or Retire a Glossary Term Withdraw/retire an Existing Standard			Variance development or revision			
				er (Please specify)		
prioritize develo	• •	d standard developm	ient projec	t (Check all that apply to help NERC		
Regulatory Initiation				RC Standing Committee Identified		
	•	ty Issues Steering	Enhanced Periodic Review Initiated			
Committee) Identified			Industry Stakeholder Identified			
Reliability Standard Development Plan Industry Need (What Bulk Electric System (BES) reliability benefit does the proposed project provide?):						
The need for this SAR is to enable the option for Canadian Registered Entities to leverage operating						
experience, observed GMD effects and on-going research efforts for defining alternative Benchmark						
GMD Events and/or Supplemental GMD Events specific to their unique topology.						
Registered Entities from Ontario, Québec, Manitoba and Saskatchewan have indicated support for a						
revision to be included in TPL-007-2 as an option for Canadian Registered Entities to pursue. At a						
minimum, Registered Entities in Ontario (Hydro One and IESO) have indicated that this proposed						

revision would be used to define and implement an alternative Benchmark GMD Event and/or Supplemental GMD Event that appropriately reflects their specific geographical and geological characteristics.

Purpose or Goal (How does this proposed project provide the reliability-related benefit described above?):

The goal is to enable Canadian Registered Entities to define and implement alternative Benchmark GMD Events and/or Supplemental GMD Events that appropriately reflects the specific geographical and geological characteristics of the Canadian provinces, including those located on the Canadian Shield, a vast area of igneous rock exhibiting low electrical conductivity, through leveraging ongoing research efforts, operating experience, and observed GMD effects:

- Registered Canadian entities from Canadian provinces (most prominently Manitoba, Ontario and Québec) located on the Canadian Shield, are currently working to develop a Benchmark GMD Event and/or Supplemental GMD Event that takes into account their unique topology.
- These Canadian Registered Entities have been researching the impact of GMD on their power systems for several years now, and have been collaborating with Natural Resources Canada to collect and analyze Canadian magnetometer data for their respective provinces.

Project Scope (Define the parameters of the proposed project):

Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 should be revised to allow Canadian jurisdictions to define and implement alternative Benchmark GMD Events and/or Supplemental GMD Events that are different from the ones defined in TPL-007-2 appropriate for a continent wide standard.

The Benchmark GMD Event and/or Supplemental GMD Event described in TPL-007-2 should be options to pursue for Canadian Registered Entities for performing GMD Vulnerability Assessments.

Implementation of Benchmark GMD Events and/or Supplemental GMD Events by Canadian Registered Entities should be subject to approval by applicable <u>regulatory authorities in Canada</u>Canadian governmental authority or their agencies.

The drafting team should consider that the implementation of Corrective Action Plan(s) to mitigate GMD risks that require capital investment will be subject to approval by applicable regulatory authorities in Canada.

The project should consider whether Canadian-specific language is needed in Requirement R7 to align with the regulatory practices/processes in Canada for approving Corrective Action Plan(s) requiring capital investments.

Requested information

Detailed Description (Describe the proposed deliverable(s) with sufficient detail for a drafting team to execute the project. If you propose a new or substantially revised Reliability Standard or definition, provide: (1) a technical justification¹which includes a discussion of the reliability-related benefits of developing a new or revised Reliability Standard or definition, and (2) a technical foundation document (*e.g.* research paper) to guide development of the Standard or definition):

NERC has spent a substantial amount of time and effort working with experts across the industry to develop scientifically sound Benchmark GMD Events defined in TPL-007-2 appropriate for a continent wide standard.

The research and development in this field continues to evolve, and more remains to be learned, new assessment tools need to be developed and assessment models need to be verified. In Canada, there is on-going work being done on this subject. We request that TPL-007-2 provide the flexibility for Canadian jurisdictions to leverage their expertise and to build on their research and on GMD impact assessment methodologies to define alternative Benchmark GMD Events and/or Supplemental GMD Events targeted to their unique topology.

The Canadian Shield is a sprawling rock formation that stretches across nearly all of Québec, much of Ontario and Manitoba, the northern portion of Saskatchewan and the northeast corner of Alberta. This geological formation blocks current from being dissipated into the Earth, making these Canadian provinces more susceptible to solar storms.

As such, Registered Entities from several Canadian shield provinces have been researching the impact of GMD on the reliable operation of their BES for years. For example, Hydro One Networks Inc., has been conducting this work in Ontario, Manitoba Hydro has been conducting this work in Manitoba and Hydro Québec has been conducted this work in Québec. A list of several technical publications could be provided upon request of the SDT to demonstrate the depth of Hydro One's, Manitoba Hydro's, Hydro Québec's and other jurisdictions' technical research and expertise in modeling and analyzing GMD impacts. These references also describe significant development efforts on tools and operating processes to support planned transmission system performance during GMD events.

Natural Resources Canada has published their calculations of extreme value statistics for a 1-50 and 1-100 year geomagnetic storm based on data from 13 Natural Resources Canada geomagnetic observatories, and Natural Resources Canada and Registered Entities from Canadian shield provinces have been collaborating to collect and analyze Canadian magnetometer data for their respective provinces.

Cost Impact Assessment, if known (Provide a paragraph describing the potential cost impacts associated with the proposed project):

¹ The NERC Rules of Procedure require a technical justification for new or substantially revised Reliability Standards. Please attach pertinent information to this form before submittal to NERC.

Requested information

The cost implications of addressing a Benchmark GMD Event and/or Supplemental GMD Event is expected to be more significant for the Canadian shield provinces than for those registered entities in the lower 48 state portion of the United States. Furthermore, any capital investment must be approved by the applicable provincial regulatory authority. Consequently, it is essential that the requirements of the standard appropriately reflect conditions that exist in affected Canadian provinces. To this end, Registered Entities from these provinces are working with Natural Resources Canada and are using their own inputs to develop a Benchmark GMD Event and/or Supplemental GMD Event based on empirical data that will form the basis for seeking approval for any required investments with their respective regulatory authorities.

Please describe any unique characteristics of the BES facilities that may be impacted by this proposed standard development project (*e.g.* Dispersed Generation Resources):

Not Applicable

To assist the NERC Standards Committee in appointing a drafting team with the appropriate members, please indicate to which Functional Entities the proposed standard(s) should apply (*e.g.* Transmission Operator, Reliability Coordinator, etc. See the most recent version of the NERC Functional Model for definitions):

Canadian Registered Entities that meet the applicability specified in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 of the proposed TPL-007-2 Reliability Standard.

Do you know of any consensus building activities² in connection with this SAR? If so, please provide any recommendations or findings resulting from the consensus building activity.

The revision would be used, at a minimum, by IESO and Hydro One to avoid needing to seek remand to TPL-007-2 in Ontario, Canada. Working with CEA, IESO and Hydro One have engaged other Canadian Registered Entities to solicit feedback. Registered entities from Manitoba, Québec and Saskatchewan are supportive of a <u>revision</u> to TPL-007-2 as an option for Canadian Registered Entities to pursue. No Canadian Entity has voiced opposition to such a revision.

Are there any related standards or SARs that should be assessed for impact as a result of this proposed project? If so which standard(s) or project number(s)?

No

Are there alternatives (e.g. guidelines, white paper, alerts, etc.) that have been considered or could meet the objectives? If so, please list the alternatives.

² Consensus building activities are occasionally conducted by NERC and/or project review teams. They typically are conducted to obtain industry inputs prior to proposing any standard development project to revise, or develop a standard or definition.

	Reliability Principles
Does	s this proposed standard development project support at least one of the following Reliability
Princ	ciples (<u>Reliability Interface Principles</u>)? Please check all those that apply.
\square	1. Interconnected bulk power systems shall be planned and operated in a coordinated manner
	to perform reliably under normal and abnormal conditions as defined in the NERC Standards.
	2. The frequency and voltage of interconnected bulk power systems shall be controlled within
	defined limits through the balancing of real and reactive power supply and demand.
	3. Information necessary for the planning and operation of interconnected bulk power systems
\square	shall be made available to those entities responsible for planning and operating the systems
	reliably.
	4. Plans for emergency operation and system restoration of interconnected bulk power systems
	shall be developed, coordinated, maintained and implemented.
	5. Facilities for communication, monitoring and control shall be provided, used and maintained
	for the reliability of interconnected bulk power systems.
	6. Personnel responsible for planning and operating interconnected bulk power systems shall be
	trained, qualified, and have the responsibility and authority to implement actions.
\square	7. The security of the interconnected bulk power systems shall be assessed, monitored and
	maintained on a wide area basis.
	8. Bulk power systems shall be protected from malicious physical or cyber-attacks.

Market Interface Principles	
Does the proposed standard development project comply with all of the following	Enter
Market Interface Principles?	(yes/no)
 A reliability standard shall not give any market participant an unfair competitive advantage. 	YES
 A reliability standard shall neither mandate nor prohibit any specific market structure. 	YES
 A reliability standard shall not preclude market solutions to achieving compliance with that standard. 	YES
 A reliability standard shall not require the public disclosure of commercially sensitive information. All market participants shall have equal opportunity to access commercially non-sensitive information that is required for compliance with reliability standards. 	YES

Identified Existing or Potential Regional or Interconnection Variances				
Region(s)/ Explanation				
Interconnection				
e.g. NPCC				

For Use by NERC Only

SAR Status Tracking (Check off as appropriate)	
 Draft SAR reviewed by NERC Staff Draft SAR presented to SC for acceptance DRAFT SAR approved for posting by the SC 	 Final SAR endorsed by the SC SAR assigned a Standards Project by NERC SAR denied or proposed as Guidance document

Version History

Version	Date	Owner	Change Tracking
1	June 3, 2013		Revised
1	August 29, 2014	Standards Information Staff	Updated template
2	January 18, 2017	Standards Information Staff	Revised
2	June 28, 2017	Standards Information Staff	Updated template

Proposed TPL-007-2 Canadian Variance

For Canadian registered entities, all references to "Attachment 1" in the standard are replaced with "Attachment 1 or Attachment 1-CAN."

The following variance shall be applicable for Canadian registered entities and replaces, in its entirety, Requirement R7:

- **R7.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, that concludes through the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment conducted in Requirement R4 that their System does not meet the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1, shall develop a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) addressing how the performance requirements will be met. Prior to the implementation of any element of a CAP developed in accordance with Requirement R7, any required regulatory approvals must be obtained. The CAP shall: [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **7.1.** List System deficiencies and the associated actions needed to achieve required System performance. Examples of such actions include:
 - Installation, modification, retirement, or removal of Transmission and generation Facilities and any associated equipment.
 - Installation, modification, or removal of Protection Systems or Remedial Action Schemes.
 - Use of Operating Procedures, specifying how long they will be needed as part of the CAP.
 - Use of Demand-Side Management, new technologies, or other initiatives.
 - **7.2.** Be developed within one year of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.
 - **7.3.** Include a timetable, subject to revision by the responsible entity in Part 7.4, for implementing the selected actions from Part 7.1. The timetable shall:
 - **7.3.1.** Specify implementation of non-hardware mitigation, if any, within two years of <u>the later of the</u> development of the CAP<u>or receipt of regulatory</u> <u>approvals, if required</u>; and
 - **7.3.2.** Specify implementation of hardware mitigation, if any, within four years <u>of the later of the development of the CAP or receipt of regulatory</u> <u>approvals, if required</u>.
 - **7.4.** Be revised if situations beyond the control of the responsible entity determined in Requirement R1 prevent implementation of the CAP within the timetable for implementation provided in Part 7.3. The revised CAP shall document the following, and be updated at least once every 12 calendar months until implemented:

- **7.4.1.** Circumstances causing the delay for fully or partially implementing the selected actions in Part 7.1;
- **7.4.2.** Description of the original CAP, and any previous changes to the CAP, with the associated timetable(s) for implementing the selected actions in Part 7.1; and
- **7.4.3.** Revisions to the selected actions in Part 7.1, if any, including utilization of Operating Procedures if applicable, and the updated timetable for implementing the selected actions.
- 7.5. Be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission Planner(s), and functional entities referenced in the CAP within 90 calendar days of development or revision, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of development or revision, whichever is later.
 - **7.5.1.** If a recipient of the CAP provides documented comments on the results, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- M7. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, that concludes, through the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment conducted in Requirement R4, that the responsible entity's System does not meet the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1 shall have evidence such as dated electronic or hard copies of its CAP including timetable for implementing selected actions, as specified in Requirement R7. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has revised its CAP if situations beyond the responsible entity's control prevent implementation of the CAP within the timetable specified. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its CAP or relevant information, if any, (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission Planner(s), and functional entities referenced in the CAP within 90 calendar days of development or revision, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of development or revision, whichever is later as specified in Requirement R7. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its CAP within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments, in accordance with Requirement R7.

Attachment 1-CAN

Background

While Attachment 1 is an acceptable approach for Canadian registered entities to use, Attachment 1-CAN provides an alternative methodology for defining a 1-in-100 year GMD planning event for study as part of the GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s) in lieu of the benchmark and supplemental GMD events defined in Attachment 1.

General Considerations

The benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment requires the use of geophysical and engineering models that need information on a wide range of parameters. One particular approach and a specific data set is used in Attachment 1. As research on these topics continues, Canadian jurisdictions have access to additional data sets and are developing detailed models and analysis techniques that more accurately characterize the region-specific parameters. Such data includes geomagnetic field (based on magnetometers) and earth conductivity information. In some cases, direct geomagnetically induced current measurements are also available to help validate modeling and simulation results. Attachment 1-CAN provides an approach for using such data, where available, to conduct GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s). Where the information available is insufficient to support an alternative approach, Canadian registered entities should use the methodology in Attachment 1.

Given that in some cases no suitable model data exists, assumed values may be used. Any assumptions used must be clearly documented and technically justified. In these cases, a sensitivity analysis may be completed to identify how the assumptions affect the results. In order to facilitate simulation works during planning studies, a simplified model could be used as long as the model is more conservative than a more detailed model.

Calculation of Geoelectric Fields

The benchmark factors involved in the calculation of geoelectric fields are geomagnetic field variations and earth transfer function.¹ The earth transfer function can be obtained from magnetotelluric measurements or earth conductivity models. Assumptions made in doing the modeling must be clearly stated and technically justified. Technically justified information used for calculating geoelectric field may include: technical documents written by governmental entities such as Natural Resources Canada and United States Geological Survey, technical papers published in peer-reviewed journals, or measurements based on sound geophysical principles.

Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Events

The 1-in-100 year planning event should be based on regionally specific data and technically justifiable statistical analyses (e.g., extreme value theory) and applied to the benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s).

¹ The "earth transfer function" is the relationship between the electric fields and magnetic field variations at the surface of the earth.

For the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), an entity should consider the large-scale spatial structure of the GMD event. For the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), an entity should consider the small-scale spatial structure of the GMD event (e.g., using magnetometer measurements or realistic electrojet calculations).

Unofficial Comment Form

Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007

Do not use this form for submitting comments. Use the <u>electronic form</u> to submit comments on the **Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007 Standard Authorization Request (SAR)**. Comments must be submitted by **8 p.m. Eastern, Monday, April 30, 2018**.

Documents and information about this project are available on the <u>project page</u>. If you have questions, contact Standards Developer, <u>Mat Bunch</u> (via email) or at (404) 446-9785.

Background

Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 – Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events was approved by industry in 2017 and filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission on January 22, 2018 and the Canadian authorities on February 27, 2018. The first version of the standard, <u>TPL-007-1</u>, requires entities to assess the impact to their systems from a defined event referred to as the "Benchmark GMD Event." The second version of the standard adds new Requirements R8, R9, and R10 to require responsible entities to assess the potential implications of a "Supplemental GMD Event" on their equipment and systems in accordance with the FERC's directives in <u>Order No. 830</u>.

More information and historical information can be found on the <u>Project 2013-03 Geomagnetic</u> <u>Disturbance Mitigation</u> project page.

Purpose/Industry Need

This posting is soliciting comment on the SAR.

The purpose of this project is to enable the option for Canadian Registered Entities to leverage operating experience, observed GMD effects, and on-going research efforts for defining alternative Benchmark GMD Events and/or Supplemental GMD Events that appropriately reflect their specific geographical and geological characteristics Background Information





1. Do you agree with the scope and objectives of the SAR? If not, please explain why you do not agree and, if possible, provide specific language revisions that would make it acceptable to you.

	Yes
	No
Со	mments:

2. What factors should the SAR drafting team consider to support reliability across the North American interconnected power grid? If possible, provide specific example(s) and supporting rationale.

Comments:

3. If you have any other comments on this SAR that you haven't already mentioned above, please provide them here:

Comments:

Standards Announcement

Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2

Informal Comment Period Open through September 6, 2018

Now Available

A 28-day informal comment period on the Proposed TPL-007-2 Canadian Variance is open through **8 p.m. Eastern, Thursday, September 6, 2018**.

Commenting

Use the <u>electronic form</u> to submit comments on the SAR. If you experience any difficulties using the electronic form, contact <u>Linda Jenkins</u>. The unofficial Word version of the comment form is posted on the project page.

- If you are having difficulty accessing the SBS due to a forgotten password, incorrect credential error messages, or system lock-out, contact NERC IT support directly at https://support.nerc.net/ (Monday Friday, 8 a.m. 5 p.m. Eastern).
- Passwords expire every 6 months and must be reset.
- The SBS is not supported for use on mobile devices.
- Please be mindful of ballot and comment period closing dates. We ask to **allow at least 48 hours** for NERC support staff to assist with inquiries. Therefore, it is recommended that users try logging into their SBS accounts **prior to the last day** of a comment/ballot period.

Next Steps

The drafting team will review all responses received during the comment period and determine the next steps of the project.

For more information on the Standards Development Process, refer to the Standard Processes Manual.

For more information or assistance, contact Standards Developer, <u>Mat Bunch</u> (via email) or at (404) 446-9785.

North American Electric Reliability Corporation 3353 Peachtree Rd, NE Suite 600, North Tower Atlanta, GA 30326 404-446-2560 | <u>www.nerc.com</u>

RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

Comment Report

There were 9 sets of responses, including comments from approximately 36 different people from approximately 28 companies representing 10 of the Industry Segments as shown in the table on the following pages.

Questions

1. The SDT developed a Canadian Variance to Requirement R7 to accommodate for required regulatory approvals in different Canadian jurisdictions. For example, Canadian entities may be required to obtain a regulatory approval for investments associated with Corrective Action Plans (CAPs). Such approval may limit the scope or modify the timeline of a CAP. Do you agree that the proposed Variance to Requirement R7 allows for the necessary flexibility to take into account the required regulatory approvals within your jurisdiction? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions for the Variance, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

2. Do you agree that the language in the 'Background' and 'General Considerations' sections of Attachment 1-CAN adequately describes the Canadian Variance? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

3. The SDT developed the Attachment 1-CAN, as an alternative to Attachment 1, for defining a 1-in-100 year GMD planning event to be used in the benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s). The proposed alternative approach in Attachment 1-CAN for the GMD planning event is to be based on regionally specific data and statistical analyses. Do you agree that the proposed approach to define a 1-in-100 year GMD event is sufficiently clear and flexible for Canadian entities while achieving an equivalent level of reliability of TPL-007-2? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions for defining a GMD event, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

4. The SDT proposed that the calculation of the geoelectric fields, which is based on geomagnetic field variations and earth transfer function, must be based on technically justified information. Technically justified information may include technical documents written by governmental entities, technical papers published in peer-reviewed journals, or measurements based on sound geophysical principles. Do you agree that technical documents as defined in Attachment 1-CAN are credible sources of technically justified information? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions for defining what constitute a technically justified information, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

5. If you have any additional comments regarding the completeness, the adequacy, and the accuracy of the proposed modifications for the SDT to consider, provide them here.

Organization Name	Name	Segment(s)	Region	Group Name	Group Member Name	Group Member Organization	Group Member Segment(s)	Group Member Region								
Northeast Power Coordinating Council	Ruida Shu 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 NPCC Image: Provide Share of Sha	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10) NPCC	RSC no Dominion	Guy V. Zito	Northeast Power Coordinating Council	10	NPCC								
							New Brunswick Power	2	NPCC							
				Wayne Sipperly	New York Power Authority	4	NPCC									
					Glen Smith	Entergy Services	4	NPCC								
					Brian Robinson	Utility Services	5	NPCC								
												Alan Adar	Alan Adamson	New York State Reliability Council	7	NPCC
				Edward Bedder	Orange & Rockland Utilities	1	NPCC									
				David Burke	Orange & Rockland Utilities	3	NPCC									
					Michele Tondalo	UI	1	NPCC								
				Laura Mcleod	NB Power	1	NPCC									
				David Ramkalawan	Ontario Power Generation Inc.	5	NPCC									
				Helen Lainis	IESO	2	NPCC									
				Michael Schiavone	National Grid	1	NPCC									
				Michael Jones	National Grid	3	NPCC									
						Con Ed - Consolidated Edison	1	NPCC								
					Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	3	NPCC									

Sean Cavote	PSEG	4	NPCC
Kathleen Goodman	ISO-NE	2	NPCC
Quintin Lee	Eversource Energy	1	NPCC
Dermot Smyth	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	1,5	NPCC
Dermot Smyth	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	1,5	NPCC
Salvatore Spagnolo	New York Power Authority	1	NPCC
Shivaz Chopra	New York Power Authority	6	NPCC
David Kiguel	Independent	NA - Not Applicable	NPCC
Silvia Mitchell	NextEra Energy - Florida Power and Light Co.	6	NPCC
Caroline Dupuis	Hydro Quebec	1	NPCC
Chantal Mazza	Hydro Quebec	2	NPCC
Gregory Campoli	New York Independent System Operator	2	NPCC
Paul Malozewski	Hydro One Networks, Inc.	3	NPCC

1. The SDT developed a Canadian Variance to Requirement R7 to accommodate for required regulatory approvals in different Canadian jurisdictions. For example, Canadian entities may be required to obtain a regulatory approval for investments associated with Corrective Action Plans (CAPs). Such approval may limit the scope or modify the timeline of a CAP. Do you agree that the proposed Variance to Requirement R7 allows for the necessary flexibility to take into account the required regulatory approvals within your jurisdiction? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions for the Variance, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

Terry Volkmann - Glencoe Light and Power Commission - 1				
Answer	No			
Document Name				
Comment				
All utilities have some form of regulatory ap	proval of investments. This variance should be applicable across all of NERC, not just Canada.			
Likes 0				
Dislikes 0				
Response				
Laura McLeod - NB Power Corporation -	1,5			
Answer	Yes			
Document Name				
Comment				
	tly such that obtaining regulatory approval is an optional requirement and not mandatory requirement of the compliant if they do not seek regulatory approval prior to implementing a corrective action plan.			
Likes 0				
Dislikes 0				
Response				
Michael Godbout - Hydro-Qu?bec Transl	Energie - 1 - NPCC			
Answer	Yes			
Document Name				
Comment				

see question 5 for comments and suggestions.			
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			
David Ramkalawan - Ontario Power Gene	eration Inc 5		
Answer	Yes		
Document Name			
Comment			
The proposed revision does not account for	the case when no approval is provided by the regulator.		
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			
Wayne Guttormson - SaskPower - 1			
Answer	Yes		
Document Name			
Comment			
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			
Maryanne Darling-Reich - Black Hills Corporation - 1,3,5,6 - WECC			
Answer	Yes		
Document Name			
Comment			
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			

Response				
Leonard Kula - Independent Electricity S	Leonard Kula - Independent Electricity System Operator - 2			
Answer	Yes			
Document Name				
Comment				
Likes 0				
Dislikes 0				
Response				
Ruida Shu - Northeast Power Coordination	ng Council - 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 - NPCC, Group Name RSC no Dominion			
Answer	Yes			
Document Name				
Comment				
Likes 0				
Dislikes 0				
Response				
Payam Farahbakhsh - Hydro One Networ	rks, Inc 1,3			
Answer	Yes			
Document Name				
Comment				
Likes 0				
Dislikes 0				
Response				

2. Do you agree that the language in the 'Background' and 'General Considerations' sections of Attachment 1-CAN adequately describes the Canadian Variance? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.				
Terry Volkmann - Glencoe Light and Pow	ver Commission - 1			
nswer No				
Document Name				
Comment				
This is good section, but if the Canadians	s find a different methodology that is more accurate it needs to apply to all under TPL-007.			
Much of the existing methodology is deri	ved from the Canadian events and data.			
So if the Canadian find some thing better				
Likes 0				
Dislikes 0				
Response				
David Ramkalawan - Ontario Power Gene	eration Inc 5			
Answer	Yes			
Document Name				
Comment				
	ent from Attachment 1-CAN as follow: "Where the information available is insufficient to support an entities shall (instead of "should") use the methodology in Attachment 1."			
Likes 0				
Dislikes 0				
Response				
Michael Godbout - Hydro-Qu?bec Trans	Energie - 1 - NPCC			
Answer	Yes			
Document Name				
Comment				
see question 5 for comments and suggestions.				

2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 - NPCC, Group Name RSC no Dominion
2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 - NPCC, Group Name RSC no Dominion
2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 - NPCC, Group Name RSC no Dominion
2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 - NPCC, Group Name RSC no Dominion
2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 - NPCC, Group Name RSC no Dominion
2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 - NPCC, Group Name RSC no Dominion
2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 - NPCC, Group Name RSC no Dominion
2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 - NPCC, Group Name RSC no Dominion
or - 2

Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Maryanne Darling-Reich - Black Hills Co	rporation - 1,3,5,6 - WECC
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Wayne Guttormson - SaskPower - 1	
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	

3. The SDT developed the Attachment 1-CAN, as an alternative to Attachment 1, for defining a 1-in-100 year GMD planning event to be used in the benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s). The proposed alternative approach in Attachment 1-CAN for the GMD planning event is to be based on regionally specific data and statistical analyses. Do you agree that the proposed approach to define a 1-in-100 year GMD event is sufficiently clear and flexible for Canadian entities while achieving an equivalent level of reliability of TPL-007-2? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions for defining a GMD event, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

Terry Volkmann - Glencoe Light and Pov	rry Volkmann - Glencoe Light and Power Commission - 1				
Answer	No				
Document Name					
Comment					
If the Canadians find a different methodology that is more accurate it needs to apply to all under TPL-007. Much of the existing methodology is derived from the Canadian events and data. So if the Canadian find some thing better it need to apply to more than Canada.					
Likes 0					
Dislikes 0					
Response					
Michael Godbout - Hydro-Qu?bec TransEnergie - 1 - NPCC					
Answer	Yes				
Document Name					
Comment					
see question 5 for comments and suggestions.					
Likes 0					
Dislikes 0					
Response					
Wayne Guttormson - SaskPower - 1					
Answer	Yes				
Document Name					
Comment					

Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Maryanne Darling-Reich - Black Hills Cor	poration - 1,3,5,6 - WECC
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Laura McLeod - NB Power Corporation -	1,5
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Leonard Kula - Independent Electricity S	ystem Operator - 2
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Ruida Shu - Northeast Power Coordination	ng Council - 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 - NPCC, Group Name RSC no Dominion

Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Payam Farahbakhsh - Hydro One Netwo	rks, Inc 1,3
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
David Ramkalawan - Ontario Power Gene	eration Inc 5
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	

4. The SDT proposed that the calculation of the geoelectric fields, which is based on geomagnetic field variations and earth transfer function, must be based on technically justified information. Technically justified information may include technical documents written by governmental entities, technical papers published in peer-reviewed journals, or measurements based on sound geophysical principles. Do you agree that technical documents as defined in Attachment 1-CAN are credible sources of technically justified information? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions for defining what constitute a technically justified information, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

Terry Volkmann - Glencoe Light and Pow	ver Commission - 1							
Answer	No							
Document Name								
Comment								
Technical papers published in peer-revie accepted position. It should state tech paper model.	ewed journals without the publishing review comments do not necessarily represent an industry nical papers and review comments published in peer-reviewed journals. Should follow the IEEE							
Likes 0								
Dislikes 0								
Response								
David Ramkalawan - Ontario Power Gene	eration Inc 5							
Answer	Yes							
Document Name								
Comment								
Likes 0								
Dislikes 0								
Response								
Payam Farahbakhsh - Hydro One Networ	ks, Inc 1,3							
Answer	Yes							
Document Name								
Comment								
Likes 0								

Dislikes 0	
Response	
Ruida Shu - Northeast Power Coordination	ng Council - 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 - NPCC, Group Name RSC no Dominion
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Michael Godbout - Hydro-Qu?bec Transl	Energie - 1 - NPCC
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Leonard Kula - Independent Electricity S	ystem Operator - 2
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Laura McLeod - NB Power Corporation -	
Answer	Yes

Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Maryanne Darling-Reich - Black Hills Co	rporation - 1,3,5,6 - WECC
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Wayne Guttormson - SaskPower - 1	
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	

5. If you have any additional comments regarding the completeness, the adequacy, and the accuracy of the proposed modifications for the SDT to consider, provide them here.

Michael Godbout - Hydro-Qu?bec Transl	Energie - 1 - NPCC
Answer	
Document Name	Comments-HQT-RC-TPL-007-2-CAN.docx
Comment	
see attached file for comments.	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Payam Farahbakhsh - Hydro One Networ	′ks, Inc 1,3
Answer	
Document Name	
Comment	
	continues to evolve. More remains to be learned which will result in tool refinements to support more ence, it should be emphasized that the interpretation of assessment results should account for the maturity ed.
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
David Ramkalawan - Ontario Power Gene	eration Inc 5
Answer	
Document Name	
Comment	
OPG has the following additional comments	3:
Field readings can be used for validation of GMD events).	the physical modeling assumption (earth transfer function and network modeling) at the first opportunity (i.e.
There should be a timeline related to the su	bmission associated with the regulatory approval of the CAP implementation.

Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	

Comments received from Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO)

"A comment like: The thoughts in the variance would flow more clearly if expressed in a manner similar to the following:

One particular GMD Vulnerability Assessment approach and a specific data set is specified in Attachment 1. Canadian registered entities have access to additional data sets that enable the development of other approaches to more accurately characterize their planning areas. Such data includes geomagnetic field (from magnetometer measurements), earth conductivity information and GIC measurements. Canadian registered entities should use the approach and data set specified in Attachment 1 unless sufficient information is available to support an alternative approach. Attachment 1-CAN provides the necessary conditions to employ an alternative approach.

Assumptions used in an alternate approach to a GMD Vulnerability Assessment must be clearly documented and technically justified. A sensitivity analysis should be provided to identify how assumptions affect results. To facilitate planning studies simplified models should be employed only when they produce more conservative results than more detailed models."



Consideration of Comments

Project Name:	2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2	
Comment Period Start Date:	8/10/2018	
Comment Period End Date:	9/6/2018	

There were 9 sets of responses, including comments from approximately 36 different people from approximately 28 companies representing 10 of the Industry Segments as shown in the table on the following pages.

All comments submitted can be reviewed in their original format on the project page.

If you feel that your comment has been overlooked, please let us know immediately. Our goal is to give every comment serious consideration in this process. If you feel there has been an error or omission, you can contact the Senior Director of Engineering and Standards, <u>Howard</u> <u>Gugel</u> (via email) or at (404) 446-9693.



Questions

1. The SDT developed a Canadian Variance to Requirement R7 to accommodate for required regulatory approvals in different Canadian jurisdictions. For example, Canadian entities may be required to obtain a regulatory approval for investments associated with Corrective Action Plans (CAPs). Such approval may limit the scope or modify the timeline of a CAP. Do you agree that the proposed Variance to Requirement R7 allows for the necessary flexibility to take into account the required regulatory approvals within your jurisdiction? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions for the Variance, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

2. Do you agree that the language in the 'Background' and 'General Considerations' sections of Attachment 1-CAN adequately describes the Canadian Variance? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

3. The SDT developed the Attachment 1-CAN, as an alternative to Attachment 1, for defining a 1-in-100 year GMD planning event to be used in the benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s). The proposed alternative approach in Attachment 1-CAN for the GMD planning event is to be based on regionally specific data and statistical analyses. Do you agree that the proposed approach to define a 1-in-100 year GMD event is sufficiently clear and flexible for Canadian entities while achieving an equivalent level of reliability of TPL-007-2? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions for defining a GMD event, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

4. The SDT proposed that the calculation of the geoelectric fields, which is based on geomagnetic field variations and earth transfer function, must be based on technically justified information. Technically justified information may include technical documents written by governmental entities, technical papers published in peer-reviewed journals, or measurements based on sound geophysical principles. Do you agree that technical documents as defined in Attachment 1-CAN are credible sources of technically justified information? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions for defining what constitute a technically justified information, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

5. If you have any additional comments regarding the completeness, the adequacy, and the accuracy of the proposed modifications for the SDT to consider, provide them here.

The Industry Segments are:

- 1 Transmission Owners
- 2 RTOs, ISOs
- 3 Load-serving Entities
- 4 Transmission-dependent Utilities
- 5 Electric Generators
- 6 Electricity Brokers, Aggregators, and Marketers
- 7 Large Electricity End Users
- 8 Small Electricity End Users
- 9 Federal, State, Provincial Regulatory or other Government Entities
- 10 Regional Reliability Organizations, Regional Entities



Organization Name	Name	Segment(s)	Region	Group Name	Group Member Name	Group Member Organization	Group Member Segment(s)	Group Member Region
Northeast Power Coordinating Council	ower oordinating	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 NF	NPCC	RSC no Dominion	Guy V. Zito	Northeast Power Coordinating Council	10	NPCC
				Randy MacDonald	New Brunswick Power	2	NPCC	
					Wayne Sipperly	New York Power Authority	4	NPCC
					Glen Smith	Entergy Services	4	NPCC
					Brian Robinson	Utility Services	5	NPCC
			Alan Adamson	New York State Reliability Council	7	NPCC		
					Edward Bedder	Orange & Rockland Utilities	1	NPCC
				David Burke	Orange & Rockland Utilities	3	NPCC	



Michele Tondalo	UI	1	NPCC
Laura Mcleod	NB Power	1	NPCC
David Ramkalawan	Ontario Power Generation Inc.	5	NPCC
Helen Lainis	IESO	2	NPCC
Michael Schiavone	National Grid	1	NPCC
Michael Jones	National Grid	3	NPCC
Michael Forte	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison	1	NPCC
Peter Yost	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	3	NPCC
Sean Cavote	PSEG	4	NPCC
Kathleen Goodman	ISO-NE	2	NPCC
Quintin Lee	Eversource Energy	1	NPCC
Dermot Smyth	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	1,5	NPCC



		-	-	
	Dermot Smyth	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	1,5	NPCC
	Salvatore Spagnolo	New York Power Authority	1	NPCC
	Shivaz Chopra	New York Power Authority	6	NPCC
	David Kiguel	Independent	NA - Not Applicable	NPCC
	Silvia Mitchell	NextEra Energy - Florida Power and Light Co.	6	NPCC
	Caroline Dupuis	Hydro Quebec	1	NPCC
	Chantal Mazza	Hydro Quebec	2	NPCC
	Gregory Campoli	New York Independent System Operator	2	NPCC
	Paul Malozewski	Hydro One Networks, Inc.	3	NPCC



1. The SDT developed a Canadian Variance to Requirement R7 to accommodate for required regulatory approvals in different Canadian jurisdictions. For example, Canadian entities may be required to obtain a regulatory approval for investments associated with Corrective Action Plans (CAPs). Such approval may limit the scope or modify the timeline of a CAP. Do you agree that the proposed Variance to Requirement R7 allows for the necessary flexibility to take into account the required regulatory approvals within your jurisdiction? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions for the Variance, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

Terry Volkmann - Glencoe Light and Power Commission - 1					
Answer	No				
Document Name					
Comment					
All utilities have some form of regulatory approval of investments. This variance should be applicable across all of NERC, not just Canada.					
Likes 0					
Dislikes 0					
Response					
TPL-007-2 through the developmen	cope for this project, as outlined in its SAR, is to address certain concerns of Canadian entities regarding at of a Canadian Variance. Changes to the continent-wide standard are therefore outside the scope of this suggests that the commenter submit a separate SAR to address this issue in the continent-wide standard.				
Laura McLeod - NB Power Corporation - 1,5					
Answer	Yes				
Document Name					



Comment

The wording in R7 should be modified slightly such that obtaining regulatory approval is an optional requirement and not mandatory requirement of the standard. An entity should not be held non-compliant if they do not seek regulatory approval prior to implementing a corrective action plan.

Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			
The objective was to consider the delays and the changes to the corrective action plans that stems from regulatory approvals, where such approvals are required. The Requirement R7 wording was not intended to make regulatory approvals mandatory prior to implementing a Corrective Action Plan (CAP). The draft has been revised for clarity.			
Michael Godbout - Hydro-Québec	TransÉnergie - 1 - NPCC		
Answer	Yes		
Document Name			
Comment			
see question 5 for comments and suggestions.			
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			
Please see the SDT's response to Question 5.			
David Ramkalawan - Ontario Power Generation Inc 5			
Answer	Yes		
Document Name			
Comment			



The proposed revision does not account for the case when no approval is provided by the regulator.		
Likes 0		
Dislikes 0		
Response		
The objective was to consider the delays and the changes to the CAPs that stems from regulatory approvals, where such approvals are required. The Requirement R7 wording was not intended to make regulatory approvals mandatory prior to implementing a CAP. The draft has been revised for clarity.		
Wayne Guttormson - SaskPower -	1	
Answer	Yes	
Document Name		
Comment		
Likes 0		
Dislikes 0		
Response		
Maryanne Darling-Reich - Black Hil	lls Corporation - 1,3,5,6 - WECC	
Answer	Yes	
Document Name		
Comment		
Likes 0		
Dislikes 0		



Response

Leonard Kula - Independent Electricity System Operator - 2		
Answer	Yes	
Document Name		
Comment		
Likes 0		
Dislikes 0		
Response		
Ruida Shu - Northeast Power Coord	dinating Council - 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 - NPCC, Group Name RSC no Dominion	
Answer	Yes	
Document Name		
Comment		
Likes 0		
Dislikes 0		
Response		
Payam Farahbakhsh - Hydro One Networks, Inc 1,3		
Answer	Yes	
Document Name		
Comment		



Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	

2. Do you agree that the language in the 'Background' and 'General Considerations' sections of Attachment 1-CAN adequately describes the Canadian Variance? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

Terry Volkmann - Glencoe Light and Power Commission - 1		
Answer No		
Document Name		
Comment		
This is good section, but if the Canadians find a different methodology that is more accurate it needs to apply to all under TPL-007. Much of the existing methodology is derived from the Canadian events and data. So if the Canadian find some thing better it need to apply to more than Canada.		
Likes 0		
Dislikes 0		
Response		
Thank you for your comment. The scope for this project, as outlined in its SAR, is to address certain concerns of Canadian entities regarding TPL-007-2 through the development of a Canadian Variance. Changes to the continent-wide standard are therefore outside the scope of this project. The variance drafting team suggests that the commenter submit a separate SAR to address this issue in the continent-wide standard.		



David Ramkalawan - Ontario Power Generation Inc 5		
Answer	Yes	
Document Name		
Comment		
OPG suggest to revise the following statement from Attachment 1-CAN as follow: "Where the information available is insufficient to support an alternative approach, Canadian registered entities shall (instead of "should") use the methodology in Attachment 1."		
Likes 0		
Dislikes 0		
Response		
The SDT has revised the text to clar	ify the circumstance under which the Attachment 1-CAN methodology may be used.	
Michael Godbout - Hydro-Québec	TransÉnergie - 1 - NPCC	
Answer	Yes	
Document Name		
Comment		
See question 5 for comments and suggestions.		
Likes 0		
Dislikes 0		
Response		
Thank you for your comment. See response to Question 5.		
Payam Farahbakhsh - Hydro One Networks, Inc 1,3		
Answer	Yes	
Document Name		

Comment		
Likes 0		
Dislikes 0		
Response		
Ruida Shu - Northeast Power Coor	dinating Council - 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 - NPCC, Group Name RSC no Dominion	
Answer	Yes	
Document Name		
Comment		
Likes 0		
Dislikes 0		
Response		
Leonard Kula - Independent Electricity System Operator - 2		
Answer	Yes	
Document Name		
Comment		
Likes 0		
Dislikes 0		
Response		

N	Ε	R	C	
	-			
			COR	

Laura McLeod - NB Power Corporation - 1,5		
Yes		
ls Corporation - 1,3,5,6 - WECC		
Yes		
Comment		
Response		
Wayne Guttormson - SaskPower - 1		
Yes		
Comment		



Dislikes 0	
Response	

3. The SDT developed the Attachment 1-CAN, as an alternative to Attachment 1, for defining a 1-in-100 year GMD planning event to be used in the benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s). The proposed alternative approach in Attachment 1-CAN for the GMD planning event is to be based on regionally specific data and statistical analyses. Do you agree that the proposed approach to define a 1-in-100 year GMD event is sufficiently clear and flexible for Canadian entities while achieving an equivalent level of reliability of TPL-007-2? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions for defining a GMD event, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

Terry Volkmann - Glencoe Light and Power Commission - 1

Answer	No
Document Name	
Comment	
If the Canadians find a different methodology that is more accurate it needs to apply to all under TPL-007. Much of the existing methodology is derived from the Canadian events and data. So if the Canadian find some thing better it need to apply to more than Canada.	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Thank you for your comment. The scope for this project, as outlined in its SAR, is to address certain concerns of Canadian entities regarding TPL-007-2 through the development of a Canadian Variance. Changes to the continent-wide standard are therefore outside the scope of this project. The variance drafting team suggests that the commenter submit a separate SAR to address this issue in the continent-wide standard.	
Michael Godbout - Hydro-Québec TransÉnergie - 1 - NPCC	

NERC

Answer	Yes	
Document Name		
Comment		
See question 5 for comments and s	uggestions.	
Likes 0		
Dislikes 0		
Response		
See the SDT's response to Question	15.	
Wayne Guttormson - SaskPower -	1	
Answer	Yes	
Document Name		
Comment		
Likes 0		
Dislikes 0		
Response		
Maryanne Darling-Reich - Black Hills Corporation - 1,3,5,6 - WECC		
Answer	Yes	
Document Name		
Comment		
Likes 0		



Dislikes 0	
Response	
Laura McLeod - NB Power Corpora	tion - 1,5
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Leonard Kula - Independent Electri	icity System Operator - 2
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Ruida Shu - Northeast Power Coord	dinating Council - 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 - NPCC, Group Name RSC no Dominion
Answer	Yes
Document Name	

NERC

Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Payam Farahbakhsh - Hydro One N	letworks, Inc 1,3
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
David Ramkalawan - Ontario Powe	er Generation Inc 5
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	

4. The SDT proposed that the calculation of the geoelectric fields, which is based on geomagnetic field variations and earth transfer function, must be based on technically justified information. Technically justified information may include technical documents written by governmental entities, technical papers published in peer-reviewed journals, or measurements based on sound geophysical principles. Do you agree that technical documents as defined in Attachment 1-CAN are credible sources of technically justified information? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions for defining what constitute a technically justified information, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

Terry Volkmann - Glencoe Light and Power Commission - 1			
Answer	Νο		
Document Name			
Comment			
	reviewed journals without the publishing review comments do not necessarily represent an industry technical papers and review comments published in peer-reviewed journals. Should follow the IEEE paper		
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			
technically sound. A peer reviewed	drafting team believes that a peer-reviewed technical paper gives confidence that the approach is technical paper is not meant to achieve consensus amongst the industry members. The drafting team the review comments after verification. Further, a number of reputable journals do not publish review		
David Ramkalawan - Ontario Powe	er Generation Inc 5		
Answer	Yes		
Document Name			
Comment			



Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Payam Farahbakhsh - Hydro One N	letworks, Inc 1,3
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Ruida Shu - Northeast Power Coord	dinating Council - 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 - NPCC, Group Name RSC no Dominion
Ruida Shu - Northeast Power Coord Answer	dinating Council - 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 - NPCC, Group Name RSC no Dominion Yes
Answer	
Answer Document Name	
Answer Document Name	
Answer Document Name Comment	
Answer Document Name Comment Likes 0	
Answer Document Name Comment Likes 0 Dislikes 0	
Answer Document Name Comment Likes 0 Dislikes 0	Yes
Answer Document Name Comment Likes 0 Dislikes 0 Response	Yes

N	Ε	R	С		
NOR	TH .	AME	RICAN	ELEC	TRIC
REL	ABI	LITY	CORF	ORAT	ION

Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Leonard Kula - Independent Electri	icity System Operator - 2
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Laura McLeod - NB Power Corpora	tion - 1,5
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	



Maryanne Darling-Reich -	Black Hills Corporation - 1,3,5,	,6 - WECC		
Answer	Yes			
Document Name				
Comment				
Likes 0				
Dislikes 0				
Response				
Wayne Guttormson - Sask	Power - 1			
Answer	Yes			
Document Name				
Comment				
Likes 0				
Dislikes 0				
Response			 	

5. If you have any additional comments regarding the completeness, the adequacy, and the accuracy of the proposed modifications for the SDT to consider, provide them here.

Michael Godbout - Hydro-Québec TransÉnergie - 1 - NPCC		
Answer		
Document Name	Comments-HQT-RC-TPL-007-2-CAN.docx	
Comment		
see attached file for comments.		
Likes 0		
Dislikes 0		

Response

1. Including regulatory considerations

Requirement R7 has been modified to address the regulatory concerns.

2. Performance-based

Requirement R4.1 does not limit the study or studies to the on-peak and off-peak, but it requires that at least these two conditions to be studied. Although a performance-based approach would allow entities to identify the conditions under which their System would be the most vulnerable to the GMD event, the scope for this project, as outlined in its SAR, is to address certain concerns of Canadian entities regarding TPL-007-2 through the development of a Canadian Variance. Changes to the continent-wide standard are therefore outside the scope of this project. The variance drafting team suggests that the commenter submit a separate SAR to address this issue in the continent-wide standard.

3. Potential for less stringency in modelling

The SDT contends that the objective of Attachment 1-CAN is to achieve an equivalent level of reliability (1-in-100-year event) as Attachment 1 while using regionally specific data to estimate the GMD event. Any assumptions or data set(s) must be technically justified, as defined in Attachment 1-CAN, including the impact of the sampling rate(s) on the GMD event.

4. Existing guidelines and technical bases

The SDT contends that no changes would be required to the Guidelines and Technical Basis as a consequence of the proposed Canadian Variance and does not intend to produce a white paper at this time.

5. Steady-state vs dynamic studies

While the SDT recognizes the relevancy of the concern, addressing the concern in the continent-wide Requirement(s) is outside the current scope of the SAR.

6. The use of Attachment-1-CAN - all or nothing?

The SDT contends that unless a Canadian entity has sufficient information to use Attachment 1-CAN, it shall use Attachment 1. The SDT has revised the proposed Variance to address the concerns.

7. The use of Attachment-1-CAN – is it a free choice or a constrained choice for the entity?

The SDT contends that unless a Canadian entity has sufficient information to use Attachment 1-CAN, it shall use Attachment 1. The SDT has revised the proposed Variance to address the concerns.

8. Sound studies

The information for calculating geoelectric field "may include", but is not limited to, "measurements based on sound geophysical principles". To further clarify the sentence, the SDT modified the sentence as follows: "technical papers published in peer-reviewed journals, <u>and</u> <u>measurements based on sound scientific principles</u>."

9. Text suggestions

The SDT has revised the proposed Variance to address the concerns.

Payam Farahbakhsh - Hydro One Networks, Inc. - 1,3

Answer

Document Name

Comment



The research and development in this field continues to evolve. More remains to be learned which will result in tool refinements to support more precise analysis and study conclusions. Hence, it should be emphasized that the interpretation of assessment results should account for the maturity of methodologies and software toolset applied.

Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
_	d take into account the impact of the evolution of research and development (i.e., maturity of the modeling proposed Variance has been revised for clarity.
David Ramkalawan - Ontario Powe	er Generation Inc 5
Answer	
Document Name	
Comment	
opportunity (i.e. GMD events). There should be a timeline related	omments: dation of the physical modeling assumption (earth transfer function and network modeling) at the first to the submission associated with the regulatory approval of the CAP implementation.
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
1. The text was modified to ensure	that field readings are used for validation purposes, where possible.
-	e delays and the changes to the corrective action plans that stems from regulatory approvals, where such sed Variance has been revised for clarity in Part 7.3.3.



Additional comment from IESO - The thoughts in the variance would flow more clearly if expressed in a manner similar to the following: "One particular GMD Vulnerability Assessment approach and a specific data set is specified in Attachment 1. Canadian registered entities have access to additional data sets that enable the development of other approaches to more accurately characterize their planning areas. Such data includes geomagnetic field (from magnetometer measurements), earth conductivity information and GIC measurements. Canadian registered entities should use the approach and data set specified in Attachment 1 unless sufficient information is available to support an alternative approach. Attachment 1-CAN provides the necessary conditions to employ an alternative approach.

Assumptions used in an alternate approach to a GMD Vulnerability Assessment must be clearly documented and technically justified. A sensitivity analysis should be provided to identify how assumptions affect results. To facilitate planning studies simplified models should be employed only when they produce more conservative results than more detailed models."

The SDT has revised the document flow to incorporate this comment along with comments from Ontario Power Generation and Hydro-Quebec TransÉnergie's). See <u>TPL-007-3</u>, <u>Attachment 1 CAN</u> (redline).

Standard Development Timeline

This section is maintained by the drafting team during the development of the standard and will be removed when the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees (Board).

Description of Current Draft

Final Draft

Completed Actions	Date
Standard Authorization Request (SAR) posted for formal comment period	03/30/18 – 04/30/18
Standards Committee approved modified SAR for posting	06/13/18
28-day informal comment period	08/10/18 – 09/06/18
45-day formal or informal comment period with initial ballot	October 2018 – November 2018
10-day final ballot	November 2018

Anticipated Actions	Date	
Board adoption	February 2019	

New or Modified Term(s) Used in NERC Reliability Standards

This section includes all new or modified terms used in the proposed standard that will be included in the *Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards* upon applicable regulatory approval. Terms used in the proposed standard that are already defined and are not being modified can be found in the *Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards*. The new or revised terms listed below will be presented for approval with the proposed standard. Upon Board adoption, this section will be removed.

Term(s):

None.

A. Introduction

- 1. Title: Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events
- **2. Number:** TPL-007-3
- **3. Purpose:** Establish requirements for Transmission system planned performance during geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) events.
- 4. Applicability:

4.1. Functional Entities:

- **4.1.1.** Planning Coordinator with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2;
- **4.1.2.** Transmission Planner with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2;
- 4.1.3. Transmission Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2; and
- **4.1.4.** Generator Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2.
- 4.2. Facilities:
 - **4.2.1.** Facilities that include power transformer(s) with a high side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV.
- 5. Effective Date: See Implementation Plan for TPL-007-3.
- **Background:** During a GMD event, geomagnetically-induced currents (GIC) may cause transformer hot-spot heating or damage, loss of Reactive Power sources, increased Reactive Power demand, and Misoperation(s), the combination of which may result in voltage collapse and blackout.

The only difference between TPL-007-3 and TPL-007-2 is that TPL-007-3 adds a Canadian Variance to address regulatory practices/processes within Canadian jurisdictions and to allow the use of Canadian-specific data and research to define and implement alternative GMD event(s) that achieve at least an equivalent reliability objective of that in TPL-007-2.

B. Requirements and Measures

R1. Each Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with its Transmission Planner(s), shall identify the individual and joint responsibilities of the Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner(s) in the Planning Coordinator's planning area for maintaining models, performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, and implementing process(es) to obtain GMD measurement data as specified in this standard. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- M1. Each Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with its Transmission Planners, shall provide documentation on roles and responsibilities, such as meeting minutes, agreements, copies of procedures or protocols in effect between entities or between departments of a vertically integrated system, or email correspondence that identifies an agreement has been reached on individual and joint responsibilities for maintaining models, performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, and implementing process(es) to obtain GMD measurement data in accordance with Requirement R1.
- **R2.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall maintain System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M2. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence in either electronic or hard copy format that it is maintaining System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.
- **R3.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System during the GMD events described in Attachment 1. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- **M3.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence, such as electronic or hard copies of the criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System in accordance with Requirement R3.

Benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s)

- R4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall complete a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment of the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon at least once every 60 calendar months. This benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall use a study or studies based on models identified in Requirement R2, document assumptions, and document summarized results of the steady state analysis. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **4.1.** The study or studies shall include the following conditions:
 - **4.1.1.** System On-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon; and
 - **4.1.2.** System Off-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon.

- **4.2.** The study or studies shall be conducted based on the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1 to determine whether the System meets the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1.
- **4.3.** The benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, and adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later.
 - **4.3.1.** If a recipient of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment provides documented comments on the results, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- M4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have dated evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment meeting all of the requirements in Requirement R4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, and adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later, as specified in Requirement R4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments in accordance with Requirement R4.
- **R5.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide GIC flow information to be used for the benchmark thermal impact assessment of transformers specified in Requirement R6 to each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns an applicable Bulk Electric System (BES) power transformer in the planning area. The GIC flow information shall include: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **5.1.** The maximum effective GIC value for the worst case geoelectric field orientation for the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1. This value shall be provided to the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.

- **5.2.** The effective GIC time series, GIC(t), calculated using the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1 in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area. GIC(t) shall be provided within 90 calendar days of receipt of the written request and after determination of the maximum effective GIC value in Part 5.1.
- **M5.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided the maximum effective GIC values to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area as specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided GIC(t) in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.
- **R6.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A per phase or greater. The benchmark thermal impact assessment shall: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - 6.1. Be based on the effective GIC flow information provided in Requirement R5;
 - 6.2. Document assumptions used in the analysis;
 - **6.3.** Describe suggested actions and supporting analysis to mitigate the impact of GICs, if any; and
 - **6.4.** Be performed and provided to the responsible entities, as determined in Requirement R1, within 24 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1.
- **M6.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its benchmark thermal impact assessment for all of its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A per phase or greater, and shall have evidence such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided its thermal impact assessment to the responsible entities as specified in Requirement R6.
- **R7.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, that concludes through the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment conducted in Requirement R4 that their System does not meet the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1, shall develop a Corrective

Action Plan (CAP) addressing how the performance requirements will be met. The CAP shall: [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- **7.1.** List System deficiencies and the associated actions needed to achieve required System performance. Examples of such actions include:
 - Installation, modification, retirement, or removal of Transmission and generation Facilities and any associated equipment.
 - Installation, modification, or removal of Protection Systems or Remedial Action Schemes.
 - Use of Operating Procedures, specifying how long they will be needed as part of the CAP.
 - Use of Demand-Side Management, new technologies, or other initiatives.
- **7.2.** Be developed within one year of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.
- **7.3.** Include a timetable, subject to revision by the responsible entity in Part 7.4, for implementing the selected actions from Part 7.1. The timetable shall:
 - **7.3.1.** Specify implementation of non-hardware mitigation, if any, within two years of development of the CAP; and
 - **7.3.2.** Specify implementation of hardware mitigation, if any, within four years of development of the CAP.
- **7.4.** Be revised if situations beyond the control of the responsible entity determined in Requirement R1 prevent implementation of the CAP within the timetable for implementation provided in Part 7.3. The revised CAP shall document the following, and be updated at least once every 12 calendar months until implemented:
 - **7.4.1.** Circumstances causing the delay for fully or partially implementing the selected actions in Part 7.1;
 - **7.4.2.** Description of the original CAP, and any previous changes to the CAP, with the associated timetable(s) for implementing the selected actions in Part 7.1; and
 - **7.4.3.** Revisions to the selected actions in Part 7.1, if any, including utilization of Operating Procedures if applicable, and the updated timetable for implementing the selected actions.
- **7.5.** Be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission Planner(s), and functional entities referenced in the CAP within 90 calendar days of development or revision, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of development or revision, whichever is later.

- **7.5.1.** If a recipient of the CAP provides documented comments on the results, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- **M7.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, that concludes, through the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment conducted in Requirement R4, that the responsible entity's System does not meet the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1 shall have evidence such as dated electronic or hard copies of its CAP including timetable for implementing selected actions, as specified in Requirement R7. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has revised its CAP if situations beyond the responsible entity's control prevent implementation of the CAP within the timetable specified. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its CAP or relevant information, if any, (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission Planner(s), and functional entities referenced in the CAP within 90 calendar days of development or revision, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of development or revision, whichever is later as specified in Requirement R7. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its CAP within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments, in accordance with Requirement R7.

Supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s)

- **R8.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall complete a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment of the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon at least once every 60 calendar months. This supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall use a study or studies based on models identified in Requirement R2, document assumptions, and document summarized results of the steady state analysis. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **8.1.** The study or studies shall include the following conditions:
 - **8.1.1.** System On-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon; and
 - **8.1.2.** System Off-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon.

- **8.2.** The study or studies shall be conducted based on the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1 to determine whether the System meets the performance requirements for the steady state planning supplemental GMD event contained in Table 1.
- **8.3.** If the analysis concludes there is Cascading caused by the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1, an evaluation of possible actions designed to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the consequences and adverse impacts of the event(s) shall be conducted.
- **8.4.** The supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later.
 - **8.4.1.** If a recipient of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment provides documented comments on the results, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- M8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have dated evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment meeting all of the requirements in Requirement R8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its supplemental GMD Vulnerability: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later, as specified in Requirement R8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments in accordance with Requirement R8.
- **R9.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide GIC flow information to be used for the supplemental thermal impact assessment of transformers specified in Requirement R10 to each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns an applicable Bulk Electric System (BES) power transformer in the planning area. The GIC flow information shall include: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- **9.1.** The maximum effective GIC value for the worst case geoelectric field orientation for the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1. This value shall be provided to the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.
- **9.2.** The effective GIC time series, GIC(t), calculated using the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1 in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area. GIC(t) shall be provided within 90 calendar days of receipt of the written request and after determination of the maximum effective GIC value in Part 9.1.
- M9. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided the maximum effective GIC values to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area as specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided GIC(t) in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.
- **R10.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A per phase or greater. The supplemental thermal impact assessment shall: [*Violation Risk Factor: Medium*] [*Time Horizon: Long-term Planning*]
 - **10.1.** Be based on the effective GIC flow information provided in Requirement R9;
 - **10.2.** Document assumptions used in the analysis;
 - **10.3.** Describe suggested actions and supporting analysis to mitigate the impact of GICs, if any; and
 - **10.4.** Be performed and provided to the responsible entities, as determined in Requirement R1, within 24 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1.
- M10. Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its supplemental thermal impact assessment for all of its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A per phase or greater, and shall have evidence such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided its supplemental thermal impact assessment to the responsible entities as specified in Requirement R10.

GMD Measurement Data Processes

- **R11.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall implement a process to obtain GIC monitor data from at least one GIC monitor located in the Planning Coordinator's planning area or other part of the system included in the Planning Coordinator's GIC System model. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M11. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its GIC monitor location(s) and documentation of its process to obtain GIC monitor data in accordance with Requirement R11.
- **R12.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall implement a process to obtain geomagnetic field data for its Planning Coordinator's planning area. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- **M12.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its process to obtain geomagnetic field data for its Planning Coordinator's planning area in accordance with Requirement R12.

C. Compliance

- 1. Compliance Monitoring Process
 - **1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority:** "Compliance Enforcement Authority" means NERC or the Regional Entity, or any entity as otherwise designated by an Applicable Governmental Authority, in their respective roles of monitoring and/or enforcing compliance with mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards in their respective jurisdictions.
 - **1.2.** Evidence Retention: The following evidence retention period(s) identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full-time period since the last audit.

The applicable entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

- For Requirements R1, R2, R3, R5, R6, R9, and R10, each responsible entity shall retain documentation as evidence for five years.
- For Requirements R4 and R8, each responsible entity shall retain documentation of the current GMD Vulnerability Assessment and the preceding GMD Vulnerability Assessment.

- For Requirement R7, each responsible entity shall retain documentation as evidence for five years or until all actions in the Corrective Action Plan are completed, whichever is later.
- For Requirements R11 and R12, each responsible entity shall retain documentation as evidence for three years.
- **1.3.** Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program: As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, "Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program" refers to the identification of the processes that will be used to evaluate data or information for the purpose of assessing performance or outcomes with the associated Reliability Standard.

Table 1: Steady State Planning GMD Event

Steady State:

- a. Voltage collapse, Cascading and uncontrolled islanding shall not occur.
- b. Generation loss is acceptable as a consequence of the steady state planning GMD events.
- c. Planned System adjustments such as Transmission configuration changes and re-dispatch of generation are allowed if such adjustments are executable within the time duration applicable to the Facility Ratings.

Category	Initial Condition	Event	Interruption of Firm Transmission Service Allowed	Load Loss Allowed
Benchmark GMD Event - GMD Event with Outages	 System as may be postured in response to space weather information¹, and then GMD event² 	Reactive Power compensation devices and other Transmission Facilities removed as a result of Protection System operation or Misoperation due to harmonics during the GMD event	Yes ³	Yes ³
Supplemental GMD Event - GMD Event with Outages	 System as may be postured in response to space weather information¹, and then GMD event² 	Reactive Power compensation devices and other Transmission Facilities removed as a result of Protection System operation or Misoperation due to harmonics during the GMD event	Yes	Yes
Table 1: Steady State Performance Footnotes				

- 1. The System condition for GMD planning may include adjustments to posture the System that are executable in response to space weather information.
- 2. The GMD conditions for the benchmark and supplemental planning events are described in Attachment 1.
- 3. Load loss as a result of manual or automatic Load shedding (e.g., UVLS) and/or curtailment of Firm Transmission Service may be used to meet BES performance requirements during studied GMD conditions. The likelihood and magnitude of Load loss or curtailment of Firm Transmission Service should be minimized.

Violation Severity Levels

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
R1.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with its Transmission Planner(s), failed to determine and identify individual or joint responsibilities of the Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner(s) in the Planning Coordinator's planning area for maintaining models, performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, and implementing process(es) to obtain GMD measurement data as specified in this standard.	
R2.	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not maintain either System models or GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the studies	The responsible entity did not maintain both System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the studies	

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
			needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.	needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.	
R3.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not have criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System during the GMD events described in Attachment 1 as required.	
R4.	The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 60 calendar months and less than or equal to 64 calendar months since the last benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	The responsible entity's completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy one of the elements listed in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.3; OR The responsible entity completed a benchmark	The responsible entity's completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy two of the elements listed in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.3; OR The responsible entity completed a benchmark	The responsible entity's completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy three of the elements listed in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.3; OR The responsible entity completed a benchmark	
		GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 64 calendar months and less than or equal to 68 calendar months since the	GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 68 calendar months and less than or equal to 72 calendar months since the	GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 72 calendar months since the last benchmark	

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
		last benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	last benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	GMD Vulnerability Assessment; OR The responsible entity does not have a completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	
R5.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 90 calendar days and less than or equal to 100 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 100 calendar days and less than or equal to 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity did not provide the maximum effective GIC value to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area; OR The responsible entity did not provide the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), upon written request.	
R6.	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for 5% or less or one of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for more than 5% up to (and including) 10% or two of its solely owned and jointly	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for more than 10% up to (and including) 15% or three of its solely owned and	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for more than 15% or more than three of its solely owned and jointly owned	

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
	transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 24 calendar months and less than or equal to 26 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1.	owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 26 calendar months and less than or equal to 28 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1; OR The responsible entity failed to include one of the	jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 28 calendar months and less than or equal to 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1; OR The responsible entity failed to include two of the	applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1; OR The responsible entity failed to include three of the required elements as listed	

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
		required elements as listed in Requirement R6, Parts 6.1 through 6.3.	required elements as listed in Requirement R6, Parts 6.1 through 6.3.	in Requirement R6, Parts 6.1 through 6.3.	
R7.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with one of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with two of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with three of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with four or more of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5; OR The responsible entity did not have a Corrective Action Plan as required by Requirement R7.	
R8.	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy one of elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy two of elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy three of the elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy four of the elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
	than 60 calendar months and less than or equal to 64 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	than 64 calendar months and less than or equal to 68 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	than 68 calendar months and less than or equal to 72 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	than 72 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment; OR The responsible entity does not have a completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	
R9.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 90 calendar days and less than or equal to 100 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 100 calendar days and less than or equal to 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity did not provide the maximum effective GIC value to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area; OR The responsible entity did not provide the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), upon written request.	
R10.	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for 5% or less or one of its	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for more than 5% up to (and	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for more than 10% up to	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for more than 15% or more	

R #	Violation Severity Levels			
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
	solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 24 calendar months and less than or equal to 26 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1.	including) 10% or two of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 26 calendar months and less than or equal to 28 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1 OR	(and including) 15% or three of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 28 calendar months and less than or equal to 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1; OR	than three of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1; OR

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
		The responsible entity failed to include one of the required elements as listed in Requirement R10, Parts 10.1 through 10.3.	The responsible entity failed to include two of the required elements as listed in Requirement R10, Parts 10.1 through 10.3.	The responsible entity failed to include three of the required elements as listed in Requirement R10, Parts 10.1 through 10.3.	
R11.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not implement a process to obtain GIC monitor data from at least one GIC monitor located in the Planning Coordinator's planning area or other part of the system included in the Planning Coordinator's GIC System Model.	
R12.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not implement a process to obtain geomagnetic field data for its Planning Coordinator's planning area.	

D. Regional Variances

D.A. Regional Variance for Canadian Jurisdictions

This Variance shall be applicable in those Canadian jurisdictions where the Variance has been approved for use by the applicable governmental authority or has otherwise become effective in the jurisdiction.

All references to "Attachment 1" in the standard are replaced with "Attachment 1 or Attachment 1-CAN."

In addition, this Variance replaces Requirement R7, Part 7.3 with the following:

- **D.A.7.3.** Include a timetable, subject to revision by the responsible entity in Part 7.4, for implementing the selected actions from Part 7.1. The timetable shall:
 - **D.A.7.3.1.** Specify implementation of non-hardware mitigation, if any, within two years of the later of the development of the CAP or receipt of regulatory approvals, if required; and
 - **D.A.7.3.2.** Specify implementation of hardware mitigation, if any, within four years of the later of the development of the CAP or receipt of regulatory approvals, if required.

E. Associated Documents

Attachment 1 Attachment 1-CAN

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	December 17, 2014	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	New
2	November 9, 2017	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	Revised to respond to directives in FERC Order No. 830.
3	TBD	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	

Attachment 1

Calculating Geoelectric Fields for the Benchmark and Supplemental GMD Events

The benchmark GMD event¹ defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows that are needed to conduct a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment. It is composed of the following elements: (1) a reference peak geoelectric field amplitude of 8 V/km derived from statistical analysis of historical magnetometer data; (2) scaling factors to account for local geomagnetic latitude; (3) scaling factors to account for local earth conductivity; and (4) a reference geomagnetic field time series or waveform to facilitate time-domain analysis of GMD impact on equipment.

The supplemental GMD event is composed of similar elements as described above, except (1) the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude is 12 V/km over a localized area; and (2) the geomagnetic field time series or waveform includes a local enhancement in the waveform.²

The regional geoelectric field peak amplitude used in GMD Vulnerability Assessment, E_{peak} , can be obtained from the reference geoelectric field value of 8 V/km for the benchmark GMD event (1) or 12 V/km for the supplemental GMD event (2) using the following relationships:

$$E_{peak} = 8 \times \alpha \times \beta_{b} (V/km) \tag{1}$$

$$E_{peak} = 12 \times \alpha \times \beta_s (V/km)$$
⁽²⁾

where, α is the scaling factor to account for local geomagnetic latitude, and β is a scaling factor to account for the local earth conductivity structure. Subscripts *b* and *s* for the β scaling factor denote association with the benchmark or supplemental GMD events, respectively.

Scaling the Geomagnetic Field

The benchmark and supplemental GMD events are defined for geomagnetic latitude of 60° and must be scaled to account for regional differences based on geomagnetic latitude. Table 2 provides a scaling factor correlating peak geoelectric field to geomagnetic latitude. Alternatively, the scaling factor α is computed with the empirical expression:

$$\alpha = 0.001 \times e^{(0.115 \times L)} \tag{3}$$

where, L is the geomagnetic latitude in degrees and $0.1 \le \alpha \le 1$.

¹ The Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description, May 2016 is available on the Related Information webpage for TPL-007-1: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/TPL0071RD/Benchmark_clean_May12_complete.pdf</u>.

² The extent of local enhancements is on the order of 100 km in North-South (latitude) direction but longer in East-West (longitude) direction. The local enhancement in the geomagnetic field occurs over the time period of 2-5 minutes. Additional information is available in the Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description, October 2017 white paper on the Project 2013-03 Geomagnetic Disturbance Mitigation project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

For large planning areas that cover more than one scaling factor from Table 2, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment should be based on a peak geoelectric field that is:

- calculated by using the most conservative (largest) value for α; or
- calculated assuming a non-uniform or piecewise uniform geomagnetic field.

Table 2: Geomagnetic Field Scaling Factors for the Benchmark and Supplemental GMD Events		
Geomagnetic Latitude (Degrees)	Scaling Factor1 (α)	
≤ 40	0.10	
45	0.2	
50	0.3	
54	0.5	
56	0.6	
57	0.7	
58	0.8	
59	0.9	
≥ 60	1.0	

Scaling the Geoelectric Field

The benchmark GMD event is defined for the reference Quebec earth model described in Table 4. The peak geoelectric field, E_{peak}, used in a GMD Vulnerability Assessment may be obtained by either:

- Calculating the geoelectric field for the ground conductivity in the planning area and the reference geomagnetic field time series scaled according to geomagnetic latitude, using a procedure such as the plane wave method described in the NERC GMD Task Force GIC Application Guide;³ or
- Using the earth conductivity scaling factor β from Table 3 that correlates to the ground conductivity map in Figure 1 or Figure 2. Along with the scaling factor α from equation (3) or Table 2, β is applied to the reference geoelectric field using equation (1 or 2, as applicable) to obtain the regional geoelectric field peak amplitude E_{peak} to be used in GMD Vulnerability Assessments. When a ground conductivity model is not available, the planning entity should use the largest β factor of adjacent physiographic regions or a technically justified value.

³ Available at the NERC GMD Task Force project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Pages/Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Task-Force-(GMDTF)-2013.aspx</u>.

The earth models used to calculate Table 3 for the United States were obtained from publicly available information published on the U. S. Geological Survey website.⁴ The models used to calculate Table 3 for Canada were obtained from Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) and reflect the average structure for large regions. A planner can also use specific earth model(s) with documented justification and the reference geomagnetic field time series to calculate the β factor(s) as follows:

$$\beta_b = E/8$$
 for the benchmark GMD event (4)

$$\beta_s = E/12$$
 for the supplemental GMD (5)

where, *E* is the absolute value of peak geoelectric in V/km obtained from the technically justified earth model and the reference geomagnetic field time series.

For large planning areas that span more than one β scaling factor, the most conservative (largest) value for β may be used in determining the peak geoelectric field to obtain conservative results. Alternatively, a planner could perform analysis using a non-uniform or piecewise uniform geoelectric field.

Applying the Localized Peak Geoelectric Field in the Supplemental GMD Event

The peak geoelectric field of the supplemental GMD event occurs in a localized area.⁵ Planners have flexibility to determine how to apply the localized peak geoelectric field over the planning area in performing GIC calculations. Examples of approaches are:

- Apply the peak geoelectric field (12 V/km scaled to the planning area) over the entire planning area;
- Apply a spatially limited (12 V/km scaled to the planning area) peak geoelectric field (e.g., 100 km in North-South latitude direction and 500 km in East-West longitude direction) over a portion(s) of the system, and apply the benchmark GMD event over the rest of the system; or
- Other methods to adjust the benchmark GMD event analysis to account for the localized geoelectric field enhancement of the supplemental GMD event.

⁴ Available at <u>http://geomag.usgs.gov/conductivity/</u>.

⁵ See the Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Description white paper located on the Project 2013-03 Geomagnetic Disturbance Mitigation project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.




Figure 1: Physiographic Regions of the Continental United States⁶



Figure 2: Physiographic Regions of Canada

⁶ Additional map detail is available at the U.S. Geological Survey: <u>http://geomag.usgs.gov/</u>.

Table 3: Geoelectric Field Scaling Factors				
Earth model	Scaling Factor Benchmark Event (β _b)	Scaling Factor Supplemental Event (βs)		
AK1A	0.56	0.51		
AK1B	0.56	0.51		
AP1	0.33	0.30		
AP2	0.82	0.78		
BR1	0.22	0.22		
CL1	0.76	0.73		
CO1	0.27	0.25		
CP1	0.81	0.77		
CP2	0.95	0.86		
FL1	0.76	0.73		
CS1	0.41	0.37		
IP1	0.94	0.90		
IP2	0.28	0.25		
IP3	0.93	0.90		
IP4	0.41	0.35		
NE1	0.81	0.77		
PB1	0.62	0.55		
PB2	0.46	0.39		
PT1	1.17	1.19		
SL1	0.53	0.49		
SU1	0.93	0.90		
BOU	0.28	0.24		
FBK	0.56	0.56		
PRU	0.21	0.22		
BC	0.67	0.62		
PRAIRIES	0.96	0.88		
SHIELD	1.0	1.0		
ATLANTIC	0.79	0.76		

Rationale: Scaling factors in Table 3 are dependent upon the frequency content of the reference storm. Consequently, the benchmark GMD event and the supplemental GMD event may produce different scaling factors for a given earth model.

The scaling factor associated with the benchmark GMD event for the Florida earth model (FL1) has been updated based on the earth model published on the USGS public website.

Table 4: Reference Earth Model (Quebec)			
Layer Thickness (km)	Resistivity (Ω-m)		
15	20,000		
10	200		
125	1,000		
200	100		
∞	3		

Reference Geomagnetic Field Time Series or Waveform for the Benchmark GMD $\mathsf{Event}^{_7}$

The geomagnetic field measurement record of the March 13-14 1989 GMD event, measured at the NRCan Ottawa geomagnetic observatory, is the basis for the reference geomagnetic field waveform to be used to calculate the GIC time series, GIC(t), required for transformer thermal impact assessment.

The geomagnetic latitude of the Ottawa geomagnetic observatory is 55°; therefore, the amplitudes of the geomagnetic field measurement data were scaled up to the 60° reference geomagnetic latitude (see Figure 3) such that the resulting peak geoelectric field amplitude computed using the reference earth model was 8 V/km (see Figures 4 and 5). The sampling rate for the geomagnetic field waveform is 10 seconds.⁸ To use this geoelectric field time series when a different earth model is applicable, it should be scaled with the appropriate benchmark conductivity scaling factor β_b .

⁷ Refer to the Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description white paper for details on the determination of the reference geomagnetic field waveform: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/TPL0071RI.aspx</u>.

⁸ The data file of the benchmark geomagnetic field waveform is available on the Related Information webpage for TPL-007-1: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/TPL0071RI.aspx</u>.




Figure 3: Benchmark Geomagnetic Field Waveform Red B_n (Northward), Blue B_e (Eastward)





Figure 4: Benchmark Geoelectric Field Waveform E_E (Eastward)






Reference Geomagnetic Field Time Series or Waveform for the Supplemental GMD Event^9


The geomagnetic field measurement record of the March 13-14, 1989 GMD event, measured at the NRCan Ottawa geomagnetic observatory, is the basis for the reference geomagnetic field waveform to be used to calculate the GIC time series, GIC(t), required for transformer thermal impact assessment for the supplemental GMD event. The supplemental GMD event waveform differs from the benchmark GMD event waveform in that the supplemental GMD event waveform has a local enhancement.


The geomagnetic latitude of the Ottawa geomagnetic observatory is 55°; therefore, the amplitudes of the geomagnetic field measurement data were scaled up to the 60° reference geomagnetic latitude (see Figure 6) such that the resulting peak geoelectric field amplitude computed using the reference earth model was 12 V/km (see Figure7). The sampling rate for the geomagnetic field waveform is 10 seconds.¹⁰ To use this geoelectric field time series when a different earth model is applicable, it should be scaled with the appropriate supplemental conductivity scaling factor β_s .

⁹ Refer to the Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description white paper for details on the determination of the reference geomagnetic field waveform: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

¹⁰ The data file of the benchmark geomagnetic field waveform is available on the NERC GMD Task Force project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Pages/Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Task-Force-(GMDTF)-2013.aspx</u>.









Attachment 1-CAN

Attachment 1-CAN provides an alternative that a Canadian entity may use in lieu of the benchmark or supplemental GMD event(s) defined in Attachment 1 for performing GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s).

A Canadian entity may use the provisions of Attachment 1-CAN if it has regionally specific information that provides a technically justified means to re-define a 1-in-100 year GMD planning event(s) within its planning area.

Information for the Alternative Methodology

GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s) require the use of geophysical and engineering models. Canadian-specific data is available and growing. Ongoing research allows for more accurate characterization of regional parameters used in these models. Such Canadian-specific data includes geomagnetic field, earth conductivity, and geomagnetically induced current measurements that can be used for modeling and simulation validation.

Information used to calculate geoelectric fields for the benchmark and supplemental GMD events shall be clearly documented and technically justified. For example, the factors involved in the calculation of geoelectric fields are geomagnetic field variations and an earth transfer function(s).^[1] Technically justified information used in modelling geomagnetic field variations may include: technical documents produced by governmental entities such as Natural Resources Canada; technical papers published in peer-reviewed journals; and data sets gathered using sound scientific principles. An earth transfer function may rely on magnetotelluric measurements or earth conductivity models.

Modeling assumptions shall also be clearly documented and technically justified. An entity may use sensitivity analysis to identify how the assumptions affect the results.

A simplified model may be used to perform a GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), as long as the model is more conservative than a more detailed model.

When interpreting assessment results, the entity shall consider the maturity of the modeling, toolset, and techniques applied.

Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Events

The 1-in-100 year planning event shall be based on regionally specific data and technically justifiable statistical analyses (e.g., extreme value theory) and applied to the benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s).


For the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), an entity shall consider the large-scale spatial structure of the GMD event. For the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), an

^[1] The "earth transfer function" is the relationship between the electric fields and magnetic field variations at the surface of the earth.

entity shall consider the small-scale spatial structure of the GMD event (e.g., using magnetometer measurements or realistic electrojet calculations).

Guidelines and Technical Basis

The diagram below provides an overall view of the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process:



The requirements in this standard cover various aspects of the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process.

Benchmark GMD Event (Attachment 1)

The benchmark GMD event defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows that are needed to conduct a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment. The *Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description*, May 2016¹¹ white paper includes the event description, analysis, and example calculations.

Supplemental GMD Event (Attachment 1)

The supplemental GMD event defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows that are needed to conduct a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment. The *Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description*, October 2017¹² white paper includes the event description and analysis.

Requirement R2

A GMD Vulnerability Assessment requires a GIC System model, which is a dc representation of the System, to calculate GIC flow. In a GMD Vulnerability Assessment, GIC simulations are used to determine transformer Reactive Power absorption and transformer thermal response. Details for developing the GIC System model are provided in the NERC GMD Task Force guide: *Application Guide for Computing Geomagnetically-Induced Current in the Bulk Power System*, December 2013.¹³

Underground pipe-type cables present a special modeling situation in that the steel pipe that encloses the power conductors significantly reduces the geoelectric field induced into the conductors themselves, while they remain a path for GIC. Solid dielectric cables that are not

¹¹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/TPL0071RI.aspx</u>.

¹² http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.

¹³ http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GIC%20Application %20Guide%202013 approved.pdf.

enclosed by a steel pipe will not experience a reduction in the induced geoelectric field. A planning entity should account for special modeling situations in the GIC system model, if applicable.

Requirement R4

The *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,¹⁴ December 2013 developed by the NERC GMD Task Force provides technical information on GMD-specific considerations for planning studies.

Requirement R5

The benchmark thermal impact assessment of transformers specified in Requirement R6 is based on GIC information for the benchmark GMD Event. This GIC information is determined by the planning entity through simulation of the GIC System model and must be provided to the entity responsible for conducting the thermal impact assessment. GIC information should be provided in accordance with Requirement R5 each time the GMD Vulnerability Assessment is performed since, by definition, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes a documented evaluation of susceptibility to localized equipment damage due to GMD.

The maximum effective GIC value provided in Part 5.1 is used for the benchmark thermal impact assessment. Only those transformers that experience an effective GIC value of 75 A or greater per phase require evaluation in Requirement R6.

GIC(t) provided in Part 5.2 is used to convert the steady state GIC flows to time-series GIC data for the benchmark thermal impact assessment of transformers. This information may be needed by one or more of the methods for performing a benchmark thermal impact assessment. Additional information is in the following section and the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,¹⁵ October 2017.

The peak GIC value of 75 Amps per phase has been shown through thermal modeling to be a conservative threshold below which the risk of exceeding known temperature limits established by technical organizations is low.

Requirement R6

The benchmark thermal impact assessment of a power transformer may be based on manufacturer-provided GIC capability curves, thermal response simulation, thermal impact screening, or other technically justified means. Approaches for conducting the assessment are presented in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper ERO Enterprise-Endorsed Implementation Guidance*¹⁶ for this requirement. This ERO-Endorsed document is posted on the NERC Compliance Guidance¹⁷ webpage.

¹⁴ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning</u> %20Guide_approved.pdf.

¹⁵ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

¹⁶ http://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/guidance/EROEndorsedImplementationGuidance/TPL-007-1 Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper.pdf.

¹⁷ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/guidance/Pages/default.aspx</u>.

Transformers are exempt from the benchmark thermal impact assessment requirement if the effective GIC value for the transformer is less than 75 A per phase, as determined by a GIC analysis of the System. Justification for this criterion is provided in the *Screening Criterion for Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,¹⁸ October 2017. A documented design specification exceeding this value is also a justifiable threshold criterion that exempts a transformer from Requirement R6.

The benchmark threshold criteria and its associated transformer thermal impact must be evaluated on the basis of effective GIC. Refer to the white papers for additional information.

Requirement R7

Technical considerations for GMD mitigation planning, including operating and equipment strategies, are available in Chapter 5 of the *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,¹⁹ December 2013. Additional information is available in the 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk-Power System,²⁰ February 2012.

Requirement R8

The *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,²¹ December 2013 developed by the NERC GMD Task Force provides technical information on GMD-specific considerations for planning studies.

The supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment process is similar to the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment process described under Requirement R4.

Requirement R9

The supplemental thermal impact assessment specified of transformers in Requirement R10 is based on GIC information for the supplemental GMD Event. This GIC information is determined by the planning entity through simulation of the GIC System model and must be provided to the entity responsible for conducting the thermal impact assessment. GIC information should be provided in accordance with Requirement R9 each time the GMD Vulnerability Assessment is performed since, by definition, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes a documented evaluation of susceptibility to localized equipment damage due to GMD.

The maximum effective GIC value provided in Part 9.1 is used for the supplemental thermal impact assessment. Only those transformers that experience an effective GIC value of 85 A or greater per phase require evaluation in Requirement R10.

GIC(t) provided in Part 9.2 is used to convert the steady state GIC flows to time-series GIC data for the supplemental thermal impact assessment of transformers. This information may be

¹⁸ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

¹⁹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning</u> <u>%20Guide_approved.pdf</u>.

²⁰ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/2012GMD.pdf</u>.

²¹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning</u> <u>%20Guide_approved.pdf</u>.

needed by one or more of the methods for performing a supplemental thermal impact assessment. Additional information is in the following section.

The peak GIC value of 85 Amps per phase has been shown through thermal modeling to be a conservative threshold below which the risk of exceeding known temperature limits established by technical organizations is low.

Requirement R10

The supplemental thermal impact assessment of a power transformer may be based on manufacturer-provided GIC capability curves, thermal response simulation, thermal impact screening, or other technically justified means. Approaches for conducting the assessment are presented in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper ERO Enterprise-Endorsed Implementation Guidance*²² discussed in the Requirement R6 section above. A later version of the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,²³ October 2017, has been developed to include updated information pertinent to the supplemental GMD event and supplemental thermal impact assessment.

Transformers are exempt from the supplemental thermal impact assessment requirement if the effective GIC value for the transformer is less than 85 A per phase, as determined by a GIC analysis of the System. Justification for this criterion is provided in the revised *Screening Criterion for Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,²⁴ October 2017. A documented design specification exceeding this value is also a justifiable threshold criterion that exempts a transformer from Requirement R10.

The supplemental threshold criteria and its associated transformer thermal impact must be evaluated on the basis of effective GIC. Refer to the white papers for additional information.

Requirement R11

Technical considerations for GIC monitoring are contained in Chapter 6 of the 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk-Power System, ²⁵ February 2012. GIC monitoring is generally performed by Hall effect transducers that are attached to the neutral of the wye-grounded transformer. Data from GIC monitors is useful for model validation and situational awareness.

Responsible entities consider the following in developing a process for obtaining GIC monitor data:

• **Monitor locations.** An entity's operating process may be constrained by location of existing GIC monitors. However, when planning for additional GIC monitoring installations consider that data from monitors located in areas found to have high GIC based on system

²² <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/guidance/EROEndorsedImplementationGuidance/TPL-007-1 Transformer Thermal Impact</u> <u>Assessment White Paper.pdf</u>.

²³ http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.

²⁴ http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.

²⁵ http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/2012GMD.pdf.


studies may provide more useful information for validation and situational awareness purposes. Conversely, data from GIC monitors that are located in the vicinity of transportation systems using direct current (e.g., subways or light rail) may be unreliable.

- Monitor specifications. Capabilities of Hall effect transducers, existing and planned, should be considered in the operating process. When planning new GIC monitor installations, consider monitor data range (e.g., -500 A through + 500 A) and ambient temperature ratings consistent with temperatures in the region in which the monitor will be installed.
- **Sampling Interval.** An entity's operating process may be constrained by capabilities of existing GIC monitors. However, when possible specify data sampling during periods of interest at a rate of 10 seconds or faster.
- **Collection Periods.** The process should specify when the entity expects GIC data to be collected. For example, collection could be required during periods where the Kp index is above a threshold, or when GIC values are above a threshold. Determining when to discontinue collecting GIC data should also be specified to maintain consistency in data collection.
- Data format. Specify time and value formats. For example, Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) (MM/DD/YYYY HH:MM:SS) and GIC Value (Ampere). Positive (+) and negative (-) signs indicate direction of GIC flow. Positive reference is flow from ground into transformer neutral. Time fields should indicate the sampled time rather than system or SCADA time if supported by the GIC monitor system.
- **Data retention.** The entity's process should specify data retention periods, for example 1 year. Data retention periods should be adequately long to support availability for the entity's model validation process and external reporting requirements, if any.
- Additional information. The entity's process should specify collection of other information necessary for making the data useful, for example monitor location and type of neutral connection (e.g., three-phase or single-phase).

Requirement R12

Magnetometers measure changes in the earth's magnetic field. Entities should obtain data from the nearest accessible magnetometer. Sources of magnetometer data include:

• Observatories such as those operated by U.S. Geological Survey and Natural Resources Canada, see figure below for locations:²⁶



- Research institutions and academic universities;
- Entities with installed magnetometers.

Entities that choose to install magnetometers should consider equipment specifications and data format protocols contained in the latest version of the *INTERMAGNET Technical Reference Manual*, Version 4.6, 2012.²⁷

²⁶ <u>http://www.intermagnet.org/index-eng.php</u>.

²⁷ http://www.intermagnet.org/publications/intermag_4-6.pdf.

Rationale

During development of TPL-007-1, text boxes were embedded within the standard to explain the rationale for various parts of the standard. The text from the rationale text boxes was moved to this section upon approval of TPL-007-1 by the NERC Board of Trustees. In developing TPL-007-2, the SDT has made changes to the sections below only when necessary for clarity. Changes are marked with brackets [].

Rationale for Applicability:

Instrumentation transformers and station service transformers do not have significant impact on geomagnetically-induced current (GIC) flows; therefore, these transformers are not included in the applicability for this standard.

Terminal voltage describes line-to-line voltage.

Rationale for R1:

In some areas, planning entities may determine that the most effective approach to conduct a GMD Vulnerability Assessment is through a regional planning organization. No requirement in the standard is intended to prohibit a collaborative approach where roles and responsibilities are determined by a planning organization made up of one or more Planning Coordinator(s).

Rationale for R2:

A GMD Vulnerability Assessment requires a GIC System model to calculate GIC flow which is used to determine transformer Reactive Power absorption and transformer thermal response. Guidance for developing the GIC System model is provided in the *Application Guide Computing Geomagnetically-Induced Current in the Bulk-Power System*,²⁸ December 2013, developed by the NERC GMD Task Force.

The System model specified in Requirement R2 is used in conducting steady state power flow analysis that accounts for the Reactive Power absorption of power transformer(s) due to GIC in the System.

The GIC System model includes all power transformer(s) with a high side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV. The model is used to calculate GIC flow in the network.

The projected System condition for GMD planning may include adjustments to the System that are executable in response to space weather information. These adjustments could include, for example, recalling or postponing maintenance outages.

The Violation Risk Factor (VRF) for Requirement R2 is changed from Medium to High. This change is for consistency with the VRF for approved standard TPL-001-4 Requirement R1, which is proposed for revision in the NERC filing dated August 29, 2014 (Docket No. RM12-1-000). NERC guidelines require consistency among Reliability Standards.

²⁸ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GIC%20Application</u> %20Guide%202013_approved.pdf.

Rationale for R3:

Requirement R3 allows a responsible entity the flexibility to determine the System steady state voltage criteria for System steady state performance in Table 1. Steady state voltage limits are an example of System steady state performance criteria.

Rationale for R4:

The GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes steady state power flow analysis and the supporting study or studies using the models specified in Requirement R2 that account for the effects of GIC. Performance criteria are specified in Table 1.

At least one System On-Peak Load and at least one System Off-Peak Load must be examined in the analysis.

Distribution of GMD Vulnerability Assessment results provides a means for sharing relevant information with other entities responsible for planning reliability. Results of GIC studies may affect neighboring systems and should be taken into account by planners.

The *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,²⁹ December 2013 developed by the NERC GMD Task Force provides technical information on GMD-specific considerations for planning studies. The provision of information in Requirement R4, Part 4.3, shall be subject to the legal and regulatory obligations for the disclosure of confidential and/or sensitive information.

Rationale for R5:

This GIC information is necessary for determining the thermal impact of GIC on transformers in the planning area and must be provided to entities responsible for performing the thermal impact assessment so that they can accurately perform the assessment. GIC information should be provided in accordance with Requirement R5 as part of the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process since, by definition, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes documented evaluation of susceptibility to localized equipment damage due to GMD.

The maximum effective GIC value provided in Part 5.1 is used for transformer thermal impact assessment.

GIC(t) provided in Part 5.2 can alternatively be used to convert the steady state GIC flows to timeseries GIC data for transformer thermal impact assessment. This information may be needed by one or more of the methods for performing a thermal impact assessment. Additional guidance is available in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,³⁰ October 2017.

A Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that desires GIC(t) may request it from the planning entity. The planning entity shall provide GIC(t) upon request once GIC has been calculated, but

²⁹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning</u> <u>%20Guide_approved.pdf</u>.

³⁰ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

no later than 90 calendar days after receipt of a request from the owner and after completion of Requirement R5, Part 5.1.

The provision of information in Requirement R5 shall be subject to the legal and regulatory obligations for the disclosure of confidential and/or sensitive information.

Rationale for R6:

The transformer thermal impact screening criterion has been revised from 15 A per phase to 75 A per phase [for the benchmark GMD event]. Only those transformers that experience an effective GIC value of 75 A per phase or greater require evaluation in Requirement R6. The justification is provided in the *Screening Criterion for Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,³¹ October 2017.

The thermal impact assessment may be based on manufacturer-provided GIC capability curves, thermal response simulation, thermal impact screening, or other technically justified means. The transformer thermal assessment will be repeated or reviewed using previous assessment results each time the planning entity performs a GMD Vulnerability Assessment and provides GIC information as specified in Requirement R5. Approaches for conducting the assessment are presented in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,³² October 2017.

Thermal impact assessments are provided to the planning entity, as determined in Requirement R1, so that identified issues can be included in the GMD Vulnerability Assessment (R4), and the Corrective Action Plan (R7) as necessary.

Thermal impact assessments of non-BES transformers are not required because those transformers do not have a wide-area effect on the reliability of the interconnected Transmission system.

The provision of information in Requirement R6, Part 6.4, shall be subject to the legal and regulatory obligations for the disclosure of confidential and/or sensitive information.

Rationale for R7:

The proposed requirement addresses directives in Order No. 830 for establishing Corrective Action Plan (CAP) deadlines associated with GMD Vulnerability Assessments. In Order No. 830, FERC directed revisions to TPL-007 such that CAPs are developed within one year from the completion of GMD Vulnerability Assessments (P 101). Furthermore, FERC directed establishment of implementation deadlines after the completion of the CAP as follows (P 102):

- Two years for non-hardware mitigation; and
- Four years for hardware mitigation.

The objective of Part 7.4 is to provide awareness to potentially impacted entities when implementation of planned mitigation is not achievable within the deadlines established in Part

³¹ http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.

³² <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

7.3. Examples of situations beyond the control of the of the responsible entity (see Section 7.4) include, but are not limited to:

- Delays resulting from regulatory/legal processes, such as permitting;
- Delays resulting from stakeholder processes required by tariff;
- Delays resulting from equipment lead times; or

Delays resulting from the inability to acquire necessary Right-of-Way.

Rationale for Table 3:

Table 3 has been revised to use the same ground model designation, FL1, as is being used by USGS. The calculated scaling factor for FL1 is 0.74. [The scaling factor associated with the benchmark GMD event for the Florida earth model (FL1) has been updated to 0.76 in TPL-007-2 based on the earth model published on the USGS public website.]

Rationale for R8 – R10:

The proposed requirements address directives in Order No. 830 for revising the benchmark GMD event used in GMD Vulnerability Assessments (P 44, P 47-49). The requirements add a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment based on the supplemental GMD event that accounts for localized peak geoelectric fields.

Rationale for R11 – R12:

The proposed requirements address directives in Order No. 830 for requiring responsible entities to collect GIC monitoring and magnetometer data as necessary to enable model validation and situational awareness (P 88; P. 90-92). GMD measurement data refers to GIC monitor data and geomagnetic field data in Requirements R11 and R12, respectively. See the Guidelines and Technical Basis section of this standard for technical information.

The objective of Requirement R11 is for entities to obtain GIC data for the Planning Coordinator's planning area or other part of the system included in the Planning Coordinator's GIC System model to inform GMD Vulnerability Assessments. Technical considerations for GIC monitoring are contained in Chapter 9 of the 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk-Power System (NERC 2012 GMD Report). GIC monitoring is generally performed by Hall effect transducers that are attached to the neutral of the transformer and measure dc current flowing through the neutral.

The objective of Requirement R12 is for entities to obtain geomagnetic field data for the Planning Coordinator's planning area to inform GMD Vulnerability Assessments. Magnetometers provide geomagnetic field data by measuring changes in the earth's magnetic field. Sources of geomagnetic field data include:

- Observatories such as those operated by U.S. Geological Survey, Natural Resources Canada, research organizations, or university research facilities;
- Installed magnetometers; and
- Commercial or third-party sources of geomagnetic field data.

Geomagnetic field data for a Planning Coordinator's planning area is obtained from one or more of the above data sources located in the Planning Coordinator's planning area, or by obtaining a geomagnetic field data product for the Planning Coordinator's planning area from a government or research organization. The geomagnetic field data product does not need to be derived from a magnetometer or observatory within the Planning Coordinator's planning area.

Standard Development Timeline

This section is maintained by the drafting team during the development of the standard and will be removed when the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees (Board).

Description of Current Draft

45-day formal comment period with initial ballot

Completed Actions	Date
Standards Committee approved Standard Authorization Request (SAR) for posting	<u>06/13/18</u>
SAR posted for comment	<u>03/30/18 –</u> <u>04/30/18</u>
28-day informal comment period	<u>08/10/18 –</u> <u>09/06/18</u>

Anticipated Actions	Date
45-day formal or informal comment period with initial ballot	<u>October 2018 –</u> <u>November 2018</u>
45-day formal or informal comment period with additional ballot	TBD
10-day final ballot	<u>TBD</u>
Board adoption	February 2019

New or Modified Term(s) Used in NERC Reliability Standards

This section includes all new or modified terms used in the proposed standard that will be included in the *Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards* upon applicable regulatory approval. Terms used in the proposed standard that are already defined and are not being modified can be found in the *Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards*. The new or revised terms listed below will be presented for approval with the proposed standard. Upon Board adoption, this section will be removed.

Term(s):

None.

A. Introduction

- 1. Title: Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events
- **2. Number:** TPL-007-23
- **3. Purpose:** Establish requirements for Transmission system planned performance during geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) events.
- 4. Applicability:

4.1. Functional Entities:

- **4.1.1.** Planning Coordinator with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2;
- **4.1.2.** Transmission Planner with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2;
- 4.1.3. Transmission Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2; and
- **4.1.4.** Generator Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2.
- 4.2. Facilities:
 - **4.2.1.** Facilities that include power transformer(s) with a high side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV.
- 5. Effective Date: See Implementation Plan for TPL-007-23.
- **Background:** During a GMD event, geomagnetically-induced currents (GIC) may cause transformer hot-spot heating or damage, loss of Reactive Power sources, increased Reactive Power demand, and Misoperation(s), the combination of which may result in voltage collapse and blackout.

The only difference between TPL-007-3 and TPL-007-2 is that TPL-007-3 adds a Canadian Variance to address regulatory practices/processes within Canadian jurisdictions and to allow the use of Canadian-specific data and research to define and implement alternative GMD event(s) that achieve at least an equivalent reliability objective of that in TPL-007-2.

B. Requirements and Measures

R1. Each Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with its Transmission Planner(s), shall identify the individual and joint responsibilities of the Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner(s) in the Planning Coordinator's planning area for maintaining models, performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, and implementing process(es) to obtain GMD measurement data as specified in this standard. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- M1. Each Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with its Transmission Planners, shall provide documentation on roles and responsibilities, such as meeting minutes, agreements, copies of procedures or protocols in effect between entities or between departments of a vertically integrated system, or email correspondence that identifies an agreement has been reached on individual and joint responsibilities for maintaining models, performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, and implementing process(es) to obtain GMD measurement data in accordance with Requirement R1.
- R2. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall maintain System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M2. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence in either electronic or hard copy format that it is maintaining System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.
- **R3.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System during the GMD events described in Attachment 1. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- **M3.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence, such as electronic or hard copies of the criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System in accordance with Requirement R3.

Benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s)

- R4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall complete a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment of the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon at least once every 60 calendar months. This benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall use a study or studies based on models identified in Requirement R2, document assumptions, and document summarized results of the steady state analysis. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **4.1.** The study or studies shall include the following conditions:
 - **4.1.1.** System On-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon; and
 - **4.1.2.** System Off-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon.

- **4.2.** The study or studies shall be conducted based on the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1 to determine whether the System meets the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1.
- **4.3.** The benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, and adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later.
 - **4.3.1.** If a recipient of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment provides documented comments on the results, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- M4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have dated evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment meeting all of the requirements in Requirement R4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, and adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later, as specified in Requirement R4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments in accordance with Requirement R4.
- **R5.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide GIC flow information to be used for the benchmark thermal impact assessment of transformers specified in Requirement R6 to each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns an applicable Bulk Electric System (BES) power transformer in the planning area. The GIC flow information shall include: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **5.1.** The maximum effective GIC value for the worst case geoelectric field orientation for the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1. This value shall be provided to the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.

- **5.2.** The effective GIC time series, GIC(t), calculated using the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1 in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area. GIC(t) shall be provided within 90 calendar days of receipt of the written request and after determination of the maximum effective GIC value in Part 5.1.
- **M5.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided the maximum effective GIC values to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area as specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided GIC(t) in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.
- **R6.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A per phase or greater. The benchmark thermal impact assessment shall: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - 6.1. Be based on the effective GIC flow information provided in Requirement R5;
 - 6.2. Document assumptions used in the analysis;
 - **6.3.** Describe suggested actions and supporting analysis to mitigate the impact of GICs, if any; and
 - **6.4.** Be performed and provided to the responsible entities, as determined in Requirement R1, within 24 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1.
- **M6.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its benchmark thermal impact assessment for all of its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A per phase or greater, and shall have evidence such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided its thermal impact assessment to the responsible entities as specified in Requirement R6.
- **R7.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, that concludes through the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment conducted in Requirement R4 that their System does not meet the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1, shall develop a Corrective

Action Plan (CAP) addressing how the performance requirements will be met. The CAP shall: [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- **7.1.** List System deficiencies and the associated actions needed to achieve required System performance. Examples of such actions include:
 - Installation, modification, retirement, or removal of Transmission and generation Facilities and any associated equipment.
 - Installation, modification, or removal of Protection Systems or Remedial Action Schemes.
 - Use of Operating Procedures, specifying how long they will be needed as part of the CAP.
 - Use of Demand-Side Management, new technologies, or other initiatives.
- **7.2.** Be developed within one year of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.
- **7.3.** Include a timetable, subject to revision by the responsible entity in Part 7.4, for implementing the selected actions from Part 7.1. The timetable shall:
 - **7.3.1.** Specify implementation of non-hardware mitigation, if any, within two years of development of the CAP; and
 - **7.3.2.** Specify implementation of hardware mitigation, if any, within four years of development of the CAP.
- **7.4.** Be revised if situations beyond the control of the responsible entity determined in Requirement R1 prevent implementation of the CAP within the timetable for implementation provided in Part 7.3. The revised CAP shall document the following, and be updated at least once every 12 calendar months until implemented:
 - **7.4.1.** Circumstances causing the delay for fully or partially implementing the selected actions in Part 7.1;
 - **7.4.2.** Description of the original CAP, and any previous changes to the CAP, with the associated timetable(s) for implementing the selected actions in Part 7.1; and
 - **7.4.3.** Revisions to the selected actions in Part 7.1, if any, including utilization of Operating Procedures if applicable, and the updated timetable for implementing the selected actions.
- **7.5.** Be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission Planner(s), and functional entities referenced in the CAP within 90 calendar days of development or revision, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of development or revision, whichever is later.

- **7.5.1.** If a recipient of the CAP provides documented comments on the results, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- **M7.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, that concludes, through the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment conducted in Requirement R4, that the responsible entity's System does not meet the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1 shall have evidence such as dated electronic or hard copies of its CAP including timetable for implementing selected actions, as specified in Requirement R7. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has revised its CAP if situations beyond the responsible entity's control prevent implementation of the CAP within the timetable specified. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its CAP or relevant information, if any, (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission Planner(s), and functional entities referenced in the CAP within 90 calendar days of development or revision, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of development or revision, whichever is later as specified in Requirement R7. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its CAP within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments, in accordance with Requirement R7.

Supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s)

- R8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall complete a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment of the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon at least once every 60 calendar months. This supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall use a study or studies based on models identified in Requirement R2, document assumptions, and document summarized results of the steady state analysis. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - 8.1. The study or studies shall include the following conditions:
 - **8.1.1.** System On-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon; and
 - **8.1.2.** System Off-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon.

- **8.2.** The study or studies shall be conducted based on the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1 to determine whether the System meets the performance requirements for the steady state planning supplemental GMD event contained in Table 1.
- **8.3.** If the analysis concludes there is Cascading caused by the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1, an evaluation of possible actions designed to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the consequences and adverse impacts of the event(s) shall be conducted.
- **8.4.** The supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later.
 - **8.4.1.** If a recipient of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment provides documented comments on the results, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- M8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have dated evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment meeting all of the requirements in Requirement R8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its supplemental GMD Vulnerability: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later, as specified in Requirement R8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments in accordance with Requirement R8.
- **R9.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide GIC flow information to be used for the supplemental thermal impact assessment of transformers specified in Requirement R10 to each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns an applicable Bulk Electric System (BES) power transformer in the planning area. The GIC flow information shall include: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- **9.1.** The maximum effective GIC value for the worst case geoelectric field orientation for the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1. This value shall be provided to the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.
- **9.2.** The effective GIC time series, GIC(t), calculated using the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1 in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area. GIC(t) shall be provided within 90 calendar days of receipt of the written request and after determination of the maximum effective GIC value in Part 9.1.
- M9. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided the maximum effective GIC values to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area as specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided GIC(t) in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.
- **R10.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A per phase or greater. The supplemental thermal impact assessment shall: [*Violation Risk Factor: Medium*] [*Time Horizon: Long-term Planning*]
 - **10.1.** Be based on the effective GIC flow information provided in Requirement R9;
 - 10.2. Document assumptions used in the analysis;
 - **10.3.** Describe suggested actions and supporting analysis to mitigate the impact of GICs, if any; and
 - **10.4.** Be performed and provided to the responsible entities, as determined in Requirement R1, within 24 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1.
- M10. Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its supplemental thermal impact assessment for all of its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A per phase or greater, and shall have evidence such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided its supplemental thermal impact assessment to the responsible entities as specified in Requirement R10.

GMD Measurement Data Processes

- **R11.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall implement a process to obtain GIC monitor data from at least one GIC monitor located in the Planning Coordinator's planning area or other part of the system included in the Planning Coordinator's GIC System model. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M11. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its GIC monitor location(s) and documentation of its process to obtain GIC monitor data in accordance with Requirement R11.
- **R12.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall implement a process to obtain geomagnetic field data for its Planning Coordinator's planning area. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M12. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its process to obtain geomagnetic field data for its Planning Coordinator's planning area in accordance with Requirement R12.

C. Compliance

- 1. Compliance Monitoring Process
 - **1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority:** "Compliance Enforcement Authority" means NERC or the Regional Entity, or any entity as otherwise designated by an Applicable Governmental Authority, in their respective roles of monitoring and/or enforcing compliance with mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards in their respective jurisdictions.
 - **1.2.** Evidence Retention: The following evidence retention period(s) identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full-time period since the last audit.

The applicable entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

- For Requirements R1, R2, R3, R5, R6, R9, and R10, each responsible entity shall retain documentation as evidence for five years.
- For Requirements R4 and R8, each responsible entity shall retain documentation of the current GMD Vulnerability Assessment and the preceding GMD Vulnerability Assessment.

- For Requirement R7, each responsible entity shall retain documentation as evidence for five years or until all actions in the Corrective Action Plan are completed, whichever is later.
- For Requirements R11 and R12, each responsible entity shall retain documentation as evidence for three years.
- **1.3.** Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program: As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, "Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program" refers to the identification of the processes that will be used to evaluate data or information for the purpose of assessing performance or outcomes with the associated Reliability Standard.

Table 1: Steady State Planning GMD Event

Steady State:

- a. Voltage collapse, Cascading and uncontrolled islanding shall not occur.
- b. Generation loss is acceptable as a consequence of the steady state planning GMD events.
- c. Planned System adjustments such as Transmission configuration changes and re-dispatch of generation are allowed if such adjustments are executable within the time duration applicable to the Facility Ratings.

Category	Initial Condition	Event	Interruption of Firm Transmission Service Allowed	Load Loss Allowed
Benchmark GMD Event - GMD Event with Outages	 System as may be postured in response to space weather information¹, and then GMD event² 	Reactive Power compensation devices and other Transmission Facilities removed as a result of Protection System operation or Misoperation due to harmonics during the GMD event	Yes ³	Yes ³
Supplemental GMD Event - GMD Event with Outages	 System as may be postured in response to space weather information¹, and then GMD event² 	Reactive Power compensation devices and other Transmission Facilities removed as a result of Protection System operation or Misoperation due to harmonics during the GMD event	Yes	Yes
	Table	1: Steady State Performance Footnot	es	

- 1. The System condition for GMD planning may include adjustments to posture the System that are executable in response to space weather information.
- 2. The GMD conditions for the benchmark and supplemental planning events are described in Attachment 1.
- 3. Load loss as a result of manual or automatic Load shedding (e.g., UVLS) and/or curtailment of Firm Transmission Service may be used to meet BES performance requirements during studied GMD conditions. The likelihood and magnitude of Load loss or curtailment of Firm Transmission Service should be minimized.

Violation Severity Levels

R #		Violation Severity Levels			
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
R1.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with its Transmission Planner(s), failed to determine and identify individual or joint responsibilities of the Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner(s) in the Planning Coordinator's planning area for maintaining models, performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, and implementing process(es) to obtain GMD measurement data as specified in this standard.	
R2.	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not maintain either System models or GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the studies	The responsible entity did not maintain both System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the studies	

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
			needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.	needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.	
R3.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not have criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System during the GMD events described in Attachment 1 as required.	
R4.	The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 60 calendar months and less than or equal to 64 calendar months since the last benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	The responsible entity's completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy one of the elements listed in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.3; OR The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 64 calendar months and less than or equal to 68 calendar months since the	The responsible entity's completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy two of the elements listed in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.3; OR The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 68 calendar months and less than or equal to 72 calendar months since the	The responsible entity's completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy three of the elements listed in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.3; OR The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 72 calendar months since the last benchmark	

D #	Violation Severity Levels			
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
		last benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	last benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	GMD Vulnerability Assessment; OR The responsible entity does not have a completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.
R5.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 90 calendar days and less than or equal to 100 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 100 calendar days and less than or equal to 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity did not provide the maximum effective GIC value to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area; OR The responsible entity did not provide the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), upon written request.
R6.	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for 5% or less or one of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for more than 5% up to (and including) 10% or two of its solely owned and jointly	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for more than 10% up to (and including) 15% or three of its solely owned and	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for more than 15% or more than three of its solely owned and jointly owned

R #	Violation Severity Levels			
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
	transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 24 calendar months and less than or equal to 26 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1.	owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 26 calendar months and less than or equal to 28 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1; OR The responsible entity failed to include one of the	jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 28 calendar months and less than or equal to 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1; OR The responsible entity failed to include two of the	applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1; OR The responsible entity failed to include three of the required elements as listed

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
		required elements as listed in Requirement R6, Parts 6.1 through 6.3.	required elements as listed in Requirement R6, Parts 6.1 through 6.3.	in Requirement R6, Parts 6.1 through 6.3.	
R7.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with one of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with two of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with three of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with four or more of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5; OR The responsible entity did not have a Corrective Action Plan as required by Requirement R7.	
R8.	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy one of elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy two of elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy three of the elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy four of the elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	

R #		Violation Se	verity Levels	
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
	than 60 calendar months and less than or equal to 64 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	than 64 calendar months and less than or equal to 68 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	than 68 calendar months and less than or equal to 72 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	than 72 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment; OR The responsible entity does not have a completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.
R9.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 90 calendar days and less than or equal to 100 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 100 calendar days and less than or equal to 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity did not provide the maximum effective GIC value to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area; OR The responsible entity did not provide the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), upon written request.
R10.	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for 5% or less or one of its	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for more than 5% up to (and	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for more than 10% up to	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for more than 15% or more

Lower VSLModerate VSLHigh VSLsolely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; ORincluding) 10% or two of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase;including) 10% or two of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase;(and including) 15% or three of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase;(and including) 15% or three of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is Requ	R# =		Violation Se	verity Levels	
owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; ORsolely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; ORsolely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase;of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase;of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase;of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase;of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where walue provided in 85 A or greater per phase;owned applicable soleowned applicable transformers (whichever is greater) walue provided in 85 A or greater per phase;owned applicable soleowned applicable transformers (whichever is greater) walue provided in 85 A or greater per phase;owned applicable soleowned applicable transformers (whichever is greater) walue provided in 85 A or great	K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided infor its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GICfor its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GICfor its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GICfor its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GICfor its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GICfor its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GICfor its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GICfor its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GICfor its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GICfor its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GICfor its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GICfor its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GICfor its solely owned and iointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GICfor its solely owned and iointly owned applicablefor its solely owned applicable61Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is but did so more than 26Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is than or equal to 28 calendar months of receiving GIC flow<	() 	solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 24 calendar months and less than or equal to 26 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in	including) 10% or two of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 26 calendar months and less than or equal to 28 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1	(and including) 15% or three of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 28 calendar months and less than or equal to 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1;	than three of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1;

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
		The responsible entity failed to include one of the required elements as listed in Requirement R10, Parts 10.1 through 10.3.	The responsible entity failed to include two of the required elements as listed in Requirement R10, Parts 10.1 through 10.3.	The responsible entity failed to include three of the required elements as listed in Requirement R10, Parts 10.1 through 10.3.	
R11.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not implement a process to obtain GIC monitor data from at least one GIC monitor located in the Planning Coordinator's planning area or other part of the system included in the Planning Coordinator's GIC System Model.	
R12.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not implement a process to obtain geomagnetic field data for its Planning Coordinator's planning area.	

D. Regional Variances

D.A. Regional Variance for Canadian Jurisdictions

This Variance shall be applicable in Canada.

<u>All references to "Attachment 1" in the standard are replaced with "Attachment 1 or</u> <u>Attachment 1-CAN."</u>

In addition, this Variance replaces Requirement R7, Part 7.3 with the following:

- **D.A.7.3.** Include a timetable, subject to revision by the responsible entity in Part 7.4, for implementing the selected actions from Part 7.1. The timetable shall:
 - **D.A.7.3.1.** Specify implementation of non-hardware mitigation, if any, within two years of the later of the development of the CAP or receipt of regulatory approvals, if required; and
 - **D.A.7.3.2.** Specify implementation of hardware mitigation, if any, within four years of the later of the development of the CAP or receipt of regulatory approvals, if required.

E. Associated Documents

Attachment 1

Attachment 1-CAN

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	December 17, 2014	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	New
2	November 9, 2017	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	Revised to respond to directives in FERC Order No. 830.

Attachment 1

Calculating Geoelectric Fields for the Benchmark and Supplemental GMD Events

The benchmark GMD event¹ defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows that are needed to conduct a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment. It is composed of the following elements: (1) a reference peak geoelectric field amplitude of 8 V/km derived from statistical analysis of historical magnetometer data; (2) scaling factors to account for local geomagnetic latitude; (3) scaling factors to account for local earth conductivity; and (4) a reference geomagnetic field time series or waveform to facilitate time-domain analysis of GMD impact on equipment.

The supplemental GMD event is composed of similar elements as described above, except (1) the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude is 12 V/km over a localized area; and (2) the geomagnetic field time series or waveform includes a local enhancement in the waveform.²

The regional geoelectric field peak amplitude used in GMD Vulnerability Assessment, E_{peak} , can be obtained from the reference geoelectric field value of 8 V/km for the benchmark GMD event (1) or 12 V/km for the supplemental GMD event (2) using the following relationships:

$$E_{peak} = 8 \times \alpha \times \beta_{b} (V/km) \tag{1}$$

$$E_{peak} = 12 \times \alpha \times \beta_s (V/km)$$
⁽²⁾

where, α is the scaling factor to account for local geomagnetic latitude, and β is a scaling factor to account for the local earth conductivity structure. Subscripts *b* and *s* for the β scaling factor denote association with the benchmark or supplemental GMD events, respectively.

Scaling the Geomagnetic Field

The benchmark and supplemental GMD events are defined for geomagnetic latitude of 60° and must be scaled to account for regional differences based on geomagnetic latitude. Table 2 provides a scaling factor correlating peak geoelectric field to geomagnetic latitude. Alternatively, the scaling factor α is computed with the empirical expression:

$$\alpha = 0.001 \times e^{(0.115 \times L)} \tag{3}$$

where, L is the geomagnetic latitude in degrees and $0.1 \le \alpha \le 1$.

¹ The Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description, May 2016 is available on the Related Information webpage for TPL-007-1: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/TPL0071RD/Benchmark_clean_May12_complete.pdf</u>.

² The extent of local enhancements is on the order of 100 km in North-South (latitude) direction but longer in East-West (longitude) direction. The local enhancement in the geomagnetic field occurs over the time period of 2-5 minutes. Additional information is available in the Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description, October 2017 white paper on the Project 2013-03 Geomagnetic Disturbance Mitigation project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

For large planning areas that cover more than one scaling factor from Table 2, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment should be based on a peak geoelectric field that is:

- calculated by using the most conservative (largest) value for α; or
- calculated assuming a non-uniform or piecewise uniform geomagnetic field.

Table 2: Geomagnetic Field Scaling Factors for the Benchmark and Supplemental GMD Events		
Geomagnetic Latitude (Degrees)	Scaling Factor1 (α)	
≤ 40	0.10	
45	0.2	
50	0.3	
54	0.5	
56	0.6	
57	0.7	
58	0.8	
59	0.9	
≥ 60	1.0	

Scaling the Geoelectric Field

The benchmark GMD event is defined for the reference Quebec earth model described in Table 4. The peak geoelectric field, E_{peak}, used in a GMD Vulnerability Assessment may be obtained by either:

- Calculating the geoelectric field for the ground conductivity in the planning area and the reference geomagnetic field time series scaled according to geomagnetic latitude, using a procedure such as the plane wave method described in the NERC GMD Task Force GIC Application Guide;³ or
- Using the earth conductivity scaling factor β from Table 3 that correlates to the ground conductivity map in Figure 1 or Figure 2. Along with the scaling factor α from equation (3) or Table 2, β is applied to the reference geoelectric field using equation (1 or 2, as applicable) to obtain the regional geoelectric field peak amplitude E_{peak} to be used in GMD Vulnerability Assessments. When a ground conductivity model is not available, the planning entity should use the largest β factor of adjacent physiographic regions or a technically justified value.

³ Available at the NERC GMD Task Force project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Pages/Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Task-Force-(GMDTF)-2013.aspx</u>.

The earth models used to calculate Table 3 for the United States were obtained from publicly available information published on the U. S. Geological Survey website.⁴ The models used to calculate Table 3 for Canada were obtained from Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) and reflect the average structure for large regions. A planner can also use specific earth model(s) with documented justification and the reference geomagnetic field time series to calculate the β factor(s) as follows:

$$\beta_b = E/8$$
 for the benchmark GMD event (4)

$$\beta_s = E/12$$
 for the supplemental GMD (5)

where, *E* is the absolute value of peak geoelectric in V/km obtained from the technically justified earth model and the reference geomagnetic field time series.

For large planning areas that span more than one β scaling factor, the most conservative (largest) value for β may be used in determining the peak geoelectric field to obtain conservative results. Alternatively, a planner could perform analysis using a non-uniform or piecewise uniform geoelectric field.

Applying the Localized Peak Geoelectric Field in the Supplemental GMD Event

The peak geoelectric field of the supplemental GMD event occurs in a localized area.⁵ Planners have flexibility to determine how to apply the localized peak geoelectric field over the planning area in performing GIC calculations. Examples of approaches are:

- Apply the peak geoelectric field (12 V/km scaled to the planning area) over the entire planning area;
- Apply a spatially limited (12 V/km scaled to the planning area) peak geoelectric field (e.g., 100 km in North-South latitude direction and 500 km in East-West longitude direction) over a portion(s) of the system, and apply the benchmark GMD event over the rest of the system; or
- Other methods to adjust the benchmark GMD event analysis to account for the localized geoelectric field enhancement of the supplemental GMD event.

⁴ Available at <u>http://geomag.usgs.gov/conductivity/</u>.

⁵ See the Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Description white paper located on the Project 2013-03 Geomagnetic Disturbance Mitigation project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.




Figure 1: Physiographic Regions of the Continental United States⁶



Figure 2: Physiographic Regions of Canada

⁶ Additional map detail is available at the U.S. Geological Survey: <u>http://geomag.usgs.gov/</u>.

Table 3: Geoelectric Field Scaling Factors				
Earth model	Scaling Factor Benchmark Event (β _b)	Scaling Factor Supplemental Event (βs)		
AK1A	0.56	0.51		
AK1B	0.56	0.51		
AP1	0.33	0.30		
AP2	0.82	0.78		
BR1	0.22	0.22		
CL1	0.76	0.73		
CO1	0.27	0.25		
CP1	0.81	0.77		
CP2	0.95	0.86		
FL1	0.76	0.73		
CS1	0.41	0.37		
IP1	0.94	0.90		
IP2	0.28	0.25		
IP3	0.93	0.90		
IP4	0.41	0.35		
NE1	0.81	0.77		
PB1	0.62	0.55		
PB2	0.46	0.39		
PT1	1.17	1.19		
SL1	0.53	0.49		
SU1	0.93	0.90		
BOU	0.28	0.24		
FBK	0.56	0.56		
PRU	0.21	0.22		
BC	0.67	0.62		
PRAIRIES	0.96	0.88		
SHIELD	1.0	1.0		
ATLANTIC	0.79	0.76		

Rationale: Scaling factors in Table 3 are dependent upon the frequency content of the reference storm. Consequently, the benchmark GMD event and the supplemental GMD event may produce different scaling factors for a given earth model.

The scaling factor associated with the benchmark GMD event for the Florida earth model (FL1) has been updated based on the earth model published on the USGS public website.

Table 4: Reference Earth Model (Quebec)	
Layer Thickness (km)	Resistivity (Ω-m)
15	20,000
10	200
125	1,000
200	100
∞	3

Reference Geomagnetic Field Time Series or Waveform for the Benchmark GMD $\mathsf{Event}^{_7}$

The geomagnetic field measurement record of the March 13-14 1989 GMD event, measured at the NRCan Ottawa geomagnetic observatory, is the basis for the reference geomagnetic field waveform to be used to calculate the GIC time series, GIC(t), required for transformer thermal impact assessment.

The geomagnetic latitude of the Ottawa geomagnetic observatory is 55°; therefore, the amplitudes of the geomagnetic field measurement data were scaled up to the 60° reference geomagnetic latitude (see Figure 3) such that the resulting peak geoelectric field amplitude computed using the reference earth model was 8 V/km (see Figures 4 and 5). The sampling rate for the geomagnetic field waveform is 10 seconds.⁸ To use this geoelectric field time series when a different earth model is applicable, it should be scaled with the appropriate benchmark conductivity scaling factor β_b .

⁷ Refer to the Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description white paper for details on the determination of the reference geomagnetic field waveform: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/TPL0071RI.aspx</u>.

⁸ The data file of the benchmark geomagnetic field waveform is available on the Related Information webpage for TPL-007-1: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/TPL0071RI.aspx</u>.




Figure 3: Benchmark Geomagnetic Field Waveform Red B_n (Northward), Blue B_e (Eastward)





Figure 4: Benchmark Geoelectric Field Waveform E_E (Eastward)






Reference Geomagnetic Field Time Series or Waveform for the Supplemental GMD Event^{9}


The geomagnetic field measurement record of the March 13-14, 1989 GMD event, measured at the NRCan Ottawa geomagnetic observatory, is the basis for the reference geomagnetic field waveform to be used to calculate the GIC time series, GIC(t), required for transformer thermal impact assessment for the supplemental GMD event. The supplemental GMD event waveform differs from the benchmark GMD event waveform in that the supplemental GMD event waveform has a local enhancement.

The geomagnetic latitude of the Ottawa geomagnetic observatory is 55°; therefore, the amplitudes of the geomagnetic field measurement data were scaled up to the 60° reference geomagnetic latitude (see Figure 6) such that the resulting peak geoelectric field amplitude computed using the reference earth model was 12 V/km (see Figure7). The sampling rate for the geomagnetic field waveform is 10 seconds.¹⁰ To use this geoelectric field time series when a different earth model is applicable, it should be scaled with the appropriate supplemental conductivity scaling factor β_s .

⁹ Refer to the Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description white paper for details on the determination of the reference geomagnetic field waveform: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

¹⁰ The data file of the benchmark geomagnetic field waveform is available on the NERC GMD Task Force project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Pages/Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Task-Force-(GMDTF)-2013.aspx</u>.








Figure 7: Supplemental Geoelectric Field Waveform Blue E_N (Northward), Red E_E (Eastward)

Attachment 1-CAN

Attachment 1-CAN provides an alternative that any Canadian entity may use in lieu of the benchmark or supplemental GMD event(s) defined in Attachment 1 for performing GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s).

A Canadian entity may use the provisions of Attachment 1-CAN if it has regionally specific information that provides a technically justified means to re-define a 1-in-100 year GMD planning event(s) within its planning area.

Information for the Alternative Methodology

<u>GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s) require the use of geophysical and engineering models.</u> <u>Canadian-specific data is available and growing. Ongoing research allows for more accurate characterization of regional parameters used in these models. Such Canadian-specific data includes geomagnetic field, earth conductivity, and geomagnetically induced current measurements that can be used for modeling and simulation validation.</u>

Information used to calculate geoelectric fields for the benchmark and supplemental GMD events shall be clearly documented and technically justified. For example, the factors involved in the calculation of geoelectric fields are geomagnetic field variations and an earth transfer function(s).^[1] Technically justified information used in modelling geomagnetic field variations may include: technical documents produced by governmental entities such as Natural Resources Canada; technical papers published in peer-reviewed journals; and data sets gathered using sound scientific principles. An earth transfer function may rely on magnetotelluric measurements or earth conductivity models.

Modeling assumptions shall also be clearly documented and technically justified. An entity may use sensitivity analysis to identify how the assumptions affect the results.

A simplified model may be used to perform a GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), as long as the model is more conservative than a more detailed model.

When interpreting assessment results, the entity shall consider the maturity of the modeling, toolset, and techniques applied.

Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Events

The 1-in-100 year planning event shall be based on regionally specific data and technically justifiable statistical analyses (e.g., extreme value theory) and applied to the benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s).


For the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), an entity shall consider the large-scale spatial structure of the GMD event. For the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), an

^[1] The "earth transfer function" is the relationship between the electric fields and magnetic field variations at the surface of the <u>earth.</u>

entity shall consider the small-scale spatial structure of the GMD event (e.g., using magnetometer measurements or realistic electrojet calculations).

Guidelines and Technical Basis

The diagram below provides an overall view of the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process:



The requirements in this standard cover various aspects of the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process.

Benchmark GMD Event (Attachment 1)

The benchmark GMD event defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows that are needed to conduct a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment. The *Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description*, May 2016¹¹ white paper includes the event description, analysis, and example calculations.

Supplemental GMD Event (Attachment 1)

The supplemental GMD event defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows that are needed to conduct a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment. The *Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description*, October 2017¹² white paper includes the event description and analysis.

Requirement R2

A GMD Vulnerability Assessment requires a GIC System model, which is a dc representation of the System, to calculate GIC flow. In a GMD Vulnerability Assessment, GIC simulations are used to determine transformer Reactive Power absorption and transformer thermal response. Details for developing the GIC System model are provided in the NERC GMD Task Force guide: *Application Guide for Computing Geomagnetically-Induced Current in the Bulk Power System*, December 2013.¹³

Underground pipe-type cables present a special modeling situation in that the steel pipe that encloses the power conductors significantly reduces the geoelectric field induced into the conductors themselves, while they remain a path for GIC. Solid dielectric cables that are not

¹¹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/TPL0071RI.aspx</u>.

¹² <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

¹³ http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GIC%20Application %20Guide%202013 approved.pdf.

enclosed by a steel pipe will not experience a reduction in the induced geoelectric field. A planning entity should account for special modeling situations in the GIC system model, if applicable.

Requirement R4

The *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,¹⁴ December 2013 developed by the NERC GMD Task Force provides technical information on GMD-specific considerations for planning studies.

Requirement R5

The benchmark thermal impact assessment of transformers specified in Requirement R6 is based on GIC information for the benchmark GMD Event. This GIC information is determined by the planning entity through simulation of the GIC System model and must be provided to the entity responsible for conducting the thermal impact assessment. GIC information should be provided in accordance with Requirement R5 each time the GMD Vulnerability Assessment is performed since, by definition, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes a documented evaluation of susceptibility to localized equipment damage due to GMD.

The maximum effective GIC value provided in Part 5.1 is used for the benchmark thermal impact assessment. Only those transformers that experience an effective GIC value of 75 A or greater per phase require evaluation in Requirement R6.

GIC(t) provided in Part 5.2 is used to convert the steady state GIC flows to time-series GIC data for the benchmark thermal impact assessment of transformers. This information may be needed by one or more of the methods for performing a benchmark thermal impact assessment. Additional information is in the following section and the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,¹⁵ October 2017.

The peak GIC value of 75 Amps per phase has been shown through thermal modeling to be a conservative threshold below which the risk of exceeding known temperature limits established by technical organizations is low.

Requirement R6

The benchmark thermal impact assessment of a power transformer may be based on manufacturer-provided GIC capability curves, thermal response simulation, thermal impact screening, or other technically justified means. Approaches for conducting the assessment are presented in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper ERO Enterprise-Endorsed Implementation Guidance*¹⁶ for this requirement. This ERO-Endorsed document is posted on the NERC Compliance Guidance¹⁷ webpage.

¹⁴ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning</u> <u>%20Guide_approved.pdf</u>.

¹⁵ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

¹⁶ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/guidance/EROEndorsedImplementationGuidance/TPL-007-1</u> <u>Transformer</u> <u>Thermal</u> <u>Impact</u> <u>Assessment</u> <u>White</u> <u>Paper.pdf</u>.

¹⁷ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/guidance/Pages/default.aspx</u>.

Transformers are exempt from the benchmark thermal impact assessment requirement if the effective GIC value for the transformer is less than 75 A per phase, as determined by a GIC analysis of the System. Justification for this criterion is provided in the *Screening Criterion for Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,¹⁸ October 2017. A documented design specification exceeding this value is also a justifiable threshold criterion that exempts a transformer from Requirement R6.

The benchmark threshold criteria and its associated transformer thermal impact must be evaluated on the basis of effective GIC. Refer to the white papers for additional information.

Requirement R7

Technical considerations for GMD mitigation planning, including operating and equipment strategies, are available in Chapter 5 of the *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,¹⁹ December 2013. Additional information is available in the 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk-Power System,²⁰ February 2012.

Requirement R8

The *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,²¹ December 2013 developed by the NERC GMD Task Force provides technical information on GMD-specific considerations for planning studies.

The supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment process is similar to the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment process described under Requirement R4.

Requirement R9

The supplemental thermal impact assessment specified of transformers in Requirement R10 is based on GIC information for the supplemental GMD Event. This GIC information is determined by the planning entity through simulation of the GIC System model and must be provided to the entity responsible for conducting the thermal impact assessment. GIC information should be provided in accordance with Requirement R9 each time the GMD Vulnerability Assessment is performed since, by definition, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes a documented evaluation of susceptibility to localized equipment damage due to GMD.

The maximum effective GIC value provided in Part 9.1 is used for the supplemental thermal impact assessment. Only those transformers that experience an effective GIC value of 85 A or greater per phase require evaluation in Requirement R10.

GIC(t) provided in Part 9.2 is used to convert the steady state GIC flows to time-series GIC data for the supplemental thermal impact assessment of transformers. This information may be

¹⁸ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

¹⁹ http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning %20Guide_approved.pdf.

²⁰ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/2012GMD.pdf.</u>

²¹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning</u> <u>%20Guide_approved.pdf</u>.

needed by one or more of the methods for performing a supplemental thermal impact assessment. Additional information is in the following section.

The peak GIC value of 85 Amps per phase has been shown through thermal modeling to be a conservative threshold below which the risk of exceeding known temperature limits established by technical organizations is low.

Requirement R10

The supplemental thermal impact assessment of a power transformer may be based on manufacturer-provided GIC capability curves, thermal response simulation, thermal impact screening, or other technically justified means. Approaches for conducting the assessment are presented in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper ERO Enterprise-Endorsed Implementation Guidance*²² discussed in the Requirement R6 section above. A later version of the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,²³ October 2017, has been developed to include updated information pertinent to the supplemental GMD event and supplemental thermal impact assessment.

Transformers are exempt from the supplemental thermal impact assessment requirement if the effective GIC value for the transformer is less than 85 A per phase, as determined by a GIC analysis of the System. Justification for this criterion is provided in the revised *Screening Criterion for Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,²⁴ October 2017. A documented design specification exceeding this value is also a justifiable threshold criterion that exempts a transformer from Requirement R10.

The supplemental threshold criteria and its associated transformer thermal impact must be evaluated on the basis of effective GIC. Refer to the white papers for additional information.

Requirement R11

Technical considerations for GIC monitoring are contained in Chapter 6 of the 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk-Power System, ²⁵ February 2012. GIC monitoring is generally performed by Hall effect transducers that are attached to the neutral of the wye-grounded transformer. Data from GIC monitors is useful for model validation and situational awareness.

Responsible entities consider the following in developing a process for obtaining GIC monitor data:

• **Monitor locations.** An entity's operating process may be constrained by location of existing GIC monitors. However, when planning for additional GIC monitoring installations consider that data from monitors located in areas found to have high GIC based on system

²² <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/guidance/EROEndorsedImplementationGuidance/TPL-007-1 Transformer Thermal Impact</u> <u>Assessment_White_Paper.pdf</u>.

²³ http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.

²⁴ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

²⁵ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/2012GMD.pdf.</u>


studies may provide more useful information for validation and situational awareness purposes. Conversely, data from GIC monitors that are located in the vicinity of transportation systems using direct current (e.g., subways or light rail) may be unreliable.

- Monitor specifications. Capabilities of Hall effect transducers, existing and planned, should be considered in the operating process. When planning new GIC monitor installations, consider monitor data range (e.g., -500 A through + 500 A) and ambient temperature ratings consistent with temperatures in the region in which the monitor will be installed.
- **Sampling Interval.** An entity's operating process may be constrained by capabilities of existing GIC monitors. However, when possible specify data sampling during periods of interest at a rate of 10 seconds or faster.
- **Collection Periods.** The process should specify when the entity expects GIC data to be collected. For example, collection could be required during periods where the Kp index is above a threshold, or when GIC values are above a threshold. Determining when to discontinue collecting GIC data should also be specified to maintain consistency in data collection.
- Data format. Specify time and value formats. For example, Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) (MM/DD/YYYY HH:MM:SS) and GIC Value (Ampere). Positive (+) and negative (-) signs indicate direction of GIC flow. Positive reference is flow from ground into transformer neutral. Time fields should indicate the sampled time rather than system or SCADA time if supported by the GIC monitor system.
- **Data retention.** The entity's process should specify data retention periods, for example 1 year. Data retention periods should be adequately long to support availability for the entity's model validation process and external reporting requirements, if any.
- Additional information. The entity's process should specify collection of other information necessary for making the data useful, for example monitor location and type of neutral connection (e.g., three-phase or single-phase).

Requirement R12

Magnetometers measure changes in the earth's magnetic field. Entities should obtain data from the nearest accessible magnetometer. Sources of magnetometer data include:

• Observatories such as those operated by U.S. Geological Survey and Natural Resources Canada, see figure below for locations:²⁶



- Research institutions and academic universities;
- Entities with installed magnetometers.

Entities that choose to install magnetometers should consider equipment specifications and data format protocols contained in the latest version of the *INTERMAGNET Technical Reference Manual*, Version 4.6, 2012.²⁷

²⁶ <u>http://www.intermagnet.org/index-eng.php</u>.

²⁷ <u>http://www.intermagnet.org/publications/intermag_4-6.pdf</u>.

Rationale

During development of TPL-007-1, text boxes were embedded within the standard to explain the rationale for various parts of the standard. The text from the rationale text boxes was moved to this section upon approval of TPL-007-1 by the NERC Board of Trustees. In developing TPL-007-2, the SDT has made changes to the sections below only when necessary for clarity. Changes are marked with brackets [].

Rationale for Applicability:

Instrumentation transformers and station service transformers do not have significant impact on geomagnetically-induced current (GIC) flows; therefore, these transformers are not included in the applicability for this standard.

Terminal voltage describes line-to-line voltage.

Rationale for R1:

In some areas, planning entities may determine that the most effective approach to conduct a GMD Vulnerability Assessment is through a regional planning organization. No requirement in the standard is intended to prohibit a collaborative approach where roles and responsibilities are determined by a planning organization made up of one or more Planning Coordinator(s).

Rationale for R2:

A GMD Vulnerability Assessment requires a GIC System model to calculate GIC flow which is used to determine transformer Reactive Power absorption and transformer thermal response. Guidance for developing the GIC System model is provided in the *Application Guide Computing Geomagnetically-Induced Current in the Bulk-Power System*,²⁸ December 2013, developed by the NERC GMD Task Force.

The System model specified in Requirement R2 is used in conducting steady state power flow analysis that accounts for the Reactive Power absorption of power transformer(s) due to GIC in the System.

The GIC System model includes all power transformer(s) with a high side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV. The model is used to calculate GIC flow in the network.

The projected System condition for GMD planning may include adjustments to the System that are executable in response to space weather information. These adjustments could include, for example, recalling or postponing maintenance outages.

The Violation Risk Factor (VRF) for Requirement R2 is changed from Medium to High. This change is for consistency with the VRF for approved standard TPL-001-4 Requirement R1, which is proposed for revision in the NERC filing dated August 29, 2014 (Docket No. RM12-1-000). NERC guidelines require consistency among Reliability Standards.

²⁸ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GIC%20Application</u> <u>%20Guide%202013_approved.pdf</u>.

Rationale for R3:

Requirement R3 allows a responsible entity the flexibility to determine the System steady state voltage criteria for System steady state performance in Table 1. Steady state voltage limits are an example of System steady state performance criteria.

Rationale for R4:

The GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes steady state power flow analysis and the supporting study or studies using the models specified in Requirement R2 that account for the effects of GIC. Performance criteria are specified in Table 1.

At least one System On-Peak Load and at least one System Off-Peak Load must be examined in the analysis.

Distribution of GMD Vulnerability Assessment results provides a means for sharing relevant information with other entities responsible for planning reliability. Results of GIC studies may affect neighboring systems and should be taken into account by planners.

The *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,²⁹ December 2013 developed by the NERC GMD Task Force provides technical information on GMD-specific considerations for planning studies. The provision of information in Requirement R4, Part 4.3, shall be subject to the legal and regulatory obligations for the disclosure of confidential and/or sensitive information.

Rationale for R5:

This GIC information is necessary for determining the thermal impact of GIC on transformers in the planning area and must be provided to entities responsible for performing the thermal impact assessment so that they can accurately perform the assessment. GIC information should be provided in accordance with Requirement R5 as part of the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process since, by definition, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes documented evaluation of susceptibility to localized equipment damage due to GMD.

The maximum effective GIC value provided in Part 5.1 is used for transformer thermal impact assessment.

GIC(t) provided in Part 5.2 can alternatively be used to convert the steady state GIC flows to timeseries GIC data for transformer thermal impact assessment. This information may be needed by one or more of the methods for performing a thermal impact assessment. Additional guidance is available in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,³⁰ October 2017.

A Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that desires GIC(t) may request it from the planning entity. The planning entity shall provide GIC(t) upon request once GIC has been calculated, but

²⁹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning</u> %20Guide_approved.pdf.

³⁰ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

no later than 90 calendar days after receipt of a request from the owner and after completion of Requirement R5, Part 5.1.

The provision of information in Requirement R5 shall be subject to the legal and regulatory obligations for the disclosure of confidential and/or sensitive information.

Rationale for R6:

The transformer thermal impact screening criterion has been revised from 15 A per phase to 75 A per phase [for the benchmark GMD event]. Only those transformers that experience an effective GIC value of 75 A per phase or greater require evaluation in Requirement R6. The justification is provided in the *Screening Criterion for Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,³¹ October 2017.

The thermal impact assessment may be based on manufacturer-provided GIC capability curves, thermal response simulation, thermal impact screening, or other technically justified means. The transformer thermal assessment will be repeated or reviewed using previous assessment results each time the planning entity performs a GMD Vulnerability Assessment and provides GIC information as specified in Requirement R5. Approaches for conducting the assessment are presented in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,³² October 2017.

Thermal impact assessments are provided to the planning entity, as determined in Requirement R1, so that identified issues can be included in the GMD Vulnerability Assessment (R4), and the Corrective Action Plan (R7) as necessary.

Thermal impact assessments of non-BES transformers are not required because those transformers do not have a wide-area effect on the reliability of the interconnected Transmission system.

The provision of information in Requirement R6, Part 6.4, shall be subject to the legal and regulatory obligations for the disclosure of confidential and/or sensitive information.

Rationale for R7:

The proposed requirement addresses directives in Order No. 830 for establishing Corrective Action Plan (CAP) deadlines associated with GMD Vulnerability Assessments. In Order No. 830, FERC directed revisions to TPL-007 such that CAPs are developed within one year from the completion of GMD Vulnerability Assessments (P 101). Furthermore, FERC directed establishment of implementation deadlines after the completion of the CAP as follows (P 102):

- Two years for non-hardware mitigation; and
- Four years for hardware mitigation.

The objective of Part 7.4 is to provide awareness to potentially impacted entities when implementation of planned mitigation is not achievable within the deadlines established in Part

³¹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

³² <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

7.3. Examples of situations beyond the control of the of the responsible entity (see Section 7.4) include, but are not limited to:

- Delays resulting from regulatory/legal processes, such as permitting;
- Delays resulting from stakeholder processes required by tariff;
- Delays resulting from equipment lead times; or

Delays resulting from the inability to acquire necessary Right-of-Way.

Rationale for Table 3:

Table 3 has been revised to use the same ground model designation, FL1, as is being used by USGS. The calculated scaling factor for FL1 is 0.74. [The scaling factor associated with the benchmark GMD event for the Florida earth model (FL1) has been updated to 0.76 in TPL-007-2 based on the earth model published on the USGS public website.]

Rationale for R8 – R10:

The proposed requirements address directives in Order No. 830 for revising the benchmark GMD event used in GMD Vulnerability Assessments (P 44, P 47-49). The requirements add a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment based on the supplemental GMD event that accounts for localized peak geoelectric fields.

Rationale for R11 – R12:

The proposed requirements address directives in Order No. 830 for requiring responsible entities to collect GIC monitoring and magnetometer data as necessary to enable model validation and situational awareness (P 88; P. 90-92). GMD measurement data refers to GIC monitor data and geomagnetic field data in Requirements R11 and R12, respectively. See the Guidelines and Technical Basis section of this standard for technical information.

The objective of Requirement R11 is for entities to obtain GIC data for the Planning Coordinator's planning area or other part of the system included in the Planning Coordinator's GIC System model to inform GMD Vulnerability Assessments. Technical considerations for GIC monitoring are contained in Chapter 9 of the 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk-Power System (NERC 2012 GMD Report). GIC monitoring is generally performed by Hall effect transducers that are attached to the neutral of the transformer and measure dc current flowing through the neutral.

The objective of Requirement R12 is for entities to obtain geomagnetic field data for the Planning Coordinator's planning area to inform GMD Vulnerability Assessments. Magnetometers provide geomagnetic field data by measuring changes in the earth's magnetic field. Sources of geomagnetic field data include:

- Observatories such as those operated by U.S. Geological Survey, Natural Resources Canada, research organizations, or university research facilities;
- Installed magnetometers; and
- Commercial or third-party sources of geomagnetic field data.

Geomagnetic field data for a Planning Coordinator's planning area is obtained from one or more of the above data sources located in the Planning Coordinator's planning area, or by obtaining a geomagnetic field data product for the Planning Coordinator's planning area from a government or research organization. The geomagnetic field data product does not need to be derived from a magnetometer or observatory within the Planning Coordinator's planning area.

NERC

Implementation Plan

Project 2018-01 Canadian-Specific Revisions to TPL-007-2

Applicable Standard(s)

• TPL-007-3- Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events

Requested Retirement(s)

- TPL-007-1 Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events
- TPL-007-2 Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events

Prerequisite Standard(s) None

Applicable Entities

- Planning Coordinator with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard;
- Transmission Planner with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard;
- Transmission Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard; and
- Generator Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard.

Section 4.2 states that the standard applies to facilities that include power transformer(s) with a high side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV.

Terms in the NERC Glossary of Terms

There are no new, modified, or retired terms.

Background

In January 2018, NERC submitted for regulatory approval Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. This standard was developed in response to certain directives of the United States Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) from Order No. 830 (September 22, 2016), approving Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 and its associated five-year Implementation Plan and directing certain modifications.

In May 2018, a Standard Authorization Request was submitted identifying a need for a Canadianspecific Variance to the TPL-007-2 standard. Specifically, the Standard Authorization Request sought to provide an option for Canadian Registered Entities to define alternative Benchmark GMD Events and/or Supplemental GMD Events specific to their unique topology.



Reliability Standard TPL-007-3 adds a Variance for Canadian entities. The Canadian Variance replaces, in its entirety, Requirement R7, Part 7.3 of the continent-wide standard for Canadian entities and adds an alternate methodology for GMD Vulnerability Assessments, as described in Attachment 1-CAN. None of the continent-wide Requirements have been changed.

Effective Date and Phased-In Compliance Dates

The effective date for the proposed Reliability Standard is provided below. Where the standard drafting team identified the need for a longer implementation period for compliance with a particular section of a proposed Reliability Standard (e.g., an entire Requirement or a portion thereof), the additional time for compliance with that section is specified below. The phased-in compliance date for those particular sections represents the date that entities must begin to comply with that particular section of the Reliability Standard, even where the Reliability Standard goes into effect at an earlier date.

Reliability Standard TPL-007-3

United States

The standard shall become effective on the later of: (1) the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2; or (2) the first day of the first calendar quarter after the date TPL-007-3 is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.

This implementation plan incorporates by reference the phased-in compliance dates of the TPL-007-2 implementation plan (see Attachment 1).

All Other Jurisdictions

Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is three (3) months after the effective date of the applicable governmental authority's order approving the standard, or as otherwise provided for by the applicable governmental authority.

Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is three (3) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees, or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

This implementation plan incorporates by reference the phased-in compliance dates of the TPL-007-2 implementation plan (see Attachment 1), except that the phased-in compliance dates described therein shall be based on the effective date of TPL-007-3.

Attachment 1-TPL-007-2 Implementation Plan

Implementation Plan

Project 2013-03 Geomagnetic Disturbance Mitigation Reliability Standard TPL-007-2

Applicable Standard

• TPL-007-2 - Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events

Requested Retirement

• TPL-007-1 - Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events

Prerequisite Standard None

Applicable Entities

- Planning Coordinator with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard;
- Transmission Planner with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard;
- Transmission Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard; and
- Generator Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard.

Section 4.2 states that the standard applies to facilities that include power transformer(s) with a high-side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV.

Terms in the NERC Glossary of Terms

There are no new, modified, or retired terms.

Background

On September 22, 2016, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued Order No. 830 approving Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 and its associated five-year Implementation Plan. In the Order, FERC also directed NERC to develop certain modifications to the standard. FERC established a deadline of 18 months from the effective date of Order No. 830 for completing the revisions, which is May 2018.

General Considerations

This Implementation Plan is intended to integrate the new requirements in TPL-007-2 with the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process that is being implemented through approved TPL-007-1. At the time of the May 2018 filing deadline, many requirements in approved standard TPL-007-1 that lead

to completion of the geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) Vulnerability Assessment will be in effect. Furthermore, many entities may be taking steps to complete studies or assessments that are required by future enforceable requirements in TPL-007-1. The Implementation Plan phases in the requirements in TPL-007-2 based on the effective date of TPL-007-2, as follows:

- Effective Date before January 1, 2021. Implementation timeline supports applicable entities completing new requirements for supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments concurrently with requirements for the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment (concurrent effective dates).
- Effective Date on or after January 1, 2021. Implementation timeline supports applicable entities completing the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessments before new requirements for supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments become effective.

Effective Date

The effective date for the proposed Reliability Standard is provided below. Where the standard drafting team identified the need for a longer implementation period for compliance with a particular section of the proposed Reliability Standard (e.g., an entire Requirement or a portion thereof), the additional time for compliance with that section is specified below. These phased-in compliance dates represent the dates that entities must begin to comply with that particular section of the Reliability Standard, even where the Reliability Standard goes into effect at an earlier date.

Standard TPL-007-2

Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is three (3) months after the effective date of the applicable governmental authority's order approving the standard, or as otherwise provided for by the applicable governmental authority.

Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is three (3) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees, or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

Phased-In Compliance Dates

If TPL-007-2 becomes effective before January 1, 2021

Implementation timeline supports applicable entities completing new requirements for supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments concurrently with requirements for the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment (concurrent effective dates).

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R1 and R2

Entities shall be required to comply with Requirements R1 and R2 upon the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirement R5

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirements R5 until six (6) months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirement R9

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirement R9 until six (6) months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R11 and R12

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirements R11 and R12 until 24 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R6 and R10

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirements R6 and R10 until 30 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R3, R4, and R8

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirements R3, R4, and R8 until 42 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirement R7

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirement R7 until 54 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

If TPL-007-2 becomes effective on or after January 1, 2021

Implementation timeline supports applicable entities completing the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessments before new requirements for supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments become effective.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R1, R2, R5, and R6

Entities shall be required to comply with Requirements R1, R2, R5, and R6 upon the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R3 and R4

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirements R3 and R4 until 12 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R7, R11, and R12

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirements R7, R11, and R12 until 24 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirement R9

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirement R9 until 36 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirement R10

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirement R10 until 60 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirement R8

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirement R8 until 72 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Retirement Date

Standard TPL-007-1

Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 shall be retired immediately prior to the effective date of TPL-007-2 in the particular jurisdiction in which the revised standard is becoming effective.

Initial Performance of Periodic Requirements

Transmission Owners and Generator Owners are not required to comply with Requirement R6 prior to the compliance date for Requirement R6, regardless of when geomagnetically-induced current (GIC) flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1 is received.

Transmission Owners and Generator Owners are not required to comply with Requirement R10 prior to the compliance date for Requirement R10, regardless of when GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1 is received.



Violation Risk Factor and Violation Severity Level Justifications

TPL-007-3 – Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events

The Project 2018-01 Standard Drafting Team reviewed the Violation Risk Factors (VRFs) and Violation Severity Levels (VSLs) for each requirement in Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 (Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events) and determined that no modifications to the VRFs and VSLs are necessary for the proposed TPL-007-3 (Canadian Variance). Since the VRFs and VSLs do not require modifications, the applicable justifications for those VRFs and VSLs will also remain the same as applied to the proposed TPL-007-2 (Canadian Variance).

• TPL-007-2 VRF and VSL Justifications

Unofficial Comment Form Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2

Do not use this form for submitting comments. Use the <u>electronic form</u> to submit comments on the proposed **TPL-007-3 (Canadian Variance) – Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events**. The electronic comment form must be completed by **8:00 p.m. Eastern, Thursday, November 15, 2018**.

Documents and information about this project are available on the project page. If you have questions, contact Standards Developer, <u>Mat Bunch</u> (via email), or at (404) 446-9785.

Project Purpose

The purpose of this project is to provide Canadian entities the latitude to leverage operating experience, observed GMD effects, and on-going research efforts for defining alternative Benchmark GMD Events and/or Supplemental GMD Events that appropriately reflect their specific geographical and geological characteristics. This project also addresses regulatory frameworks specific to Canadian jurisdictions.

Background and Summary

Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 – Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events was approved by industry in 2017 and filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission on January 22, 2018 and the Canadian authorities on February 27, 2018. On June 13, 2018, the Standards Committee approved a SAR and appointed a standard drafting team (SDT) to make Canadian-specific revisions to TPL-007-2.

Reliability Standard TPL-007-3 adds a Variance for Canadian entities. The Canadian Variance replaces, in its entirety, Requirement R7, Part 7.3 of the continent-wide standard for Canadian entities and adds an alternate methodology for GMD Vulnerability Assessments, as described in Attachment 1-CAN. **None of the continent-wide Requirements have been changed.**

Please provide your responses to the questions listed below along with any detailed comments.

NERC

Questions

1. The SDT developed a Canadian Variance to Requirement R7, Part 7.3 to accommodate for required regulatory approvals in different Canadian jurisdictions. For example, Canadian entities may be required to obtain a regulatory approval for investments associated with Corrective Action Plans (CAPs). Such approval may limit the scope or modify the timeline of a CAP. Do you agree that the proposed Variance to Part 7.3 allows for the necessary flexibility to take into account the required regulatory approvals within your jurisdiction? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions for the Variance, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

	Yes
	No
C	

Comments:

2. Do you agree that the language in the introduction section of Attachment 1-CAN adequately describes the Canadian Variance? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

Yes
No

Comments:

3. The SDT developed the Attachment 1-CAN, as an alternative to Attachment 1, for defining a 1-in-100 year GMD planning event to be used in the benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s). The proposed alternative approach in Attachment 1-CAN for the GMD planning event is to be based on Canadian-specific data and statistical analyses. Do you agree that the proposed approach to define a 1-in-100 year GMD event is sufficiently clear and flexible for Canadian entities while achieving an equivalent level of reliability of TPL-007-2? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions for defining a GMD event, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

	Yes
	No
Со	mments:

4. The SDT proposed that the calculation of the geoelectric fields, which is based on geomagnetic field variations and earth transfer function, must be based on technically justified information. Technically justified information includes technical documents produced by governmental entities, technical papers published in peer-reviewed journals, or data sets gathered using sound scientific principles. Do you agree that technical documents, as defined in Attachment 1-CAN, are credible sources of technically justified information? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions for defining what



constitute a technically justified information, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

	Yes
	No
C	

Comments:

5. If you have any additional comments regarding the completeness, the adequacy, and the accuracy of the proposed modifications for the SDT to consider, provide them here. Comments:

Standards Announcement

Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2

Formal Comment Period Open through November 15, 2018 Ballot Pools Forming through October 31, 2018

Now Available

A 45-day formal comment period for **TPL-007-3 (Canadian Variance) – Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events** is open through **Thursday, November 15, 2018.**

Reliability Standard TPL-007-3 adds a Variance for Canadian entities. The Canadian Variance replaces, in its entirety, Requirement R7, Part 7.3 of the continent-wide standard for Canadian entities and adds an alternate methodology for GMD Vulnerability Assessments, as described in Attachment 1-CAN. **None of the continent-wide Requirements have been changed.**

Commenting

Use the <u>electronic form</u> to submit comments on the SAR. If you experience any difficulties using the electronic form, contact <u>Linda Jenkins</u>. The unofficial Word version of the comment form is posted on the project page.

Join the Ballot Pools

Ballot pools are being formed through **8 p.m. Eastern, Wednesday, October 31, 2018.** Registered Ballot Body members can join the ballot pools <u>here</u>.

- If you are having difficulty accessing the SBS due to a forgotten password, incorrect credential error messages, or system lock-out, contact NERC IT support directly at <u>https://support.nerc.net/</u> (Monday – Friday, 8 a.m. - 5 p.m. Eastern).
- Passwords expire every 6 months and must be reset.
- The SBS is not supported for use on mobile devices.
- Please be mindful of ballot and comment period closing dates. We ask to **allow at least 48 hours** for NERC support staff to assist with inquiries. Therefore, it is recommended that users try logging into their SBS accounts **prior to the last day** of a comment/ballot period.

Next Steps

Initial ballots for the Standard and Implementation Plan will be conducted **November 6 – November 15, 2018.**

For more information on the Standards Development Process, refer to the Standard Processes Manual.

For more information or assistance, contact Standards Developer, Mat Bunch (via email) or at (404) 446-9785.

North American Electric Reliability Corporation 3353 Peachtree Rd, NE Suite 600, North Tower Atlanta, GA 30326 404-446-2560 | <u>www.nerc.com</u>

BALLOT RESULTS

C

Comment: View Comment Results (/CommentResults/Index/155) Ballot Name: Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2 Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2 IN 1 ST Voting Start Date: 11/6/2018 12:01:00 AM Voting End Date: 11/16/2018 8:00:00 PM Ballot Type: ST Ballot Activity: IN Ballot Series: 1 Total # Votes: 107 Total Ballot Pool: 138 Quorum: 77.54 Weighted Segment Value: 100

Segment	Ballot Pool	Segment Weight	Affirmative Votes	Affirmative Fraction	Negative Votes w/ Comment	Negative Fraction w/ Comment	Negative Votes w/o Comment	Abstain	No Vote
Segment: 1	37	1	12	1	0	0	0	15	10
Segment: 2	5	0.5	5	0.5	0	0	0	0	0
Segment: 3	23	0.5	5	0.5	0	0	0	13	5
Segment: 4	4	0.1	1	0.1	0	0	0	2	1
Segment:		1	10 ame: ERODVS	1	0	0	0	13	11

Segment	Ballot Pool	Segment Weight	Affirmative Votes	Affirmative Fraction	Negative Votes w/ Comment	Negative Fraction w/ Comment	Negative Votes w/o Comment	Abstain	No Vote
Segment: 6	25	0.7	7	0.7	0	0	0	14	4
Segment: 7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Segment: 8	2	0.2	2	0.2	0	0	0	0	0
Segment: 9	1	0.1	1	0.1	0	0	0	0	0
Segment: 10	7	0.6	6	0.6	0	0	0	1	0
Totals:	138	4.7	49	4.7	0	0	0	58	31

BALLOT	POOL MEMBERS					
Show All ventries Search: Search						
Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo	
1 © 2019 - NERC Ver	American Transmission Company, LLC 4.3.0.0 Machine Name: ERODVSBSWB02	Douglas Johnson		None	N/A	

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
1	Arizona Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.	John Shaver		None	N/A
1	Austin Energy	Thomas Standifur		None	N/A
1	BC Hydro and Power Authority	Adrian Andreoiu		Abstain	N/A
1	Berkshire Hathaway Energy - MidAmerican Energy Co.	Terry Harbour		Abstain	N/A
1	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	Dermot Smyth		Affirmative	N/A
1	Dairyland Power Cooperative	Renee Leidel		None	N/A
1	Dominion - Dominion Virginia Power	Larry Nash		Affirmative	N/A
1	Duke Energy	Laura Lee		Abstain	N/A
1	Edison International - Southern California Edison Company	Steven Mavis		Abstain	N/A
1	Entergy - Entergy Services, Inc.	Oliver Burke		Affirmative	N/A
1	Glencoe Light and Power Commission	Terry Volkmann		Affirmative	N/A
1	Great River Energy	Gordon Pietsch		Affirmative	N/A
1	Hydro One Networks, Inc.	Payam Farahbakhsh		Affirmative	N/A
1	Hydro-Qu?bec TransEnergie	Nicolas Turcotte		Affirmative	N/A
1	Imperial Irrigation District	Jesus Sammy Alcaraz		None	N/A
1	KAMO Electric Cooperative	Micah Breedlove		None	N/A
1 19 - NERC Ve	Lakeland Electric r 4.3.0.0 Machine Name: ERODVSBSWB02	Larry Watt		Affirmative	N/A

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
1	Lincoln Electric System	Danny Pudenz		Abstain	N/A
1	Long Island Power Authority	Robert Ganley		None	N/A
1	Manitoba Hydro	Mike Smith		Affirmative	N/A
1	National Grid USA	Michael Jones		Affirmative	N/A
1	Nebraska Public Power District	Jamison Cawley		Abstain	N/A
1	New York Power Authority	Salvatore Spagnolo		Affirmative	N/A
1	NextEra Energy - Florida Power and Light Co.	Mike ONeil		None	N/A
1	OGE Energy - Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co.	Terri Pyle		Abstain	N/A
1	Platte River Power Authority	Matt Thompson		Abstain	N/A
1	PNM Resources - Public Service Company of New Mexico	Laurie Williams		None	N/A
1	PSEG - Public Service Electric and Gas Co.	Joseph Smith		Abstain	N/A
1	Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County	Long Duong		Abstain	N/A
1	Salt River Project	Steven Cobb		Abstain	N/A
1	SaskPower	Wayne Guttormson		Affirmative	N/A
1	SCANA - South Carolina Electric and Gas Co.	Tom Hanzlik		Abstain	N/A
1	Southern Company - Southern Company Services, Inc.	Katherine Prewitt		Abstain	N/A
1	Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA)	John Merrell		Abstain	N/A
119 - NERC Ver	4.3JOSD Marchain @ Nacodar 19 Robot OVSBSWB02	Richard Jackson		None	N/A

C

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
1	Western Area Power Administration	sean erickson		Abstain	N/A
2	Independent Electricity System Operator	Leonard Kula		Affirmative	N/A
2	ISO New England, Inc.	Michael Puscas	John Pearson	Affirmative	N/A
2	Midcontinent ISO, Inc.	Terry Bllke		Affirmative	N/A
2	New York Independent System Operator	Gregory Campoli		Affirmative	N/A
2	PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.	Mark Holman		Affirmative	N/A
3	Ameren - Ameren Services	David Jendras		None	N/A
3	Austin Energy	W. Dwayne Preston		Abstain	N/A
3	BC Hydro and Power Authority	Hootan Jarollahi		Abstain	N/A
3	City of Vero Beach	Ginny Beigel	Brandon McCormick	None	N/A
3	Cleco Corporation	Michelle Corley	Louis Guidry	Abstain	N/A
3	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	Peter Yost		Affirmative	N/A
3	Dominion - Dominion Resources, Inc.	Connie Lowe		Affirmative	N/A
3	Duke Energy	Lee Schuster		Abstain	N/A
3	Florida Municipal Power Agency	Joe McKinney	Brandon McCormick	None	N/A
3	Hydro One Networks, Inc.	Paul Malozewski	Oshani Pathirane	Affirmative	N/A
3	Lincoln Electric System	Jason Fortik		Abstain	N/A
3	National Grid USA	Brian Shanahan		Affirmative	N/A
89 - NERC Ve	r 4.3.0.0 Arken Rublig Rower Robins BSWB02	Tony Eddleman		Abstain	N/A

C

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
3	New York Power Authority	David Rivera		Affirmative	N/A
3	NiSource - Northern Indiana Public Service Co.	Dmitriy Bazylyuk		Abstain	N/A
3	Owensboro Municipal Utilities	Thomas Lyons		Abstain	N/A
3	Platte River Power Authority	Jeff Landis		Abstain	N/A
3	PPL - Louisville Gas and Electric Co.	Joseph Bencomo		None	N/A
3	PSEG - Public Service Electric and Gas Co.	James Meyer		Abstain	N/A
3	Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc.	James Frauen		None	N/A
3	Snohomish County PUD No. 1	Holly Chaney		Abstain	N/A
3	Southern Company - Alabama Power Company	Joel Dembowski		Abstain	N/A
3	Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA)	Marc Donaldson		Abstain	N/A
4	Florida Municipal Power Agency	Carol Chinn	Brandon McCormick	None	N/A
4	Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County	John Martinsen		Abstain	N/A
4	Utility Services, Inc.	Brian Evans- Mongeon		Affirmative	N/A
4	WEC Energy Group, Inc.	Anthony Jankowski		Abstain	N/A
5	Ameren - Ameren Missouri	Sam Dwyer		None	N/A
5	BC Hydro and Power Authority	Helen Hamilton Harding		Abstain	N/A
5	Black Hills Corporation	George Tatar		Abstain	N/A

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
5	Boise-Kuna Irrigation District - Lucky Peak Power Plant Project	Mike Kukla		None	N/A
5	Choctaw Generation Limited Partnership, LLLP	Rob Watson		None	N/A
5	City Water, Light and Power of Springfield, IL	Steve Rose		None	N/A
5	Cleco Corporation	Stephanie Huffman		None	N/A
5	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	William Winters	Daniel Valle	Affirmative	N/A
5	Dairyland Power Cooperative	Tommy Drea		None	N/A
5	Dominion - Dominion Resources, Inc.	Lou Oberski		Affirmative	N/A
5	Duke Energy	Dale Goodwine		Abstain	N/A
5	Edison International - Southern California Edison Company	Selene Willis		Abstain	N/A
5	Florida Municipal Power Agency	Chris Gowder	Brandon McCormick	None	N/A
5	Great River Energy	Preston Walsh	Michael Brytowski	Affirmative	N/A
5	Herb Schrayshuen	Herb Schrayshuen		Affirmative	N/A
5	Hydro-Qu?bec Production	Junji Yamaguchi		None	N/A
5	JEA	John Babik		Abstain	N/A
5	Lakeland Electric	Jim Howard		Affirmative	N/A
5	Lincoln Electric System	Kayleigh Wilkerson		Abstain	N/A
5	Manitoba Hydro	Yuguang Xiao		Affirmative	N/A

© 2019 - NERC Ver 4.3.0.0 Machine Name: ERODVSBSWB02

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
5	Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company	David Gordon		Affirmative	N/A
5	NB Power Corporation	Laura McLeod		Affirmative	N/A
5	Nebraska Public Power District	Don Schmit		Abstain	N/A
5	New York Power Authority	Shivaz Chopra		Affirmative	N/A
5	OGE Energy - Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co.	Patrick Wells		None	N/A
5	Oglethorpe Power Corporation	Donna Johnson		Abstain	N/A
5	Omaha Public Power District	Mahmood Safi		Abstain	N/A
5	Ontario Power Generation Inc.	Constantin Chitescu		Affirmative	N/A
5	Platte River Power Authority	Tyson Archie		Abstain	N/A
5	PSEG - PSEG Fossil LLC	Tim Kucey		Abstain	N/A
5	Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County	Sam Nietfeld		Abstain	N/A
5	Southern Company - Southern Company Generation	William D. Shultz		Abstain	N/A
5	Tri-State G and T Association, Inc.	Richard Schlottmann		None	N/A
5	U.S. Bureau of Reclamation	Wendy Center		None	N/A
6	Ameren - Ameren Services	Robert Quinlivan		None	N/A
6	Cleco Corporation	Robert Hirchak	Louis Guidry	Abstain	N/A
6	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	Christopher Overberg		Affirmative	N/A

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
6	Dominion - Dominion Resources, Inc.	Sean Bodkin		Affirmative	N/A
6	Duke Energy	Greg Cecil		Abstain	N/A
6	Edison International - Southern California Edison Company	Kenya Streeter		Abstain	N/A
6	Florida Municipal Power Agency	Richard Montgomery	Brandon McCormick	None	N/A
6	Florida Municipal Power Pool	Tom Reedy	Brandon McCormick	None	N/A
6	Great River Energy	Donna Stephenson	Michael Brytowski	Affirmative	N/A
6	Lakeland Electric	Paul Shipps		Affirmative	N/A
6	Lincoln Electric System	Eric Ruskamp		Abstain	N/A
6	Manitoba Hydro	Blair Mukanik		Affirmative	N/A
6	New York Power Authority	Thomas Savin		Affirmative	N/A
6	NextEra Energy - Florida Power and Light Co.	Silvia Mitchell		Affirmative	N/A
6	NiSource - Northern Indiana Public Service Co.	Joe O'Brien		Abstain	N/A
6	Platte River Power Authority	Sabrina Martz		Abstain	N/A
6	Powerex Corporation	Gordon Dobson- Mack		Abstain	N/A
6	PPL - Louisville Gas and Electric Co.	Linn Oelker		None	N/A
6	PSEG - PSEG Energy Resources and Trade LLC	Karla Barton		Abstain	N/A
6	Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Trudy Novak		Abstain	N/A
69 - NERC Ve	r4.380.0010/maistin@cvature?UERODVSBSWB02	Franklin Lu		Abstain	N/A

C

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
6	Southern Company - Southern Company Generation and Energy Marketing	Jennifer Sykes		Abstain	N/A
6	Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA)	Rick Applegate		Abstain	N/A
6	Tennessee Valley Authority	Marjorie Parsons		Abstain	N/A
6	Xcel Energy, Inc.	Carrie Dixon		Abstain	N/A
8	David Kiguel	David Kiguel		Affirmative	N/A
8	Roger Zaklukiewicz	Roger Zaklukiewicz		Affirmative	N/A
9	Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities	Donald Nelson		Affirmative	N/A
10	Florida Reliability Coordinating Council	Peter Heidrich		Affirmative	N/A
10	Midwest Reliability Organization	Russel Mountjoy		Affirmative	N/A
10	New York State Reliability Council	ALAN ADAMSON		Abstain	N/A
10	Northeast Power Coordinating Council	Guy V. Zito		Affirmative	N/A
10	ReliabilityFirst	Anthony Jablonski		Affirmative	N/A
10	SERC Reliability Corporation	Drew Slabaugh		Affirmative	N/A
10	Western Electricity Coordinating Council	Steven Rueckert		Affirmative	N/A

Showing 1 to 138 of 138 entries

© 2019 - NERC Ver 4.3.0.0 Machine Name: ERODVSBSWB02

BALLOT RESULTS

Comment: View Comment Results (/CommentResults/Index/155) Ballot Name: Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2 Implementation Plan IN 1 OT Voting Start Date: 11/6/2018 12:01:00 AM Voting End Date: 11/16/2018 8:00:00 PM Ballot Type: OT Ballot Activity: IN Ballot Series: 1 Total # Votes: 106 Total Ballot Pool: 134 Quorum: 79.1 Weighted Segment Value: 100

Segment	Ballot Pool	Segment Weight	Affirmative Votes	Affirmative Fraction	Negative Votes w/ Comment	Negative Fraction w/ Comment	Negative Votes w/o Comment	Abstain	No Vote
Segment: 1	36	1	12	1	0	0	0	15	9
Segment: 2	5	0.5	5	0.5	0	0	0	0	0
Segment: 3	22	0.5	5	0.5	0	0	0	12	5
Segment: 4	4	0.1	1	0.1	0	0	0	2	1
Segment: 5	32	0.9	9	0.9	0	0	0	14	9

© 2019 - NERC Ver 4.3.0.0 Machine Name: ERODVSBSWB02

Segment	Ballot Pool	Segment Weight	Affirmative Votes	Affirmative Fraction	Negative Votes w/ Comment	Negative Fraction w/ Comment	Negative Votes w/o Comment	Abstain	No Vote
Segment: 6	25	0.7	7	0.7	0	0	0	14	4
Segment: 7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Segment: 8	2	0.2	2	0.2	0	0	0	0	0
Segment: 9	1	0.1	1	0.1	0	0	0	0	0
Segment: 10	7	0.5	5	0.5	0	0	0	2	0
Totals:	134	4.5	47	4.5	0	0	0	59	28

BALLOT	POOL MEMBERS							
Show All v	Show All v entries Search: Search							
Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo			
1 © 2019 - NERC Ver	American Transmission Company, LLC 4.3.0.0 Machine Name: ERODVSBSWB02	Douglas Johnson		None	N/A			

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
	Arizona Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.	John Shaver		None	N/A
	Austin Energy	Thomas Standifur		None	N/A
	BC Hydro and Power Authority	Adrian Andreoiu		Abstain	N/A
	Berkshire Hathaway Energy - MidAmerican Energy Co.	Terry Harbour		Abstain	N/A
	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	Dermot Smyth		Affirmative	N/A
	Dairyland Power Cooperative	Renee Leidel		None	N/A
	Dominion - Dominion Virginia Power	Larry Nash		Affirmative	N/A
	Duke Energy	Laura Lee		Abstain	N/A
	Edison International - Southern California Edison Company	Steven Mavis		Abstain	N/A
	Entergy - Entergy Services, Inc.	Oliver Burke		Affirmative	N/A
	Glencoe Light and Power Commission	Terry Volkmann		Affirmative	N/A
	Great River Energy	Gordon Pietsch		Affirmative	N/A
	Hydro One Networks, Inc.	Payam Farahbakhsh		Affirmative	N/A
	Hydro-Qu?bec TransEnergie	Nicolas Turcotte		Affirmative	N/A
	KAMO Electric Cooperative	Micah Breedlove		None	N/A
	Lakeland Electric	Larry Watt		Affirmative	N/A
	Lincoln Electric System	Danny Pudenz		Abstain	N/A
) - NERC Ve	r4.3.000 Network Bowern & UERODDVSBSWB02	Robert Ganley		None	N/A

C

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
1	Manitoba Hydro	Mike Smith		Affirmative	N/A
1	National Grid USA	Michael Jones		Affirmative	N/A
1	Nebraska Public Power District	Jamison Cawley		Abstain	N/A
1	New York Power Authority	Salvatore Spagnolo		Affirmative	N/A
1	NextEra Energy - Florida Power and Light Co.	Mike ONeil		None	N/A
1	OGE Energy - Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co.	Terri Pyle		Abstain	N/A
1	Platte River Power Authority	Matt Thompson		Abstain	N/A
1	PNM Resources - Public Service Company of New Mexico	Laurie Williams		None	N/A
1	PSEG - Public Service Electric and Gas Co.	Joseph Smith		Abstain	N/A
1	Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County	Long Duong		Abstain	N/A
1	Salt River Project	Steven Cobb		Abstain	N/A
1	SaskPower	Wayne Guttormson		Affirmative	N/A
1	SCANA - South Carolina Electric and Gas Co.	Tom Hanzlik		Abstain	N/A
1	Southern Company - Southern Company Services, Inc.	Katherine Prewitt		Abstain	N/A
1	Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA)	John Merrell		Abstain	N/A
1	U.S. Bureau of Reclamation	Richard Jackson		None	N/A
1	Western Area Power Administration	sean erickson		Abstain	N/A
29 - NERC Ve	r 4.3rclopoladaintelleannieitersoedeverseandoor	Leonard Kula		Affirmative	N/A

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
2	ISO New England, Inc.	Michael Puscas	John Pearson	Affirmative	N/A
2	Midcontinent ISO, Inc.	Terry Bllke		Affirmative	N/A
2	New York Independent System Operator	Gregory Campoli		Affirmative	N/A
2	PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.	Mark Holman		Affirmative	N/A
3	Ameren - Ameren Services	David Jendras		None	N/A
3	Austin Energy	W. Dwayne Preston		Abstain	N/A
3	City of Vero Beach	Ginny Beigel	Brandon McCormick	None	N/A
3	Cleco Corporation	Michelle Corley	Louis Guidry	Abstain	N/A
3	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	Peter Yost		Affirmative	N/A
3	Dominion - Dominion Resources, Inc.	Connie Lowe		Affirmative	N/A
3	Duke Energy	Lee Schuster		Abstain	N/A
3	Florida Municipal Power Agency	Joe McKinney	Brandon McCormick	None	N/A
3	Hydro One Networks, Inc.	Paul Malozewski	Oshani Pathirane	Affirmative	N/A
3	Lincoln Electric System	Jason Fortik		Abstain	N/A
3	National Grid USA	Brian Shanahan		Affirmative	N/A
3	Nebraska Public Power District	Tony Eddleman		Abstain	N/A
3	New York Power Authority	David Rivera		Affirmative	N/A
3	NiSource - Northern Indiana Public Service Co.	Dmitriy Bazylyuk		Abstain	N/A
脅 - NERC Ve	r 4. 90% Malerin Municipal Letility SBSWB02	Thomas Lyons		Abstain	N/A

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
3	Platte River Power Authority	Jeff Landis		Abstain	N/A
3	PPL - Louisville Gas and Electric Co.	Joseph Bencomo		None	N/A
3	PSEG - Public Service Electric and Gas Co.	James Meyer		Abstain	N/A
3	Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc.	James Frauen		None	N/A
3	Snohomish County PUD No. 1	Holly Chaney		Abstain	N/A
3	Southern Company - Alabama Power Company	Joel Dembowski		Abstain	N/A
3	Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA)	Marc Donaldson		Abstain	N/A
4	Florida Municipal Power Agency	Carol Chinn	Brandon McCormick	None	N/A
4	Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County	John Martinsen		Abstain	N/A
4	Utility Services, Inc.	Brian Evans- Mongeon		Affirmative	N/A
4	WEC Energy Group, Inc.	Anthony Jankowski		Abstain	N/A
5	Ameren - Ameren Missouri	Sam Dwyer		None	N/A
5	BC Hydro and Power Authority	Helen Hamilton Harding		Abstain	N/A
5	Black Hills Corporation	George Tatar		Abstain	N/A
5	Boise-Kuna Irrigation District - Lucky Peak Power Plant Project	Mike Kukla		None	N/A
5	Choctaw Generation Limited Partnership, LLLP	Rob Watson		None	N/A
5 019 - NERC Ve	City Water, Light and Power of Springfield, IL r 4.3.0.0 Machine Name: ERODVSBSWB02	Steve Rose		None	N/A

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
5	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	William Winters	Daniel Valle	Affirmative	N/A
5	Dairyland Power Cooperative	Tommy Drea		None	N/A
5	Dominion - Dominion Resources, Inc.	Lou Oberski		Affirmative	N/A
5	Duke Energy	Dale Goodwine		Abstain	N/A
5	Edison International - Southern California Edison Company	Selene Willis		Abstain	N/A
5	Florida Municipal Power Agency	Chris Gowder	Brandon McCormick	None	N/A
5	Great River Energy	Preston Walsh	Michael Brytowski	Affirmative	N/A
5	Herb Schrayshuen	Herb Schrayshuen		Affirmative	N/A
5	Hydro-Qu?bec Production	Junji Yamaguchi		None	N/A
5	JEA	John Babik		Abstain	N/A
5	Lakeland Electric	Jim Howard		Affirmative	N/A
5	Lincoln Electric System	Kayleigh Wilkerson		Abstain	N/A
5	Manitoba Hydro	Yuguang Xiao		Affirmative	N/A
5	Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company	David Gordon		Abstain	N/A
5	NB Power Corporation	Laura McLeod		Affirmative	N/A
5	Nebraska Public Power District	Don Schmit		Abstain	N/A
5	New York Power Authority	Shivaz Chopra		Affirmative	N/A
1 59 - NERC Ve	r 4.3005 EN Halengye Nakhalero BRODASSBO VEBODric Co.	Patrick Wells		None	N/A

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
5	Oglethorpe Power Corporation	Donna Johnson		Abstain	N/A
5	Omaha Public Power District	Mahmood Safi		Abstain	N/A
5	Ontario Power Generation Inc.	Constantin Chitescu		Affirmative	N/A
5	Platte River Power Authority	Tyson Archie		Abstain	N/A
5	PSEG - PSEG Fossil LLC	Tim Kucey		Abstain	N/A
5	Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County	Sam Nietfeld		Abstain	N/A
5	Southern Company - Southern Company Generation	William D. Shultz		Abstain	N/A
5	U.S. Bureau of Reclamation	Wendy Center		None	N/A
6	Ameren - Ameren Services	Robert Quinlivan		None	N/A
6	Cleco Corporation	Robert Hirchak	Louis Guidry	Abstain	N/A
6	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	Christopher Overberg		Affirmative	N/A
6	Dominion - Dominion Resources, Inc.	Sean Bodkin		Affirmative	N/A
6	Duke Energy	Greg Cecil		Abstain	N/A
6	Edison International - Southern California Edison Company	Kenya Streeter		Abstain	N/A
6	Florida Municipal Power Agency	Richard Montgomery	Brandon McCormick	None	N/A
6	Florida Municipal Power Pool	Tom Reedy	Brandon McCormick	None	N/A
6 019 - NERC Vei	Great River Energy 4.3.0.0 Machine Name: ERODVSBSWB02	Donna Stephenson	Michael Brytowski	Affirmative	N/A

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
6	Lakeland Electric	Paul Shipps		Affirmative	N/A
6	Lincoln Electric System	Eric Ruskamp		Abstain	N/A
6	Manitoba Hydro	Blair Mukanik		Affirmative	N/A
6	New York Power Authority	Thomas Savin		Affirmative	N/A
6	NextEra Energy - Florida Power and Light Co.	Silvia Mitchell		Affirmative	N/A
6	NiSource - Northern Indiana Public Service Co.	Joe O'Brien		Abstain	N/A
6	Platte River Power Authority	Sabrina Martz		Abstain	N/A
6	Powerex Corporation	Gordon Dobson- Mack		Abstain	N/A
6	PPL - Louisville Gas and Electric Co.	Linn Oelker		None	N/A
6	PSEG - PSEG Energy Resources and Trade LLC	Karla Barton		Abstain	N/A
6	Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Trudy Novak		Abstain	N/A
6	Snohomish County PUD No. 1	Franklin Lu		Abstain	N/A
6	Southern Company - Southern Company Generation and Energy Marketing	Jennifer Sykes		Abstain	N/A
6	Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA)	Rick Applegate		Abstain	N/A
6	Tennessee Valley Authority	Marjorie Parsons		Abstain	N/A
6	Xcel Energy, Inc.	Carrie Dixon		Abstain	N/A
8	David Kiguel	David Kiguel		Affirmative	N/A
) 1 89 - NERC Vei	r 4. Rogelvizekinkieweinz e: ERODVSBSWB02	Roger Zaklukiewicz		Affirmative	N/A

C

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
9	Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities	Donald Nelson		Affirmative	N/A
10	Florida Reliability Coordinating Council	Peter Heidrich		Affirmative	N/A
10	Midwest Reliability Organization	Russel Mountjoy		Affirmative	N/A
10	New York State Reliability Council	ALAN ADAMSON		Abstain	N/A
10	Northeast Power Coordinating Council	Guy V. Zito		Affirmative	N/A
10	ReliabilityFirst	Anthony Jablonski		Affirmative	N/A
10	SERC Reliability Corporation	Drew Slabaugh		Affirmative	N/A
10	Western Electricity Coordinating Council	Steven Rueckert		Abstain	N/A
		1	1	Previous	1 Next

Showing 1 to 134 of 134 entries

Standards Announcement

Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2

Formal Comment Period Open through November 15, 2018 Ballot Pools Forming through October 31, 2018

Now Available

A 45-day formal comment period for **TPL-007-3 (Canadian Variance) – Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events** is open through **Thursday, November 15, 2018.**

Reliability Standard TPL-007-3 adds a Variance for Canadian entities. The Canadian Variance replaces, in its entirety, Requirement R7, Part 7.3 of the continent-wide standard for Canadian entities and adds an alternate methodology for GMD Vulnerability Assessments, as described in Attachment 1-CAN. **None of the continent-wide Requirements have been changed.**

Commenting

Use the <u>electronic form</u> to submit comments on the SAR. If you experience any difficulties using the electronic form, contact <u>Linda Jenkins</u>. The unofficial Word version of the comment form is posted on the project page.

Join the Ballot Pools

Ballot pools are being formed through **8 p.m. Eastern, Wednesday, October 31, 2018.** Registered Ballot Body members can join the ballot pools <u>here</u>.

- If you are having difficulty accessing the SBS due to a forgotten password, incorrect credential error messages, or system lock-out, contact NERC IT support directly at <u>https://support.nerc.net/</u> (Monday – Friday, 8 a.m. - 5 p.m. Eastern).
- Passwords expire every 6 months and must be reset.
- The SBS is not supported for use on mobile devices.
- Please be mindful of ballot and comment period closing dates. We ask to **allow at least 48 hours** for NERC support staff to assist with inquiries. Therefore, it is recommended that users try logging into their SBS accounts **prior to the last day** of a comment/ballot period.

Next Steps

Initial ballots for the Standard and Implementation Plan will be conducted **November 6 – November 15, 2018.**

For more information on the Standards Development Process, refer to the Standard Processes Manual.

For more information or assistance, contact Standards Developer, Mat Bunch (via email) or at (404) 446-9785.

North American Electric Reliability Corporation 3353 Peachtree Rd, NE Suite 600, North Tower Atlanta, GA 30326 404-446-2560 | <u>www.nerc.com</u>

Comment Report

Project Name:	Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2
Comment Period Start Date:	10/2/2018
Comment Period End Date:	11/15/2018
Associated Ballots:	Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2 Implementation Plan IN 1 OT Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2 Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL- 007-2 IN 1 ST

There were 8 sets of responses, including comments from approximately 41 different people from approximately 30 companies representing 10 of the Industry Segments as shown in the table on the following pages.

Questions

1. The SDT developed a Canadian Variance to Requirement R7, Part 7.3 to accommodate for required regulatory approvals in different Canadian jurisdictions. For example, Canadian entities may be required to obtain a regulatory approval for investments associated with Corrective Action Plans (CAPs). Such approval may limit the scope or modify the timeline of a CAP. Do you agree that the proposed Variance to Part 7.3 allows for the necessary flexibility to take into account the required regulatory approvals within your jurisdiction? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions for the Variance, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

2. Do you agree that the language in the introduction section of Attachment 1-CAN adequately describes the Canadian Variance? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

3. The SDT developed the Attachment 1-CAN, as an alternative to Attachment 1, for defining a 1-in-100 year GMD planning event to be used in the benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s). The proposed alternative approach in Attachment 1-CAN for the GMD planning event is to be based on Canadian-specific data and statistical analyses. Do you agree that the proposed approach to define a 1-in-100 year GMD event is sufficiently clear and flexible for Canadian entities while achieving an equivalent level of reliability of TPL-007-2? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions for defining a GMD event, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

4. The SDT proposed that the calculation of the geoelectric fields, which is based on geomagnetic field variations and earth transfer function, must be based on technically justified information. Technically justified information includes technical documents produced by governmental entities, technical papers published in peer-reviewed journals, or data sets gathered using sound scientific principles. Do you agree that technical documents, as defined in Attachment 1-CAN, are credible sources of technically justified information? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions for defining what constitute a technically justified information, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

5. If you have any additional comments regarding the completeness, the adequacy, and the accuracy of the proposed modifications for the SDT to consider, provide them here.

Organization Name	Name	Segment(s)	Region	Group Name	Group Member Name	Group Member Organization	Group Member Segment(s)	Group Member Region
Manitoba Mike Smith Hydro	Smith 1	Manitoba Hydro	Yuguang Xiao	Manitoba Hydro	5	MRO		
					Karim Abdel-Hadi	Manitoba Hydro	3	MRO
					Blair Mukanik	Manitoba Hydro	6	MRO
					Mike Smith	Manitoba Hydro	1	MRO
Northeast Power Coordinating Council	Shu 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10		RSC no Dominion	Guy V. Zito	Northeast Power Coordinating Council	10	NPCC	
				Randy MacDonald	New Brunswick Power	2	NPCC	
				Glen Smith	Entergy Services	4	NPCC	
				Brian Robinson	Utility Services	5	NPCC	
				Alan Adamson	New York State Reliability Council	7	NPCC	
				David Burke	Orange & Rockland Utilities	3	NPCC	
				Michele Tondalo	UI	1	NPCC	
					Helen Lainis	IESO	2	NPCC
				Michael Jones	National Grid	3	NPCC	
				Sean Cavote	PSEG	4	NPCC	
				Kathleen Goodman	ISO-NE	2	NPCC	
				Salvatore Spagnolo	New York Power Authority	1	NPCC	
				Shivaz Chopra	New York Power Authority	6	NPCC	
				David Kiguel	Independent	NA - Not Applicable	NPCC	

Silvia Mitchell	NextEra Energy - Florida Power and Light Co.	6
Paul Malozewski	Hydro One Networks, Inc.	3
Gregory Campoli	New York Independent System Operator	2
Caroline Dupuis	Hydro Quebec	1
Chantal Mazza	Hydro Quebec	2
Michael Forte	Con Edison	1
Laura McLeod	NB Power Corporation	5
Nick	Kowalczyk	1
Dermot Smyth	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	1
John Hastings	National Grid	1
Peter Yost	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	3
Sofia Gadea- Omelchenko	Con Edison	5
Joel Charlebois	AESI - Acumen Engineered Solutions International Inc.	5
Quintin Lee	Eversource Energy	1
Mike Cooke	Ontario Power Generation, Inc.	4

1. The SDT developed a Canadian Variance to Requirement R7, Part 7.3 to accommodate for required regulatory approvals in different Canadian jurisdictions. For example, Canadian entities may be required to obtain a regulatory approval for investments associated with Corrective Action Plans (CAPs). Such approval may limit the scope or modify the timeline of a CAP. Do you agree that the proposed Variance to Part 7.3 allows for the necessary flexibility to take into account the required regulatory approvals within your jurisdiction? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions for the Variance, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

Leonard Kula - Independent Electricity S	ystem Operator - 2	
Answer	Yes	
Document Name		
Comment		
The proposed language change provides	s the flexibility to account for the regulatory approval process in Canada.	
Likes 0		
Dislikes 0		
Response		
Ruida Shu - Northeast Power Coordinati	ng Council - 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 - NPCC, Group Name RSC no Dominion	
Answer	Yes	
Document Name		
Comment		
The proposed language change provides th	e flexibility to account for the regulatory approval process in Canada.	
Likes 0		
Dislikes 0		
Response		
Nicolas Turcotte - Hydro-Qu?bec TransE	inergie - 1	
Answer	Yes	
Document Name		
Comment		
Likes 0		

Dislikes 0	
Response	
Junji Yamaguchi - Hydro-Qu?bec Produc	ction - 5
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
	of: Michael Puscas, ISO New England, Inc., 2; - John Pearson
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Constantin Chitescu - Ontario Power Ge	
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Payam Farahbakhsh - Hydro One Netwo	
Answer	Yes

Document Name		
Comment		
Likes 0		
Dislikes 0		
Response		
Mike Smith - Manitoba Hydro - 1, Group N	Name Manitoba Hydro	
Answer		
Document Name		
Comment		
The posted version of "Proposed TPL-007-2 TPL-007-2" version does not have these cha	2 Canadian Variance" has proposed changed to R7 and Part 7.3 as noted above. However, the "Redline to anges. Please review.	
In Manitoba, regulatory approvals are not required for specific capital projects. Therefore the proposed variance is not required in this jurisdiction.		
Regulations within Manitoba currently prevent Manitoba Hydro from adopting standards that require construction or enhancement of facilities in Manitoba. Manitoba has no suggestions for a variance that would alleviate this concern. As a result Manitoba Hydro adopted TPL-007 as its own standard (MH-TPL-007-2).		
Likes 0		
Dislikes 0		
Response		

2. Do you agree that the language in the introduction section of Attachment 1-CAN adequately describes the Canadian Variance? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

Ruida Shu - Northeast Power Coordinating Council - 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 - NPCC, Group Name RSC no Dominion			
Answer	Yes		
Document Name			
Comment			
compared with most with other places subje describes the balance the Canadian variance	the both geomagnetic latitude and earth conductivity. Both of these factors tend to be larger in Canada act to NERC standards so the risk of higher GICs in Canada is higher. The introduction adequately ce will achieve: preserving an equivalent level of reliability (e.g. 1-in-100 year event) while allowing the monstrated to better match Canadian circumstances.		
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			
Leonard Kula - Independent Electricity S	ystem Operator - 2		
Answer	Yes		
Document Name			
Comment			
Canada compared with most with other p adequately describes the balance the Ca	on the both geomagnetic latitude and earth conductivity. Both of these factors tend to be larger in blaces subject to NERC standards so the risk of higher GICs in Canada is higher. The introduction nadian variance will achieve: preserving an equivalent level of reliability (e.g. 1-in-100 year event) proach that can be demonstrated to better match Canadian circumstances.		
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			
Payam Farahbakhsh - Hydro One Networks, Inc 1			
Answer	Yes		
Document Name			
Comment			
Likes 0			

Dislikes 0		
Response		
Constantin Chitescu - Ontario Power Ger	neration Inc 5	
Answer	Yes	
Document Name		
Comment		
Likes 0		
Dislikes 0		
Response		
John Pearson - John Pearson On Behalf	of: Michael Puscas, ISO New England, Inc., 2; - John Pearson	
Answer	Yes	
Document Name		
Comment		
Likes 0		
Dislikes 0		
Response		
Mike Smith - Manitoba Hydro - 1, Group I	Name Manitoba Hydro	
Answer	Yes	
Document Name		
Comment		
Likes 0		
Dislikes 0		
Response		
Junji Yamaguchi - Hydro-Qu?bec Production - 5		
Answer	Yes	

Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Nicolas Turcotte - Hydro-Qu?bec TransE	nergie - 1
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	

3. The SDT developed the Attachment 1-CAN, as an alternative to Attachment 1, for defining a 1-in-100 year GMD planning event to be used in the benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s). The proposed alternative approach in Attachment 1-CAN for the GMD planning event is to be based on Canadian-specific data and statistical analyses. Do you agree that the proposed approach to define a 1-in-100 year GMD event is sufficiently clear and flexible for Canadian entities while achieving an equivalent level of reliability of TPL-007-2? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions for defining a GMD event, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.			
Leonard Kula - Independent Electricity S	ystem Operator - 2		
Answer	Yes		
Document Name			
Comment			
	tions specified in TPL-007-2 to be used unless the data and sensitivity assessment conditions in the sufficiently clear and flexible for Canadian entities while achieving an equivalent level of reliability.		
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			
Mike Smith - Manitoba Hydro - 1, Group I	Name Manitoba Hydro		
Answer	Yes		
Document Name			
Comment			
Manitoba Hydro agrees that Attachment 1-0	CAN allows for alternative methodologies to be used and supports this approach.		
Manitoba Hydro is concerned about the precedence of mandating construction for a 1-in-100 year event. NERC TPL-001-4 does not mandate implementation of a CAP for extreme events, typically defined as 1-in-30 or greater. Manitoba Hydro prefers to set its risk tolerance to be in line with TPL-001-4 and has defined a GMD Planning event at 3 V/km, which corresponds to a 1-in-30 year probability. Manitoba Hydro will determine a CAP for a GMD Planning event. Extreme events of 1-in-50 year (3.5 V/km) and much greater than 1-in-100 years (8 V/km) will be studied in a similar manner as extreme events in TPL-001-4.			
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			
Ruida Shu - Northeast Power Coordination	ng Council - 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 - NPCC, Group Name RSC no Dominion		
Answer	Yes		
Document Name			

Comment			
Requiring the methodology and assumptions specified in TPL-007-2 to be used unless the data and sensitivity assessment conditions in the Canadian Variance are both satisfied is sufficiently clear and flexible for Canadian entities while achieving an equivalent level of reliability.			
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			
Nicolas Turcotte - Hydro-Qu?bec TransE	nergie - 1		
Answer	Yes		
Document Name			
Comment			
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			
Junji Yamaguchi - Hydro-Qu?bec Produc	ction - 5		
Answer	Yes		
Document Name			
Comment			
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			
John Pearson - John Pearson On Behalf of: Michael Puscas, ISO New England, Inc., 2; - John Pearson			
Answer	Yes		
Document Name			
Comment			
Likes 0			

Dislikes 0		
Response		
Constantin Chitescu - Ontario Power Ge	neration Inc 5	
Answer	Yes	
Document Name		
Comment		
Likes 0		
Dislikes 0		
Response		
Payam Farahbakhsh - Hydro One Netwo	rks, Inc 1	
Answer	Yes	
Document Name		
Comment		
Likes 0		
Dislikes 0		
Response		

4. The SDT proposed that the calculation of the geoelectric fields, which is based on geomagnetic field variations and earth transfer function, must be based on technically justified information. Technically justified information includes technical documents produced by governmental entities, technical papers published in peer-reviewed journals, or data sets gathered using sound scientific principles. Do you agree that technical documents, as defined in Attachment 1-CAN, are credible sources of technically justified information? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions for defining what constitute a technically justified information, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

Ruida Shu - Northeast Power Coordinating Council - 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 - NPCC, Group Name RSC no Dominion					
Answer	Yes				
Document Name					
Comment					
	nent 1-CAN are a credible source of technically justified information. Direct measurements (e.g. GIC e given the highest weighting when assessing technically justified information.				
Likes 0					
Dislikes 0					
Response					
Mike Smith - Manitoba Hydro - 1, Group	Name Manitoba Hydro				
Answer	Yes				
Document Name					
Comment					
This would address one of Manitoba Hydro research/data to be used in assessments.	's original concerns with the standard and not lock the standard to "old" research but allow the latest				
Likes 0					
Dislikes 0					
Response					
Leonard Kula - Independent Electricity S	system Operator - 2				
Answer	Yes				
Document Name					
Comment					
The technical documents defined in Atta	chment 1-CAN are a credible source of technically justified information. Direct measurements (e.g.				

GIC current, magnetic field) in Canada sl	hould be given the highest weighting when assessing technically justified information.
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Payam Farahbakhsh - Hydro One Networ	rks, Inc 1
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Constantin Chitescu - Ontario Power Ge	neration Inc 5
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
John Pearson - John Pearson On Behalf	of: Michael Puscas, ISO New England, Inc., 2; - John Pearson
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	

Junji Yamaguchi - Hydro-Qu?bec Produc	ction - 5
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Nicolas Turcotte - Hydro-Qu?bec TransE	nergie - 1
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	

5. If you have any additional comments regarding the completeness, the adequacy, and the accuracy of the proposed modifications for the	ŧ
SDT to consider, provide them here.	

Nicolas Turcotte - Hydro-Qu?bec TransE	nergie - 1			
Answer				
Document Name				
Comment				
The SDT should consider the impact of the 1989 blackout in Quebec.	harmonics generated by the GMD eventon the system performance. These were the main cause for the			
Likes 0				
Dislikes 0				
Response				
Leonard Kula - Independent Electricity S	ystem Operator - 2			
Answer				
Document Name				
Comment				
NA				
Likes 0				
Dislikes 0				
Response				
Mike Smith - Manitoba Hydro - 1, Group N	Name Manitoba Hydro			
Answer				
Document Name				
Comment				
There are portions of Attachment 1-CAN that	at are not related to the assessment methodology and may fit better within the requirements, such as:			
Modeling assumptions shall also be clearly documented and technically justified. An entity may				
use sensitivity analysis to identify how the assumptions affect the results.				
A simplified model may be used to perform a GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), as long as the				

model is more conservative than a more detailed model.

When interpreting assessment results, the entity shall consider the maturity of the modeling,

toolset, and techniques applied.

Additional comments – made during previous rounds of commenting of TPL-007

Manitoba Hydro does not support the supplemental GMD assessment in R8 and associated additional thermal analysis required in TPL-007-2 R9 and R10. The science is still evolving on localized enhancements.

Manitoba Hydro also notes that R12 serves no obvious purpose in meeting the stated objectives or purpose of the standard; the collection of magnetometer data is performed by NRCAN and several Canadian Universities within Canada.

Manitoba Hydro will not be able to adopt this standard as written due to conflicts with local legislation.

Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Payam Farahbakhsh - Hydro One Networ	rks, Inc 1
Answer	
Document Name	
Comment	
prior to the beginning of each standard asse	adding a requirement to review the definition of the alternative benchmark or supplemental GMD events at or essment cycle. This review would allow the future assessments to leverage the results of ongoing research discovered in the future from growing data sets.
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	



Consideration of Comments

/	Project Name:	Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2			
	Comment Period Start Date:	10/2/2018			
_	Comment Period End Date:	11/15/2018			
	Associated Ballots:				

There were 8 sets of responses, including comments from approximately 41 different people from approximately 30 companies representing 10 of the Industry Segments as shown in the table on the following pages.

All comments submitted can be reviewed in their original format on the project page.

If you feel that your comment has been overlooked, please let us know immediately. Our goal is to give every comment serious consideration in this process. If you feel there has been an error or omission, you can contact the Senior Director of Engineering and Standards, <u>Howard</u> <u>Gugel</u> (via email) or at (404) 446-9693.



Questions

1. The SDT developed a Canadian Variance to Requirement R7, Part 7.3 to accommodate for required regulatory approvals in different Canadian jurisdictions. For example, Canadian entities may be required to obtain a regulatory approval for investments associated with Corrective Action Plans (CAPs). Such approval may limit the scope or modify the timeline of a CAP. Do you agree that the proposed Variance to Part 7.3 allows for the necessary flexibility to take into account the required regulatory approvals within your jurisdiction? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions for the Variance, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

2. Do you agree that the language in the introduction section of Attachment 1-CAN adequately describes the Canadian Variance? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

3. The SDT developed the Attachment 1-CAN, as an alternative to Attachment 1, for defining a 1-in-100 year GMD planning event to be used in the benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s). The proposed alternative approach in Attachment 1-CAN for the GMD planning event is to be based on Canadian-specific data and statistical analyses. Do you agree that the proposed approach to define a 1-in-100 year GMD event is sufficiently clear and flexible for Canadian entities while achieving an equivalent level of reliability of TPL-007-2? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions for defining a GMD event, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

4. The SDT proposed that the calculation of the geoelectric fields, which is based on geomagnetic field variations and earth transfer function, must be based on technically justified information. Technically justified information includes technical documents produced by governmental entities, technical papers published in peer-reviewed journals, or data sets gathered using sound scientific principles. Do you agree that technical documents, as defined in Attachment 1-CAN, are credible sources of technically justified information? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions for defining what constitute a technically justified information, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

5. If you have any additional comments regarding the completeness, the adequacy, and the accuracy of the proposed modifications for the SDT to consider, provide them here.



The Industry Segments are:

- 1 Transmission Owners
- 2 RTOs, ISOs
- 3 Load-serving Entities
- 4 Transmission-dependent Utilities
- 5 Electric Generators
- 6 Electricity Brokers, Aggregators, and Marketers
- 7 Large Electricity End Users
- 8 Small Electricity End Users
- 9 Federal, State, Provincial Regulatory or other Government Entities
- 10 Regional Reliability Organizations, Regional Entities



Organization Name	Name	Segment(s)	Region	Group Name	Group Member Name	Group Member Organization	Group Member Segment(s)	Group Member Region
Manitoba Hydro	Mike Smith	1		Manitoba Hydro	Yuguang Xiao	Manitoba Hydro	5	MRO
					Karim Abdel- Hadi	Manitoba Hydro	3	MRO
					Blair Mukanik	Manitoba Hydro	6	MRO
					Mike Smith	Manitoba Hydro	1	MRO
Northeast Power Coordinating Council		uida Shu 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 I		RSC no Dominion	Guy V. Zito	Northeast Power Coordinating Council	10	NPCC
					Randy MacDonald	New Brunswick Power	2	NPCC
					Glen Smith	Entergy Services	4	NPCC
					Brian Robinson	Utility Services	5	NPCC
					Alan Adamson	New York State Reliability Council	7	NPCC



David Burke	Orange & Rockland Utilities	3	NPCC
Michele Tondalo	UI	1	NPCC
Helen Lainis	IESO	2	NPCC
Michael Jones	National Grid	3	NPCC
Sean Cavote	PSEG	4	NPCC
Kathleen Goodman	ISO-NE	2	NPCC
Salvatore Spagnolo	New York Power Authority	1	NPCC
Shivaz Chopra	New York Power Authority	6	NPCC
David Kiguel	Independent	NA - Not Applicable	NPCC
Silvia Mitchell	NextEra Energy - Florida Power and Light Co.	6	NPCC
Paul Malozewski	Hydro One Networks, Inc.	3	NPCC



Gregory Campoli	New York Independent System Operator	2	NPCC
Caroline Dupuis	Hydro Quebec	1	NPCC
Chantal Mazza	Hydro Quebec	2	NPCC
Michael Forte	Con Edison	1	NPCC
Laura McLeod	NB Power Corporation	5	NPCC
Nick	Kowalczyk	1	NPCC
Dermot Smyth	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	1	NPCC
John Hastings	National Grid	1	NPCC
Peter Yost	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	3	NPCC
Sofia Gadea- Omelchenko	Con Edison	5	NPCC
Joel Charlebois	AESI - Acumen Engineered Solutions	5	NPCC



Quintin Lee
Mike Cooke



1. The SDT developed a Canadian Variance to Requirement R7, Part 7.3 to accommodate for required regulatory approvals in different Canadian jurisdictions. For example, Canadian entities may be required to obtain a regulatory approval for investments associated with Corrective Action Plans (CAPs). Such approval may limit the scope or modify the timeline of a CAP. Do you agree that the proposed Variance to Part 7.3 allows for the necessary flexibility to take into account the required regulatory approvals within your jurisdiction? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions for the Variance, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

Leonard Kula - Independent Electricity System Operator - 2				
Answer	Yes			
Document Name				
Comment				
The proposed language change pro	ovides the flexibility to account for the regulatory approval process in Canada.			
Likes 0				
Dislikes 0				
Response				
The SDT thanks you for your suppor	t.			
Ruida Shu - Northeast Power Coord	dinating Council - 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 - NPCC, Group Name RSC no Dominion			
Answer	Yes			
Document Name				
Comment				
The proposed language change prov	vides the flexibility to account for the regulatory approval process in Canada.			
Likes 0				



Dislikes 0	
Response	
The SDT thanks you for your suppor	rt.
Nicolas Turcotte - Hydro-Qu?bec TransEnergie - 1	
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Junji Yamaguchi - Hydro-Qu?bec Production - 5	
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
John Pearson - John Pearson On Behalf of: Michael Puscas, ISO New England, Inc., 2; - John Pearson	
Answer	Yes



Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Constantin Chitescu - Ontario Power Generation Inc 5	
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Payam Farahbakhsh - Hydro One N	letworks, Inc 1
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	



Response	
Mike Smith - Manitoba Hydro - 1, G	Group Name Manitoba Hydro
Answer	
Document Name	
Comment	
The posted version of "Proposed TPL-007-2 Canadian Variance" has proposed changed to R7 and Part 7.3 as noted above. However, the "Redline to TPL-007-2" version does not have these changes. Please review. In Manitoba, regulatory approvals are not required for specific capital projects. Therefore the proposed variance is not required in this jurisdiction. Regulations within Manitoba currently prevent Manitoba Hydro from adopting standards that require construction or enhancement of facilities in Manitoba. Manitoba has no suggestions for a variance that would alleviate this concern. As a result Manitoba Hydro adopted TPL- 007 as its own standard (MH-TPL-007-2).	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
The SDT thanks you for your support. The redline is located in the Variance section of the standard.	
The SDT acknowledges the jurisdictional issues mentioned; however, addressing those issues is outside of the scope of this project.	



2. Do you agree that the language in the introduction section of Attachment 1-CAN adequately describes the Canadian Variance? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

Ruida Shu - Northeast Power Coordinating Council - 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 - NPCC, Group Name RSC no Dominion	
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
The effective geo-electric field depends on the both geomagnetic latitude and earth conductivity. Both of these factors tend to be larger in Canada compared with most with other places subject to NERC standards so the risk of higher GICs in Canada is higher. The introduction adequately describes the balance the Canadian variance will achieve: preserving an equivalent level of reliability (e.g. 1-in-100 year event) while allowing the flexibility to use an approach that can be demonstrated to better match Canadian circumstances.	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
The SDT thanks you for your support.	
Leonard Kula - Independent Electricity System Operator - 2	
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
The effective geo-electric field depends on the both geomagnetic latitude and earth conductivity. Both of these factors tend to be larger in Canada compared with most with other places subject to NERC standards so the risk of higher GICs in Canada is higher. The introduction	



adequately describes the balance the Canadian variance will achieve: preserving an equivalent level of reliability (e.g. 1-in-100 year event) while allowing the flexibility to use an approach that can be demonstrated to better match Canadian circumstances.

Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
The SDT thanks you for your support.	
Payam Farahbakhsh - Hydro One Networks, Inc 1	
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Constantin Chitescu - Ontario Power Generation Inc 5	
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	



John Pearson - John Pearson On Behalf of: Michael Puscas, ISO New England, Inc., 2; - John Pearson	
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
	~
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Mike Smith - Manitoba Hydro - 1, Group Name Manitoba Hydro	
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Junji Yamaguchi - Hydro-Qu?bec Production - 5	
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	



Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
Nicolas Turcotte - Hydro-Qu?bec TransEnergie - 1	
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	



3. The SDT developed the Attachment 1-CAN, as an alternative to Attachment 1, for defining a 1-in-100 year GMD planning event to be used in the benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s). The proposed alternative approach in Attachment 1-CAN for the GMD planning event is to be based on Canadian-specific data and statistical analyses. Do you agree that the proposed approach to define a 1-in-100 year GMD event is sufficiently clear and flexible for Canadian entities while achieving an equivalent level of reliability of TPL-007-2? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions for defining a GMD event, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

Leonard Kula - Independent Electricity System Operator - 2	
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Requiring the methodology and assumptions specified in TPL-007-2 to be used unless the data and sensitivity assessment conditions in the Canadian Variance are both satisfied is sufficiently clear and flexible for Canadian entities while achieving an equivalent level of reliability.	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
The SDT thanks you for your support	

The SDT thanks you for your support.

Mike Smith - Manitoba Hydro - 1, Group Name Manitoba Hydro	
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	



Manitoba Hydro agrees that Attachment 1-CAN allows for alternative methodologies to be used and supports this approach.

Manitoba Hydro is concerned about the precedence of mandating construction for a 1-in-100 year event. NERC TPL-001-4 does not mandate implementation of a CAP for extreme events, typically defined as 1-in-30 or greater. Manitoba Hydro prefers to set its risk tolerance to be in line with TPL-001-4 and has defined a GMD Planning event at 3 V/km, which corresponds to a 1-in-30 year probability. Manitoba Hydro will determine a CAP for a GMD Planning event. Extreme events of 1-in-50 year (3.5 V/km) and much greater than 1-in-100 years (8 V/km) will be studied in a similar manner as extreme events in TPL-001-4.

Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
The SDT thanks you for your support. The mandate of the SDT was to achieve at least an equivalent level of reliability of that in TPL-007-2 (1- in-100-year event); therefore, addressing whether or not mandating construction for a 1-in-100 year event is outside the scope of this project.	
Ruida Shu - Northeast Power Coordinating Council - 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 - NPCC, Group Name RSC no Dominion	
Answer	Yes
Document Name	
Comment	
Requiring the methodology and assumptions specified in TPL-007-2 to be used unless the data and sensitivity assessment conditions in the Canadian Variance are both satisfied is sufficiently clear and flexible for Canadian entities while achieving an equivalent level of reliability.	
Likes 0	
Dislikes 0	
Response	
The SDT thanks you for your support.	



Nicolas Turcotte - Hydro-Qu?bec TransEnergie - 1			
Answer	Yes		
Document Name			
Comment			
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			
Junji Yamaguchi - Hydro-Qu?bec Pr	roduction - 5		
Answer	Yes		
Document Name			
Comment			
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			
John Pearson - John Pearson On Behalf of: Michael Puscas, ISO New England, Inc., 2; - John Pearson			
Answer	Yes		
Document Name			
Comment			



Likes 0				
Dislikes 0				
Response				
Constantin Chitescu - Ontario Powe	er Generation Inc 5			
Answer	Yes			
Document Name				
Comment				
Likes 0				
Dislikes 0				
Response				
Payam Farahbakhsh - Hydro One Networks, Inc 1				
Answer	Yes			
Document Name				
Comment				
Likes 0				
Dislikes 0				
Response				



4. The SDT proposed that the calculation of the geoelectric fields, which is based on geomagnetic field variations and earth transfer function, must be based on technically justified information. Technically justified information includes technical documents produced by governmental entities, technical papers published in peer-reviewed journals, or data sets gathered using sound scientific principles. Do you agree that technical documents, as defined in Attachment 1-CAN, are credible sources of technically justified information? If you do not agree, or if you agree but have comments or suggestions for defining what constitute a technically justified information, provide your recommendation, explanation, and proposed modification.

Ruida Shu - Northeast Power Coordinating Council - 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 - NPCC, Group Name RSC no Dominion

Answer	Yes	
Document Name		
Comment		
	Attachment 1-CAN are a credible source of technically justified information. Direct measurements (e.g. da should be given the highest weighting when assessing technically justified information.	
Likes 0		
Dislikes 0		
Response		
The SDT thanks you for your support. The intent of the proposed Canadian Variance was to allow the use of the best information available.		
Mike Smith - Manitoba Hydro - 1, Group Name Manitoba Hydro		
Answer	Yes	
Document Name		
Comment		



This would address one of Manitobal latest research/data to be used in a	a Hydro's original concerns with the standard and not lock the standard to "old" research but allow the ssessments.			
Likes 0				
Dislikes 0				
Response				
The SDT thanks you for your suppor	t.			
Leonard Kula - Independent Electricity System Operator - 2				
Answer	Yes			
Document Name				
Comment				
	n Attachment 1-CAN are a credible source of technically justified information. Direct measurements Canada should be given the highest weighting when assessing technically justified information.			
Likes 0				
Dislikes 0				
Response				
The SDT thanks you for your support. The intent of the proposed Canadian Variance was to allow the use of the best information available.				
Payam Farahbakhsh - Hydro One Networks, Inc 1				
Answer	Yes			
Document Name				
Comment				



Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			
Constantin Chitescu - Ontario Powe	er Generation Inc 5		
Answer	Yes		
Document Name			
Comment			
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			
John Pearson - John Pearson On Be	half of: Michael Puscas, ISO New England, Inc., 2; - John Pearson		
Answer	Yes		
Document Name			
Comment			
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			
Junji Yamaguchi - Hydro-Qu?bec Pr	Junji Yamaguchi - Hydro-Qu?bec Production - 5		



Answer	Yes		
Document Name			
Comment			
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			
Nicolas Turcotte - Hydro-Qu?bec Tu	ransEnergie - 1		
Answer Yes			
Document Name			
Comment			
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			



5. If you have any additional comm SDT to consider, provide them here	ents regarding the completeness, the adequacy, and the accuracy of the proposed modifications for the		
Nicolas Turcotte - Hydro-Qu?bec TransEnergie - 1			
Answer			
Document Name			
Comment			
The SDT should consider the impact for the 1989 blackout in Quebec.	of the harmonics generated by the GMD event on the system performance. These were the main cause		
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			
	ent. Addressing the impact of harmonics generated by a GMD event on System performance is not limited L-007-2; therefore, addressing this concern is outside the current project scope.		
Leonard Kula - Independent Electric	city System Operator - 2		
Answer			
Document Name			
Comment			
NA			
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			



Response			
Mike Smith - Manitoba Hydro - 1, Group Name Manitoba Hydro			
Answer			
Document Name			
Comment			
There are portions of Attachment 1- such as:	CAN that are not related to the assessment methodology and may fit better within the requirements,		
Modeling assumptions shall also be	clearly documented and technically justified. An entity may		
use sensitivity analysis to identify h	ow the assumptions affect the results.		
A simplified model may be used to perform a GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), as long as the			
model is more conservative than a more detailed model.			
When interpreting assessment results, the entity shall consider the maturity of the modeling,			
toolset, and techniques applied.			
Additional comments – made during previous rounds of commenting of TPL-007			
Manitoba Hydro does not support the supplemental GMD assessment in R8 and associated additional thermal analysis required in TPL-007-2 R9 and R10. The science is still evolving on localized enhancements.			
-	serves no obvious purpose in meeting the stated objectives or purpose of the standard; the collection of NRCAN and several Canadian Universities within Canada.		
Manitoba Hydro will not be able to a	adopt this standard as written due to conflicts with local legislation.		
Consideration of Comments			



Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			
The SDT has considered (i) creating Canadian Variances (requirement-by-requirement) or (ii) developing Attachment 1-CAN. The SDT determined that it would be more efficient to create Attachment 1-CAN.			
The project scope did not include the modifications to requirements R8 to R10. The Appendix 1-CAN allow Canadian entities to use information collected under R-12 to better define the GMD event or supplemental event. The SDT's objective was to create a Variance to allow an entity to define its own event(s) to allow the use of data to define or modify the GMD planning.			
The SDT acknowledges the aforeme project.	ntioned conflicts with local legislation; however, addressing those concerns is outside the scope of the		
Payam Farahbakhsh - Hydro One N	etworks, Inc 1		
Answer			
Document Name			
Comment			
The proposed standard could benefit from adding a requirement to review the definition of the alternative benchmark or supplemental GMD events at or prior to the beginning of each standard assessment cycle. This review would allow the future assessments to leverage the results of ongoing research and consider new information that may be discovered in the future from growing data sets.			
Likes 0			
Dislikes 0			
Response			
	ent and acknowledges that ongoing research and new information should be considered; however, adding on of the alternative benchmark or supplemental GMD events is outside the scope of the project.		



The SDT acknowledges the concern of not having a specifically defined "standard assessment cycle." The SDT recognizes that an entity may benefit from defining parameters around its assessment cycles.

Standard Development Timeline

This section is maintained by the drafting team during the development of the standard and will be removed when the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees (Board).

Description of Current Draft

10-day final ballot

Completed Actions	Date
Standards Committee approved Standard Authorization Request (SAR) for posting	06/13/18
SAR posted for comment	03/30/18 – 04/30/18
28-day informal comment period	08/10/18 – 09/06/18

Anticipated Actions	Date	
45-day formal or informal comment period with initial ballot	October 2018 – November 2018	
10-day final ballot	November 2018	
Board adoption	February 2019	

New or Modified Term(s) Used in NERC Reliability Standards

This section includes all new or modified terms used in the proposed standard that will be included in the *Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards* upon applicable regulatory approval. Terms used in the proposed standard that are already defined and are not being modified can be found in the *Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards*. The new or revised terms listed below will be presented for approval with the proposed standard. Upon Board adoption, this section will be removed.

Term(s):

None.

A. Introduction

- 1. Title: Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events
- **2. Number:** TPL-007-3
- **3. Purpose:** Establish requirements for Transmission system planned performance during geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) events.

4. Applicability:

4.1. Functional Entities:

- **4.1.1.** Planning Coordinator with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2;
- **4.1.2.** Transmission Planner with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2;
- 4.1.3. Transmission Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2; and
- **4.1.4.** Generator Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2.

4.2. Facilities:

- **4.2.1.** Facilities that include power transformer(s) with a high side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV.
- 5. Effective Date: See Implementation Plan for TPL-007-3.
- **Background:** During a GMD event, geomagnetically-induced currents (GIC) may cause transformer hot-spot heating or damage, loss of Reactive Power sources, increased Reactive Power demand, and Misoperation(s), the combination of which may result in voltage collapse and blackout.

The only difference between TPL-007-3 and TPL-007-2 is that TPL-007-3 adds a Canadian Variance to address regulatory practices/processes within Canadian jurisdictions and to allow the use of Canadian-specific data and research to define and implement alternative GMD event(s) that achieve at least an equivalent reliability objective of that in TPL-007-2.

B. Requirements and Measures

R1. Each Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with its Transmission Planner(s), shall identify the individual and joint responsibilities of the Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner(s) in the Planning Coordinator's planning area for maintaining models, performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, and implementing process(es) to obtain GMD measurement data as specified in this standard. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- M1. Each Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with its Transmission Planners, shall provide documentation on roles and responsibilities, such as meeting minutes, agreements, copies of procedures or protocols in effect between entities or between departments of a vertically integrated system, or email correspondence that identifies an agreement has been reached on individual and joint responsibilities for maintaining models, performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, and implementing process(es) to obtain GMD measurement data in accordance with Requirement R1.
- **R2.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall maintain System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M2. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence in either electronic or hard copy format that it is maintaining System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.
- **R3.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System during the GMD events described in Attachment 1. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- **M3.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence, such as electronic or hard copies of the criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System in accordance with Requirement R3.

Benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s)

- R4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall complete a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment of the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon at least once every 60 calendar months. This benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall use a study or studies based on models identified in Requirement R2, document assumptions, and document summarized results of the steady state analysis. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **4.1.** The study or studies shall include the following conditions:
 - **4.1.1.** System On-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon; and
 - **4.1.2.** System Off-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon.

- **4.2.** The study or studies shall be conducted based on the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1 to determine whether the System meets the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1.
- **4.3.** The benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, and adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later.
 - **4.3.1.** If a recipient of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment provides documented comments on the results, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- M4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have dated evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment meeting all of the requirements in Requirement R4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, and adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later, as specified in Requirement R4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments in accordance with Requirement R4.
- **R5.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide GIC flow information to be used for the benchmark thermal impact assessment of transformers specified in Requirement R6 to each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns an applicable Bulk Electric System (BES) power transformer in the planning area. The GIC flow information shall include: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **5.1.** The maximum effective GIC value for the worst case geoelectric field orientation for the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1. This value shall be provided to the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.

- **5.2.** The effective GIC time series, GIC(t), calculated using the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1 in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area. GIC(t) shall be provided within 90 calendar days of receipt of the written request and after determination of the maximum effective GIC value in Part 5.1.
- **M5.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided the maximum effective GIC values to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area as specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided GIC(t) in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.
- **R6.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A per phase or greater. The benchmark thermal impact assessment shall: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - 6.1. Be based on the effective GIC flow information provided in Requirement R5;
 - 6.2. Document assumptions used in the analysis;
 - **6.3.** Describe suggested actions and supporting analysis to mitigate the impact of GICs, if any; and
 - **6.4.** Be performed and provided to the responsible entities, as determined in Requirement R1, within 24 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1.
- **M6.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its benchmark thermal impact assessment for all of its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A per phase or greater, and shall have evidence such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided its thermal impact assessment to the responsible entities as specified in Requirement R6.
- **R7.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, that concludes through the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment conducted in Requirement R4 that their System does not meet the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1, shall develop a Corrective

Action Plan (CAP) addressing how the performance requirements will be met. The CAP shall: [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- **7.1.** List System deficiencies and the associated actions needed to achieve required System performance. Examples of such actions include:
 - Installation, modification, retirement, or removal of Transmission and generation Facilities and any associated equipment.
 - Installation, modification, or removal of Protection Systems or Remedial Action Schemes.
 - Use of Operating Procedures, specifying how long they will be needed as part of the CAP.
 - Use of Demand-Side Management, new technologies, or other initiatives.
- **7.2.** Be developed within one year of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.
- **7.3.** Include a timetable, subject to revision by the responsible entity in Part 7.4, for implementing the selected actions from Part 7.1. The timetable shall:
 - **7.3.1.** Specify implementation of non-hardware mitigation, if any, within two years of development of the CAP; and
 - **7.3.2.** Specify implementation of hardware mitigation, if any, within four years of development of the CAP.
- **7.4.** Be revised if situations beyond the control of the responsible entity determined in Requirement R1 prevent implementation of the CAP within the timetable for implementation provided in Part 7.3. The revised CAP shall document the following, and be updated at least once every 12 calendar months until implemented:
 - **7.4.1.** Circumstances causing the delay for fully or partially implementing the selected actions in Part 7.1;
 - **7.4.2.** Description of the original CAP, and any previous changes to the CAP, with the associated timetable(s) for implementing the selected actions in Part 7.1; and
 - **7.4.3.** Revisions to the selected actions in Part 7.1, if any, including utilization of Operating Procedures if applicable, and the updated timetable for implementing the selected actions.
- **7.5.** Be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission Planner(s), and functional entities referenced in the CAP within 90 calendar days of development or revision, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of development or revision, whichever is later.

- **7.5.1.** If a recipient of the CAP provides documented comments on the results, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- **M7.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, that concludes, through the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment conducted in Requirement R4, that the responsible entity's System does not meet the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1 shall have evidence such as dated electronic or hard copies of its CAP including timetable for implementing selected actions, as specified in Requirement R7. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has revised its CAP if situations beyond the responsible entity's control prevent implementation of the CAP within the timetable specified. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its CAP or relevant information, if any, (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission Planner(s), and functional entities referenced in the CAP within 90 calendar days of development or revision, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of development or revision, whichever is later as specified in Requirement R7. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its CAP within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments, in accordance with Requirement R7.

Supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s)

- **R8.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall complete a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment of the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon at least once every 60 calendar months. This supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall use a study or studies based on models identified in Requirement R2, document assumptions, and document summarized results of the steady state analysis. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **8.1.** The study or studies shall include the following conditions:
 - **8.1.1.** System On-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon; and
 - **8.1.2.** System Off-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon.

- **8.2.** The study or studies shall be conducted based on the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1 to determine whether the System meets the performance requirements for the steady state planning supplemental GMD event contained in Table 1.
- **8.3.** If the analysis concludes there is Cascading caused by the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1, an evaluation of possible actions designed to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the consequences and adverse impacts of the event(s) shall be conducted.
- **8.4.** The supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later.
 - **8.4.1.** If a recipient of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment provides documented comments on the results, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- M8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have dated evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment meeting all of the requirements in Requirement R8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its supplemental GMD Vulnerability: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later, as specified in Requirement R8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments in accordance with Requirement R8.
- **R9.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide GIC flow information to be used for the supplemental thermal impact assessment of transformers specified in Requirement R10 to each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns an applicable Bulk Electric System (BES) power transformer in the planning area. The GIC flow information shall include: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- **9.1.** The maximum effective GIC value for the worst case geoelectric field orientation for the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1. This value shall be provided to the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.
- **9.2.** The effective GIC time series, GIC(t), calculated using the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1 in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area. GIC(t) shall be provided within 90 calendar days of receipt of the written request and after determination of the maximum effective GIC value in Part 9.1.
- M9. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided the maximum effective GIC values to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area as specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided GIC(t) in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.
- **R10.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A per phase or greater. The supplemental thermal impact assessment shall: [*Violation Risk Factor: Medium*] [*Time Horizon: Long-term Planning*]
 - **10.1.** Be based on the effective GIC flow information provided in Requirement R9;
 - **10.2.** Document assumptions used in the analysis;
 - **10.3.** Describe suggested actions and supporting analysis to mitigate the impact of GICs, if any; and
 - **10.4.** Be performed and provided to the responsible entities, as determined in Requirement R1, within 24 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1.
- M10. Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its supplemental thermal impact assessment for all of its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A per phase or greater, and shall have evidence such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided its supplemental thermal impact assessment to the responsible entities as specified in Requirement R10.

GMD Measurement Data Processes

- **R11.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall implement a process to obtain GIC monitor data from at least one GIC monitor located in the Planning Coordinator's planning area or other part of the system included in the Planning Coordinator's GIC System model. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M11. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its GIC monitor location(s) and documentation of its process to obtain GIC monitor data in accordance with Requirement R11.
- **R12.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall implement a process to obtain geomagnetic field data for its Planning Coordinator's planning area. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M12. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its process to obtain geomagnetic field data for its Planning Coordinator's planning area in accordance with Requirement R12.

C. Compliance

- 1. Compliance Monitoring Process
 - **1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority:** "Compliance Enforcement Authority" means NERC or the Regional Entity, or any entity as otherwise designated by an Applicable Governmental Authority, in their respective roles of monitoring and/or enforcing compliance with mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards in their respective jurisdictions.
 - **1.2.** Evidence Retention: The following evidence retention period(s) identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full-time period since the last audit.

The applicable entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

- For Requirements R1, R2, R3, R5, R6, R9, and R10, each responsible entity shall retain documentation as evidence for five years.
- For Requirements R4 and R8, each responsible entity shall retain documentation of the current GMD Vulnerability Assessment and the preceding GMD Vulnerability Assessment.

- For Requirement R7, each responsible entity shall retain documentation as evidence for five years or until all actions in the Corrective Action Plan are completed, whichever is later.
- For Requirements R11 and R12, each responsible entity shall retain documentation as evidence for three years.
- **1.3.** Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program: As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, "Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program" refers to the identification of the processes that will be used to evaluate data or information for the purpose of assessing performance or outcomes with the associated Reliability Standard.

Table 1: Steady State Planning GMD Event

Steady State:

- a. Voltage collapse, Cascading and uncontrolled islanding shall not occur.
- b. Generation loss is acceptable as a consequence of the steady state planning GMD events.
- c. Planned System adjustments such as Transmission configuration changes and re-dispatch of generation are allowed if such adjustments are executable within the time duration applicable to the Facility Ratings.

Category	Initial Condition	Event	Interruption of Firm Transmission Service Allowed	Load Loss Allowed
Benchmark GMD Event - GMD Event with Outages	 System as may be postured in response to space weather information¹, and then GMD event² 	Reactive Power compensation devices and other Transmission Facilities removed as a result of Protection System operation or Misoperation due to harmonics during the GMD event	Yes ³	Yes ³
Supplemental GMD Event - GMD Event with Outages	 System as may be postured in response to space weather information¹, and then GMD event² 	Reactive Power compensation devices and other Transmission Facilities removed as a result of Protection System operation or Misoperation due to harmonics during the GMD event	Yes	Yes
Table 1: Steady State Performance Footnotes				

- 1. The System condition for GMD planning may include adjustments to posture the System that are executable in response to space weather information.
- 2. The GMD conditions for the benchmark and supplemental planning events are described in Attachment 1.
- 3. Load loss as a result of manual or automatic Load shedding (e.g., UVLS) and/or curtailment of Firm Transmission Service may be used to meet BES performance requirements during studied GMD conditions. The likelihood and magnitude of Load loss or curtailment of Firm Transmission Service should be minimized.

Violation Severity Levels

R #		Violation Se	verity Levels	
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with its Transmission Planner(s), failed to determine and identify individual or joint responsibilities of the Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner(s) in the Planning Coordinator's planning area for maintaining models, performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, and implementing process(es) to obtain GMD measurement data as specified in this standard.
R2.	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not maintain either System models or GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the studies	The responsible entity did not maintain both System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the studies

R #		Violation Se	verity Levels	
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.	needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.
R3.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not have criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System during the GMD events described in Attachment 1 as required.
R4.	The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 60 calendar months and less than or equal to 64 calendar months since the last benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	The responsible entity's completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy one of the elements listed in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.3; OR	The responsible entity's completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy two of the elements listed in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.3; OR	The responsible entity's completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy three of the elements listed in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.3; OR
		The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 64 calendar months and less than or equal to 68 calendar months since the	The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 68 calendar months and less than or equal to 72 calendar months since the	The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 72 calendar months since the last benchmark

R #		Violation Se	verity Levels	
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
		last benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	last benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	GMD Vulnerability Assessment; OR The responsible entity does not have a completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.
R5.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 90 calendar days and less than or equal to 100 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 100 calendar days and less than or equal to 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity did not provide the maximum effective GIC value to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area; OR The responsible entity did not provide the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), upon written request.
R6.	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for 5% or less or one of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for more than 5% up to (and including) 10% or two of its solely owned and jointly	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for more than 10% up to (and including) 15% or three of its solely owned and	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for more than 15% or more than three of its solely owned and jointly owned

R #	Violation Severity Levels			
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
	transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 24 calendar months and less than or equal to 26 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1.	owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 26 calendar months and less than or equal to 28 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1; OR The responsible entity failed to include one of the	jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 28 calendar months and less than or equal to 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1; OR The responsible entity failed to include two of the	applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1; OR The responsible entity failed to include three of the required elements as listed

R #		Violation Se	verity Levels	
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
		required elements as listed in Requirement R6, Parts 6.1 through 6.3.	required elements as listed in Requirement R6, Parts 6.1 through 6.3.	in Requirement R6, Parts 6.1 through 6.3.
R7.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with one of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with two of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with three of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with four or more of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5; OR The responsible entity did not have a Corrective Action Plan as required by Requirement R7.
R8.	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy one of elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy two of elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy three of the elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy four of the elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more

R #		Violation Se	verity Levels	
К#	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
	than 60 calendar months and less than or equal to 64 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	than 64 calendar months and less than or equal to 68 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	than 68 calendar months and less than or equal to 72 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	than 72 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment; OR The responsible entity does not have a completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.
R9.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 90 calendar days and less than or equal to 100 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 100 calendar days and less than or equal to 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity did not provide the maximum effective GIC value to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area; OR The responsible entity did not provide the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), upon written request.
R10.	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for 5% or less or one of its	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for more than 5% up to (and	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for more than 10% up to	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for more than 15% or more

R #	Violation Severity Levels			
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
	solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 24 calendar months and less than or equal to 26 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1.	including) 10% or two of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 26 calendar months and less than or equal to 28 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1 OR	(and including) 15% or three of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 28 calendar months and less than or equal to 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1; OR	than three of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1; OR

R #		Violation Se	verity Levels	
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL The responsible entity failed to include one of the equired elements as listed to Requirement R10, Parts	High VSL	Severe VSL
		The responsible entity failed to include one of the required elements as listed in Requirement R10, Parts 10.1 through 10.3.	The responsible entity failed to include two of the required elements as listed in Requirement R10, Parts 10.1 through 10.3.	The responsible entity failed to include three of the required elements as listed in Requirement R10, Parts 10.1 through 10.3.
R11.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not implement a process to obtain GIC monitor data from at least one GIC monitor located in the Planning Coordinator's planning area or other part of the system included in the Planning Coordinator's GIC System Model.
R12.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not implement a process to obtain geomagnetic field data for its Planning Coordinator's planning area.

D. Regional Variances D.A. Regional Variance for Canadian Jurisdictions

This Variance shall be applicable in Canada.

All references to "Attachment 1" in the standard are replaced with "Attachment 1 or Attachment 1-CAN."

In addition, this Variance replaces Requirement R7, Part 7.3 with the following:

- **D.A.7.3.** Include a timetable, subject to revision by the responsible entity in Part 7.4, for implementing the selected actions from Part 7.1. The timetable shall:
 - **D.A.7.3.1.** Specify implementation of non-hardware mitigation, if any, within two years of the later of the development of the CAP or receipt of regulatory approvals, if required; and
 - **D.A.7.3.2.** Specify implementation of hardware mitigation, if any, within four years of the later of the development of the CAP or receipt of regulatory approvals, if required.

E. Associated Documents

Attachment 1

Attachment 1-CAN

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	December 17, 2014	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	New
2	November 9, 2017	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	Revised to respond to directives in FERC Order No. 830.

Attachment 1

Calculating Geoelectric Fields for the Benchmark and Supplemental GMD Events

The benchmark GMD event¹ defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows that are needed to conduct a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment. It is composed of the following elements: (1) a reference peak geoelectric field amplitude of 8 V/km derived from statistical analysis of historical magnetometer data; (2) scaling factors to account for local geomagnetic latitude; (3) scaling factors to account for local earth conductivity; and (4) a reference geomagnetic field time series or waveform to facilitate time-domain analysis of GMD impact on equipment.

The supplemental GMD event is composed of similar elements as described above, except (1) the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude is 12 V/km over a localized area; and (2) the geomagnetic field time series or waveform includes a local enhancement in the waveform.²

The regional geoelectric field peak amplitude used in GMD Vulnerability Assessment, E_{peak} , can be obtained from the reference geoelectric field value of 8 V/km for the benchmark GMD event (1) or 12 V/km for the supplemental GMD event (2) using the following relationships:

$$E_{peak} = 8 \times \alpha \times \beta_{b} (V/km) \tag{1}$$

$$E_{peak} = 12 \times \alpha \times \beta_s (V/km)$$
⁽²⁾

where, α is the scaling factor to account for local geomagnetic latitude, and β is a scaling factor to account for the local earth conductivity structure. Subscripts *b* and *s* for the β scaling factor denote association with the benchmark or supplemental GMD events, respectively.

Scaling the Geomagnetic Field

The benchmark and supplemental GMD events are defined for geomagnetic latitude of 60° and must be scaled to account for regional differences based on geomagnetic latitude. Table 2 provides a scaling factor correlating peak geoelectric field to geomagnetic latitude. Alternatively, the scaling factor α is computed with the empirical expression:

$$\alpha = 0.001 \times e^{(0.115 \times L)} \tag{3}$$

where, L is the geomagnetic latitude in degrees and $0.1 \le \alpha \le 1$.

¹ The Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description, May 2016 is available on the Related Information webpage for TPL-007-1: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/TPL0071RD/Benchmark_clean_May12_complete.pdf</u>.

² The extent of local enhancements is on the order of 100 km in North-South (latitude) direction but longer in East-West (longitude) direction. The local enhancement in the geomagnetic field occurs over the time period of 2-5 minutes. Additional information is available in the Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description, October 2017 white paper on the Project 2013-03 Geomagnetic Disturbance Mitigation project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

For large planning areas that cover more than one scaling factor from Table 2, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment should be based on a peak geoelectric field that is:

- calculated by using the most conservative (largest) value for α; or
- calculated assuming a non-uniform or piecewise uniform geomagnetic field.

Table 2: Geomagnetic Field Scaling Factors for the Benchmark and Supplemental GMD Events		
Geomagnetic Latitude (Degrees)	Scaling Factor1 (α)	
≤ 40	0.10	
45	0.2	
50	0.3	
54	0.5	
56	0.6	
57	0.7	
58	0.8	
59	0.9	
≥ 60	1.0	

Scaling the Geoelectric Field

The benchmark GMD event is defined for the reference Quebec earth model described in Table 4. The peak geoelectric field, E_{peak}, used in a GMD Vulnerability Assessment may be obtained by either:

- Calculating the geoelectric field for the ground conductivity in the planning area and the reference geomagnetic field time series scaled according to geomagnetic latitude, using a procedure such as the plane wave method described in the NERC GMD Task Force GIC Application Guide;³ or
- Using the earth conductivity scaling factor β from Table 3 that correlates to the ground conductivity map in Figure 1 or Figure 2. Along with the scaling factor α from equation (3) or Table 2, β is applied to the reference geoelectric field using equation (1 or 2, as applicable) to obtain the regional geoelectric field peak amplitude E_{peak} to be used in GMD Vulnerability Assessments. When a ground conductivity model is not available, the planning entity should use the largest β factor of adjacent physiographic regions or a technically justified value.

³ Available at the NERC GMD Task Force project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Pages/Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Task-Force-(GMDTF)-2013.aspx</u>.

The earth models used to calculate Table 3 for the United States were obtained from publicly available information published on the U. S. Geological Survey website.⁴ The models used to calculate Table 3 for Canada were obtained from Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) and reflect the average structure for large regions. A planner can also use specific earth model(s) with documented justification and the reference geomagnetic field time series to calculate the β factor(s) as follows:

$$\beta_b = E/8$$
 for the benchmark GMD event (4)

$$\beta_s = E/12$$
 for the supplemental GMD (5)

where, *E* is the absolute value of peak geoelectric in V/km obtained from the technically justified earth model and the reference geomagnetic field time series.

For large planning areas that span more than one β scaling factor, the most conservative (largest) value for β may be used in determining the peak geoelectric field to obtain conservative results. Alternatively, a planner could perform analysis using a non-uniform or piecewise uniform geoelectric field.

Applying the Localized Peak Geoelectric Field in the Supplemental GMD Event

The peak geoelectric field of the supplemental GMD event occurs in a localized area.⁵ Planners have flexibility to determine how to apply the localized peak geoelectric field over the planning area in performing GIC calculations. Examples of approaches are:

- Apply the peak geoelectric field (12 V/km scaled to the planning area) over the entire planning area;
- Apply a spatially limited (12 V/km scaled to the planning area) peak geoelectric field (e.g., 100 km in North-South latitude direction and 500 km in East-West longitude direction) over a portion(s) of the system, and apply the benchmark GMD event over the rest of the system; or
- Other methods to adjust the benchmark GMD event analysis to account for the localized geoelectric field enhancement of the supplemental GMD event.

⁴ Available at <u>http://geomag.usgs.gov/conductivity/</u>.

⁵ See the Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Description white paper located on the Project 2013-03 Geomagnetic Disturbance Mitigation project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.




Figure 1: Physiographic Regions of the Continental United States⁶



Figure 2: Physiographic Regions of Canada

⁶ Additional map detail is available at the U.S. Geological Survey: <u>http://geomag.usgs.gov/</u>.

Table 3: Geoelectric Field Scaling Factors				
Earth model	Scaling Factor Benchmark Event (β _b)	Scaling Factor Supplemental Event (βs)		
AK1A	0.56	0.51		
AK1B	0.56	0.51		
AP1	0.33	0.30		
AP2	0.82	0.78		
BR1	0.22	0.22		
CL1	0.76	0.73		
CO1	0.27	0.25		
CP1	0.81	0.77		
CP2	0.95	0.86		
FL1	0.76	0.73		
CS1	0.41	0.37		
IP1	0.94	0.90		
IP2	0.28	0.25		
IP3	0.93	0.90		
IP4	0.41	0.35		
NE1	0.81	0.77		
PB1	0.62	0.55		
PB2	0.46	0.39		
PT1	1.17	1.19		
SL1	0.53	0.49		
SU1	0.93	0.90		
BOU	0.28	0.24		
FBK	0.56	0.56		
PRU	0.21	0.22		
BC	0.67	0.62		
PRAIRIES	0.96	0.88		
SHIELD	1.0	1.0		
ATLANTIC	0.79	0.76		

Rationale: Scaling factors in Table 3 are dependent upon the frequency content of the reference storm. Consequently, the benchmark GMD event and the supplemental GMD event may produce different scaling factors for a given earth model.

The scaling factor associated with the benchmark GMD event for the Florida earth model (FL1) has been updated based on the earth model published on the USGS public website.

Table 4: Reference Earth Model (Quebec)			
Layer Thickness (km)	Resistivity (Ω-m)		
15	20,000		
10	200		
125 1,000			
200 100			
∞	3		

Reference Geomagnetic Field Time Series or Waveform for the Benchmark GMD $\mathsf{Event}^{\scriptscriptstyle 7}$

The geomagnetic field measurement record of the March 13-14 1989 GMD event, measured at the NRCan Ottawa geomagnetic observatory, is the basis for the reference geomagnetic field waveform to be used to calculate the GIC time series, GIC(t), required for transformer thermal impact assessment.

The geomagnetic latitude of the Ottawa geomagnetic observatory is 55°; therefore, the amplitudes of the geomagnetic field measurement data were scaled up to the 60° reference geomagnetic latitude (see Figure 3) such that the resulting peak geoelectric field amplitude computed using the reference earth model was 8 V/km (see Figures 4 and 5). The sampling rate for the geomagnetic field waveform is 10 seconds.⁸ To use this geoelectric field time series when a different earth model is applicable, it should be scaled with the appropriate benchmark conductivity scaling factor β_b .

⁷ Refer to the Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description white paper for details on the determination of the reference geomagnetic field waveform: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/TPL0071RI.aspx</u>.

⁸ The data file of the benchmark geomagnetic field waveform is available on the Related Information webpage for TPL-007-1: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/TPL0071RI.aspx</u>.




Figure 3: Benchmark Geomagnetic Field Waveform Red B_n (Northward), Blue B_e (Eastward)





Figure 4: Benchmark Geoelectric Field Waveform E_E (Eastward)






Reference Geomagnetic Field Time Series or Waveform for the Supplemental GMD Event^9


The geomagnetic field measurement record of the March 13-14, 1989 GMD event, measured at the NRCan Ottawa geomagnetic observatory, is the basis for the reference geomagnetic field waveform to be used to calculate the GIC time series, GIC(t), required for transformer thermal impact assessment for the supplemental GMD event. The supplemental GMD event waveform differs from the benchmark GMD event waveform in that the supplemental GMD event waveform has a local enhancement.


The geomagnetic latitude of the Ottawa geomagnetic observatory is 55°; therefore, the amplitudes of the geomagnetic field measurement data were scaled up to the 60° reference geomagnetic latitude (see Figure 6) such that the resulting peak geoelectric field amplitude computed using the reference earth model was 12 V/km (see Figure7). The sampling rate for the geomagnetic field waveform is 10 seconds.¹⁰ To use this geoelectric field time series when a different earth model is applicable, it should be scaled with the appropriate supplemental conductivity scaling factor β_s .

⁹ Refer to the Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description white paper for details on the determination of the reference geomagnetic field waveform: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

¹⁰ The data file of the benchmark geomagnetic field waveform is available on the NERC GMD Task Force project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Pages/Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Task-Force-(GMDTF)-2013.aspx</u>.









Attachment 1-CAN

Attachment 1-CAN provides an alternative that any Canadian entity may use in lieu of the benchmark or supplemental GMD event(s) defined in Attachment 1 for performing GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s).

A Canadian entity may use the provisions of Attachment 1-CAN if it has regionally specific information that provides a technically justified means to re-define a 1-in-100 year GMD planning event(s) within its planning area.

Information for the Alternative Methodology

GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s) require the use of geophysical and engineering models. Canadian-specific data is available and growing. Ongoing research allows for more accurate characterization of regional parameters used in these models. Such Canadian-specific data includes geomagnetic field, earth conductivity, and geomagnetically induced current measurements that can be used for modeling and simulation validation.

Information used to calculate geoelectric fields for the benchmark and supplemental GMD events shall be clearly documented and technically justified. For example, the factors involved in the calculation of geoelectric fields are geomagnetic field variations and an earth transfer function(s).^[1] Technically justified information used in modelling geomagnetic field variations may include: technical documents produced by governmental entities such as Natural Resources Canada; technical papers published in peer-reviewed journals; and data sets gathered using sound scientific principles. An earth transfer function may rely on magnetotelluric measurements or earth conductivity models.

Modeling assumptions shall also be clearly documented and technically justified. An entity may use sensitivity analysis to identify how the assumptions affect the results.

A simplified model may be used to perform a GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), as long as the model is more conservative than a more detailed model.

When interpreting assessment results, the entity shall consider the maturity of the modeling, toolset, and techniques applied.

Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Events

The 1-in-100 year planning event shall be based on regionally specific data and technically justifiable statistical analyses (e.g., extreme value theory) and applied to the benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s).


For the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), an entity shall consider the large-scale spatial structure of the GMD event. For the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), an

^[1] The "earth transfer function" is the relationship between the electric fields and magnetic field variations at the surface of the earth.

entity shall consider the small-scale spatial structure of the GMD event (e.g., using magnetometer measurements or realistic electrojet calculations).

Guidelines and Technical Basis

The diagram below provides an overall view of the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process:



The requirements in this standard cover various aspects of the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process.

Benchmark GMD Event (Attachment 1)

The benchmark GMD event defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows that are needed to conduct a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment. The *Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description*, May 2016¹¹ white paper includes the event description, analysis, and example calculations.

Supplemental GMD Event (Attachment 1)

The supplemental GMD event defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows that are needed to conduct a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment. The *Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description*, October 2017¹² white paper includes the event description and analysis.

Requirement R2

A GMD Vulnerability Assessment requires a GIC System model, which is a dc representation of the System, to calculate GIC flow. In a GMD Vulnerability Assessment, GIC simulations are used to determine transformer Reactive Power absorption and transformer thermal response. Details for developing the GIC System model are provided in the NERC GMD Task Force guide: *Application Guide for Computing Geomagnetically-Induced Current in the Bulk Power System*, December 2013.¹³

Underground pipe-type cables present a special modeling situation in that the steel pipe that encloses the power conductors significantly reduces the geoelectric field induced into the conductors themselves, while they remain a path for GIC. Solid dielectric cables that are not

¹¹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/TPL0071RI.aspx</u>.

¹² <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

¹³ http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GIC%20Application %20Guide%202013 approved.pdf.

enclosed by a steel pipe will not experience a reduction in the induced geoelectric field. A planning entity should account for special modeling situations in the GIC system model, if applicable.

Requirement R4

The *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,¹⁴ December 2013 developed by the NERC GMD Task Force provides technical information on GMD-specific considerations for planning studies.

Requirement R5

The benchmark thermal impact assessment of transformers specified in Requirement R6 is based on GIC information for the benchmark GMD Event. This GIC information is determined by the planning entity through simulation of the GIC System model and must be provided to the entity responsible for conducting the thermal impact assessment. GIC information should be provided in accordance with Requirement R5 each time the GMD Vulnerability Assessment is performed since, by definition, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes a documented evaluation of susceptibility to localized equipment damage due to GMD.

The maximum effective GIC value provided in Part 5.1 is used for the benchmark thermal impact assessment. Only those transformers that experience an effective GIC value of 75 A or greater per phase require evaluation in Requirement R6.

GIC(t) provided in Part 5.2 is used to convert the steady state GIC flows to time-series GIC data for the benchmark thermal impact assessment of transformers. This information may be needed by one or more of the methods for performing a benchmark thermal impact assessment. Additional information is in the following section and the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,¹⁵ October 2017.

The peak GIC value of 75 Amps per phase has been shown through thermal modeling to be a conservative threshold below which the risk of exceeding known temperature limits established by technical organizations is low.

Requirement R6

The benchmark thermal impact assessment of a power transformer may be based on manufacturer-provided GIC capability curves, thermal response simulation, thermal impact screening, or other technically justified means. Approaches for conducting the assessment are presented in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper ERO Enterprise-Endorsed Implementation Guidance*¹⁶ for this requirement. This ERO-Endorsed document is posted on the NERC Compliance Guidance¹⁷ webpage.

¹⁴ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning</u> %20Guide_approved.pdf.

¹⁵ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

¹⁶ http://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/guidance/EROEndorsedImplementationGuidance/TPL-007-1 Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper.pdf.

¹⁷ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/guidance/Pages/default.aspx.</u>

Transformers are exempt from the benchmark thermal impact assessment requirement if the effective GIC value for the transformer is less than 75 A per phase, as determined by a GIC analysis of the System. Justification for this criterion is provided in the *Screening Criterion for Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,¹⁸ October 2017. A documented design specification exceeding this value is also a justifiable threshold criterion that exempts a transformer from Requirement R6.

The benchmark threshold criteria and its associated transformer thermal impact must be evaluated on the basis of effective GIC. Refer to the white papers for additional information.

Requirement R7

Technical considerations for GMD mitigation planning, including operating and equipment strategies, are available in Chapter 5 of the *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,¹⁹ December 2013. Additional information is available in the 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk-Power System,²⁰ February 2012.

Requirement R8

The *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,²¹ December 2013 developed by the NERC GMD Task Force provides technical information on GMD-specific considerations for planning studies.

The supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment process is similar to the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment process described under Requirement R4.

Requirement R9

The supplemental thermal impact assessment specified of transformers in Requirement R10 is based on GIC information for the supplemental GMD Event. This GIC information is determined by the planning entity through simulation of the GIC System model and must be provided to the entity responsible for conducting the thermal impact assessment. GIC information should be provided in accordance with Requirement R9 each time the GMD Vulnerability Assessment is performed since, by definition, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes a documented evaluation of susceptibility to localized equipment damage due to GMD.

The maximum effective GIC value provided in Part 9.1 is used for the supplemental thermal impact assessment. Only those transformers that experience an effective GIC value of 85 A or greater per phase require evaluation in Requirement R10.

GIC(t) provided in Part 9.2 is used to convert the steady state GIC flows to time-series GIC data for the supplemental thermal impact assessment of transformers. This information may be

¹⁸ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

¹⁹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning</u> <u>%20Guide_approved.pdf</u>.

²⁰ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/2012GMD.pdf</u>.

²¹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning</u> <u>%20Guide_approved.pdf</u>.

needed by one or more of the methods for performing a supplemental thermal impact assessment. Additional information is in the following section.

The peak GIC value of 85 Amps per phase has been shown through thermal modeling to be a conservative threshold below which the risk of exceeding known temperature limits established by technical organizations is low.

Requirement R10

The supplemental thermal impact assessment of a power transformer may be based on manufacturer-provided GIC capability curves, thermal response simulation, thermal impact screening, or other technically justified means. Approaches for conducting the assessment are presented in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper ERO Enterprise-Endorsed Implementation Guidance*²² discussed in the Requirement R6 section above. A later version of the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,²³ October 2017, has been developed to include updated information pertinent to the supplemental GMD event and supplemental thermal impact assessment.

Transformers are exempt from the supplemental thermal impact assessment requirement if the effective GIC value for the transformer is less than 85 A per phase, as determined by a GIC analysis of the System. Justification for this criterion is provided in the revised *Screening Criterion for Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,²⁴ October 2017. A documented design specification exceeding this value is also a justifiable threshold criterion that exempts a transformer from Requirement R10.

The supplemental threshold criteria and its associated transformer thermal impact must be evaluated on the basis of effective GIC. Refer to the white papers for additional information.

Requirement R11

Technical considerations for GIC monitoring are contained in Chapter 6 of the 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk-Power System, ²⁵ February 2012. GIC monitoring is generally performed by Hall effect transducers that are attached to the neutral of the wye-grounded transformer. Data from GIC monitors is useful for model validation and situational awareness.

Responsible entities consider the following in developing a process for obtaining GIC monitor data:

• **Monitor locations.** An entity's operating process may be constrained by location of existing GIC monitors. However, when planning for additional GIC monitoring installations consider that data from monitors located in areas found to have high GIC based on system

²² <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/guidance/EROEndorsedImplementationGuidance/TPL-007-1 Transformer Thermal Impact</u> <u>Assessment White Paper.pdf</u>.

²³ http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.

²⁴ http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.

²⁵ http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/2012GMD.pdf.


studies may provide more useful information for validation and situational awareness purposes. Conversely, data from GIC monitors that are located in the vicinity of transportation systems using direct current (e.g., subways or light rail) may be unreliable.

- Monitor specifications. Capabilities of Hall effect transducers, existing and planned, should be considered in the operating process. When planning new GIC monitor installations, consider monitor data range (e.g., -500 A through + 500 A) and ambient temperature ratings consistent with temperatures in the region in which the monitor will be installed.
- **Sampling Interval.** An entity's operating process may be constrained by capabilities of existing GIC monitors. However, when possible specify data sampling during periods of interest at a rate of 10 seconds or faster.
- **Collection Periods.** The process should specify when the entity expects GIC data to be collected. For example, collection could be required during periods where the Kp index is above a threshold, or when GIC values are above a threshold. Determining when to discontinue collecting GIC data should also be specified to maintain consistency in data collection.
- Data format. Specify time and value formats. For example, Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) (MM/DD/YYYY HH:MM:SS) and GIC Value (Ampere). Positive (+) and negative (-) signs indicate direction of GIC flow. Positive reference is flow from ground into transformer neutral. Time fields should indicate the sampled time rather than system or SCADA time if supported by the GIC monitor system.
- **Data retention.** The entity's process should specify data retention periods, for example 1 year. Data retention periods should be adequately long to support availability for the entity's model validation process and external reporting requirements, if any.
- Additional information. The entity's process should specify collection of other information necessary for making the data useful, for example monitor location and type of neutral connection (e.g., three-phase or single-phase).

Requirement R12

Magnetometers measure changes in the earth's magnetic field. Entities should obtain data from the nearest accessible magnetometer. Sources of magnetometer data include:

• Observatories such as those operated by U.S. Geological Survey and Natural Resources Canada, see figure below for locations:²⁶



- Research institutions and academic universities;
- Entities with installed magnetometers.

Entities that choose to install magnetometers should consider equipment specifications and data format protocols contained in the latest version of the *INTERMAGNET Technical Reference Manual*, Version 4.6, 2012.²⁷

²⁶ <u>http://www.intermagnet.org/index-eng.php</u>.

²⁷ http://www.intermagnet.org/publications/intermag_4-6.pdf.

Rationale

During development of TPL-007-1, text boxes were embedded within the standard to explain the rationale for various parts of the standard. The text from the rationale text boxes was moved to this section upon approval of TPL-007-1 by the NERC Board of Trustees. In developing TPL-007-2, the SDT has made changes to the sections below only when necessary for clarity. Changes are marked with brackets [].

Rationale for Applicability:

Instrumentation transformers and station service transformers do not have significant impact on geomagnetically-induced current (GIC) flows; therefore, these transformers are not included in the applicability for this standard.

Terminal voltage describes line-to-line voltage.

Rationale for R1:

In some areas, planning entities may determine that the most effective approach to conduct a GMD Vulnerability Assessment is through a regional planning organization. No requirement in the standard is intended to prohibit a collaborative approach where roles and responsibilities are determined by a planning organization made up of one or more Planning Coordinator(s).

Rationale for R2:

A GMD Vulnerability Assessment requires a GIC System model to calculate GIC flow which is used to determine transformer Reactive Power absorption and transformer thermal response. Guidance for developing the GIC System model is provided in the *Application Guide Computing Geomagnetically-Induced Current in the Bulk-Power System*,²⁸ December 2013, developed by the NERC GMD Task Force.

The System model specified in Requirement R2 is used in conducting steady state power flow analysis that accounts for the Reactive Power absorption of power transformer(s) due to GIC in the System.

The GIC System model includes all power transformer(s) with a high side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV. The model is used to calculate GIC flow in the network.

The projected System condition for GMD planning may include adjustments to the System that are executable in response to space weather information. These adjustments could include, for example, recalling or postponing maintenance outages.

The Violation Risk Factor (VRF) for Requirement R2 is changed from Medium to High. This change is for consistency with the VRF for approved standard TPL-001-4 Requirement R1, which is proposed for revision in the NERC filing dated August 29, 2014 (Docket No. RM12-1-000). NERC guidelines require consistency among Reliability Standards.

²⁸ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GIC%20Application</u> <u>%20Guide%202013_approved.pdf</u>.

Rationale for R3:

Requirement R3 allows a responsible entity the flexibility to determine the System steady state voltage criteria for System steady state performance in Table 1. Steady state voltage limits are an example of System steady state performance criteria.

Rationale for R4:

The GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes steady state power flow analysis and the supporting study or studies using the models specified in Requirement R2 that account for the effects of GIC. Performance criteria are specified in Table 1.

At least one System On-Peak Load and at least one System Off-Peak Load must be examined in the analysis.

Distribution of GMD Vulnerability Assessment results provides a means for sharing relevant information with other entities responsible for planning reliability. Results of GIC studies may affect neighboring systems and should be taken into account by planners.

The *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,²⁹ December 2013 developed by the NERC GMD Task Force provides technical information on GMD-specific considerations for planning studies. The provision of information in Requirement R4, Part 4.3, shall be subject to the legal and regulatory obligations for the disclosure of confidential and/or sensitive information.

Rationale for R5:

This GIC information is necessary for determining the thermal impact of GIC on transformers in the planning area and must be provided to entities responsible for performing the thermal impact assessment so that they can accurately perform the assessment. GIC information should be provided in accordance with Requirement R5 as part of the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process since, by definition, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes documented evaluation of susceptibility to localized equipment damage due to GMD.

The maximum effective GIC value provided in Part 5.1 is used for transformer thermal impact assessment.

GIC(t) provided in Part 5.2 can alternatively be used to convert the steady state GIC flows to timeseries GIC data for transformer thermal impact assessment. This information may be needed by one or more of the methods for performing a thermal impact assessment. Additional guidance is available in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,³⁰ October 2017.

A Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that desires GIC(t) may request it from the planning entity. The planning entity shall provide GIC(t) upon request once GIC has been calculated, but

²⁹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning</u> <u>%20Guide_approved.pdf</u>.

³⁰ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

no later than 90 calendar days after receipt of a request from the owner and after completion of Requirement R5, Part 5.1.

The provision of information in Requirement R5 shall be subject to the legal and regulatory obligations for the disclosure of confidential and/or sensitive information.

Rationale for R6:

The transformer thermal impact screening criterion has been revised from 15 A per phase to 75 A per phase [for the benchmark GMD event]. Only those transformers that experience an effective GIC value of 75 A per phase or greater require evaluation in Requirement R6. The justification is provided in the *Screening Criterion for Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,³¹ October 2017.

The thermal impact assessment may be based on manufacturer-provided GIC capability curves, thermal response simulation, thermal impact screening, or other technically justified means. The transformer thermal assessment will be repeated or reviewed using previous assessment results each time the planning entity performs a GMD Vulnerability Assessment and provides GIC information as specified in Requirement R5. Approaches for conducting the assessment are presented in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,³² October 2017.

Thermal impact assessments are provided to the planning entity, as determined in Requirement R1, so that identified issues can be included in the GMD Vulnerability Assessment (R4), and the Corrective Action Plan (R7) as necessary.

Thermal impact assessments of non-BES transformers are not required because those transformers do not have a wide-area effect on the reliability of the interconnected Transmission system.

The provision of information in Requirement R6, Part 6.4, shall be subject to the legal and regulatory obligations for the disclosure of confidential and/or sensitive information.

Rationale for R7:

The proposed requirement addresses directives in Order No. 830 for establishing Corrective Action Plan (CAP) deadlines associated with GMD Vulnerability Assessments. In Order No. 830, FERC directed revisions to TPL-007 such that CAPs are developed within one year from the completion of GMD Vulnerability Assessments (P 101). Furthermore, FERC directed establishment of implementation deadlines after the completion of the CAP as follows (P 102):

- Two years for non-hardware mitigation; and
- Four years for hardware mitigation.

The objective of Part 7.4 is to provide awareness to potentially impacted entities when implementation of planned mitigation is not achievable within the deadlines established in Part

³¹ http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.

³² <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

7.3. Examples of situations beyond the control of the responsible entity (see Section 7.4) include, but are not limited to:

- Delays resulting from regulatory/legal processes, such as permitting;
- Delays resulting from stakeholder processes required by tariff;
- Delays resulting from equipment lead times; or

Delays resulting from the inability to acquire necessary Right-of-Way.

Rationale for Table 3:

Table 3 has been revised to use the same ground model designation, FL1, as is being used by USGS. The calculated scaling factor for FL1 is 0.74. [The scaling factor associated with the benchmark GMD event for the Florida earth model (FL1) has been updated to 0.76 in TPL-007-2 based on the earth model published on the USGS public website.]

Rationale for R8 – R10:

The proposed requirements address directives in Order No. 830 for revising the benchmark GMD event used in GMD Vulnerability Assessments (P 44, P 47-49). The requirements add a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment based on the supplemental GMD event that accounts for localized peak geoelectric fields.

Rationale for R11 – R12:

The proposed requirements address directives in Order No. 830 for requiring responsible entities to collect GIC monitoring and magnetometer data as necessary to enable model validation and situational awareness (P 88; P. 90-92). GMD measurement data refers to GIC monitor data and geomagnetic field data in Requirements R11 and R12, respectively. See the Guidelines and Technical Basis section of this standard for technical information.

The objective of Requirement R11 is for entities to obtain GIC data for the Planning Coordinator's planning area or other part of the system included in the Planning Coordinator's GIC System model to inform GMD Vulnerability Assessments. Technical considerations for GIC monitoring are contained in Chapter 9 of the 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk-Power System (NERC 2012 GMD Report). GIC monitoring is generally performed by Hall effect transducers that are attached to the neutral of the transformer and measure dc current flowing through the neutral.

The objective of Requirement R12 is for entities to obtain geomagnetic field data for the Planning Coordinator's planning area to inform GMD Vulnerability Assessments. Magnetometers provide geomagnetic field data by measuring changes in the earth's magnetic field. Sources of geomagnetic field data include:

- Observatories such as those operated by U.S. Geological Survey, Natural Resources Canada, research organizations, or university research facilities;
- Installed magnetometers; and
- Commercial or third-party sources of geomagnetic field data.

Geomagnetic field data for a Planning Coordinator's planning area is obtained from one or more of the above data sources located in the Planning Coordinator's planning area, or by obtaining a geomagnetic field data product for the Planning Coordinator's planning area from a government or research organization. The geomagnetic field data product does not need to be derived from a magnetometer or observatory within the Planning Coordinator's planning area.

Standard Development Timeline

This section is maintained by the drafting team during the development of the standard and will be removed when the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees (Board).

Description of Current Draft

45-day formal comment period with initial ballot 10-day final ballot

Completed Actions	Date
Standards Committee approved Standard Authorization Request (SAR) for posting	<u>06/13/18</u>
SAR posted for comment	<u>03/30/18 –</u> <u>04/30/18</u>
28-day informal comment period	<u>08/10/18 –</u> <u>09/06/18</u>

Anticipated Actions	Date
45-day formal or informal comment period with initial ballot	<u>October 2018 –</u> <u>November 2018</u>
45-day formal or informal comment period with additional ballot	TBD
10-day final ballot	November 2018
Board adoption	February 2019

New or Modified Term(s) Used in NERC Reliability Standards

This section includes all new or modified terms used in the proposed standard that will be included in the *Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards* upon applicable regulatory approval. Terms used in the proposed standard that are already defined and are not being modified can be found in the *Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards*. The new or revised terms listed below will be presented for approval with the proposed standard. Upon Board adoption, this section will be removed.

Term(s):

None.

A. Introduction

- 1. Title: Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events
- **2. Number:** TPL-007-23
- **3. Purpose:** Establish requirements for Transmission system planned performance during geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) events.
- 4. Applicability:

4.1. Functional Entities:

- **4.1.1.** Planning Coordinator with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2;
- **4.1.2.** Transmission Planner with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2;
- 4.1.3. Transmission Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2; and
- **4.1.4.** Generator Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2.
- 4.2. Facilities:
 - **4.2.1.** Facilities that include power transformer(s) with a high side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV.
- 5. Effective Date: See Implementation Plan for TPL-007-23.
- **Background:** During a GMD event, geomagnetically-induced currents (GIC) may cause transformer hot-spot heating or damage, loss of Reactive Power sources, increased Reactive Power demand, and Misoperation(s), the combination of which may result in voltage collapse and blackout.

The only difference between TPL-007-3 and TPL-007-2 is that TPL-007-3 adds a Canadian Variance to address regulatory practices/processes within Canadian jurisdictions and to allow the use of Canadian-specific data and research to define and implement alternative GMD event(s) that achieve at least an equivalent reliability objective of that in TPL-007-2.

B. Requirements and Measures

R1. Each Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with its Transmission Planner(s), shall identify the individual and joint responsibilities of the Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner(s) in the Planning Coordinator's planning area for maintaining models, performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, and implementing process(es) to obtain GMD measurement data as specified in this standard. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- M1. Each Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with its Transmission Planners, shall provide documentation on roles and responsibilities, such as meeting minutes, agreements, copies of procedures or protocols in effect between entities or between departments of a vertically integrated system, or email correspondence that identifies an agreement has been reached on individual and joint responsibilities for maintaining models, performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, and implementing process(es) to obtain GMD measurement data in accordance with Requirement R1.
- R2. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall maintain System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M2. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence in either electronic or hard copy format that it is maintaining System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.
- **R3.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System during the GMD events described in Attachment 1. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- **M3.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence, such as electronic or hard copies of the criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System in accordance with Requirement R3.

Benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s)

- R4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall complete a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment of the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon at least once every 60 calendar months. This benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall use a study or studies based on models identified in Requirement R2, document assumptions, and document summarized results of the steady state analysis. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **4.1.** The study or studies shall include the following conditions:
 - **4.1.1.** System On-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon; and
 - **4.1.2.** System Off-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon.

- **4.2.** The study or studies shall be conducted based on the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1 to determine whether the System meets the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1.
- **4.3.** The benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, and adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later.
 - **4.3.1.** If a recipient of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment provides documented comments on the results, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- M4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have dated evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment meeting all of the requirements in Requirement R4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, and adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later, as specified in Requirement R4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments in accordance with Requirement R4.
- **R5.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide GIC flow information to be used for the benchmark thermal impact assessment of transformers specified in Requirement R6 to each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns an applicable Bulk Electric System (BES) power transformer in the planning area. The GIC flow information shall include: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **5.1.** The maximum effective GIC value for the worst case geoelectric field orientation for the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1. This value shall be provided to the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.

- **5.2.** The effective GIC time series, GIC(t), calculated using the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1 in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area. GIC(t) shall be provided within 90 calendar days of receipt of the written request and after determination of the maximum effective GIC value in Part 5.1.
- **M5.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided the maximum effective GIC values to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area as specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided GIC(t) in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.
- **R6.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A per phase or greater. The benchmark thermal impact assessment shall: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - 6.1. Be based on the effective GIC flow information provided in Requirement R5;
 - 6.2. Document assumptions used in the analysis;
 - **6.3.** Describe suggested actions and supporting analysis to mitigate the impact of GICs, if any; and
 - **6.4.** Be performed and provided to the responsible entities, as determined in Requirement R1, within 24 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1.
- **M6.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its benchmark thermal impact assessment for all of its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A per phase or greater, and shall have evidence such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided its thermal impact assessment to the responsible entities as specified in Requirement R6.
- **R7.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, that concludes through the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment conducted in Requirement R4 that their System does not meet the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1, shall develop a Corrective

Action Plan (CAP) addressing how the performance requirements will be met. The CAP shall: [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- **7.1.** List System deficiencies and the associated actions needed to achieve required System performance. Examples of such actions include:
 - Installation, modification, retirement, or removal of Transmission and generation Facilities and any associated equipment.
 - Installation, modification, or removal of Protection Systems or Remedial Action Schemes.
 - Use of Operating Procedures, specifying how long they will be needed as part of the CAP.
 - Use of Demand-Side Management, new technologies, or other initiatives.
- **7.2.** Be developed within one year of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.
- **7.3.** Include a timetable, subject to revision by the responsible entity in Part 7.4, for implementing the selected actions from Part 7.1. The timetable shall:
 - **7.3.1.** Specify implementation of non-hardware mitigation, if any, within two years of development of the CAP; and
 - **7.3.2.** Specify implementation of hardware mitigation, if any, within four years of development of the CAP.
- **7.4.** Be revised if situations beyond the control of the responsible entity determined in Requirement R1 prevent implementation of the CAP within the timetable for implementation provided in Part 7.3. The revised CAP shall document the following, and be updated at least once every 12 calendar months until implemented:
 - **7.4.1.** Circumstances causing the delay for fully or partially implementing the selected actions in Part 7.1;
 - **7.4.2.** Description of the original CAP, and any previous changes to the CAP, with the associated timetable(s) for implementing the selected actions in Part 7.1; and
 - **7.4.3.** Revisions to the selected actions in Part 7.1, if any, including utilization of Operating Procedures if applicable, and the updated timetable for implementing the selected actions.
- **7.5.** Be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission Planner(s), and functional entities referenced in the CAP within 90 calendar days of development or revision, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of development or revision, whichever is later.

- **7.5.1.** If a recipient of the CAP provides documented comments on the results, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- **M7.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, that concludes, through the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment conducted in Requirement R4, that the responsible entity's System does not meet the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1 shall have evidence such as dated electronic or hard copies of its CAP including timetable for implementing selected actions, as specified in Requirement R7. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has revised its CAP if situations beyond the responsible entity's control prevent implementation of the CAP within the timetable specified. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its CAP or relevant information, if any, (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission Planner(s), and functional entities referenced in the CAP within 90 calendar days of development or revision, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of development or revision, whichever is later as specified in Requirement R7. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its CAP within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments, in accordance with Requirement R7.

Supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s)

- R8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall complete a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment of the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon at least once every 60 calendar months. This supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall use a study or studies based on models identified in Requirement R2, document assumptions, and document summarized results of the steady state analysis. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - 8.1. The study or studies shall include the following conditions:
 - **8.1.1.** System On-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon; and
 - **8.1.2.** System Off-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon.

- **8.2.** The study or studies shall be conducted based on the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1 to determine whether the System meets the performance requirements for the steady state planning supplemental GMD event contained in Table 1.
- **8.3.** If the analysis concludes there is Cascading caused by the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1, an evaluation of possible actions designed to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the consequences and adverse impacts of the event(s) shall be conducted.
- **8.4.** The supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later.
 - **8.4.1.** If a recipient of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment provides documented comments on the results, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- M8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have dated evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment meeting all of the requirements in Requirement R8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its supplemental GMD Vulnerability: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later, as specified in Requirement R8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments in accordance with Requirement R8.
- **R9.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide GIC flow information to be used for the supplemental thermal impact assessment of transformers specified in Requirement R10 to each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns an applicable Bulk Electric System (BES) power transformer in the planning area. The GIC flow information shall include: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- **9.1.** The maximum effective GIC value for the worst case geoelectric field orientation for the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1. This value shall be provided to the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.
- **9.2.** The effective GIC time series, GIC(t), calculated using the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1 in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area. GIC(t) shall be provided within 90 calendar days of receipt of the written request and after determination of the maximum effective GIC value in Part 9.1.
- M9. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided the maximum effective GIC values to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area as specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided GIC(t) in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.
- **R10.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A per phase or greater. The supplemental thermal impact assessment shall: [*Violation Risk Factor: Medium*] [*Time Horizon: Long-term Planning*]
 - **10.1.** Be based on the effective GIC flow information provided in Requirement R9;
 - **10.2.** Document assumptions used in the analysis;
 - **10.3.** Describe suggested actions and supporting analysis to mitigate the impact of GICs, if any; and
 - **10.4.** Be performed and provided to the responsible entities, as determined in Requirement R1, within 24 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1.
- M10. Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its supplemental thermal impact assessment for all of its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A per phase or greater, and shall have evidence such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided its supplemental thermal impact assessment to the responsible entities as specified in Requirement R10.

GMD Measurement Data Processes

- **R11.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall implement a process to obtain GIC monitor data from at least one GIC monitor located in the Planning Coordinator's planning area or other part of the system included in the Planning Coordinator's GIC System model. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M11. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its GIC monitor location(s) and documentation of its process to obtain GIC monitor data in accordance with Requirement R11.
- **R12.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall implement a process to obtain geomagnetic field data for its Planning Coordinator's planning area. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- **M12.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its process to obtain geomagnetic field data for its Planning Coordinator's planning area in accordance with Requirement R12.

C. Compliance

- 1. Compliance Monitoring Process
 - **1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority:** "Compliance Enforcement Authority" means NERC or the Regional Entity, or any entity as otherwise designated by an Applicable Governmental Authority, in their respective roles of monitoring and/or enforcing compliance with mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards in their respective jurisdictions.
 - **1.2.** Evidence Retention: The following evidence retention period(s) identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full-time period since the last audit.

The applicable entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

- For Requirements R1, R2, R3, R5, R6, R9, and R10, each responsible entity shall retain documentation as evidence for five years.
- For Requirements R4 and R8, each responsible entity shall retain documentation of the current GMD Vulnerability Assessment and the preceding GMD Vulnerability Assessment.

- For Requirement R7, each responsible entity shall retain documentation as evidence for five years or until all actions in the Corrective Action Plan are completed, whichever is later.
- For Requirements R11 and R12, each responsible entity shall retain documentation as evidence for three years.
- **1.3.** Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program: As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, "Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program" refers to the identification of the processes that will be used to evaluate data or information for the purpose of assessing performance or outcomes with the associated Reliability Standard.

Table 1: Steady State Planning GMD Event

Steady State:

- a. Voltage collapse, Cascading and uncontrolled islanding shall not occur.
- b. Generation loss is acceptable as a consequence of the steady state planning GMD events.
- c. Planned System adjustments such as Transmission configuration changes and re-dispatch of generation are allowed if such adjustments are executable within the time duration applicable to the Facility Ratings.

Category	Initial Condition	Event	Interruption of Firm Transmission Service Allowed	Load Loss Allowed
Benchmark GMD Event - GMD Event with Outages	 System as may be postured in response to space weather information¹, and then GMD event² 	Reactive Power compensation devices and other Transmission Facilities removed as a result of Protection System operation or Misoperation due to harmonics during the GMD event	Yes ³	Yes ³
Supplemental GMD Event - GMD Event with Outages1. System as may be postured in response to space weather information ¹ , and then 2. GMD event ²		Reactive Power compensation devices and other Transmission Facilities removed as a result of Protection System operation or Misoperation due to harmonics during the GMD event	Yes	Yes
Table 1: Steady State Performance Footnotes				

- 1. The System condition for GMD planning may include adjustments to posture the System that are executable in response to space weather information.
- 2. The GMD conditions for the benchmark and supplemental planning events are described in Attachment 1.
- 3. Load loss as a result of manual or automatic Load shedding (e.g., UVLS) and/or curtailment of Firm Transmission Service may be used to meet BES performance requirements during studied GMD conditions. The likelihood and magnitude of Load loss or curtailment of Firm Transmission Service should be minimized.

Violation Severity Levels

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
R1.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with its Transmission Planner(s), failed to determine and identify individual or joint responsibilities of the Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner(s) in the Planning Coordinator's planning area for maintaining models, performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, and implementing process(es) to obtain GMD measurement data as specified in this standard.	
R2.	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not maintain either System models or GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the studies	The responsible entity did not maintain both System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the studies	

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
			needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.	needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.	
R3.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not have criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System during the GMD events described in Attachment 1 as required.	
R4.	The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 60 calendar months and less than or equal to 64 calendar months since the last benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	The responsible entity's completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy one of the elements listed in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.3; OR The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 64 calendar months and less than or equal to 68 calendar months since the	The responsible entity's completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy two of the elements listed in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.3; OR The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 68 calendar months and less than or equal to 72 calendar months since the	The responsible entity's completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy three of the elements listed in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.3; OR The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 72 calendar months since the last benchmark	

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
		last benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	last benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	GMD Vulnerability Assessment; OR The responsible entity does not have a completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	
R5.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 90 calendar days and less than or equal to 100 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 100 calendar days and less than or equal to 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity did not provide the maximum effective GIC value to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area; OR The responsible entity did not provide the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), upon written request.	
R6.	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for 5% or less or one of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for more than 5% up to (and including) 10% or two of its solely owned and jointly	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for more than 10% up to (and including) 15% or three of its solely owned and	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for more than 15% or more than three of its solely owned and jointly owned	

R #	Violation Severity Levels			
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
	transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 24 calendar months and less than or equal to 26 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1.	owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 26 calendar months and less than or equal to 28 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1; OR The responsible entity failed to include one of the	jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 28 calendar months and less than or equal to 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1; OR The responsible entity failed to include two of the	applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1; OR The responsible entity failed to include three of the required elements as listed

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
		required elements as listed in Requirement R6, Parts 6.1 through 6.3.	required elements as listed in Requirement R6, Parts 6.1 through 6.3.	in Requirement R6, Parts 6.1 through 6.3.	
R7.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with one of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with two of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with three of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with four or more of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5; OR The responsible entity did not have a Corrective Action Plan as required by Requirement R7.	
R8.	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy one of elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy two of elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy three of the elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy four of the elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
	than 60 calendar months and less than or equal to 64 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	than 64 calendar months and less than or equal to 68 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	than 68 calendar months and less than or equal to 72 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	than 72 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment; OR The responsible entity does not have a completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	
R9.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 90 calendar days and less than or equal to 100 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 100 calendar days and less than or equal to 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity did not provide the maximum effective GIC value to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area; OR The responsible entity did not provide the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), upon written request.	
R10.	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for 5% or less or one of its	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for more than 5% up to (and	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for more than 10% up to	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for more than 15% or more	

R #	Lower VSL		Violation Severity Levels			
	LOWEI VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL		
o ti g n v R 8 C T c tl fc jc p tl v R 8 b c tl n ir n	solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and ointly owned applicable BES ower transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase out did so more than 24 calendar months and less than or equal to 26 calendar months of receiving GIC flow nformation specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1.	including) 10% or two of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 26 calendar months and less than or equal to 28 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1	(and including) 15% or three of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 28 calendar months and less than or equal to 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1;	than three of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1; OR		

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
		The responsible entity failed to include one of the required elements as listed in Requirement R10, Parts 10.1 through 10.3.	The responsible entity failed to include two of the required elements as listed in Requirement R10, Parts 10.1 through 10.3.	The responsible entity failed to include three of the required elements as listed in Requirement R10, Parts 10.1 through 10.3.	
R11.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not implement a process to obtain GIC monitor data from at least one GIC monitor located in the Planning Coordinator's planning area or other part of the system included in the Planning Coordinator's GIC System Model.	
R12.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not implement a process to obtain geomagnetic field data for its Planning Coordinator's planning area.	

D. Regional Variances

D.A. Regional Variance for Canadian Jurisdictions

This Variance shall be applicable in Canada.

<u>All references to "Attachment 1" in the standard are replaced with "Attachment 1 or</u> <u>Attachment 1-CAN."</u>

In addition, this Variance replaces Requirement R7, Part 7.3 with the following:

- **D.A.7.3.** Include a timetable, subject to revision by the responsible entity in Part 7.4, for implementing the selected actions from Part 7.1. The timetable shall:
 - D.A.7.3.1. Specify implementation of non-hardware mitigation, if any, within two years of the later of the development of the CAP or receipt of regulatory approvals, if required; and
 - **D.A.7.3.2.** Specify implementation of hardware mitigation, if any, within four years of the later of the development of the CAP or receipt of regulatory approvals, if required.

E. Associated Documents

Attachment 1

Attachment 1-CAN

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	December 17, 2014	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	New
2	November 9, 2017	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	Revised to respond to directives in FERC Order No. 830.

Attachment 1

Calculating Geoelectric Fields for the Benchmark and Supplemental GMD Events

The benchmark GMD event¹ defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows that are needed to conduct a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment. It is composed of the following elements: (1) a reference peak geoelectric field amplitude of 8 V/km derived from statistical analysis of historical magnetometer data; (2) scaling factors to account for local geomagnetic latitude; (3) scaling factors to account for local earth conductivity; and (4) a reference geomagnetic field time series or waveform to facilitate time-domain analysis of GMD impact on equipment.

The supplemental GMD event is composed of similar elements as described above, except (1) the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude is 12 V/km over a localized area; and (2) the geomagnetic field time series or waveform includes a local enhancement in the waveform.²

The regional geoelectric field peak amplitude used in GMD Vulnerability Assessment, E_{peak} , can be obtained from the reference geoelectric field value of 8 V/km for the benchmark GMD event (1) or 12 V/km for the supplemental GMD event (2) using the following relationships:

$$E_{peak} = 8 \times \alpha \times \beta_b (V/km) \tag{1}$$

$$E_{peak} = 12 \times \alpha \times \beta_s (V/km)$$
⁽²⁾

where, α is the scaling factor to account for local geomagnetic latitude, and β is a scaling factor to account for the local earth conductivity structure. Subscripts *b* and *s* for the β scaling factor denote association with the benchmark or supplemental GMD events, respectively.

Scaling the Geomagnetic Field

The benchmark and supplemental GMD events are defined for geomagnetic latitude of 60° and must be scaled to account for regional differences based on geomagnetic latitude. Table 2 provides a scaling factor correlating peak geoelectric field to geomagnetic latitude. Alternatively, the scaling factor α is computed with the empirical expression:

$$\alpha = 0.001 \times e^{(0.115 \times L)} \tag{3}$$

where, L is the geomagnetic latitude in degrees and $0.1 \le \alpha \le 1$.

¹ The Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description, May 2016 is available on the Related Information webpage for TPL-007-1: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/TPL0071RD/Benchmark_clean_May12_complete.pdf</u>.

² The extent of local enhancements is on the order of 100 km in North-South (latitude) direction but longer in East-West (longitude) direction. The local enhancement in the geomagnetic field occurs over the time period of 2-5 minutes. Additional information is available in the Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description, October 2017 white paper on the Project 2013-03 Geomagnetic Disturbance Mitigation project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

For large planning areas that cover more than one scaling factor from Table 2, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment should be based on a peak geoelectric field that is:

- calculated by using the most conservative (largest) value for α; or
- calculated assuming a non-uniform or piecewise uniform geomagnetic field.

Table 2: Geomagnetic Field Scaling Factors for the Benchmark and Supplemental GMD Events		
Geomagnetic Latitude (Degrees)	Scaling Factor1 (α)	
≤ 40	0.10	
45	0.2	
50	0.3	
54	0.5	
56	0.6	
57	0.7	
58	0.8	
59	0.9	
≥ 60	1.0	

Scaling the Geoelectric Field

The benchmark GMD event is defined for the reference Quebec earth model described in Table 4. The peak geoelectric field, E_{peak}, used in a GMD Vulnerability Assessment may be obtained by either:

- Calculating the geoelectric field for the ground conductivity in the planning area and the reference geomagnetic field time series scaled according to geomagnetic latitude, using a procedure such as the plane wave method described in the NERC GMD Task Force GIC Application Guide;³ or
- Using the earth conductivity scaling factor β from Table 3 that correlates to the ground conductivity map in Figure 1 or Figure 2. Along with the scaling factor α from equation (3) or Table 2, β is applied to the reference geoelectric field using equation (1 or 2, as applicable) to obtain the regional geoelectric field peak amplitude E_{peak} to be used in GMD Vulnerability Assessments. When a ground conductivity model is not available, the planning entity should use the largest β factor of adjacent physiographic regions or a technically justified value.

³ Available at the NERC GMD Task Force project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Pages/Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Task-Force-(GMDTF)-2013.aspx</u>.

The earth models used to calculate Table 3 for the United States were obtained from publicly available information published on the U. S. Geological Survey website.⁴ The models used to calculate Table 3 for Canada were obtained from Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) and reflect the average structure for large regions. A planner can also use specific earth model(s) with documented justification and the reference geomagnetic field time series to calculate the β factor(s) as follows:

$$\beta_b = E/8$$
 for the benchmark GMD event (4)

$$\beta_s = E/12$$
 for the supplemental GMD (5)

where, *E* is the absolute value of peak geoelectric in V/km obtained from the technically justified earth model and the reference geomagnetic field time series.

For large planning areas that span more than one β scaling factor, the most conservative (largest) value for β may be used in determining the peak geoelectric field to obtain conservative results. Alternatively, a planner could perform analysis using a non-uniform or piecewise uniform geoelectric field.

Applying the Localized Peak Geoelectric Field in the Supplemental GMD Event

The peak geoelectric field of the supplemental GMD event occurs in a localized area.⁵ Planners have flexibility to determine how to apply the localized peak geoelectric field over the planning area in performing GIC calculations. Examples of approaches are:

- Apply the peak geoelectric field (12 V/km scaled to the planning area) over the entire planning area;
- Apply a spatially limited (12 V/km scaled to the planning area) peak geoelectric field (e.g., 100 km in North-South latitude direction and 500 km in East-West longitude direction) over a portion(s) of the system, and apply the benchmark GMD event over the rest of the system; or
- Other methods to adjust the benchmark GMD event analysis to account for the localized geoelectric field enhancement of the supplemental GMD event.

⁴ Available at <u>http://geomag.usgs.gov/conductivity/</u>.

⁵ See the Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Description white paper located on the Project 2013-03 Geomagnetic Disturbance Mitigation project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.




Figure 1: Physiographic Regions of the Continental United States⁶



Figure 2: Physiographic Regions of Canada

⁶ Additional map detail is available at the U.S. Geological Survey: <u>http://geomag.usgs.gov/</u>.

Table 3: Geoelectric Field Scaling Factors				
Earth model	Scaling Factor Benchmark Event (β _b)	Scaling Factor Supplemental Event (β _s)		
AK1A	0.56	0.51		
AK1B	0.56	0.51		
AP1	0.33	0.30		
AP2	0.82	0.78		
BR1	0.22	0.22		
CL1	0.76	0.73		
CO1	0.27	0.25		
CP1	0.81	0.77		
CP2	0.95	0.86		
FL1	0.76	0.73		
CS1	0.41	0.37		
IP1	0.94	0.90		
IP2	0.28	0.25		
IP3	0.93	0.90		
IP4	0.41	0.35		
NE1	0.81	0.77		
PB1	0.62	0.55		
PB2	0.46	0.39		
PT1	1.17	1.19		
SL1	0.53	0.49		
SU1	0.93	0.90		
BOU	0.28	0.24		
FBK	0.56	0.56		
PRU	0.21	0.22		
BC	0.67	0.62		
PRAIRIES	0.96	0.88		
SHIELD	1.0	1.0		
ATLANTIC	0.79	0.76		

Rationale: Scaling factors in Table 3 are dependent upon the frequency content of the reference storm. Consequently, the benchmark GMD event and the supplemental GMD event may produce different scaling factors for a given earth model.

The scaling factor associated with the benchmark GMD event for the Florida earth model (FL1) has been updated based on the earth model published on the USGS public website.

Table 4: Reference Earth Model (Quebec)			
Layer Thickness (km)	Resistivity (Ω-m)		
15	20,000		
10	200		
125	1,000		
200	100		
∞	3		

Reference Geomagnetic Field Time Series or Waveform for the Benchmark GMD $\mathsf{Event}^{\scriptscriptstyle 7}$

The geomagnetic field measurement record of the March 13-14 1989 GMD event, measured at the NRCan Ottawa geomagnetic observatory, is the basis for the reference geomagnetic field waveform to be used to calculate the GIC time series, GIC(t), required for transformer thermal impact assessment.

The geomagnetic latitude of the Ottawa geomagnetic observatory is 55°; therefore, the amplitudes of the geomagnetic field measurement data were scaled up to the 60° reference geomagnetic latitude (see Figure 3) such that the resulting peak geoelectric field amplitude computed using the reference earth model was 8 V/km (see Figures 4 and 5). The sampling rate for the geomagnetic field waveform is 10 seconds.⁸ To use this geoelectric field time series when a different earth model is applicable, it should be scaled with the appropriate benchmark conductivity scaling factor β_b .

⁷ Refer to the Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description white paper for details on the determination of the reference geomagnetic field waveform: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/TPL0071RI.aspx</u>.

⁸ The data file of the benchmark geomagnetic field waveform is available on the Related Information webpage for TPL-007-1: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/TPL0071RI.aspx</u>.




Figure 3: Benchmark Geomagnetic Field Waveform Red B_n (Northward), Blue B_e (Eastward)





Figure 4: Benchmark Geoelectric Field Waveform E_E (Eastward)





Reference Geomagnetic Field Time Series or Waveform for the Supplemental GMD Event^9

The geomagnetic field measurement record of the March 13-14, 1989 GMD event, measured at the NRCan Ottawa geomagnetic observatory, is the basis for the reference geomagnetic field waveform to be used to calculate the GIC time series, GIC(t), required for transformer thermal impact assessment for the supplemental GMD event. The supplemental GMD event waveform differs from the benchmark GMD event waveform in that the supplemental GMD event waveform has a local enhancement.

The geomagnetic latitude of the Ottawa geomagnetic observatory is 55°; therefore, the amplitudes of the geomagnetic field measurement data were scaled up to the 60° reference geomagnetic latitude (see Figure 6) such that the resulting peak geoelectric field amplitude computed using the reference earth model was 12 V/km (see Figure7). The sampling rate for the geomagnetic field waveform is 10 seconds.¹⁰ To use this geoelectric field time series when a different earth model is applicable, it should be scaled with the appropriate supplemental conductivity scaling factor β_s .

⁹ Refer to the Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description white paper for details on the determination of the reference geomagnetic field waveform: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

¹⁰ The data file of the benchmark geomagnetic field waveform is available on the NERC GMD Task Force project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Pages/Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Task-Force-(GMDTF)-2013.aspx</u>.




Figure 6: Supplemental Geomagnetic Field Waveform Red B_N (Northward), Blue B_E (Eastward)




Figure 7: Supplemental Geoelectric Field Waveform Blue E_N (Northward), Red E_E (Eastward)

Attachment 1-CAN

Attachment 1-CAN provides an alternative that any Canadian entity may use in lieu of the benchmark or supplemental GMD event(s) defined in Attachment 1 for performing GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s).

A Canadian entity may use the provisions of Attachment 1-CAN if it has regionally specific information that provides a technically justified means to re-define a 1-in-100 year GMD planning event(s) within its planning area.

Information for the Alternative Methodology

GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s) require the use of geophysical and engineering models. Canadian-specific data is available and growing. Ongoing research allows for more accurate characterization of regional parameters used in these models. Such Canadian-specific data includes geomagnetic field, earth conductivity, and geomagnetically induced current measurements that can be used for modeling and simulation validation.

Information used to calculate geoelectric fields for the benchmark and supplemental GMD events shall be clearly documented and technically justified. For example, the factors involved in the calculation of geoelectric fields are geomagnetic field variations and an earth transfer function(s).^[1] Technically justified information used in modelling geomagnetic field variations may include: technical documents produced by governmental entities such as Natural Resources Canada; technical papers published in peer-reviewed journals; and data sets gathered using sound scientific principles. An earth transfer function may rely on magnetotelluric measurements or earth conductivity models.

Modeling assumptions shall also be clearly documented and technically justified. An entity may use sensitivity analysis to identify how the assumptions affect the results.

A simplified model may be used to perform a GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), as long as the model is more conservative than a more detailed model.

When interpreting assessment results, the entity shall consider the maturity of the modeling, toolset, and techniques applied.

Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Events

The 1-in-100 year planning event shall be based on regionally specific data and technically justifiable statistical analyses (e.g., extreme value theory) and applied to the benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s).


For the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), an entity shall consider the large-scale spatial structure of the GMD event. For the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), an

^[1] The "earth transfer function" is the relationship between the electric fields and magnetic field variations at the surface of the <u>earth.</u>

entity shall consider the small-scale spatial structure of the GMD event (e.g., using magnetometer measurements or realistic electrojet calculations).

Guidelines and Technical Basis

The diagram below provides an overall view of the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process:



The requirements in this standard cover various aspects of the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process.

Benchmark GMD Event (Attachment 1)

The benchmark GMD event defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows that are needed to conduct a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment. The *Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description*, May 2016¹¹ white paper includes the event description, analysis, and example calculations.

Supplemental GMD Event (Attachment 1)

The supplemental GMD event defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows that are needed to conduct a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment. The *Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description*, October 2017¹² white paper includes the event description and analysis.

Requirement R2

A GMD Vulnerability Assessment requires a GIC System model, which is a dc representation of the System, to calculate GIC flow. In a GMD Vulnerability Assessment, GIC simulations are used to determine transformer Reactive Power absorption and transformer thermal response. Details for developing the GIC System model are provided in the NERC GMD Task Force guide: *Application Guide for Computing Geomagnetically-Induced Current in the Bulk Power System*, December 2013.¹³

Underground pipe-type cables present a special modeling situation in that the steel pipe that encloses the power conductors significantly reduces the geoelectric field induced into the conductors themselves, while they remain a path for GIC. Solid dielectric cables that are not

¹¹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/TPL0071RI.aspx</u>.

¹² <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

¹³ http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GIC%20Application %20Guide%202013 approved.pdf.

enclosed by a steel pipe will not experience a reduction in the induced geoelectric field. A planning entity should account for special modeling situations in the GIC system model, if applicable.

Requirement R4

The *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,¹⁴ December 2013 developed by the NERC GMD Task Force provides technical information on GMD-specific considerations for planning studies.

Requirement R5

The benchmark thermal impact assessment of transformers specified in Requirement R6 is based on GIC information for the benchmark GMD Event. This GIC information is determined by the planning entity through simulation of the GIC System model and must be provided to the entity responsible for conducting the thermal impact assessment. GIC information should be provided in accordance with Requirement R5 each time the GMD Vulnerability Assessment is performed since, by definition, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes a documented evaluation of susceptibility to localized equipment damage due to GMD.

The maximum effective GIC value provided in Part 5.1 is used for the benchmark thermal impact assessment. Only those transformers that experience an effective GIC value of 75 A or greater per phase require evaluation in Requirement R6.

GIC(t) provided in Part 5.2 is used to convert the steady state GIC flows to time-series GIC data for the benchmark thermal impact assessment of transformers. This information may be needed by one or more of the methods for performing a benchmark thermal impact assessment. Additional information is in the following section and the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,¹⁵ October 2017.

The peak GIC value of 75 Amps per phase has been shown through thermal modeling to be a conservative threshold below which the risk of exceeding known temperature limits established by technical organizations is low.

Requirement R6

The benchmark thermal impact assessment of a power transformer may be based on manufacturer-provided GIC capability curves, thermal response simulation, thermal impact screening, or other technically justified means. Approaches for conducting the assessment are presented in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper ERO Enterprise-Endorsed Implementation Guidance*¹⁶ for this requirement. This ERO-Endorsed document is posted on the NERC Compliance Guidance¹⁷ webpage.

¹⁴ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning</u> <u>%20Guide_approved.pdf</u>.

¹⁵ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

¹⁶ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/guidance/EROEndorsedImplementationGuidance/TPL-007-1</u> <u>Transformer</u> <u>Thermal</u> <u>Impact</u> <u>Assessment</u> <u>White</u> <u>Paper.pdf</u>.

¹⁷ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/guidance/Pages/default.aspx</u>.

Transformers are exempt from the benchmark thermal impact assessment requirement if the effective GIC value for the transformer is less than 75 A per phase, as determined by a GIC analysis of the System. Justification for this criterion is provided in the *Screening Criterion for Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,¹⁸ October 2017. A documented design specification exceeding this value is also a justifiable threshold criterion that exempts a transformer from Requirement R6.

The benchmark threshold criteria and its associated transformer thermal impact must be evaluated on the basis of effective GIC. Refer to the white papers for additional information.

Requirement R7

Technical considerations for GMD mitigation planning, including operating and equipment strategies, are available in Chapter 5 of the *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,¹⁹ December 2013. Additional information is available in the 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk-Power System,²⁰ February 2012.

Requirement R8

The *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,²¹ December 2013 developed by the NERC GMD Task Force provides technical information on GMD-specific considerations for planning studies.

The supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment process is similar to the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment process described under Requirement R4.

Requirement R9

The supplemental thermal impact assessment specified of transformers in Requirement R10 is based on GIC information for the supplemental GMD Event. This GIC information is determined by the planning entity through simulation of the GIC System model and must be provided to the entity responsible for conducting the thermal impact assessment. GIC information should be provided in accordance with Requirement R9 each time the GMD Vulnerability Assessment is performed since, by definition, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes a documented evaluation of susceptibility to localized equipment damage due to GMD.

The maximum effective GIC value provided in Part 9.1 is used for the supplemental thermal impact assessment. Only those transformers that experience an effective GIC value of 85 A or greater per phase require evaluation in Requirement R10.

GIC(t) provided in Part 9.2 is used to convert the steady state GIC flows to time-series GIC data for the supplemental thermal impact assessment of transformers. This information may be

¹⁸ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

¹⁹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning</u> <u>%20Guide_approved.pdf</u>.

²⁰ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/2012GMD.pdf.</u>

²¹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning</u> <u>%20Guide_approved.pdf</u>.

needed by one or more of the methods for performing a supplemental thermal impact assessment. Additional information is in the following section.

The peak GIC value of 85 Amps per phase has been shown through thermal modeling to be a conservative threshold below which the risk of exceeding known temperature limits established by technical organizations is low.

Requirement R10

The supplemental thermal impact assessment of a power transformer may be based on manufacturer-provided GIC capability curves, thermal response simulation, thermal impact screening, or other technically justified means. Approaches for conducting the assessment are presented in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper ERO Enterprise-Endorsed Implementation Guidance*²² discussed in the Requirement R6 section above. A later version of the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,²³ October 2017, has been developed to include updated information pertinent to the supplemental GMD event and supplemental thermal impact assessment.

Transformers are exempt from the supplemental thermal impact assessment requirement if the effective GIC value for the transformer is less than 85 A per phase, as determined by a GIC analysis of the System. Justification for this criterion is provided in the revised *Screening Criterion for Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,²⁴ October 2017. A documented design specification exceeding this value is also a justifiable threshold criterion that exempts a transformer from Requirement R10.

The supplemental threshold criteria and its associated transformer thermal impact must be evaluated on the basis of effective GIC. Refer to the white papers for additional information.

Requirement R11

Technical considerations for GIC monitoring are contained in Chapter 6 of the 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk-Power System, ²⁵ February 2012. GIC monitoring is generally performed by Hall effect transducers that are attached to the neutral of the wye-grounded transformer. Data from GIC monitors is useful for model validation and situational awareness.

Responsible entities consider the following in developing a process for obtaining GIC monitor data:

• **Monitor locations.** An entity's operating process may be constrained by location of existing GIC monitors. However, when planning for additional GIC monitoring installations consider that data from monitors located in areas found to have high GIC based on system

²² <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/guidance/EROEndorsedImplementationGuidance/TPL-007-1 Transformer Thermal Impact</u> <u>Assessment_White_Paper.pdf</u>.

²³ http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.

²⁴ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

²⁵ http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/2012GMD.pdf.


studies may provide more useful information for validation and situational awareness purposes. Conversely, data from GIC monitors that are located in the vicinity of transportation systems using direct current (e.g., subways or light rail) may be unreliable.

- Monitor specifications. Capabilities of Hall effect transducers, existing and planned, should be considered in the operating process. When planning new GIC monitor installations, consider monitor data range (e.g., -500 A through + 500 A) and ambient temperature ratings consistent with temperatures in the region in which the monitor will be installed.
- **Sampling Interval.** An entity's operating process may be constrained by capabilities of existing GIC monitors. However, when possible specify data sampling during periods of interest at a rate of 10 seconds or faster.
- **Collection Periods.** The process should specify when the entity expects GIC data to be collected. For example, collection could be required during periods where the Kp index is above a threshold, or when GIC values are above a threshold. Determining when to discontinue collecting GIC data should also be specified to maintain consistency in data collection.
- Data format. Specify time and value formats. For example, Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) (MM/DD/YYYY HH:MM:SS) and GIC Value (Ampere). Positive (+) and negative (-) signs indicate direction of GIC flow. Positive reference is flow from ground into transformer neutral. Time fields should indicate the sampled time rather than system or SCADA time if supported by the GIC monitor system.
- **Data retention.** The entity's process should specify data retention periods, for example 1 year. Data retention periods should be adequately long to support availability for the entity's model validation process and external reporting requirements, if any.
- Additional information. The entity's process should specify collection of other information necessary for making the data useful, for example monitor location and type of neutral connection (e.g., three-phase or single-phase).

Requirement R12

Magnetometers measure changes in the earth's magnetic field. Entities should obtain data from the nearest accessible magnetometer. Sources of magnetometer data include:

• Observatories such as those operated by U.S. Geological Survey and Natural Resources Canada, see figure below for locations:²⁶



- Research institutions and academic universities;
- Entities with installed magnetometers.

Entities that choose to install magnetometers should consider equipment specifications and data format protocols contained in the latest version of the *INTERMAGNET Technical Reference Manual*, Version 4.6, 2012.²⁷

²⁶ <u>http://www.intermagnet.org/index-eng.php</u>.

²⁷ <u>http://www.intermagnet.org/publications/intermag_4-6.pdf</u>.

Rationale

During development of TPL-007-1, text boxes were embedded within the standard to explain the rationale for various parts of the standard. The text from the rationale text boxes was moved to this section upon approval of TPL-007-1 by the NERC Board of Trustees. In developing TPL-007-2, the SDT has made changes to the sections below only when necessary for clarity. Changes are marked with brackets [].

Rationale for Applicability:

Instrumentation transformers and station service transformers do not have significant impact on geomagnetically-induced current (GIC) flows; therefore, these transformers are not included in the applicability for this standard.

Terminal voltage describes line-to-line voltage.

Rationale for R1:

In some areas, planning entities may determine that the most effective approach to conduct a GMD Vulnerability Assessment is through a regional planning organization. No requirement in the standard is intended to prohibit a collaborative approach where roles and responsibilities are determined by a planning organization made up of one or more Planning Coordinator(s).

Rationale for R2:

A GMD Vulnerability Assessment requires a GIC System model to calculate GIC flow which is used to determine transformer Reactive Power absorption and transformer thermal response. Guidance for developing the GIC System model is provided in the *Application Guide Computing Geomagnetically-Induced Current in the Bulk-Power System*,²⁸ December 2013, developed by the NERC GMD Task Force.

The System model specified in Requirement R2 is used in conducting steady state power flow analysis that accounts for the Reactive Power absorption of power transformer(s) due to GIC in the System.

The GIC System model includes all power transformer(s) with a high side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV. The model is used to calculate GIC flow in the network.

The projected System condition for GMD planning may include adjustments to the System that are executable in response to space weather information. These adjustments could include, for example, recalling or postponing maintenance outages.

The Violation Risk Factor (VRF) for Requirement R2 is changed from Medium to High. This change is for consistency with the VRF for approved standard TPL-001-4 Requirement R1, which is proposed for revision in the NERC filing dated August 29, 2014 (Docket No. RM12-1-000). NERC guidelines require consistency among Reliability Standards.

²⁸ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GIC%20Application</u> <u>%20Guide%202013_approved.pdf</u>.

Rationale for R3:

Requirement R3 allows a responsible entity the flexibility to determine the System steady state voltage criteria for System steady state performance in Table 1. Steady state voltage limits are an example of System steady state performance criteria.

Rationale for R4:

The GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes steady state power flow analysis and the supporting study or studies using the models specified in Requirement R2 that account for the effects of GIC. Performance criteria are specified in Table 1.

At least one System On-Peak Load and at least one System Off-Peak Load must be examined in the analysis.

Distribution of GMD Vulnerability Assessment results provides a means for sharing relevant information with other entities responsible for planning reliability. Results of GIC studies may affect neighboring systems and should be taken into account by planners.

The *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,²⁹ December 2013 developed by the NERC GMD Task Force provides technical information on GMD-specific considerations for planning studies. The provision of information in Requirement R4, Part 4.3, shall be subject to the legal and regulatory obligations for the disclosure of confidential and/or sensitive information.

Rationale for R5:

This GIC information is necessary for determining the thermal impact of GIC on transformers in the planning area and must be provided to entities responsible for performing the thermal impact assessment so that they can accurately perform the assessment. GIC information should be provided in accordance with Requirement R5 as part of the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process since, by definition, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes documented evaluation of susceptibility to localized equipment damage due to GMD.

The maximum effective GIC value provided in Part 5.1 is used for transformer thermal impact assessment.

GIC(t) provided in Part 5.2 can alternatively be used to convert the steady state GIC flows to timeseries GIC data for transformer thermal impact assessment. This information may be needed by one or more of the methods for performing a thermal impact assessment. Additional guidance is available in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,³⁰ October 2017.

A Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that desires GIC(t) may request it from the planning entity. The planning entity shall provide GIC(t) upon request once GIC has been calculated, but

²⁹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning</u> %20Guide_approved.pdf.

³⁰ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

no later than 90 calendar days after receipt of a request from the owner and after completion of Requirement R5, Part 5.1.

The provision of information in Requirement R5 shall be subject to the legal and regulatory obligations for the disclosure of confidential and/or sensitive information.

Rationale for R6:

The transformer thermal impact screening criterion has been revised from 15 A per phase to 75 A per phase [for the benchmark GMD event]. Only those transformers that experience an effective GIC value of 75 A per phase or greater require evaluation in Requirement R6. The justification is provided in the *Screening Criterion for Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,³¹ October 2017.

The thermal impact assessment may be based on manufacturer-provided GIC capability curves, thermal response simulation, thermal impact screening, or other technically justified means. The transformer thermal assessment will be repeated or reviewed using previous assessment results each time the planning entity performs a GMD Vulnerability Assessment and provides GIC information as specified in Requirement R5. Approaches for conducting the assessment are presented in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,³² October 2017.

Thermal impact assessments are provided to the planning entity, as determined in Requirement R1, so that identified issues can be included in the GMD Vulnerability Assessment (R4), and the Corrective Action Plan (R7) as necessary.

Thermal impact assessments of non-BES transformers are not required because those transformers do not have a wide-area effect on the reliability of the interconnected Transmission system.

The provision of information in Requirement R6, Part 6.4, shall be subject to the legal and regulatory obligations for the disclosure of confidential and/or sensitive information.

Rationale for R7:

The proposed requirement addresses directives in Order No. 830 for establishing Corrective Action Plan (CAP) deadlines associated with GMD Vulnerability Assessments. In Order No. 830, FERC directed revisions to TPL-007 such that CAPs are developed within one year from the completion of GMD Vulnerability Assessments (P 101). Furthermore, FERC directed establishment of implementation deadlines after the completion of the CAP as follows (P 102):

- Two years for non-hardware mitigation; and
- Four years for hardware mitigation.

The objective of Part 7.4 is to provide awareness to potentially impacted entities when implementation of planned mitigation is not achievable within the deadlines established in Part

³¹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

³² <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

7.3. Examples of situations beyond the control of the of the responsible entity (see Section 7.4) include, but are not limited to:

- Delays resulting from regulatory/legal processes, such as permitting;
- Delays resulting from stakeholder processes required by tariff;
- Delays resulting from equipment lead times; or

Delays resulting from the inability to acquire necessary Right-of-Way.

Rationale for Table 3:

Table 3 has been revised to use the same ground model designation, FL1, as is being used by USGS. The calculated scaling factor for FL1 is 0.74. [The scaling factor associated with the benchmark GMD event for the Florida earth model (FL1) has been updated to 0.76 in TPL-007-2 based on the earth model published on the USGS public website.]

Rationale for R8 – R10:

The proposed requirements address directives in Order No. 830 for revising the benchmark GMD event used in GMD Vulnerability Assessments (P 44, P 47-49). The requirements add a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment based on the supplemental GMD event that accounts for localized peak geoelectric fields.

Rationale for R11 – R12:

The proposed requirements address directives in Order No. 830 for requiring responsible entities to collect GIC monitoring and magnetometer data as necessary to enable model validation and situational awareness (P 88; P. 90-92). GMD measurement data refers to GIC monitor data and geomagnetic field data in Requirements R11 and R12, respectively. See the Guidelines and Technical Basis section of this standard for technical information.

The objective of Requirement R11 is for entities to obtain GIC data for the Planning Coordinator's planning area or other part of the system included in the Planning Coordinator's GIC System model to inform GMD Vulnerability Assessments. Technical considerations for GIC monitoring are contained in Chapter 9 of the 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk-Power System (NERC 2012 GMD Report). GIC monitoring is generally performed by Hall effect transducers that are attached to the neutral of the transformer and measure dc current flowing through the neutral.

The objective of Requirement R12 is for entities to obtain geomagnetic field data for the Planning Coordinator's planning area to inform GMD Vulnerability Assessments. Magnetometers provide geomagnetic field data by measuring changes in the earth's magnetic field. Sources of geomagnetic field data include:

- Observatories such as those operated by U.S. Geological Survey, Natural Resources Canada, research organizations, or university research facilities;
- Installed magnetometers; and
- Commercial or third-party sources of geomagnetic field data.

Geomagnetic field data for a Planning Coordinator's planning area is obtained from one or more of the above data sources located in the Planning Coordinator's planning area, or by obtaining a geomagnetic field data product for the Planning Coordinator's planning area from a government or research organization. The geomagnetic field data product does not need to be derived from a magnetometer or observatory within the Planning Coordinator's planning area.

NERC

Implementation Plan

Project 2018-01 Canadian-Specific Revisions to TPL-007-2

Applicable Standard(s)

• TPL-007-3- Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events

Requested Retirement(s)

- TPL-007-1 Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events
- TPL-007-2 Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events

Prerequisite Standard(s)

None

Applicable Entities

- Planning Coordinator with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard;
- Transmission Planner with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard;
- Transmission Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard; and
- Generator Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard.

Section 4.2 states that the standard applies to facilities that include power transformer(s) with a high side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV.

Terms in the NERC Glossary of Terms

There are no new, modified, or retired terms.

Background

In January 2018, NERC submitted for regulatory approval Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. This standard was developed in response to certain directives of the United States Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) from Order No. 830 (September 22, 2016), approving Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 and its associated five-year Implementation Plan and directing certain modifications.

In May 2018, a Standard Authorization Request was submitted identifying a need for a Canadianspecific Variance to the TPL-007-2 standard. Specifically, the Standard Authorization Request sought to provide an option for Canadian Registered Entities to define alternative Benchmark GMD Events and/or Supplemental GMD Events specific to their unique topology.



Reliability Standard TPL-007-3 adds a Variance for Canadian entities. The Canadian Variance replaces, in its entirety, Requirement R7, Part 7.3 of the continent-wide standard for Canadian entities and adds an alternate methodology for GMD Vulnerability Assessments, as described in Attachment 1-CAN. None of the continent-wide Requirements have been changed.

Effective Date and Phased-In Compliance Dates

The effective date for the proposed Reliability Standard is provided below. Where the standard drafting team identified the need for a longer implementation period for compliance with a particular section of a proposed Reliability Standard (e.g., an entire Requirement or a portion thereof), the additional time for compliance with that section is specified below. The phased-in compliance date for those particular sections represents the date that entities must begin to comply with that particular section of the Reliability Standard, even where the Reliability Standard goes into effect at an earlier date.

Reliability Standard TPL-007-3

United States

The standard shall become effective on the later of: (1) the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2; or (2) the first day of the first calendar quarter after the date TPL-007-3 is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.

This implementation plan incorporates by reference the phased-in compliance dates of the TPL-007-2 implementation plan (see Attachment 1).

All Other Jurisdictions

Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is three (3) months after the effective date of the applicable governmental authority's order approving the standard, or as otherwise provided for by the applicable governmental authority.

Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is three (3) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees, or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

This implementation plan incorporates by reference the phased-in compliance dates of the TPL-007-2 implementation plan (see Attachment 1), except that the phased-in compliance dates described therein shall be based on the effective date of TPL-007-3.

Attachment 1-TPL-007-2 Implementation Plan

Implementation Plan

Project 2013-03 Geomagnetic Disturbance Mitigation Reliability Standard TPL-007-2

Applicable Standard

• TPL-007-2 - Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events

Requested Retirement

• TPL-007-1 - Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events

Prerequisite Standard

None

Applicable Entities

- Planning Coordinator with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard;
- Transmission Planner with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard;
- Transmission Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard; and
- Generator Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard.

Section 4.2 states that the standard applies to facilities that include power transformer(s) with a high-side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV.

Terms in the NERC Glossary of Terms

There are no new, modified, or retired terms.

Background

On September 22, 2016, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued Order No. 830 approving Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 and its associated five-year Implementation Plan. In the Order, FERC also directed NERC to develop certain modifications to the standard. FERC established a deadline of 18 months from the effective date of Order No. 830 for completing the revisions, which is May 2018.

General Considerations

This Implementation Plan is intended to integrate the new requirements in TPL-007-2 with the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process that is being implemented through approved TPL-007-1. At the time of the May 2018 filing deadline, many requirements in approved standard TPL-007-1 that lead

to completion of the geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) Vulnerability Assessment will be in effect. Furthermore, many entities may be taking steps to complete studies or assessments that are required by future enforceable requirements in TPL-007-1. The Implementation Plan phases in the requirements in TPL-007-2 based on the effective date of TPL-007-2, as follows:

- Effective Date before January 1, 2021. Implementation timeline supports applicable entities completing new requirements for supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments concurrently with requirements for the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment (concurrent effective dates).
- Effective Date on or after January 1, 2021. Implementation timeline supports applicable entities completing the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessments before new requirements for supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments become effective.

Effective Date

The effective date for the proposed Reliability Standard is provided below. Where the standard drafting team identified the need for a longer implementation period for compliance with a particular section of the proposed Reliability Standard (e.g., an entire Requirement or a portion thereof), the additional time for compliance with that section is specified below. These phased-in compliance dates represent the dates that entities must begin to comply with that particular section of the Reliability Standard, even where the Reliability Standard goes into effect at an earlier date.

Standard TPL-007-2

Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is three (3) months after the effective date of the applicable governmental authority's order approving the standard, or as otherwise provided for by the applicable governmental authority.

Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is three (3) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees, or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

Phased-In Compliance Dates

If TPL-007-2 becomes effective before January 1, 2021

Implementation timeline supports applicable entities completing new requirements for supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments concurrently with requirements for the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment (concurrent effective dates).

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R1 and R2

Entities shall be required to comply with Requirements R1 and R2 upon the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirement R5

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirements R5 until six (6) months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirement R9

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirement R9 until six (6) months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R11 and R12

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirements R11 and R12 until 24 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R6 and R10

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirements R6 and R10 until 30 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R3, R4, and R8

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirements R3, R4, and R8 until 42 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirement R7

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirement R7 until 54 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

If TPL-007-2 becomes effective on or after January 1, 2021

Implementation timeline supports applicable entities completing the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessments before new requirements for supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments become effective.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R1, R2, R5, and R6

Entities shall be required to comply with Requirements R1, R2, R5, and R6 upon the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R3 and R4

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirements R3 and R4 until 12 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R7, R11, and R12

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirements R7, R11, and R12 until 24 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirement R9

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirement R9 until 36 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirement R10

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirement R10 until 60 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirement R8

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirement R8 until 72 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Retirement Date

Standard TPL-007-1

Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 shall be retired immediately prior to the effective date of TPL-007-2 in the particular jurisdiction in which the revised standard is becoming effective.

Initial Performance of Periodic Requirements

Transmission Owners and Generator Owners are not required to comply with Requirement R6 prior to the compliance date for Requirement R6, regardless of when geomagnetically-induced current (GIC) flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1 is received.

Transmission Owners and Generator Owners are not required to comply with Requirement R10 prior to the compliance date for Requirement R10, regardless of when GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1 is received.

NERC

Implementation Plan

Project 2018-01 Canadian-Specific Revisions to TPL-007-2

Applicable Standard(s)

• TPL-007-3- Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events

Requested Retirement(s)

- TPL-007-1 Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events
- TPL-007-2 Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events

Prerequisite Standard(s)

None

Applicable Entities

- Planning Coordinator with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard;
- Transmission Planner with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard;
- Transmission Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard; and
- Generator Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard.

Section 4.2 states that the standard applies to facilities that include power transformer(s) with a high side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV.

Terms in the NERC Glossary of Terms

There are no new, modified, or retired terms.

Background

In January 2018, NERC submitted for regulatory approval Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. This standard was developed in response to certain directives of the United States Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) from Order No. 830 (September 22, 2016), approving Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 and its associated five-year Implementation Plan and directing certain modifications.

In May 2018, a Standard Authorization Request was submitted identifying a need for a Canadianspecific Variance to the TPL-007-2 standard. Specifically, the Standard Authorization Request sought to provide an option for Canadian Registered Entities to define alternative Benchmark GMD Events and/or Supplemental GMD Events specific to their unique topology.



Reliability Standard TPL-007-3 adds a Variance for Canadian entities. The Canadian Variance replaces, in its entirety, Requirement R7, Part 7.3 of the continent-wide standard for Canadian entities and adds an alternate methodology for GMD Vulnerability Assessments, as described in Attachment 1-CAN. None of the continent-wide Requirements have been changed.

Effective Date and Phased-In Compliance Dates

The effective date for the proposed Reliability Standard is provided below. Where the standard drafting team identified the need for a longer implementation period for compliance with a particular section of a proposed Reliability Standard (e.g., an entire Requirement or a portion thereof), the additional time for compliance with that section is specified below. The phased-in compliance date for those particular sections represents the date that entities must begin to comply with that particular section of the Reliability Standard, even where the Reliability Standard goes into effect at an earlier date.

Reliability Standard TPL-007-3

United States

The standard shall become effective on the later of: (1) the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2; or (2) the first day of the first calendar quarter after the date TPL-007-3 is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.

This implementation plan incorporates by reference the phased-in compliance dates of the TPL-007-2 implementation plan (see Attachment 1).

All Other Jurisdictions

Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is three (3) months after the effective date of the applicable governmental authority's order approving the standard, or as otherwise provided for by the applicable governmental authority.

Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is three (3) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees, or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

This implementation plan incorporates by reference the phased-in compliance dates of the TPL-007-2 implementation plan (see Attachment 1), except that the phased-in compliance dates described therein shall be based on the effective date of TPL-007-3.

Attachment 1-TPL-007-2 Implementation Plan

Implementation Plan

Project 2013-03 Geomagnetic Disturbance Mitigation Reliability Standard TPL-007-2

Applicable Standard

• TPL-007-2 - Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events

Requested Retirement

• TPL-007-1 - Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events

Prerequisite Standard

None

Applicable Entities

- Planning Coordinator with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard;
- Transmission Planner with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard;
- Transmission Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard; and
- Generator Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard.

Section 4.2 states that the standard applies to facilities that include power transformer(s) with a high-side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV.

Terms in the NERC Glossary of Terms

There are no new, modified, or retired terms.

Background

On September 22, 2016, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued Order No. 830 approving Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 and its associated five-year Implementation Plan. In the Order, FERC also directed NERC to develop certain modifications to the standard. FERC established a deadline of 18 months from the effective date of Order No. 830 for completing the revisions, which is May 2018.

General Considerations

This Implementation Plan is intended to integrate the new requirements in TPL-007-2 with the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process that is being implemented through approved TPL-007-1. At the time of the May 2018 filing deadline, many requirements in approved standard TPL-007-1 that lead

to completion of the geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) Vulnerability Assessment will be in effect. Furthermore, many entities may be taking steps to complete studies or assessments that are required by future enforceable requirements in TPL-007-1. The Implementation Plan phases in the requirements in TPL-007-2 based on the effective date of TPL-007-2, as follows:

- Effective Date before January 1, 2021. Implementation timeline supports applicable entities completing new requirements for supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments concurrently with requirements for the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment (concurrent effective dates).
- Effective Date on or after January 1, 2021. Implementation timeline supports applicable entities completing the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessments before new requirements for supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments become effective.

Effective Date

The effective date for the proposed Reliability Standard is provided below. Where the standard drafting team identified the need for a longer implementation period for compliance with a particular section of the proposed Reliability Standard (e.g., an entire Requirement or a portion thereof), the additional time for compliance with that section is specified below. These phased-in compliance dates represent the dates that entities must begin to comply with that particular section of the Reliability Standard, even where the Reliability Standard goes into effect at an earlier date.

Standard TPL-007-2

Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is three (3) months after the effective date of the applicable governmental authority's order approving the standard, or as otherwise provided for by the applicable governmental authority.

Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is three (3) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees, or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

Phased-In Compliance Dates

If TPL-007-2 becomes effective before January 1, 2021

Implementation timeline supports applicable entities completing new requirements for supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments concurrently with requirements for the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment (concurrent effective dates).

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R1 and R2

Entities shall be required to comply with Requirements R1 and R2 upon the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirement R5

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirements R5 until six (6) months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirement R9

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirement R9 until six (6) months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R11 and R12

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirements R11 and R12 until 24 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R6 and R10

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirements R6 and R10 until 30 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R3, R4, and R8

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirements R3, R4, and R8 until 42 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirement R7

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirement R7 until 54 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

If TPL-007-2 becomes effective on or after January 1, 2021

Implementation timeline supports applicable entities completing the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessments before new requirements for supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments become effective.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R1, R2, R5, and R6

Entities shall be required to comply with Requirements R1, R2, R5, and R6 upon the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R3 and R4

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirements R3 and R4 until 12 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirements R7, R11, and R12

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirements R7, R11, and R12 until 24 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirement R9

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirement R9 until 36 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirement R10

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirement R10 until 60 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-2 Requirement R8

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirement R8 until 72 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.

Retirement Date

Standard TPL-007-1

Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 shall be retired immediately prior to the effective date of TPL-007-2 in the particular jurisdiction in which the revised standard is becoming effective.

Initial Performance of Periodic Requirements

Transmission Owners and Generator Owners are not required to comply with Requirement R6 prior to the compliance date for Requirement R6, regardless of when geomagnetically-induced current (GIC) flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1 is received.

Transmission Owners and Generator Owners are not required to comply with Requirement R10 prior to the compliance date for Requirement R10, regardless of when GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1 is received.



Violation Risk Factor and Violation Severity Level Justifications

TPL-007-3 – Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events

The Project 2018-01 Standard Drafting Team reviewed the Violation Risk Factors (VRFs) and Violation Severity Levels (VSLs) for each requirement in Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 (Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events) and determined that no modifications to the VRFs and VSLs are necessary for the proposed TPL-007-3 (Canadian Variance). Since the VRFs and VSLs do not require modifications, the applicable justifications for those VRFs and VSLs will also remain the same as applied to the proposed TPL-007-2 (Canadian Variance).

• TPL-007-2 VRF and VSL Justifications

Standards Announcement

Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2

Final Ballots Open through December 10, 2018

Now Available

The final ballots for TPL-007-3 (Canadian Variance) – Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events and the associated Implementation Plan are open through 8 p.m. Eastern, Monday, December 10, 2018.

Balloting

In the final ballot, votes are counted by exception. Votes from the previous ballot are automatically carried over in the final ballot. Only members of the applicable ballot pools can cast a vote. Ballot pool members who previously voted have the option to change their vote in the final ballot. Ballot pool members who did not cast a vote during the previous ballot can vote in the final ballot.

Members of the ballot pool(s) associated with this project can log in and submit their votes by accessing the Standards Balloting & Commenting System (SBS) <u>here</u>. If you experience issues navigating the SBS, contact <u>Linda Jenkins</u>.

- If you are having difficulty accessing the SBS due to a forgotten password, incorrect credential error messages, or system lock-out, contact NERC IT support directly at <u>https://support.nerc.net/</u> (Monday – Friday, 8 a.m. - 5 p.m. Eastern).
- Passwords expire every 6 months and must be reset.
- The SBS is not supported for use on mobile devices.
- Please be mindful of ballot and comment period closing dates. We ask to **allow at least 48 hours** for NERC support staff to assist with inquiries. Therefore, it is recommended that users try logging into their SBS accounts **prior to the last day** of a comment/ballot period.

Next Steps

The voting results will be posted and announced after the ballots close. If approved, the standard will be submitted to the Board of Trustees for adoption and then filed with the appropriate regulatory authorities.

Standards Development Process

For more information on the Standards Development Process, refer to the Standard Processes Manual.

For more information or assistance, contact Standards Developer, <u>Mat Bunch</u> (via email) or at (404) 446-9785.



North American Electric Reliability Corporation 3353 Peachtree Rd, NE Suite 600, North Tower Atlanta, GA 30326 404-446-2560 | <u>www.nerc.com</u> Ballots

BALLOT RESULTS

Ballot Name: Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2 Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2 FN 2 ST Voting Start Date: 11/29/2018 10:28:26 AM Voting End Date: 12/10/2018 8:00:00 PM Ballot Type: ST Ballot Activity: FN Ballot Series: 2 Total # Votes: 111 Total Ballot Pool: 138 Quorum: 80.43

Quorum Established Date: 11/29/2018 10:54:04 AM

Weighted Segment Value: 100

Segment	Ballot Pool	Segment Weight	Affirmative Votes	Affirmative Fraction	Negative Votes w/ Comment	Negative Fraction w/ Comment	Negative Votes w/o Comment	Abstain	No Vote
Segment: 1	37	1	12	1	0	0	0	17	8
Segment: 2	5	0.5	5	0.5	0	0	0	0	0
Segment: 3	23	0.5	5	0.5	0	0	0	13	5
Segment: 4	4	0.1	1	0.1	0	0	0	2	1
Segment: 5	34	1	11	1	0	0	0	14	9

Segment	Ballot Pool	Segment Weight	Affirmative Votes	Affirmative Fraction	Negative Votes w/ Comment	Negative Fraction w/ Comment	Negative Votes w/o Comment	Abstain	No Vote
Segment: 6	25	0.7	7	0.7	0	0	0	14	4
Segment: 7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Segment: 8	2	0.2	2	0.2	0	0	0	0	0
Segment: 9	1	0.1	1	0.1	0	0	0	0	0
Segment: 10	7	0.6	6	0.6	0	0	0	1	0
Totals:	138	4.7	50	4.7	0	0	0	61	27

BALLOT	POOL MEMBERS				
Show All	▼ entries		S	Search: Search	
Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
1 019 - NERC Ver	American Transmission Company, LLC r 4.3.0.0 Machine Name: ERODVSBSWB02	Douglas Johnson		None	N/A

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
1	Arizona Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.	John Shaver		None	N/A
1	Austin Energy	Thomas Standifur		None	N/A
1	BC Hydro and Power Authority	Adrian Andreoiu		Abstain	N/A
1	Berkshire Hathaway Energy - MidAmerican Energy Co.	Terry Harbour		Abstain	N/A
1	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	Dermot Smyth		Affirmative	N/A
1	Dairyland Power Cooperative	Renee Leidel		None	N/A
1	Dominion - Dominion Virginia Power	Larry Nash		Affirmative	N/A
1	Duke Energy	Laura Lee		Abstain	N/A
1	Edison International - Southern California Edison Company	Steven Mavis		Abstain	N/A
1	Entergy - Entergy Services, Inc.	Oliver Burke		Affirmative	N/A
1	Glencoe Light and Power Commission	Terry Volkmann		Affirmative	N/A
1	Great River Energy	Gordon Pietsch		Affirmative	N/A
1	Hydro One Networks, Inc.	Payam Farahbakhsh		Affirmative	N/A
1	Hydro-Qu?bec TransEnergie	Nicolas Turcotte		Affirmative	N/A
1	Imperial Irrigation District	Jesus Sammy Alcaraz		None	N/A
1	KAMO Electric Cooperative	Micah Breedlove		None	N/A
1 19 - NERC Ve	Lakeland Electric r 4.3.0.0 Machine Name: ERODVSBSWB02	Larry Watt		Affirmative	N/A

©

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
1	Lincoln Electric System	Danny Pudenz		Abstain	N/A
1	Long Island Power Authority	Robert Ganley		Abstain	N/A
1	Manitoba Hydro	Mike Smith		Affirmative	N/A
1	National Grid USA	Michael Jones		Affirmative	N/A
1	Nebraska Public Power District	Jamison Cawley		Abstain	N/A
1	New York Power Authority	Salvatore Spagnolo		Affirmative	N/A
1	NextEra Energy - Florida Power and Light Co.	Mike ONeil		None	N/A
1	OGE Energy - Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co.	Terri Pyle		Abstain	N/A
1	Platte River Power Authority	Matt Thompson		Abstain	N/A
1	PNM Resources - Public Service Company of New Mexico	Laurie Williams		Abstain	N/A
1	PSEG - Public Service Electric and Gas Co.	Joseph Smith		Abstain	N/A
1	Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County	Long Duong		Abstain	N/A
1	Salt River Project	Steven Cobb		Abstain	N/A
1	SaskPower	Wayne Guttormson		Affirmative	N/A
1	SCANA - South Carolina Electric and Gas Co.	Tom Hanzlik		Abstain	N/A
1	Southern Company - Southern Company Services, Inc.	Katherine Prewitt		Abstain	N/A
1	Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA)	John Merrell		Abstain	N/A
19 - NERC Ver	4.3JOSD Marchain @ Nacodar 19 Robot OVSBSWB02	Richard Jackson		None	N/A

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
1	Western Area Power Administration	sean erickson		Abstain	N/A
2	Independent Electricity System Operator	Leonard Kula		Affirmative	N/A
2	ISO New England, Inc.	Michael Puscas	John Pearson	Affirmative	N/A
2	Midcontinent ISO, Inc.	David Zwergel		Affirmative	N/A
2	New York Independent System Operator	Gregory Campoli		Affirmative	N/A
2	PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.	Mark Holman		Affirmative	N/A
3	Ameren - Ameren Services	David Jendras		None	N/A
3	Austin Energy	W. Dwayne Preston		Abstain	N/A
3	BC Hydro and Power Authority	Hootan Jarollahi		Abstain	N/A
3	City of Vero Beach	Ginny Beigel	Brandon McCormick	None	N/A
3	Cleco Corporation	Michelle Corley	Louis Guidry	Abstain	N/A
3	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	Peter Yost		Affirmative	N/A
3	Dominion - Dominion Resources, Inc.	Connie Lowe		Affirmative	N/A
3	Duke Energy	Lee Schuster		Abstain	N/A
3	Florida Municipal Power Agency	Joe McKinney	Brandon McCormick	None	N/A
3	Hydro One Networks, Inc.	Paul Malozewski	Oshani Pathirane	Affirmative	N/A
3	Lincoln Electric System	Jason Fortik		Abstain	N/A
3	National Grid USA	Brian Shanahan		Affirmative	N/A
የ9 - NERC Ve	r 4.3.9.9 AFABARAHANARAHEREDEDIVSBSWB02	Tony Eddleman		Abstain	N/A

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
3	New York Power Authority	David Rivera		Affirmative	N/A
3	NiSource - Northern Indiana Public Service Co.	Dmitriy Bazylyuk		Abstain	N/A
3	Owensboro Municipal Utilities	Thomas Lyons		Abstain	N/A
3	Platte River Power Authority	Jeff Landis		Abstain	N/A
3	PPL - Louisville Gas and Electric Co.	Joseph Bencomo		None	N/A
3	PSEG - Public Service Electric and Gas Co.	James Meyer		Abstain	N/A
3	Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc.	James Frauen		None	N/A
3	Snohomish County PUD No. 1	Holly Chaney		Abstain	N/A
3	Southern Company - Alabama Power Company	Joel Dembowski		Abstain	N/A
3	Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA)	Marc Donaldson		Abstain	N/A
4	Florida Municipal Power Agency	Carol Chinn	Brandon McCormick	None	N/A
4	Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County	John Martinsen		Abstain	N/A
4	Utility Services, Inc.	Brian Evans- Mongeon		Affirmative	N/A
4	WEC Energy Group, Inc.	Matthew Beilfuss		Abstain	N/A
5	Ameren - Ameren Missouri	Sam Dwyer		None	N/A
5	BC Hydro and Power Authority	Helen Hamilton Harding		Abstain	N/A
5	Black Hills Corporation	George Tatar		Abstain	N/A

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
5	Boise-Kuna Irrigation District - Lucky Peak Power Plant Project	Mike Kukla		None	N/A
5	Choctaw Generation Limited Partnership, LLLP	Rob Watson		Abstain	N/A
5	City Water, Light and Power of Springfield, IL	Steve Rose		None	N/A
5	Cleco Corporation	Stephanie Huffman		None	N/A
5	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	William Winters	Daniel Valle	Affirmative	N/A
5	Dairyland Power Cooperative	Tommy Drea		None	N/A
5	Dominion - Dominion Resources, Inc.	Lou Oberski		Affirmative	N/A
5	Duke Energy	Dale Goodwine		Abstain	N/A
5	Edison International - Southern California Edison Company	Selene Willis		Abstain	N/A
5	Florida Municipal Power Agency	Chris Gowder	Brandon McCormick	None	N/A
5	Great River Energy	Preston Walsh	Michael Brytowski	Affirmative	N/A
5	Herb Schrayshuen	Herb Schrayshuen		Affirmative	N/A
5	Hydro-Qu?bec Production	Junji Yamaguchi		Affirmative	N/A
5	JEA	John Babik		Abstain	N/A
5	Lakeland Electric	Jim Howard		Affirmative	N/A
5	Lincoln Electric System	Kayleigh Wilkerson		Abstain	N/A
5	Manitoba Hydro	Yuguang Xiao		Affirmative	N/A

© 2019 - NERC Ver 4.3.0.0 Machine Name: ERODVSBSWB02

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
5	Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company	David Gordon		Affirmative	N/A
5	NB Power Corporation	Laura McLeod		Affirmative	N/A
5	Nebraska Public Power District	Don Schmit		Abstain	N/A
5	New York Power Authority	Shivaz Chopra		Affirmative	N/A
5	OGE Energy - Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co.	Patrick Wells		None	N/A
5	Oglethorpe Power Corporation	Donna Johnson		Abstain	N/A
5	Omaha Public Power District	Mahmood Safi		Abstain	N/A
5	Ontario Power Generation Inc.	Constantin Chitescu		Affirmative	N/A
5	Platte River Power Authority	Tyson Archie		Abstain	N/A
5	PSEG - PSEG Fossil LLC	Tim Kucey		Abstain	N/A
5	Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County	Sam Nietfeld		Abstain	N/A
5	Southern Company - Southern Company Generation	William D. Shultz		Abstain	N/A
5	Tri-State G and T Association, Inc.	Richard Schlottmann		None	N/A
5	U.S. Bureau of Reclamation	Wendy Center		None	N/A
6	Ameren - Ameren Services	Robert Quinlivan		None	N/A
6	Cleco Corporation	Robert Hirchak	Louis Guidry	Abstain	N/A
6	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	Christopher Overberg		Affirmative	N/A

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
6	Dominion - Dominion Resources, Inc.	Sean Bodkin		Affirmative	N/A
6	Duke Energy	Greg Cecil		Abstain	N/A
6	Edison International - Southern California Edison Company	Kenya Streeter		Abstain	N/A
6	Florida Municipal Power Agency	Richard Montgomery	Brandon McCormick	None	N/A
6	Florida Municipal Power Pool	Tom Reedy	Brandon McCormick	None	N/A
6	Great River Energy	Donna Stephenson	Michael Brytowski	Affirmative	N/A
6	Lakeland Electric	Paul Shipps		Affirmative	N/A
6	Lincoln Electric System	Eric Ruskamp		Abstain	N/A
6	Manitoba Hydro	Blair Mukanik		Affirmative	N/A
6	New York Power Authority	Thomas Savin		Affirmative	N/A
6	NextEra Energy - Florida Power and Light Co.	Silvia Mitchell		Affirmative	N/A
6	NiSource - Northern Indiana Public Service Co.	Joe O'Brien		Abstain	N/A
6	Platte River Power Authority	Sabrina Martz		Abstain	N/A
6	Powerex Corporation	Gordon Dobson- Mack		Abstain	N/A
6	PPL - Louisville Gas and Electric Co.	Linn Oelker		None	N/A
6	PSEG - PSEG Energy Resources and Trade LLC	Karla Barton		Abstain	N/A
6	Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Trudy Novak		Abstain	N/A
69 - NERC Ve	r4.380.0010/maistin@cvature?UERODVSBSWB02	Franklin Lu		Abstain	N/A

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
6	Southern Company - Southern Company Generation and Energy Marketing	Jennifer Sykes		Abstain	N/A
6	Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA)	Rick Applegate		Abstain	N/A
6	Tennessee Valley Authority	Marjorie Parsons		Abstain	N/A
6	Xcel Energy, Inc.	Carrie Dixon		Abstain	N/A
8	David Kiguel	David Kiguel		Affirmative	N/A
8	Roger Zaklukiewicz	Roger Zaklukiewicz		Affirmative	N/A
9	Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities	Donald Nelson		Affirmative	N/A
10	Florida Reliability Coordinating Council	Peter Heidrich		Affirmative	N/A
10	Midwest Reliability Organization	Russel Mountjoy		Affirmative	N/A
10	New York State Reliability Council	ALAN ADAMSON		Abstain	N/A
10	Northeast Power Coordinating Council	Guy V. Zito		Affirmative	N/A
10	ReliabilityFirst	Anthony Jablonski		Affirmative	N/A
10	SERC Reliability Corporation	Drew Slabaugh		Affirmative	N/A
10	Western Electricity Coordinating Council	Steven Rueckert		Affirmative	N/A

Showing 1 to 138 of 138 entries

© 2019 - NERC Ver 4.3.0.0 Machine Name: ERODVSBSWB02

Ballots

BALLOT RESULTS

Ballot Name: Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2 Implementation Plan FN 2 OT Voting Start Date: 11/29/2018 10:28:06 AM Voting End Date: 12/10/2018 8:00:00 PM Ballot Type: OT Ballot Activity: FN Ballot Series: 2 Total # Votes: 110 Total Ballot Pool: 134 Quorum: 82.09 Quorum Established Date: 11/29/2018 10:54:13 AM Weighted Segment Value: 100

Segment	Ballot Pool	Segment Weight	Affirmative Votes	Affirmative Fraction	Negative Votes w/ Comment	Negative Fraction w/ Comment	Negative Votes w/o Comment	Abstain	No Vote
Segment: 1	36	1	12	1	0	0	0	17	7
Segment: 2	5	0.5	5	0.5	0	0	0	0	0
Segment: 3	22	0.5	5	0.5	0	0	0	12	5
Segment: 4	4	0.1	1	0.1	0	0	0	2	1
Segment: 5	32	1	10	1	0	0	0	15	7

© 2019 - NERC Ver 4.3.0.0 Machine Name: ERODVSBSWB02

Segment	Ballot Pool	Segment Weight	Affirmative Votes	Affirmative Fraction	Negative Votes w/ Comment	Negative Fraction w/ Comment	Negative Votes w/o Comment	Abstain	No Vote
Segment: 6	25	0.7	7	0.7	0	0	0	14	4
Segment: 7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Segment: 8	2	0.2	2	0.2	0	0	0	0	0
Segment: 9	1	0.1	1	0.1	0	0	0	0	0
Segment: 10	7	0.5	5	0.5	0	0	0	2	0
Totals:	134	4.6	48	4.6	0	0	0	62	24

BALLOT	POOL MEMBERS				
Show All	entries		S	earch: Search	
Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
1 2019 - NERC Ver	American Transmission Company, LLC 4.3.0.0 Machine Name: ERODVSBSWB02	Douglas Johnson		None	N/A

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
1	Arizona Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.	John Shaver		None	N/A
1	Austin Energy	Thomas Standifur		None	N/A
1	BC Hydro and Power Authority	Adrian Andreoiu		Abstain	N/A
1	Berkshire Hathaway Energy - MidAmerican Energy Co.	Terry Harbour		Abstain	N/A
1	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	Dermot Smyth		Affirmative	N/A
1	Dairyland Power Cooperative	Renee Leidel		None	N/A
1	Dominion - Dominion Virginia Power	Larry Nash		Affirmative	N/A
1	Duke Energy	Laura Lee		Abstain	N/A
1	Edison International - Southern California Edison Company	Steven Mavis		Abstain	N/A
1	Entergy - Entergy Services, Inc.	Oliver Burke		Affirmative	N/A
1	Glencoe Light and Power Commission	Terry Volkmann		Affirmative	N/A
1	Great River Energy	Gordon Pietsch		Affirmative	N/A
1	Hydro One Networks, Inc.	Payam Farahbakhsh		Affirmative	N/A
1	Hydro-Qu?bec TransEnergie	Nicolas Turcotte		Affirmative	N/A
1	KAMO Electric Cooperative	Micah Breedlove		None	N/A
1	Lakeland Electric	Larry Watt		Affirmative	N/A
1	Lincoln Electric System	Danny Pudenz		Abstain	N/A
19 - NERC Ve	r4.3.000 Network Bonvan & UERODDVSBSWB02	Robert Ganley		Abstain	N/A

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
	Manitoba Hydro	Mike Smith		Affirmative	N/A
1	National Grid USA	Michael Jones		Affirmative	N/A
1	Nebraska Public Power District	Jamison Cawley		Abstain	N/A
1	New York Power Authority	Salvatore Spagnolo		Affirmative	N/A
1	NextEra Energy - Florida Power and Light Co.	Mike ONeil		None	N/A
1	OGE Energy - Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co.	Terri Pyle		Abstain	N/A
1	Platte River Power Authority	Matt Thompson		Abstain	N/A
1	PNM Resources - Public Service Company of New Mexico	Laurie Williams		Abstain	N/A
1	PSEG - Public Service Electric and Gas Co.	Joseph Smith		Abstain	N/A
1	Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County	Long Duong		Abstain	N/A
1	Salt River Project	Steven Cobb		Abstain	N/A
1	SaskPower	Wayne Guttormson		Affirmative	N/A
1	SCANA - South Carolina Electric and Gas Co.	Tom Hanzlik		Abstain	N/A
1	Southern Company - Southern Company Services, Inc.	Katherine Prewitt		Abstain	N/A
1	Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA)	John Merrell		Abstain	N/A
1	U.S. Bureau of Reclamation	Richard Jackson		None	N/A
	Western Area Power Administration	sean erickson		Abstain	N/A
29 - NERC Ve	r 4.3r0leptendeinte=Neatnicity=RQDev8BBA4B02	Leonard Kula		Affirmative	N/A

©

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
2	ISO New England, Inc.	Michael Puscas	John Pearson	Affirmative	N/A
2	Midcontinent ISO, Inc.	David Zwergel		Affirmative	N/A
2	New York Independent System Operator	Gregory Campoli		Affirmative	N/A
2	PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.	Mark Holman		Affirmative	N/A
3	Ameren - Ameren Services	David Jendras		None	N/A
3	Austin Energy	W. Dwayne Preston		Abstain	N/A
3	City of Vero Beach	Ginny Beigel	Brandon McCormick	None	N/A
3	Cleco Corporation	Michelle Corley	Louis Guidry	Abstain	N/A
3	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	Peter Yost		Affirmative	N/A
3	Dominion - Dominion Resources, Inc.	Connie Lowe		Affirmative	N/A
3	Duke Energy	Lee Schuster		Abstain	N/A
3	Florida Municipal Power Agency	Joe McKinney	Brandon McCormick	None	N/A
3	Hydro One Networks, Inc.	Paul Malozewski	Oshani Pathirane	Affirmative	N/A
3	Lincoln Electric System	Jason Fortik		Abstain	N/A
3	National Grid USA	Brian Shanahan		Affirmative	N/A
3	Nebraska Public Power District	Tony Eddleman		Abstain	N/A
3	New York Power Authority	David Rivera		Affirmative	N/A
3	NiSource - Northern Indiana Public Service Co.	Dmitriy Bazylyuk		Abstain	N/A
)원 - NERC Ve	r 4. 90401Maleran & Walaire et the session of the second	Thomas Lyons		Abstain	N/A

©

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
3	Platte River Power Authority	Jeff Landis		Abstain	N/A
3	PPL - Louisville Gas and Electric Co.	Joseph Bencomo		None	N/A
3	PSEG - Public Service Electric and Gas Co.	James Meyer		Abstain	N/A
3	Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc.	James Frauen		None	N/A
3	Snohomish County PUD No. 1	Holly Chaney		Abstain	N/A
3	Southern Company - Alabama Power Company	Joel Dembowski		Abstain	N/A
3	Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA)	Marc Donaldson		Abstain	N/A
4	Florida Municipal Power Agency	Carol Chinn	Brandon McCormick	None	N/A
4	Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County	John Martinsen		Abstain	N/A
4	Utility Services, Inc.	Brian Evans- Mongeon		Affirmative	N/A
4	WEC Energy Group, Inc.	Matthew Beilfuss		Abstain	N/A
5	Ameren - Ameren Missouri	Sam Dwyer		None	N/A
5	BC Hydro and Power Authority	Helen Hamilton Harding		Abstain	N/A
5	Black Hills Corporation	George Tatar		Abstain	N/A
5	Boise-Kuna Irrigation District - Lucky Peak Power Plant Project	Mike Kukla		None	N/A
5	Choctaw Generation Limited Partnership, LLLP	Rob Watson		Abstain	N/A
5 2019 - NERC Ve	City Water, Light and Power of Springfield, IL r 4.3.0.0 Machine Name: ERODVSBSWB02	Steve Rose		None	N/A

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
5	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	William Winters	Daniel Valle	Affirmative	N/A
5	Dairyland Power Cooperative	Tommy Drea		None	N/A
5	Dominion - Dominion Resources, Inc.	Lou Oberski		Affirmative	N/A
5	Duke Energy	Dale Goodwine		Abstain	N/A
5	Edison International - Southern California Edison Company	Selene Willis		Abstain	N/A
5	Florida Municipal Power Agency	Chris Gowder	Brandon McCormick	None	N/A
5	Great River Energy	Preston Walsh	Michael Brytowski	Affirmative	N/A
5	Herb Schrayshuen	Herb Schrayshuen		Affirmative	N/A
5	Hydro-Qu?bec Production	Junji Yamaguchi		Affirmative	N/A
5	JEA	John Babik		Abstain	N/A
5	Lakeland Electric	Jim Howard		Affirmative	N/A
5	Lincoln Electric System	Kayleigh Wilkerson		Abstain	N/A
5	Manitoba Hydro	Yuguang Xiao		Affirmative	N/A
5	Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company	David Gordon		Abstain	N/A
5	NB Power Corporation	Laura McLeod		Affirmative	N/A
5	Nebraska Public Power District	Don Schmit		Abstain	N/A
5	New York Power Authority	Shivaz Chopra		Affirmative	N/A
1 59 - NERC Ve	r 4.3005 EN Halengye Nakhalero BRODASSBO VEBODric Co.	Patrick Wells		None	N/A

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
5	Oglethorpe Power Corporation	Donna Johnson		Abstain	N/A
5	Omaha Public Power District	Mahmood Safi		Abstain	N/A
5	Ontario Power Generation Inc.	Constantin Chitescu		Affirmative	N/A
5	Platte River Power Authority	Tyson Archie		Abstain	N/A
5	PSEG - PSEG Fossil LLC	Tim Kucey		Abstain	N/A
5	Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County	Sam Nietfeld		Abstain	N/A
5	Southern Company - Southern Company Generation	William D. Shultz		Abstain	N/A
5	U.S. Bureau of Reclamation	Wendy Center		None	N/A
6	Ameren - Ameren Services	Robert Quinlivan		None	N/A
6	Cleco Corporation	Robert Hirchak	Louis Guidry	Abstain	N/A
6	Con Ed - Consolidated Edison Co. of New York	Christopher Overberg		Affirmative	N/A
6	Dominion - Dominion Resources, Inc.	Sean Bodkin		Affirmative	N/A
6	Duke Energy	Greg Cecil		Abstain	N/A
6	Edison International - Southern California Edison Company	Kenya Streeter		Abstain	N/A
6	Florida Municipal Power Agency	Richard Montgomery	Brandon McCormick	None	N/A
6	Florida Municipal Power Pool	Tom Reedy	Brandon McCormick	None	N/A
6 019 - NERC Vei	Great River Energy 4.3.0.0 Machine Name: ERODVSBSWB02	Donna Stephenson	Michael Brytowski	Affirmative	N/A

©

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
6	Lakeland Electric	Paul Shipps		Affirmative	N/A
6	Lincoln Electric System	Eric Ruskamp		Abstain	N/A
6	Manitoba Hydro	Blair Mukanik		Affirmative	N/A
6	New York Power Authority	Thomas Savin		Affirmative	N/A
6	NextEra Energy - Florida Power and Light Co.	Silvia Mitchell		Affirmative	N/A
6	NiSource - Northern Indiana Public Service Co.	Joe O'Brien		Abstain	N/A
6	Platte River Power Authority	Sabrina Martz		Abstain	N/A
6	Powerex Corporation	Gordon Dobson- Mack		Abstain	N/A
6	PPL - Louisville Gas and Electric Co.	Linn Oelker		None	N/A
6	PSEG - PSEG Energy Resources and Trade LLC	Karla Barton		Abstain	N/A
6	Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Trudy Novak		Abstain	N/A
6	Snohomish County PUD No. 1	Franklin Lu		Abstain	N/A
6	Southern Company - Southern Company Generation and Energy Marketing	Jennifer Sykes		Abstain	N/A
6	Tacoma Public Utilities (Tacoma, WA)	Rick Applegate		Abstain	N/A
6	Tennessee Valley Authority	Marjorie Parsons		Abstain	N/A
6	Xcel Energy, Inc.	Carrie Dixon		Abstain	N/A
8	David Kiguel	David Kiguel		Affirmative	N/A
) 8 9 - NERC Ve	r 4. Rogelvläckligkvin æ: ERODVSBSWB02	Roger Zaklukiewicz		Affirmative	N/A

Segment	Organization	Voter	Designated Proxy	Ballot	NERC Memo
9	Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities	Donald Nelson		Affirmative	N/A
10	Florida Reliability Coordinating Council	Peter Heidrich		Affirmative	N/A
10	Midwest Reliability Organization	Russel Mountjoy		Affirmative	N/A
10	New York State Reliability Council	ALAN ADAMSON		Abstain	N/A
10	Northeast Power Coordinating Council	Guy V. Zito		Affirmative	N/A
10	ReliabilityFirst	Anthony Jablonski		Affirmative	N/A
10	SERC Reliability Corporation	Drew Slabaugh		Affirmative	N/A
10	Western Electricity Coordinating Council	Steven Rueckert		Abstain	N/A
	24 of 124 optrion			Previous	1 Next

Showing 1 to 134 of 134 entries

Standard Development Timeline

This section is maintained by the drafting team during the development of the standard and will be removed when the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees (Board).

Description of Current Draft

Errata

Completed Actions	Date
Standard Authorization Request (SAR) posted for formal comment period	03/30/18 – 04/30/18
Standards Committee approved modified SAR for posting	06/13/18
28-day informal comment period	08/10/18 – 09/06/18
45-day formal or informal comment period with initial ballot	October 2018 – November 2018
10-day final ballot	November 2018

Anticipated Actions	Date
Board adoption	February 2019

New or Modified Term(s) Used in NERC Reliability Standards

This section includes all new or modified terms used in the proposed standard that will be included in the *Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards* upon applicable regulatory approval. Terms used in the proposed standard that are already defined and are not being modified can be found in the *Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards*. The new or revised terms listed below will be presented for approval with the proposed standard. Upon Board adoption, this section will be removed.

Term(s):

None.

A. Introduction

- 1. Title: Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events
- **2. Number:** TPL-007-3
- **3. Purpose:** Establish requirements for Transmission system planned performance during geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) events.

4. Applicability:

- 4.1. Functional Entities:
 - **4.1.1.** Planning Coordinator with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2;
 - **4.1.2.** Transmission Planner with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2;
 - 4.1.3. Transmission Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2; and
 - **4.1.4.** Generator Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2.

4.2. Facilities:

- **4.2.1.** Facilities that include power transformer(s) with a high side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV.
- 5. Effective Date: See Implementation Plan for TPL-007-3.
- **Background:** During a GMD event, geomagnetically-induced currents (GIC) may cause transformer hot-spot heating or damage, loss of Reactive Power sources, increased Reactive Power demand, and Misoperation(s), the combination of which may result in voltage collapse and blackout.

The only difference between TPL-007-3 and TPL-007-2 is that TPL-007-3 adds a Canadian Variance to address regulatory practices/processes within Canadian jurisdictions and to allow the use of Canadian-specific data and research to define and implement alternative GMD event(s) that achieve at least an equivalent reliability objective of that in TPL-007-2.

B. Requirements and Measures

R1. Each Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with its Transmission Planner(s), shall identify the individual and joint responsibilities of the Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner(s) in the Planning Coordinator's planning area for maintaining models, performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, and implementing process(es) to obtain GMD measurement data as specified in this standard. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- M1. Each Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with its Transmission Planners, shall provide documentation on roles and responsibilities, such as meeting minutes, agreements, copies of procedures or protocols in effect between entities or between departments of a vertically integrated system, or email correspondence that identifies an agreement has been reached on individual and joint responsibilities for maintaining models, performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, and implementing process(es) to obtain GMD measurement data in accordance with Requirement R1.
- **R2.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall maintain System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M2. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence in either electronic or hard copy format that it is maintaining System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.
- **R3.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System during the GMD events described in Attachment 1. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- **M3.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence, such as electronic or hard copies of the criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System in accordance with Requirement R3.

Benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s)

- R4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall complete a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment of the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon at least once every 60 calendar months. This benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall use a study or studies based on models identified in Requirement R2, document assumptions, and document summarized results of the steady state analysis. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **4.1.** The study or studies shall include the following conditions:
 - **4.1.1.** System On-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon; and
 - **4.1.2.** System Off-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon.

- **4.2.** The study or studies shall be conducted based on the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1 to determine whether the System meets the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1.
- **4.3.** The benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, and adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later.
 - **4.3.1.** If a recipient of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment provides documented comments on the results, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- M4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have dated evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment meeting all of the requirements in Requirement R4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, and adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later, as specified in Requirement R4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments in accordance with Requirement R4.
- **R5.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide GIC flow information to be used for the benchmark thermal impact assessment of transformers specified in Requirement R6 to each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns an applicable Bulk Electric System (BES) power transformer in the planning area. The GIC flow information shall include: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **5.1.** The maximum effective GIC value for the worst case geoelectric field orientation for the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1. This value shall be provided to the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.

- **5.2.** The effective GIC time series, GIC(t), calculated using the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1 in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area. GIC(t) shall be provided within 90 calendar days of receipt of the written request and after determination of the maximum effective GIC value in Part 5.1.
- **M5.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided the maximum effective GIC values to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area as specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided GIC(t) in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.
- **R6.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A per phase or greater. The benchmark thermal impact assessment shall: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - 6.1. Be based on the effective GIC flow information provided in Requirement R5;
 - 6.2. Document assumptions used in the analysis;
 - **6.3.** Describe suggested actions and supporting analysis to mitigate the impact of GICs, if any; and
 - **6.4.** Be performed and provided to the responsible entities, as determined in Requirement R1, within 24 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1.
- **M6.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its benchmark thermal impact assessment for all of its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A per phase or greater, and shall have evidence such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided its thermal impact assessment to the responsible entities as specified in Requirement R6.
- **R7.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, that concludes through the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment conducted in Requirement R4 that their System does not meet the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1, shall develop a Corrective

Action Plan (CAP) addressing how the performance requirements will be met. The CAP shall: [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- **7.1.** List System deficiencies and the associated actions needed to achieve required System performance. Examples of such actions include:
 - Installation, modification, retirement, or removal of Transmission and generation Facilities and any associated equipment.
 - Installation, modification, or removal of Protection Systems or Remedial Action Schemes.
 - Use of Operating Procedures, specifying how long they will be needed as part of the CAP.
 - Use of Demand-Side Management, new technologies, or other initiatives.
- **7.2.** Be developed within one year of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.
- **7.3.** Include a timetable, subject to revision by the responsible entity in Part 7.4, for implementing the selected actions from Part 7.1. The timetable shall:
 - **7.3.1.** Specify implementation of non-hardware mitigation, if any, within two years of development of the CAP; and
 - **7.3.2.** Specify implementation of hardware mitigation, if any, within four years of development of the CAP.
- **7.4.** Be revised if situations beyond the control of the responsible entity determined in Requirement R1 prevent implementation of the CAP within the timetable for implementation provided in Part 7.3. The revised CAP shall document the following, and be updated at least once every 12 calendar months until implemented:
 - **7.4.1.** Circumstances causing the delay for fully or partially implementing the selected actions in Part 7.1;
 - **7.4.2.** Description of the original CAP, and any previous changes to the CAP, with the associated timetable(s) for implementing the selected actions in Part 7.1; and
 - **7.4.3.** Revisions to the selected actions in Part 7.1, if any, including utilization of Operating Procedures if applicable, and the updated timetable for implementing the selected actions.
- **7.5.** Be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission Planner(s), and functional entities referenced in the CAP within 90 calendar days of development or revision, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of development or revision, whichever is later.

- **7.5.1.** If a recipient of the CAP provides documented comments on the results, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- **M7.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, that concludes, through the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment conducted in Requirement R4, that the responsible entity's System does not meet the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1 shall have evidence such as dated electronic or hard copies of its CAP including timetable for implementing selected actions, as specified in Requirement R7. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has revised its CAP if situations beyond the responsible entity's control prevent implementation of the CAP within the timetable specified. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its CAP or relevant information, if any, (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission Planner(s), and functional entities referenced in the CAP within 90 calendar days of development or revision, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of development or revision, whichever is later as specified in Requirement R7. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its CAP within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments, in accordance with Requirement R7.

Supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s)

- **R8.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall complete a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment of the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon at least once every 60 calendar months. This supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall use a study or studies based on models identified in Requirement R2, document assumptions, and document summarized results of the steady state analysis. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **8.1.** The study or studies shall include the following conditions:
 - **8.1.1.** System On-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon; and
 - **8.1.2.** System Off-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon.

- **8.2.** The study or studies shall be conducted based on the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1 to determine whether the System meets the performance requirements for the steady state planning supplemental GMD event contained in Table 1.
- **8.3.** If the analysis concludes there is Cascading caused by the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1, an evaluation of possible actions designed to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the consequences and adverse impacts of the event(s) shall be conducted.
- **8.4.** The supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later.
 - **8.4.1.** If a recipient of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment provides documented comments on the results, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- M8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have dated evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment meeting all of the requirements in Requirement R8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its supplemental GMD Vulnerability: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later, as specified in Requirement R8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments in accordance with Requirement R8.
- **R9.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide GIC flow information to be used for the supplemental thermal impact assessment of transformers specified in Requirement R10 to each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns an applicable Bulk Electric System (BES) power transformer in the planning area. The GIC flow information shall include: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- **9.1.** The maximum effective GIC value for the worst case geoelectric field orientation for the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1. This value shall be provided to the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.
- **9.2.** The effective GIC time series, GIC(t), calculated using the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1 in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area. GIC(t) shall be provided within 90 calendar days of receipt of the written request and after determination of the maximum effective GIC value in Part 9.1.
- M9. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided the maximum effective GIC values to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area as specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided GIC(t) in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.
- **R10.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A per phase or greater. The supplemental thermal impact assessment shall: [*Violation Risk Factor: Medium*] [*Time Horizon: Long-term Planning*]
 - **10.1.** Be based on the effective GIC flow information provided in Requirement R9;
 - 10.2. Document assumptions used in the analysis;
 - **10.3.** Describe suggested actions and supporting analysis to mitigate the impact of GICs, if any; and
 - **10.4.** Be performed and provided to the responsible entities, as determined in Requirement R1, within 24 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1.
- M10. Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its supplemental thermal impact assessment for all of its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A per phase or greater, and shall have evidence such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided its supplemental thermal impact assessment to the responsible entities as specified in Requirement R10.

GMD Measurement Data Processes

- **R11.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall implement a process to obtain GIC monitor data from at least one GIC monitor located in the Planning Coordinator's planning area or other part of the system included in the Planning Coordinator's GIC System model. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M11. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its GIC monitor location(s) and documentation of its process to obtain GIC monitor data in accordance with Requirement R11.
- **R12.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall implement a process to obtain geomagnetic field data for its Planning Coordinator's planning area. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M12. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its process to obtain geomagnetic field data for its Planning Coordinator's planning area in accordance with Requirement R12.

C. Compliance

- 1. Compliance Monitoring Process
 - **1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority:** "Compliance Enforcement Authority" means NERC or the Regional Entity, or any entity as otherwise designated by an Applicable Governmental Authority, in their respective roles of monitoring and/or enforcing compliance with mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards in their respective jurisdictions.
 - **1.2.** Evidence Retention: The following evidence retention period(s) identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full-time period since the last audit.

The applicable entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

- For Requirements R1, R2, R3, R5, R6, R9, and R10, each responsible entity shall retain documentation as evidence for five years.
- For Requirements R4 and R8, each responsible entity shall retain documentation of the current GMD Vulnerability Assessment and the preceding GMD Vulnerability Assessment.

- For Requirement R7, each responsible entity shall retain documentation as evidence for five years or until all actions in the Corrective Action Plan are completed, whichever is later.
- For Requirements R11 and R12, each responsible entity shall retain documentation as evidence for three years.
- **1.3.** Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program: As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, "Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program" refers to the identification of the processes that will be used to evaluate data or information for the purpose of assessing performance or outcomes with the associated Reliability Standard.

Table 1: Steady State Planning GMD Event

Steady State:

- a. Voltage collapse, Cascading and uncontrolled islanding shall not occur.
- b. Generation loss is acceptable as a consequence of the steady state planning GMD events.
- c. Planned System adjustments such as Transmission configuration changes and re-dispatch of generation are allowed if such adjustments are executable within the time duration applicable to the Facility Ratings.

Category	Initial Condition	Event	Interruption of Firm Transmission Service Allowed	Load Loss Allowed
Benchmark GMD Event - GMD Event with Outages	 System as may be postured in response to space weather information¹, and then GMD event² 	Reactive Power compensation devices and other Transmission Facilities removed as a result of Protection System operation or Misoperation due to harmonics during the GMD event	Yes ³	Yes ³
Supplemental GMD Event - GMD Event with Outages	 System as may be postured in response to space weather information¹, and then GMD event² 	Reactive Power compensation devices and other Transmission Facilities removed as a result of Protection System operation or Misoperation due to harmonics during the GMD event	Yes	Yes
	Table	1: Steady State Performance Footnot	es	

- 1. The System condition for GMD planning may include adjustments to posture the System that are executable in response to space weather information.
- 2. The GMD conditions for the benchmark and supplemental planning events are described in Attachment 1.
- 3. Load loss as a result of manual or automatic Load shedding (e.g., UVLS) and/or curtailment of Firm Transmission Service may be used to meet BES performance requirements during studied GMD conditions. The likelihood and magnitude of Load loss or curtailment of Firm Transmission Service should be minimized.

Violation Severity Levels

R #		Violation Severity Levels				
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL		
R1.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with its Transmission Planner(s), failed to determine and identify individual or joint responsibilities of the Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner(s) in the Planning Coordinator's planning area for maintaining models, performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, and implementing process(es) to obtain GMD measurement data as specified in this standard.		
R2.	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not maintain either System models or GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the studies	The responsible entity did not maintain both System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the studies		

R #		Violation Severity Levels			
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
			needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.	needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.	
R3.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not have criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System during the GMD events described in Attachment 1 as required.	
R4.	The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 60 calendar months and less than or equal to 64 calendar months since the last benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	The responsible entity's completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy one of the elements listed in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.3; OR The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	The responsible entity's completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy two of the elements listed in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.3; OR The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	The responsible entity's completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy three of the elements listed in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.3; OR The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	
		than 64 calendar months and less than or equal to 68 calendar months since the	than 68 calendar months and less than or equal to 72 calendar months since the	than 72 calendar months since the last benchmark	

R #		Violation Severity Levels				
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL		
		last benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	last benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	GMD Vulnerability Assessment; OR The responsible entity does not have a completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.		
R5.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 90 calendar days and less than or equal to 100 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 100 calendar days and less than or equal to 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity did not provide the maximum effective GIC value to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area; OR The responsible entity did not provide the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), upon written request.		
R6.	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for 5% or less or one of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for more than 5% up to (and including) 10% or two of its solely owned and jointly	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for more than 10% up to (and including) 15% or three of its solely owned and	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for more than 15% or more than three of its solely owned and jointly owned		

R #	# Violation Severity Levels			
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
	transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 24 calendar months and less than or equal to 26 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1.	owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 26 calendar months and less than or equal to 28 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1; OR The responsible entity failed to include one of the	jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 28 calendar months and less than or equal to 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1; OR The responsible entity failed to include two of the	applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1; OR The responsible entity failed to include three of the required elements as listed

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
		required elements as listed in Requirement R6, Parts 6.1 through 6.3.	required elements as listed in Requirement R6, Parts 6.1 through 6.3.	in Requirement R6, Parts 6.1 through 6.3.	
R7.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with one of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with two of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with three of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with four or more of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5; OR The responsible entity did not have a Corrective Action Plan as required by Requirement R7.	
R8.	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy one of elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy two of elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy three of the elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy four of the elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	

R #		Violation Se	verity Levels	
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
	than 60 calendar months and less than or equal to 64 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	than 64 calendar months and less than or equal to 68 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	than 68 calendar months and less than or equal to 72 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	than 72 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment; OR The responsible entity does not have a completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.
R9.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 90 calendar days and less than or equal to 100 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 100 calendar days and less than or equal to 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity did not provide the maximum effective GIC value to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area; OR The responsible entity did not provide the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), upon written request.
R10.	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for 5% or less or one of its	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for more than 5% up to (and	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for more than 10% up to	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for more than 15% or more

R#		Violation Severity Levels		
Ν <i>π</i>	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
	solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 24 calendar months and less than or equal to 26 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1.	including) 10% or two of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 26 calendar months and less than or equal to 28 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1	(and including) 15% or three of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 28 calendar months and less than or equal to 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1;	than three of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1; OR

R #		Violation Severity Levels				
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL		
		The responsible entity failed to include one of the required elements as listed in Requirement R10, Parts 10.1 through 10.3.	The responsible entity failed to include two of the required elements as listed in Requirement R10, Parts 10.1 through 10.3.	The responsible entity failed to include three of the required elements as listed in Requirement R10, Parts 10.1 through 10.3.		
R11.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not implement a process to obtain GIC monitor data from at least one GIC monitor located in the Planning Coordinator's planning area or other part of the system included in the Planning Coordinator's GIC System Model.		
R12.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not implement a process to obtain geomagnetic field data for its Planning Coordinator's planning area.		

D. Regional Variances D.A. Regional Variance for Canadian Jurisdictions

This Variance shall be applicable in those Canadian jurisdictions where the Variance has been approved for use by the applicable governmental authority or has otherwise become effective in the jurisdiction.

All references to "Attachment 1" in the standard are replaced with "Attachment 1 or Attachment 1-CAN."

In addition, this Variance replaces Requirement R7, Part 7.3 with the following:

- **D.A.7.3.** Include a timetable, subject to revision by the responsible entity in Part 7.4, for implementing the selected actions from Part 7.1. The timetable shall:
 - **D.A.7.3.1.** Specify implementation of non-hardware mitigation, if any, within two years of the later of the development of the CAP or receipt of regulatory approvals, if required; and
 - **D.A.7.3.2.** Specify implementation of hardware mitigation, if any, within four years of the later of the development of the CAP or receipt of regulatory approvals, if required.

E. Associated Documents

Attachment 1

Attachment 1-CAN

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	December 17, 2014	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	New
2	November 9, 2017	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	Revised to respond to directives in FERC Order No. 830.
3	TBD	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	

Attachment 1

Calculating Geoelectric Fields for the Benchmark and Supplemental GMD Events

The benchmark GMD event¹ defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows that are needed to conduct a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment. It is composed of the following elements: (1) a reference peak geoelectric field amplitude of 8 V/km derived from statistical analysis of historical magnetometer data; (2) scaling factors to account for local geomagnetic latitude; (3) scaling factors to account for local earth conductivity; and (4) a reference geomagnetic field time series or waveform to facilitate time-domain analysis of GMD impact on equipment.

The supplemental GMD event is composed of similar elements as described above, except (1) the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude is 12 V/km over a localized area; and (2) the geomagnetic field time series or waveform includes a local enhancement in the waveform.²

The regional geoelectric field peak amplitude used in GMD Vulnerability Assessment, E_{peak} , can be obtained from the reference geoelectric field value of 8 V/km for the benchmark GMD event (1) or 12 V/km for the supplemental GMD event (2) using the following relationships:

$$E_{peak} = 8 \times \alpha \times \beta_b (V/km) \tag{1}$$

$$E_{peak} = 12 \times \alpha \times \beta_s (V/km)$$
⁽²⁾

where, α is the scaling factor to account for local geomagnetic latitude, and β is a scaling factor to account for the local earth conductivity structure. Subscripts *b* and *s* for the β scaling factor denote association with the benchmark or supplemental GMD events, respectively.

Scaling the Geomagnetic Field

The benchmark and supplemental GMD events are defined for geomagnetic latitude of 60° and must be scaled to account for regional differences based on geomagnetic latitude. Table 2 provides a scaling factor correlating peak geoelectric field to geomagnetic latitude. Alternatively, the scaling factor α is computed with the empirical expression:

$$\alpha = 0.001 \times e^{(0.115 \times L)} \tag{3}$$

where, L is the geomagnetic latitude in degrees and $0.1 \le \alpha \le 1$.

¹ The Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description, May 2016 is available on the Related Information webpage for TPL-007-1: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/TPL0071RD/Benchmark_clean_May12_complete.pdf</u>.

² The extent of local enhancements is on the order of 100 km in North-South (latitude) direction but longer in East-West (longitude) direction. The local enhancement in the geomagnetic field occurs over the time period of 2-5 minutes. Additional information is available in the Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description, October 2017 white paper on the Project 2013-03 Geomagnetic Disturbance Mitigation project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

For large planning areas that cover more than one scaling factor from Table 2, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment should be based on a peak geoelectric field that is:

- calculated by using the most conservative (largest) value for α; or
- calculated assuming a non-uniform or piecewise uniform geomagnetic field.

Table 2: Geomagnetic Field Scaling Factors for the Benchmark and Supplemental GMD Events		
Geomagnetic Latitude (Degrees)	Scaling Factor1 (α)	
≤ 40	0.10	
45	0.2	
50	0.3	
54	0.5	
56	0.6	
57	0.7	
58	0.8	
59	0.9	
≥ 60	1.0	

Scaling the Geoelectric Field

The benchmark GMD event is defined for the reference Quebec earth model described in Table 4. The peak geoelectric field, E_{peak}, used in a GMD Vulnerability Assessment may be obtained by either:

- Calculating the geoelectric field for the ground conductivity in the planning area and the reference geomagnetic field time series scaled according to geomagnetic latitude, using a procedure such as the plane wave method described in the NERC GMD Task Force GIC Application Guide;³ or
- Using the earth conductivity scaling factor β from Table 3 that correlates to the ground conductivity map in Figure 1 or Figure 2. Along with the scaling factor α from equation (3) or Table 2, β is applied to the reference geoelectric field using equation (1 or 2, as applicable) to obtain the regional geoelectric field peak amplitude E_{peak} to be used in GMD Vulnerability Assessments. When a ground conductivity model is not available, the planning entity should use the largest β factor of adjacent physiographic regions or a technically justified value.

³ Available at the NERC GMD Task Force project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Pages/Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Task-Force-(GMDTF)-2013.aspx</u>.

The earth models used to calculate Table 3 for the United States were obtained from publicly available information published on the U. S. Geological Survey website.⁴ The models used to calculate Table 3 for Canada were obtained from Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) and reflect the average structure for large regions. A planner can also use specific earth model(s) with documented justification and the reference geomagnetic field time series to calculate the β factor(s) as follows:

$$\beta_b = E/8$$
 for the benchmark GMD event (4)

$$\beta_s = E/12$$
 for the supplemental GMD (5)

where, *E* is the absolute value of peak geoelectric in V/km obtained from the technically justified earth model and the reference geomagnetic field time series.

For large planning areas that span more than one β scaling factor, the most conservative (largest) value for β may be used in determining the peak geoelectric field to obtain conservative results. Alternatively, a planner could perform analysis using a non-uniform or piecewise uniform geoelectric field.

Applying the Localized Peak Geoelectric Field in the Supplemental GMD Event

The peak geoelectric field of the supplemental GMD event occurs in a localized area.⁵ Planners have flexibility to determine how to apply the localized peak geoelectric field over the planning area in performing GIC calculations. Examples of approaches are:

- Apply the peak geoelectric field (12 V/km scaled to the planning area) over the entire planning area;
- Apply a spatially limited (12 V/km scaled to the planning area) peak geoelectric field (e.g., 100 km in North-South latitude direction and 500 km in East-West longitude direction) over a portion(s) of the system, and apply the benchmark GMD event over the rest of the system; or
- Other methods to adjust the benchmark GMD event analysis to account for the localized geoelectric field enhancement of the supplemental GMD event.

⁴ Available at <u>http://geomag.usgs.gov/conductivity/</u>.

⁵ See the Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Description white paper located on the Project 2013-03 Geomagnetic Disturbance Mitigation project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.




Figure 1: Physiographic Regions of the Continental United States⁶



Figure 2: Physiographic Regions of Canada

⁶ Additional map detail is available at the U.S. Geological Survey: <u>http://geomag.usgs.gov/</u>.

Table 3: Geoelectric Field Scaling Factors			
Earth model	Scaling Factor Benchmark Event (β _b)	Scaling Factor Supplemental Event (β _s)	
AK1A	0.56	0.51	
AK1B	0.56	0.51	
AP1	0.33	0.30	
AP2	0.82	0.78	
BR1	0.22	0.22	
CL1	0.76	0.73	
CO1	0.27	0.25	
CP1	0.81	0.77	
CP2	0.95	0.86	
FL1	0.76	0.73	
CS1	0.41	0.37	
IP1	0.94	0.90	
IP2	0.28	0.25	
IP3	0.93	0.90	
IP4	0.41	0.35	
NE1	0.81	0.77	
PB1	0.62	0.55	
PB2	0.46	0.39	
PT1	1.17	1.19	
SL1	0.53	0.49	
SU1	0.93	0.90	
BOU	0.28	0.24	
FBK	0.56	0.56	
PRU	0.21	0.22	
BC	0.67	0.62	
PRAIRIES	0.96	0.88	
SHIELD	1.0	1.0	
ATLANTIC	0.79	0.76	

Rationale: Scaling factors in Table 3 are dependent upon the frequency content of the reference storm. Consequently, the benchmark GMD event and the supplemental GMD event may produce different scaling factors for a given earth model.

The scaling factor associated with the benchmark GMD event for the Florida earth model (FL1) has been updated based on the earth model published on the USGS public website.

Table 4: Reference Earth Model (Quebec)	
Layer Thickness (km)	Resistivity (Ω-m)
15	20,000
10	200
125	1,000
200	100
∞	3

Reference Geomagnetic Field Time Series or Waveform for the Benchmark GMD $\mathsf{Event}^{\scriptscriptstyle 7}$

The geomagnetic field measurement record of the March 13-14 1989 GMD event, measured at the NRCan Ottawa geomagnetic observatory, is the basis for the reference geomagnetic field waveform to be used to calculate the GIC time series, GIC(t), required for transformer thermal impact assessment.

The geomagnetic latitude of the Ottawa geomagnetic observatory is 55°; therefore, the amplitudes of the geomagnetic field measurement data were scaled up to the 60° reference geomagnetic latitude (see Figure 3) such that the resulting peak geoelectric field amplitude computed using the reference earth model was 8 V/km (see Figures 4 and 5). The sampling rate for the geomagnetic field waveform is 10 seconds.⁸ To use this geoelectric field time series when a different earth model is applicable, it should be scaled with the appropriate benchmark conductivity scaling factor β_b .

⁷ Refer to the Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description white paper for details on the determination of the reference geomagnetic field waveform: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/TPL0071RI.aspx</u>.

⁸ The data file of the benchmark geomagnetic field waveform is available on the Related Information webpage for TPL-007-1: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/TPL0071RI.aspx</u>.




Figure 3: Benchmark Geomagnetic Field Waveform Red B_n (Northward), Blue B_e (Eastward)





Figure 4: Benchmark Geoelectric Field Waveform E_E (Eastward)






Reference Geomagnetic Field Time Series or Waveform for the Supplemental GMD Event^9


The geomagnetic field measurement record of the March 13-14, 1989 GMD event, measured at the NRCan Ottawa geomagnetic observatory, is the basis for the reference geomagnetic field waveform to be used to calculate the GIC time series, GIC(t), required for transformer thermal impact assessment for the supplemental GMD event. The supplemental GMD event waveform differs from the benchmark GMD event waveform in that the supplemental GMD event waveform has a local enhancement.


The geomagnetic latitude of the Ottawa geomagnetic observatory is 55°; therefore, the amplitudes of the geomagnetic field measurement data were scaled up to the 60° reference geomagnetic latitude (see Figure 6) such that the resulting peak geoelectric field amplitude computed using the reference earth model was 12 V/km (see Figure7). The sampling rate for the geomagnetic field waveform is 10 seconds.¹⁰ To use this geoelectric field time series when a different earth model is applicable, it should be scaled with the appropriate supplemental conductivity scaling factor β_s .

⁹ Refer to the Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description white paper for details on the determination of the reference geomagnetic field waveform: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

¹⁰ The data file of the benchmark geomagnetic field waveform is available on the NERC GMD Task Force project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Pages/Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Task-Force-(GMDTF)-2013.aspx</u>.









Attachment 1-CAN

Attachment 1-CAN provides an alternative that a Canadian entity may use in lieu of the benchmark or supplemental GMD event(s) defined in Attachment 1 for performing GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s).

A Canadian entity may use the provisions of Attachment 1-CAN if it has regionally specific information that provides a technically justified means to re-define a 1-in-100 year GMD planning event(s) within its planning area.

Information for the Alternative Methodology

GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s) require the use of geophysical and engineering models. Canadian-specific data is available and growing. Ongoing research allows for more accurate characterization of regional parameters used in these models. Such Canadian-specific data includes geomagnetic field, earth conductivity, and geomagnetically induced current measurements that can be used for modeling and simulation validation.

Information used to calculate geoelectric fields for the benchmark and supplemental GMD events shall be clearly documented and technically justified. For example, the factors involved in the calculation of geoelectric fields are geomagnetic field variations and an earth transfer function(s).¹ Technically justified information used in modelling geomagnetic field variations may include: technical documents produced by governmental entities such as Natural Resources Canada; technical papers published in peer-reviewed journals; and data sets gathered using sound scientific principles. An earth transfer function may rely on magnetotelluric measurements or earth conductivity models.

Modeling assumptions shall also be clearly documented and technically justified. An entity may use sensitivity analysis to identify how the assumptions affect the results.

A simplified model may be used to perform a GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), as long as the model is more conservative than a more detailed model.

When interpreting assessment results, the entity shall consider the maturity of the modeling, toolset, and techniques applied.

Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Events

The 1-in-100 year planning event shall be based on regionally specific data and technically justifiable statistical analyses (e.g., extreme value theory) and applied to the benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s).


For the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), an entity shall consider the large-scale spatial structure of the GMD event. For the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), an

¹ The "earth transfer function" is the relationship between the electric fields and magnetic field variations at the surface of the earth.

entity shall consider the small-scale spatial structure of the GMD event (e.g., using magnetometer measurements or realistic electrojet calculations).

Guidelines and Technical Basis

The diagram below provides an overall view of the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process:



The requirements in this standard cover various aspects of the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process.

Benchmark GMD Event (Attachment 1)

The benchmark GMD event defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows that are needed to conduct a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment. The *Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description*, May 2016² white paper includes the event description, analysis, and example calculations.

Supplemental GMD Event (Attachment 1)

The supplemental GMD event defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows that are needed to conduct a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment. The *Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description*, October 2017³ white paper includes the event description and analysis.

Requirement R2

A GMD Vulnerability Assessment requires a GIC System model, which is a dc representation of the System, to calculate GIC flow. In a GMD Vulnerability Assessment, GIC simulations are used to determine transformer Reactive Power absorption and transformer thermal response. Details for developing the GIC System model are provided in the NERC GMD Task Force guide: *Application Guide for Computing Geomagnetically-Induced Current in the Bulk Power System*, December 2013.⁴

Underground pipe-type cables present a special modeling situation in that the steel pipe that encloses the power conductors significantly reduces the geoelectric field induced into the conductors themselves, while they remain a path for GIC. Solid dielectric cables that are not

² <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/TPL0071RI.aspx</u>.

³ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

⁴ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GIC%20Application</u> <u>%20Guide%202013 approved.pdf</u>.

enclosed by a steel pipe will not experience a reduction in the induced geoelectric field. A planning entity should account for special modeling situations in the GIC system model, if applicable.

Requirement R4

The *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,⁵ December 2013 developed by the NERC GMD Task Force provides technical information on GMD-specific considerations for planning studies.

Requirement R5

The benchmark thermal impact assessment of transformers specified in Requirement R6 is based on GIC information for the benchmark GMD Event. This GIC information is determined by the planning entity through simulation of the GIC System model and must be provided to the entity responsible for conducting the thermal impact assessment. GIC information should be provided in accordance with Requirement R5 each time the GMD Vulnerability Assessment is performed since, by definition, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes a documented evaluation of susceptibility to localized equipment damage due to GMD.

The maximum effective GIC value provided in Part 5.1 is used for the benchmark thermal impact assessment. Only those transformers that experience an effective GIC value of 75 A or greater per phase require evaluation in Requirement R6.

GIC(t) provided in Part 5.2 is used to convert the steady state GIC flows to time-series GIC data for the benchmark thermal impact assessment of transformers. This information may be needed by one or more of the methods for performing a benchmark thermal impact assessment. Additional information is in the following section and the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,⁶ October 2017.

The peak GIC value of 75 Amps per phase has been shown through thermal modeling to be a conservative threshold below which the risk of exceeding known temperature limits established by technical organizations is low.

Requirement R6

The benchmark thermal impact assessment of a power transformer may be based on manufacturer-provided GIC capability curves, thermal response simulation, thermal impact screening, or other technically justified means. Approaches for conducting the assessment are presented in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper ERO Enterprise-Endorsed Implementation Guidance*⁷ for this requirement. This ERO-Endorsed document is posted on the NERC Compliance Guidance⁸ webpage.

⁵ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning</u> <u>%20Guide_approved.pdf</u>.

⁶ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

⁷ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/guidance/EROEndorsedImplementationGuidance/TPL-007-1</u> Transformer Thermal Impact <u>Assessment White Paper.pdf</u>.

⁸ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/guidance/Pages/default.aspx</u>.

Transformers are exempt from the benchmark thermal impact assessment requirement if the effective GIC value for the transformer is less than 75 A per phase, as determined by a GIC analysis of the System. Justification for this criterion is provided in the *Screening Criterion for Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,⁹ October 2017. A documented design specification exceeding this value is also a justifiable threshold criterion that exempts a transformer from Requirement R6.

The benchmark threshold criteria and its associated transformer thermal impact must be evaluated on the basis of effective GIC. Refer to the white papers for additional information.

Requirement R7

Technical considerations for GMD mitigation planning, including operating and equipment strategies, are available in Chapter 5 of the *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,¹⁰ December 2013. Additional information is available in the 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk-Power System,¹¹ February 2012.

Requirement R8

The *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,¹² December 2013 developed by the NERC GMD Task Force provides technical information on GMD-specific considerations for planning studies.

The supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment process is similar to the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment process described under Requirement R4.

Requirement R9

The supplemental thermal impact assessment specified of transformers in Requirement R10 is based on GIC information for the supplemental GMD Event. This GIC information is determined by the planning entity through simulation of the GIC System model and must be provided to the entity responsible for conducting the thermal impact assessment. GIC information should be provided in accordance with Requirement R9 each time the GMD Vulnerability Assessment is performed since, by definition, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes a documented evaluation of susceptibility to localized equipment damage due to GMD.

The maximum effective GIC value provided in Part 9.1 is used for the supplemental thermal impact assessment. Only those transformers that experience an effective GIC value of 85 A or greater per phase require evaluation in Requirement R10.

GIC(t) provided in Part 9.2 is used to convert the steady state GIC flows to time-series GIC data for the supplemental thermal impact assessment of transformers. This information may be

⁹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

¹⁰ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning</u> <u>%20Guide_approved.pdf</u>.

¹¹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/2012GMD.pdf.</u>

¹² http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning %20Guide_approved.pdf.

needed by one or more of the methods for performing a supplemental thermal impact assessment. Additional information is in the following section.

The peak GIC value of 85 Amps per phase has been shown through thermal modeling to be a conservative threshold below which the risk of exceeding known temperature limits established by technical organizations is low.

Requirement R10

The supplemental thermal impact assessment of a power transformer may be based on manufacturer-provided GIC capability curves, thermal response simulation, thermal impact screening, or other technically justified means. Approaches for conducting the assessment are presented in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper ERO Enterprise-Endorsed Implementation Guidance*¹³ discussed in the Requirement R6 section above. A later version of the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,¹⁴ October 2017, has been developed to include updated information pertinent to the supplemental GMD event and supplemental thermal impact assessment.

Transformers are exempt from the supplemental thermal impact assessment requirement if the effective GIC value for the transformer is less than 85 A per phase, as determined by a GIC analysis of the System. Justification for this criterion is provided in the revised *Screening Criterion for Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,¹⁵ October 2017. A documented design specification exceeding this value is also a justifiable threshold criterion that exempts a transformer from Requirement R10.

The supplemental threshold criteria and its associated transformer thermal impact must be evaluated on the basis of effective GIC. Refer to the white papers for additional information.

Requirement R11

Technical considerations for GIC monitoring are contained in Chapter 6 of the 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk-Power System, ¹⁶ February 2012. GIC monitoring is generally performed by Hall effect transducers that are attached to the neutral of the wye-grounded transformer. Data from GIC monitors is useful for model validation and situational awareness.

Responsible entities consider the following in developing a process for obtaining GIC monitor data:

• **Monitor locations.** An entity's operating process may be constrained by location of existing GIC monitors. However, when planning for additional GIC monitoring installations consider that data from monitors located in areas found to have high GIC based on system

¹³ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/guidance/EROEndorsedImplementationGuidance/TPL-007-1</u> Transformer Thermal Impact <u>Assessment White Paper.pdf</u>.

¹⁴ http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.

¹⁵ http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.

¹⁶ http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/2012GMD.pdf.


studies may provide more useful information for validation and situational awareness purposes. Conversely, data from GIC monitors that are located in the vicinity of transportation systems using direct current (e.g., subways or light rail) may be unreliable.

- Monitor specifications. Capabilities of Hall effect transducers, existing and planned, should be considered in the operating process. When planning new GIC monitor installations, consider monitor data range (e.g., -500 A through + 500 A) and ambient temperature ratings consistent with temperatures in the region in which the monitor will be installed.
- **Sampling Interval.** An entity's operating process may be constrained by capabilities of existing GIC monitors. However, when possible specify data sampling during periods of interest at a rate of 10 seconds or faster.
- **Collection Periods.** The process should specify when the entity expects GIC data to be collected. For example, collection could be required during periods where the Kp index is above a threshold, or when GIC values are above a threshold. Determining when to discontinue collecting GIC data should also be specified to maintain consistency in data collection.
- Data format. Specify time and value formats. For example, Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) (MM/DD/YYYY HH:MM:SS) and GIC Value (Ampere). Positive (+) and negative (-) signs indicate direction of GIC flow. Positive reference is flow from ground into transformer neutral. Time fields should indicate the sampled time rather than system or SCADA time if supported by the GIC monitor system.
- **Data retention.** The entity's process should specify data retention periods, for example 1 year. Data retention periods should be adequately long to support availability for the entity's model validation process and external reporting requirements, if any.
- Additional information. The entity's process should specify collection of other information necessary for making the data useful, for example monitor location and type of neutral connection (e.g., three-phase or single-phase).

Requirement R12

Magnetometers measure changes in the earth's magnetic field. Entities should obtain data from the nearest accessible magnetometer. Sources of magnetometer data include:

• Observatories such as those operated by U.S. Geological Survey and Natural Resources Canada, see figure below for locations:¹⁷



- Research institutions and academic universities;
- Entities with installed magnetometers.

Entities that choose to install magnetometers should consider equipment specifications and data format protocols contained in the latest version of the *INTERMAGNET Technical Reference Manual*, Version 4.6, 2012.¹⁸

¹⁷ <u>http://www.intermagnet.org/index-eng.php</u>.

¹⁸ <u>http://www.intermagnet.org/publications/intermag_4-6.pdf</u>.

Rationale

During development of TPL-007-1, text boxes were embedded within the standard to explain the rationale for various parts of the standard. The text from the rationale text boxes was moved to this section upon approval of TPL-007-1 by the NERC Board of Trustees. In developing TPL-007-2, the SDT has made changes to the sections below only when necessary for clarity. Changes are marked with brackets [].

Rationale for Applicability:

Instrumentation transformers and station service transformers do not have significant impact on geomagnetically-induced current (GIC) flows; therefore, these transformers are not included in the applicability for this standard.

Terminal voltage describes line-to-line voltage.

Rationale for R1:

In some areas, planning entities may determine that the most effective approach to conduct a GMD Vulnerability Assessment is through a regional planning organization. No requirement in the standard is intended to prohibit a collaborative approach where roles and responsibilities are determined by a planning organization made up of one or more Planning Coordinator(s).

Rationale for R2:

A GMD Vulnerability Assessment requires a GIC System model to calculate GIC flow which is used to determine transformer Reactive Power absorption and transformer thermal response. Guidance for developing the GIC System model is provided in the *Application Guide Computing Geomagnetically-Induced Current in the Bulk-Power System*,¹⁹ December 2013, developed by the NERC GMD Task Force.

The System model specified in Requirement R2 is used in conducting steady state power flow analysis that accounts for the Reactive Power absorption of power transformer(s) due to GIC in the System.

The GIC System model includes all power transformer(s) with a high side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV. The model is used to calculate GIC flow in the network.

The projected System condition for GMD planning may include adjustments to the System that are executable in response to space weather information. These adjustments could include, for example, recalling or postponing maintenance outages.

The Violation Risk Factor (VRF) for Requirement R2 is changed from Medium to High. This change is for consistency with the VRF for approved standard TPL-001-4 Requirement R1, which is proposed for revision in the NERC filing dated August 29, 2014 (Docket No. RM12-1-000). NERC guidelines require consistency among Reliability Standards.

¹⁹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GIC%20Application</u> <u>%20Guide%202013_approved.pdf</u>.

Rationale for R3:

Requirement R3 allows a responsible entity the flexibility to determine the System steady state voltage criteria for System steady state performance in Table 1. Steady state voltage limits are an example of System steady state performance criteria.

Rationale for R4:

The GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes steady state power flow analysis and the supporting study or studies using the models specified in Requirement R2 that account for the effects of GIC. Performance criteria are specified in Table 1.

At least one System On-Peak Load and at least one System Off-Peak Load must be examined in the analysis.

Distribution of GMD Vulnerability Assessment results provides a means for sharing relevant information with other entities responsible for planning reliability. Results of GIC studies may affect neighboring systems and should be taken into account by planners.

The *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,²⁰ December 2013 developed by the NERC GMD Task Force provides technical information on GMD-specific considerations for planning studies. The provision of information in Requirement R4, Part 4.3, shall be subject to the legal and regulatory obligations for the disclosure of confidential and/or sensitive information.

Rationale for R5:

This GIC information is necessary for determining the thermal impact of GIC on transformers in the planning area and must be provided to entities responsible for performing the thermal impact assessment so that they can accurately perform the assessment. GIC information should be provided in accordance with Requirement R5 as part of the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process since, by definition, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes documented evaluation of susceptibility to localized equipment damage due to GMD.

The maximum effective GIC value provided in Part 5.1 is used for transformer thermal impact assessment.

GIC(t) provided in Part 5.2 can alternatively be used to convert the steady state GIC flows to timeseries GIC data for transformer thermal impact assessment. This information may be needed by one or more of the methods for performing a thermal impact assessment. Additional guidance is available in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,²¹ October 2017.

A Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that desires GIC(t) may request it from the planning entity. The planning entity shall provide GIC(t) upon request once GIC has been calculated, but

²⁰ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning</u> <u>%20Guide_approved.pdf.</u>

²¹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

no later than 90 calendar days after receipt of a request from the owner and after completion of Requirement R5, Part 5.1.

The provision of information in Requirement R5 shall be subject to the legal and regulatory obligations for the disclosure of confidential and/or sensitive information.

Rationale for R6:

The transformer thermal impact screening criterion has been revised from 15 A per phase to 75 A per phase [for the benchmark GMD event]. Only those transformers that experience an effective GIC value of 75 A per phase or greater require evaluation in Requirement R6. The justification is provided in the *Screening Criterion for Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,²² October 2017.

The thermal impact assessment may be based on manufacturer-provided GIC capability curves, thermal response simulation, thermal impact screening, or other technically justified means. The transformer thermal assessment will be repeated or reviewed using previous assessment results each time the planning entity performs a GMD Vulnerability Assessment and provides GIC information as specified in Requirement R5. Approaches for conducting the assessment are presented in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,²³ October 2017.

Thermal impact assessments are provided to the planning entity, as determined in Requirement R1, so that identified issues can be included in the GMD Vulnerability Assessment (R4), and the Corrective Action Plan (R7) as necessary.

Thermal impact assessments of non-BES transformers are not required because those transformers do not have a wide-area effect on the reliability of the interconnected Transmission system.

The provision of information in Requirement R6, Part 6.4, shall be subject to the legal and regulatory obligations for the disclosure of confidential and/or sensitive information.

Rationale for R7:

The proposed requirement addresses directives in Order No. 830 for establishing Corrective Action Plan (CAP) deadlines associated with GMD Vulnerability Assessments. In Order No. 830, FERC directed revisions to TPL-007 such that CAPs are developed within one year from the completion of GMD Vulnerability Assessments (P 101). Furthermore, FERC directed establishment of implementation deadlines after the completion of the CAP as follows (P 102):

- Two years for non-hardware mitigation; and
- Four years for hardware mitigation.

The objective of Part 7.4 is to provide awareness to potentially impacted entities when implementation of planned mitigation is not achievable within the deadlines established in Part

²² http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.

²³ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

7.3. Examples of situations beyond the control of the responsible entity (see Section 7.4) include, but are not limited to:

- Delays resulting from regulatory/legal processes, such as permitting;
- Delays resulting from stakeholder processes required by tariff;
- Delays resulting from equipment lead times; or

Delays resulting from the inability to acquire necessary Right-of-Way.

Rationale for Table 3:

Table 3 has been revised to use the same ground model designation, FL1, as is being used by USGS. The calculated scaling factor for FL1 is 0.74. [The scaling factor associated with the benchmark GMD event for the Florida earth model (FL1) has been updated to 0.76 in TPL-007-2 based on the earth model published on the USGS public website.]

Rationale for R8 – R10:

The proposed requirements address directives in Order No. 830 for revising the benchmark GMD event used in GMD Vulnerability Assessments (P 44, P 47-49). The requirements add a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment based on the supplemental GMD event that accounts for localized peak geoelectric fields.

Rationale for R11 – R12:

The proposed requirements address directives in Order No. 830 for requiring responsible entities to collect GIC monitoring and magnetometer data as necessary to enable model validation and situational awareness (P 88; P. 90-92). GMD measurement data refers to GIC monitor data and geomagnetic field data in Requirements R11 and R12, respectively. See the Guidelines and Technical Basis section of this standard for technical information.

The objective of Requirement R11 is for entities to obtain GIC data for the Planning Coordinator's planning area or other part of the system included in the Planning Coordinator's GIC System model to inform GMD Vulnerability Assessments. Technical considerations for GIC monitoring are contained in Chapter 9 of the 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk-Power System (NERC 2012 GMD Report). GIC monitoring is generally performed by Hall effect transducers that are attached to the neutral of the transformer and measure dc current flowing through the neutral.

The objective of Requirement R12 is for entities to obtain geomagnetic field data for the Planning Coordinator's planning area to inform GMD Vulnerability Assessments. Magnetometers provide geomagnetic field data by measuring changes in the earth's magnetic field. Sources of geomagnetic field data include:

- Observatories such as those operated by U.S. Geological Survey, Natural Resources Canada, research organizations, or university research facilities;
- Installed magnetometers; and
- Commercial or third-party sources of geomagnetic field data.

Geomagnetic field data for a Planning Coordinator's planning area is obtained from one or more of the above data sources located in the Planning Coordinator's planning area, or by obtaining a geomagnetic field data product for the Planning Coordinator's planning area from a government or research organization. The geomagnetic field data product does not need to be derived from a magnetometer or observatory within the Planning Coordinator's planning area.

Standard Development Timeline

This section is maintained by the drafting team during the development of the standard and will be removed when the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees (Board).

Description of Current Draft

10-day final ballotErrata

Completed Actions	Date
Standard Authorization Request (SAR) posted for formal comment period	03/30/18 – 04/30/18
Standards Committee approved modified SAR for posting	06/13/18
28-day informal comment period	08/10/18 – 09/06/18
45-day formal or informal comment period with initial ballot	<u>October 2018 –</u> <u>November 2018</u>
<u>10-day final ballot</u>	November 2018

Anticipated Actions	Date
45-day formal or informal comment period with initial ballot	October 2018 – November 2018
10 day final ballot	November 2018
Board adoption	February 2019

New or Modified Term(s) Used in NERC Reliability Standards

This section includes all new or modified terms used in the proposed standard that will be included in the *Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards* upon applicable regulatory approval. Terms used in the proposed standard that are already defined and are not being modified can be found in the *Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards*. The new or revised terms listed below will be presented for approval with the proposed standard. Upon Board adoption, this section will be removed.

Term(s):

None.

A. Introduction

- 1. Title: Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events
- **2. Number:** TPL-007-3
- **3. Purpose:** Establish requirements for Transmission system planned performance during geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) events.

4. Applicability:

- 4.1. Functional Entities:
 - **4.1.1.** Planning Coordinator with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2;
 - **4.1.2.** Transmission Planner with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2;
 - 4.1.3. Transmission Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2; and
 - **4.1.4.** Generator Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2.

4.2. Facilities:

- **4.2.1.** Facilities that include power transformer(s) with a high side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV.
- 5. Effective Date: See Implementation Plan for TPL-007-3.
- **Background:** During a GMD event, geomagnetically-induced currents (GIC) may cause transformer hot-spot heating or damage, loss of Reactive Power sources, increased Reactive Power demand, and Misoperation(s), the combination of which may result in voltage collapse and blackout.

The only difference between TPL-007-3 and TPL-007-2 is that TPL-007-3 adds a Canadian Variance to address regulatory practices/processes within Canadian jurisdictions and to allow the use of Canadian-specific data and research to define and implement alternative GMD event(s) that achieve at least an equivalent reliability objective of that in TPL-007-2.

B. Requirements and Measures

R1. Each Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with its Transmission Planner(s), shall identify the individual and joint responsibilities of the Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner(s) in the Planning Coordinator's planning area for maintaining models, performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, and implementing process(es) to obtain GMD measurement data as specified in this standard. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- M1. Each Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with its Transmission Planners, shall provide documentation on roles and responsibilities, such as meeting minutes, agreements, copies of procedures or protocols in effect between entities or between departments of a vertically integrated system, or email correspondence that identifies an agreement has been reached on individual and joint responsibilities for maintaining models, performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, and implementing process(es) to obtain GMD measurement data in accordance with Requirement R1.
- **R2.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall maintain System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M2. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence in either electronic or hard copy format that it is maintaining System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.
- **R3.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System during the GMD events described in Attachment 1. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- **M3.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence, such as electronic or hard copies of the criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System in accordance with Requirement R3.

Benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s)

- **R4.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall complete a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment of the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon at least once every 60 calendar months. This benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall use a study or studies based on models identified in Requirement R2, document assumptions, and document summarized results of the steady state analysis. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **4.1.** The study or studies shall include the following conditions:
 - **4.1.1.** System On-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon; and
 - **4.1.2.** System Off-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon.

- **4.2.** The study or studies shall be conducted based on the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1 to determine whether the System meets the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1.
- **4.3.** The benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, and adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later.
 - **4.3.1.** If a recipient of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment provides documented comments on the results, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- M4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have dated evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment meeting all of the requirements in Requirement R4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, and adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later, as specified in Requirement R4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments in accordance with Requirement R4.
- **R5.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide GIC flow information to be used for the benchmark thermal impact assessment of transformers specified in Requirement R6 to each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns an applicable Bulk Electric System (BES) power transformer in the planning area. The GIC flow information shall include: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **5.1.** The maximum effective GIC value for the worst case geoelectric field orientation for the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1. This value shall be provided to the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.

- **5.2.** The effective GIC time series, GIC(t), calculated using the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1 in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area. GIC(t) shall be provided within 90 calendar days of receipt of the written request and after determination of the maximum effective GIC value in Part 5.1.
- **M5.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided the maximum effective GIC values to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area as specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided GIC(t) in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.
- **R6.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A per phase or greater. The benchmark thermal impact assessment shall: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - 6.1. Be based on the effective GIC flow information provided in Requirement R5;
 - 6.2. Document assumptions used in the analysis;
 - **6.3.** Describe suggested actions and supporting analysis to mitigate the impact of GICs, if any; and
 - **6.4.** Be performed and provided to the responsible entities, as determined in Requirement R1, within 24 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1.
- **M6.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its benchmark thermal impact assessment for all of its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A per phase or greater, and shall have evidence such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided its thermal impact assessment to the responsible entities as specified in Requirement R6.
- **R7.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, that concludes through the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment conducted in Requirement R4 that their System does not meet the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1, shall develop a Corrective

Action Plan (CAP) addressing how the performance requirements will be met. The CAP shall: [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- **7.1.** List System deficiencies and the associated actions needed to achieve required System performance. Examples of such actions include:
 - Installation, modification, retirement, or removal of Transmission and generation Facilities and any associated equipment.
 - Installation, modification, or removal of Protection Systems or Remedial Action Schemes.
 - Use of Operating Procedures, specifying how long they will be needed as part of the CAP.
 - Use of Demand-Side Management, new technologies, or other initiatives.
- **7.2.** Be developed within one year of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.
- **7.3.** Include a timetable, subject to revision by the responsible entity in Part 7.4, for implementing the selected actions from Part 7.1. The timetable shall:
 - **7.3.1.** Specify implementation of non-hardware mitigation, if any, within two years of development of the CAP; and
 - **7.3.2.** Specify implementation of hardware mitigation, if any, within four years of development of the CAP.
- **7.4.** Be revised if situations beyond the control of the responsible entity determined in Requirement R1 prevent implementation of the CAP within the timetable for implementation provided in Part 7.3. The revised CAP shall document the following, and be updated at least once every 12 calendar months until implemented:
 - **7.4.1.** Circumstances causing the delay for fully or partially implementing the selected actions in Part 7.1;
 - **7.4.2.** Description of the original CAP, and any previous changes to the CAP, with the associated timetable(s) for implementing the selected actions in Part 7.1; and
 - **7.4.3.** Revisions to the selected actions in Part 7.1, if any, including utilization of Operating Procedures if applicable, and the updated timetable for implementing the selected actions.
- **7.5.** Be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission Planner(s), and functional entities referenced in the CAP within 90 calendar days of development or revision, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of development or revision, whichever is later.

- **7.5.1.** If a recipient of the CAP provides documented comments on the results, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- **M7.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, that concludes, through the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment conducted in Requirement R4, that the responsible entity's System does not meet the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1 shall have evidence such as dated electronic or hard copies of its CAP including timetable for implementing selected actions, as specified in Requirement R7. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has revised its CAP if situations beyond the responsible entity's control prevent implementation of the CAP within the timetable specified. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its CAP or relevant information, if any, (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission Planner(s), and functional entities referenced in the CAP within 90 calendar days of development or revision, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of development or revision, whichever is later as specified in Requirement R7. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its CAP within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments, in accordance with Requirement R7.

Supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s)

- **R8.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall complete a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment of the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon at least once every 60 calendar months. This supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall use a study or studies based on models identified in Requirement R2, document assumptions, and document summarized results of the steady state analysis. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - 8.1. The study or studies shall include the following conditions:
 - **8.1.1.** System On-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon; and
 - **8.1.2.** System Off-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon.

- **8.2.** The study or studies shall be conducted based on the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1 to determine whether the System meets the performance requirements for the steady state planning supplemental GMD event contained in Table 1.
- **8.3.** If the analysis concludes there is Cascading caused by the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1, an evaluation of possible actions designed to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the consequences and adverse impacts of the event(s) shall be conducted.
- **8.4.** The supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later.
 - **8.4.1.** If a recipient of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment provides documented comments on the results, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- M8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have dated evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment meeting all of the requirements in Requirement R8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its supplemental GMD Vulnerability: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later, as specified in Requirement R8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments in accordance with Requirement R8.
- **R9.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide GIC flow information to be used for the supplemental thermal impact assessment of transformers specified in Requirement R10 to each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns an applicable Bulk Electric System (BES) power transformer in the planning area. The GIC flow information shall include: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- **9.1.** The maximum effective GIC value for the worst case geoelectric field orientation for the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1. This value shall be provided to the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.
- **9.2.** The effective GIC time series, GIC(t), calculated using the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1 in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area. GIC(t) shall be provided within 90 calendar days of receipt of the written request and after determination of the maximum effective GIC value in Part 9.1.
- M9. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided the maximum effective GIC values to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area as specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided GIC(t) in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.
- **R10.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A per phase or greater. The supplemental thermal impact assessment shall: [*Violation Risk Factor: Medium*] [*Time Horizon: Long-term Planning*]
 - **10.1.** Be based on the effective GIC flow information provided in Requirement R9;
 - 10.2. Document assumptions used in the analysis;
 - **10.3.** Describe suggested actions and supporting analysis to mitigate the impact of GICs, if any; and
 - **10.4.** Be performed and provided to the responsible entities, as determined in Requirement R1, within 24 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1.
- M10. Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its supplemental thermal impact assessment for all of its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A per phase or greater, and shall have evidence such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided its supplemental thermal impact assessment to the responsible entities as specified in Requirement R10.

GMD Measurement Data Processes

- **R11.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall implement a process to obtain GIC monitor data from at least one GIC monitor located in the Planning Coordinator's planning area or other part of the system included in the Planning Coordinator's GIC System model. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M11. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its GIC monitor location(s) and documentation of its process to obtain GIC monitor data in accordance with Requirement R11.
- **R12.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall implement a process to obtain geomagnetic field data for its Planning Coordinator's planning area. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M12. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its process to obtain geomagnetic field data for its Planning Coordinator's planning area in accordance with Requirement R12.

C. Compliance

- 1. Compliance Monitoring Process
 - **1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority:** "Compliance Enforcement Authority" means NERC or the Regional Entity, or any entity as otherwise designated by an Applicable Governmental Authority, in their respective roles of monitoring and/or enforcing compliance with mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards in their respective jurisdictions.
 - **1.2.** Evidence Retention: The following evidence retention period(s) identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full-time period since the last audit.

The applicable entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

- For Requirements R1, R2, R3, R5, R6, R9, and R10, each responsible entity shall retain documentation as evidence for five years.
- For Requirements R4 and R8, each responsible entity shall retain documentation of the current GMD Vulnerability Assessment and the preceding GMD Vulnerability Assessment.

- For Requirement R7, each responsible entity shall retain documentation as evidence for five years or until all actions in the Corrective Action Plan are completed, whichever is later.
- For Requirements R11 and R12, each responsible entity shall retain documentation as evidence for three years.
- **1.3.** Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program: As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, "Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program" refers to the identification of the processes that will be used to evaluate data or information for the purpose of assessing performance or outcomes with the associated Reliability Standard.

Table 1: Steady State Planning GMD Event

Steady State:

- a. Voltage collapse, Cascading and uncontrolled islanding shall not occur.
- b. Generation loss is acceptable as a consequence of the steady state planning GMD events.
- c. Planned System adjustments such as Transmission configuration changes and re-dispatch of generation are allowed if such adjustments are executable within the time duration applicable to the Facility Ratings.

Category	Initial Condition	Event	Interruption of Firm Transmission Service Allowed	Load Loss Allowed
Benchmark GMD Event - GMD Event with Outages	 System as may be postured in response to space weather information¹, and then GMD event² 	Reactive Power compensation devices and other Transmission Facilities removed as a result of Protection System operation or Misoperation due to harmonics during the GMD event	Yes ³	Yes ³
Supplemental GMD Event - GMD Event with Outages	 System as may be postured in response to space weather information¹, and then GMD event² 	Reactive Power compensation devices and other Transmission Facilities removed as a result of Protection System operation or Misoperation due to harmonics during the GMD event	Yes	Yes
	Table	1: Steady State Performance Footnot	es	

- 1. The System condition for GMD planning may include adjustments to posture the System that are executable in response to space weather information.
- 2. The GMD conditions for the benchmark and supplemental planning events are described in Attachment 1.
- 3. Load loss as a result of manual or automatic Load shedding (e.g., UVLS) and/or curtailment of Firm Transmission Service may be used to meet BES performance requirements during studied GMD conditions. The likelihood and magnitude of Load loss or curtailment of Firm Transmission Service should be minimized.

Violation Severity Levels

R #	Violation Severity Levels						
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL			
R1.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with its Transmission Planner(s), failed to determine and identify individual or joint responsibilities of the Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner(s) in the Planning Coordinator's planning area for maintaining models, performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, and implementing process(es) to obtain GMD measurement data as specified in this standard.			
R2.	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not maintain either System models or GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the studies	The responsible entity did not maintain both System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the studies			

R #	Violation Severity Levels					
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL		
			needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.	needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.		
R3.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not have criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System during the GMD events described in Attachment 1 as required.		
R4.	The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 60 calendar months and less than or equal to 64 calendar months since the last benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	The responsible entity's completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy one of the elements listed in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.3; OR The responsible entity completed a benchmark	The responsible entity's completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy two of the elements listed in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.3; OR The responsible entity completed a benchmark	The responsible entity's completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy three of the elements listed in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.3; OR The responsible entity completed a benchmark		
		GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 64 calendar months and less than or equal to 68 calendar months since the	GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 68 calendar months and less than or equal to 72 calendar months since the	GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 72 calendar months since the last benchmark		

R #	Violation Severity Levels					
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL		
		last benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	last benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	GMD Vulnerability Assessment; OR The responsible entity does not have a completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.		
R5.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 90 calendar days and less than or equal to 100 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 100 calendar days and less than or equal to 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity did not provide the maximum effective GIC value to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area; OR The responsible entity did not provide the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), upon written request.		
R6.	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for 5% or less or one of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for more than 5% up to (and including) 10% or two of its solely owned and jointly	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for more than 10% up to (and including) 15% or three of its solely owned and	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for more than 15% or more than three of its solely owned and jointly owned		

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
	transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 24 calendar months and less than or equal to 26 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1.	owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 26 calendar months and less than or equal to 28 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1; OR The responsible entity failed to include one of the	jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 28 calendar months and less than or equal to 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1; OR The responsible entity failed to include two of the	applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1; OR The responsible entity failed to include three of the required elements as listed	

R #	Violation Severity Levels					
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL		
		required elements as listed in Requirement R6, Parts 6.1 through 6.3.	required elements as listed in Requirement R6, Parts 6.1 through 6.3.	in Requirement R6, Parts 6.1 through 6.3.		
R7.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with one of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with two of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with three of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with four or more of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5; OR The responsible entity did not have a Corrective Action Plan as required by Requirement R7.		
R8.	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy one of elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy two of elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy three of the elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy four of the elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.4; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental		
	GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more		

R #	Violation Severity Levels					
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL		
	than 60 calendar months and less than or equal to 64 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	than 64 calendar months and less than or equal to 68 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	than 68 calendar months and less than or equal to 72 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	than 72 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment; OR The responsible entity does not have a completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.		
R9.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 90 calendar days and less than or equal to 100 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 100 calendar days and less than or equal to 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity did not provide the maximum effective GIC value to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area; OR The responsible entity did not provide the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), upon written request.		
R10.	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for 5% or less or one of its	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for more than 5% up to (and	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for more than 10% up to	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for more than 15% or more		

R #	# Violation Severity Levels				
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
	solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 24 calendar months and less than or equal to 26 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1.	including) 10% or two of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 26 calendar months and less than or equal to 28 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1 OR	(and including) 15% or three of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 28 calendar months and less than or equal to 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1; OR	than three of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1; OR	

R #	Violation Severity Levels						
K #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL			
		The responsible entity failed to include one of the required elements as listed in Requirement R10, Parts 10.1 through 10.3.	The responsible entity failed to include two of the required elements as listed in Requirement R10, Parts 10.1 through 10.3.	The responsible entity failed to include three of the required elements as listed in Requirement R10, Parts 10.1 through 10.3.			
R11.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not implement a process to obtain GIC monitor data from at least one GIC monitor located in the Planning Coordinator's planning area or other part of the system included in the Planning Coordinator's GIC System Model.			
R12.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not implement a process to obtain geomagnetic field data for its Planning Coordinator's planning area.			

D. Regional Variances D.A. Regional Variance for Canadian Jurisdictions

This Variance shall be applicable in <u>those</u> Canad<u>ian</u> <u>-jurisdictions where the Variance</u> has been approved for use by the applicable governmental authority or has otherwise become effective in the jurisdiction.

All references to "Attachment 1" in the standard are replaced with "Attachment 1 or Attachment 1-CAN."

In addition, this Variance replaces Requirement R7, Part 7.3 with the following:

- **D.A.7.3.** Include a timetable, subject to revision by the responsible entity in Part 7.4, for implementing the selected actions from Part 7.1. The timetable shall:
 - **D.A.7.3.1.** Specify implementation of non-hardware mitigation, if any, within two years of the later of the development of the CAP or receipt of regulatory approvals, if required; and
 - **D.A.7.3.2.** Specify implementation of hardware mitigation, if any, within four years of the later of the development of the CAP or receipt of regulatory approvals, if required.

E. Associated Documents

Attachment 1

Attachment 1-CAN

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	December 17, 2014	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	New
2	November 9, 2017	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	Revised to respond to directives in FERC Order No. 830.
<u>3</u>	TBD	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	

Attachment 1

Calculating Geoelectric Fields for the Benchmark and Supplemental GMD Events

The benchmark GMD event¹ defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows that are needed to conduct a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment. It is composed of the following elements: (1) a reference peak geoelectric field amplitude of 8 V/km derived from statistical analysis of historical magnetometer data; (2) scaling factors to account for local geomagnetic latitude; (3) scaling factors to account for local earth conductivity; and (4) a reference geomagnetic field time series or waveform to facilitate time-domain analysis of GMD impact on equipment.

The supplemental GMD event is composed of similar elements as described above, except (1) the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude is 12 V/km over a localized area; and (2) the geomagnetic field time series or waveform includes a local enhancement in the waveform.²

The regional geoelectric field peak amplitude used in GMD Vulnerability Assessment, E_{peak} , can be obtained from the reference geoelectric field value of 8 V/km for the benchmark GMD event (1) or 12 V/km for the supplemental GMD event (2) using the following relationships:

$$E_{peak} = 8 \times \alpha \times \beta_b (V/km) \tag{1}$$

$$E_{peak} = 12 \times \alpha \times \beta_s (V/km)$$
⁽²⁾

where, α is the scaling factor to account for local geomagnetic latitude, and β is a scaling factor to account for the local earth conductivity structure. Subscripts *b* and *s* for the β scaling factor denote association with the benchmark or supplemental GMD events, respectively.

Scaling the Geomagnetic Field

The benchmark and supplemental GMD events are defined for geomagnetic latitude of 60° and must be scaled to account for regional differences based on geomagnetic latitude. Table 2 provides a scaling factor correlating peak geoelectric field to geomagnetic latitude. Alternatively, the scaling factor α is computed with the empirical expression:

$$\alpha = 0.001 \times e^{(0.115 \times L)} \tag{3}$$

where, L is the geomagnetic latitude in degrees and $0.1 \le \alpha \le 1$.

¹ The Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description, May 2016 is available on the Related Information webpage for TPL-007-1: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/TPL0071RD/Benchmark_clean_May12_complete.pdf</u>.

² The extent of local enhancements is on the order of 100 km in North-South (latitude) direction but longer in East-West (longitude) direction. The local enhancement in the geomagnetic field occurs over the time period of 2-5 minutes. Additional information is available in the Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description, October 2017 white paper on the Project 2013-03 Geomagnetic Disturbance Mitigation project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

For large planning areas that cover more than one scaling factor from Table 2, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment should be based on a peak geoelectric field that is:

- calculated by using the most conservative (largest) value for α; or
- calculated assuming a non-uniform or piecewise uniform geomagnetic field.

Table 2: Geomagnetic Field Scaling Factors for the Benchmark and Supplemental GMD Events		
Geomagnetic Latitude (Degrees)	Scaling Factor1 (α)	
≤ 40	0.10	
45	0.2	
50	0.3	
54	0.5	
56	0.6	
57	0.7	
58	0.8	
59	0.9	
≥ 60	1.0	

Scaling the Geoelectric Field

The benchmark GMD event is defined for the reference Quebec earth model described in Table 4. The peak geoelectric field, E_{peak}, used in a GMD Vulnerability Assessment may be obtained by either:

- Calculating the geoelectric field for the ground conductivity in the planning area and the reference geomagnetic field time series scaled according to geomagnetic latitude, using a procedure such as the plane wave method described in the NERC GMD Task Force GIC Application Guide;³ or
- Using the earth conductivity scaling factor β from Table 3 that correlates to the ground conductivity map in Figure 1 or Figure 2. Along with the scaling factor α from equation (3) or Table 2, β is applied to the reference geoelectric field using equation (1 or 2, as applicable) to obtain the regional geoelectric field peak amplitude E_{peak} to be used in GMD Vulnerability Assessments. When a ground conductivity model is not available, the planning entity should use the largest β factor of adjacent physiographic regions or a technically justified value.

³ Available at the NERC GMD Task Force project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Pages/Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Task-Force-(GMDTF)-2013.aspx</u>.

The earth models used to calculate Table 3 for the United States were obtained from publicly available information published on the U. S. Geological Survey website.⁴ The models used to calculate Table 3 for Canada were obtained from Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) and reflect the average structure for large regions. A planner can also use specific earth model(s) with documented justification and the reference geomagnetic field time series to calculate the β factor(s) as follows:

$$\beta_b = E/8$$
 for the benchmark GMD event (4)

$$\beta_s = E/12$$
 for the supplemental GMD (5)

where, *E* is the absolute value of peak geoelectric in V/km obtained from the technically justified earth model and the reference geomagnetic field time series.

For large planning areas that span more than one β scaling factor, the most conservative (largest) value for β may be used in determining the peak geoelectric field to obtain conservative results. Alternatively, a planner could perform analysis using a non-uniform or piecewise uniform geoelectric field.

Applying the Localized Peak Geoelectric Field in the Supplemental GMD Event

The peak geoelectric field of the supplemental GMD event occurs in a localized area.⁵ Planners have flexibility to determine how to apply the localized peak geoelectric field over the planning area in performing GIC calculations. Examples of approaches are:

- Apply the peak geoelectric field (12 V/km scaled to the planning area) over the entire planning area;
- Apply a spatially limited (12 V/km scaled to the planning area) peak geoelectric field (e.g., 100 km in North-South latitude direction and 500 km in East-West longitude direction) over a portion(s) of the system, and apply the benchmark GMD event over the rest of the system; or
- Other methods to adjust the benchmark GMD event analysis to account for the localized geoelectric field enhancement of the supplemental GMD event.

⁴ Available at <u>http://geomag.usgs.gov/conductivity/</u>.

⁵ See the Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Description white paper located on the Project 2013-03 Geomagnetic Disturbance Mitigation project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.




Figure 1: Physiographic Regions of the Continental United States⁶



Figure 2: Physiographic Regions of Canada

⁶ Additional map detail is available at the U.S. Geological Survey: <u>http://geomag.usgs.gov/</u>.

Table 3: Geoelectric Field Scaling Factors		
Earth model	Scaling Factor Benchmark Event (β _b)	Scaling Factor Supplemental Event (βs)
AK1A	0.56	0.51
AK1B	0.56	0.51
AP1	0.33	0.30
AP2	0.82	0.78
BR1	0.22	0.22
CL1	0.76	0.73
CO1	0.27	0.25
CP1	0.81	0.77
CP2	0.95	0.86
FL1	0.76	0.73
CS1	0.41	0.37
IP1	0.94	0.90
IP2	0.28	0.25
IP3	0.93	0.90
IP4	0.41	0.35
NE1	0.81	0.77
PB1	0.62	0.55
PB2	0.46	0.39
PT1	1.17	1.19
SL1	0.53	0.49
SU1	0.93	0.90
BOU	0.28	0.24
FBK	0.56	0.56
PRU	0.21	0.22
BC	0.67	0.62
PRAIRIES	0.96	0.88
SHIELD	1.0	1.0
ATLANTIC	0.79	0.76

Rationale: Scaling factors in Table 3 are dependent upon the frequency content of the reference storm. Consequently, the benchmark GMD event and the supplemental GMD event may produce different scaling factors for a given earth model.

The scaling factor associated with the benchmark GMD event for the Florida earth model (FL1) has been updated based on the earth model published on the USGS public website.

Table 4: Reference Earth Model (Quebec)		
Layer Thickness (km)	Resistivity (Ω-m)	
15	20,000	
10	200	
125	1,000	
200	100	
∞	3	

Reference Geomagnetic Field Time Series or Waveform for the Benchmark GMD $\mathsf{Event}^{\scriptscriptstyle 7}$

The geomagnetic field measurement record of the March 13-14 1989 GMD event, measured at the NRCan Ottawa geomagnetic observatory, is the basis for the reference geomagnetic field waveform to be used to calculate the GIC time series, GIC(t), required for transformer thermal impact assessment.

The geomagnetic latitude of the Ottawa geomagnetic observatory is 55°; therefore, the amplitudes of the geomagnetic field measurement data were scaled up to the 60° reference geomagnetic latitude (see Figure 3) such that the resulting peak geoelectric field amplitude computed using the reference earth model was 8 V/km (see Figures 4 and 5). The sampling rate for the geomagnetic field waveform is 10 seconds.⁸ To use this geoelectric field time series when a different earth model is applicable, it should be scaled with the appropriate benchmark conductivity scaling factor β_b .

⁷ Refer to the Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description white paper for details on the determination of the reference geomagnetic field waveform: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/TPL0071RI.aspx</u>.

⁸ The data file of the benchmark geomagnetic field waveform is available on the Related Information webpage for TPL-007-1: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/TPL0071RI.aspx</u>.




Figure 3: Benchmark Geomagnetic Field Waveform Red B_n (Northward), Blue B_e (Eastward)





Figure 4: Benchmark Geoelectric Field Waveform E_E (Eastward)

Final Draft – TPL-007-3 (Canadian Variance) November 2018January 2019






Reference Geomagnetic Field Time Series or Waveform for the Supplemental GMD Event^9


The geomagnetic field measurement record of the March 13-14, 1989 GMD event, measured at the NRCan Ottawa geomagnetic observatory, is the basis for the reference geomagnetic field waveform to be used to calculate the GIC time series, GIC(t), required for transformer thermal impact assessment for the supplemental GMD event. The supplemental GMD event waveform differs from the benchmark GMD event waveform in that the supplemental GMD event waveform has a local enhancement.

The geomagnetic latitude of the Ottawa geomagnetic observatory is 55°; therefore, the amplitudes of the geomagnetic field measurement data were scaled up to the 60° reference geomagnetic latitude (see Figure 6) such that the resulting peak geoelectric field amplitude computed using the reference earth model was 12 V/km (see Figure7). The sampling rate for the geomagnetic field waveform is 10 seconds.¹⁰ To use this geoelectric field time series when a different earth model is applicable, it should be scaled with the appropriate supplemental conductivity scaling factor β_s .

⁹ Refer to the Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description white paper for details on the determination of the reference geomagnetic field waveform: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

¹⁰ The data file of the benchmark geomagnetic field waveform is available on the NERC GMD Task Force project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Pages/Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Task-Force-(GMDTF)-2013.aspx</u>.








Figure 7: Supplemental Geoelectric Field Waveform Blue E_N (Northward), Red E_E (Eastward)

Attachment 1-CAN

Attachment 1-CAN provides an alternative that <u>any-a</u> Canadian entity may use in lieu of the benchmark or supplemental GMD event(s) defined in Attachment 1 for performing GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s).

A Canadian entity may use the provisions of Attachment 1-CAN if it has regionally specific information that provides a technically justified means to re-define a 1-in-100 year GMD planning event(s) within its planning area.

Information for the Alternative Methodology

GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s) require the use of geophysical and engineering models. Canadian-specific data is available and growing. Ongoing research allows for more accurate characterization of regional parameters used in these models. Such Canadian-specific data includes geomagnetic field, earth conductivity, and geomagnetically induced current measurements that can be used for modeling and simulation validation.

Information used to calculate geoelectric fields for the benchmark and supplemental GMD events shall be clearly documented and technically justified. For example, the factors involved in the calculation of geoelectric fields are geomagnetic field variations and an earth transfer function(s).¹ Technically justified information used in modelling geomagnetic field variations may include: technical documents produced by governmental entities such as Natural Resources Canada; technical papers published in peer-reviewed journals; and data sets gathered using sound scientific principles. An earth transfer function may rely on magnetotelluric measurements or earth conductivity models.

Modeling assumptions shall also be clearly documented and technically justified. An entity may use sensitivity analysis to identify how the assumptions affect the results.

A simplified model may be used to perform a GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), as long as the model is more conservative than a more detailed model.

When interpreting assessment results, the entity shall consider the maturity of the modeling, toolset, and techniques applied.

Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Events

The 1-in-100 year planning event shall be based on regionally specific data and technically justifiable statistical analyses (e.g., extreme value theory) and applied to the benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s).


For the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), an entity shall consider the large-scale spatial structure of the GMD event. For the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), an

¹ The "earth transfer function" is the relationship between the electric fields and magnetic field variations at the surface of the earth.

entity shall consider the small-scale spatial structure of the GMD event (e.g., using magnetometer measurements or realistic electrojet calculations).

Guidelines and Technical Basis

The diagram below provides an overall view of the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process:



The requirements in this standard cover various aspects of the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process.

Benchmark GMD Event (Attachment 1)

The benchmark GMD event defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows that are needed to conduct a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment. The *Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description*, May 2016² white paper includes the event description, analysis, and example calculations.

Supplemental GMD Event (Attachment 1)

The supplemental GMD event defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows that are needed to conduct a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment. The *Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description*, October 2017³ white paper includes the event description and analysis.

Requirement R2

A GMD Vulnerability Assessment requires a GIC System model, which is a dc representation of the System, to calculate GIC flow. In a GMD Vulnerability Assessment, GIC simulations are used to determine transformer Reactive Power absorption and transformer thermal response. Details for developing the GIC System model are provided in the NERC GMD Task Force guide: *Application Guide for Computing Geomagnetically-Induced Current in the Bulk Power System*, December 2013.⁴

Underground pipe-type cables present a special modeling situation in that the steel pipe that encloses the power conductors significantly reduces the geoelectric field induced into the conductors themselves, while they remain a path for GIC. Solid dielectric cables that are not

² <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/TPL0071RI.aspx</u>.

³ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

⁴ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GIC%20Application</u> <u>%20Guide%202013 approved.pdf</u>.

enclosed by a steel pipe will not experience a reduction in the induced geoelectric field. A planning entity should account for special modeling situations in the GIC system model, if applicable.

Requirement R4

The *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,⁵ December 2013 developed by the NERC GMD Task Force provides technical information on GMD-specific considerations for planning studies.

Requirement R5

The benchmark thermal impact assessment of transformers specified in Requirement R6 is based on GIC information for the benchmark GMD Event. This GIC information is determined by the planning entity through simulation of the GIC System model and must be provided to the entity responsible for conducting the thermal impact assessment. GIC information should be provided in accordance with Requirement R5 each time the GMD Vulnerability Assessment is performed since, by definition, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes a documented evaluation of susceptibility to localized equipment damage due to GMD.

The maximum effective GIC value provided in Part 5.1 is used for the benchmark thermal impact assessment. Only those transformers that experience an effective GIC value of 75 A or greater per phase require evaluation in Requirement R6.

GIC(t) provided in Part 5.2 is used to convert the steady state GIC flows to time-series GIC data for the benchmark thermal impact assessment of transformers. This information may be needed by one or more of the methods for performing a benchmark thermal impact assessment. Additional information is in the following section and the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,⁶ October 2017.

The peak GIC value of 75 Amps per phase has been shown through thermal modeling to be a conservative threshold below which the risk of exceeding known temperature limits established by technical organizations is low.

Requirement R6

The benchmark thermal impact assessment of a power transformer may be based on manufacturer-provided GIC capability curves, thermal response simulation, thermal impact screening, or other technically justified means. Approaches for conducting the assessment are presented in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper ERO Enterprise-Endorsed Implementation Guidance*⁷ for this requirement. This ERO-Endorsed document is posted on the NERC Compliance Guidance⁸ webpage.

⁵ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning</u> <u>%20Guide_approved.pdf</u>.

⁶ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

⁷ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/guidance/EROEndorsedImplementationGuidance/TPL-007-1</u> <u>Transformer</u> <u>Thermal</u> <u>Impact</u> <u>Assessment</u> <u>White</u> <u>Paper.pdf</u>.

⁸ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/guidance/Pages/default.aspx</u>.

Transformers are exempt from the benchmark thermal impact assessment requirement if the effective GIC value for the transformer is less than 75 A per phase, as determined by a GIC analysis of the System. Justification for this criterion is provided in the *Screening Criterion for Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,⁹ October 2017. A documented design specification exceeding this value is also a justifiable threshold criterion that exempts a transformer from Requirement R6.

The benchmark threshold criteria and its associated transformer thermal impact must be evaluated on the basis of effective GIC. Refer to the white papers for additional information.

Requirement R7

Technical considerations for GMD mitigation planning, including operating and equipment strategies, are available in Chapter 5 of the *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,¹⁰ December 2013. Additional information is available in the 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk-Power System,¹¹ February 2012.

Requirement R8

The *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,¹² December 2013 developed by the NERC GMD Task Force provides technical information on GMD-specific considerations for planning studies.

The supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment process is similar to the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment process described under Requirement R4.

Requirement R9

The supplemental thermal impact assessment specified of transformers in Requirement R10 is based on GIC information for the supplemental GMD Event. This GIC information is determined by the planning entity through simulation of the GIC System model and must be provided to the entity responsible for conducting the thermal impact assessment. GIC information should be provided in accordance with Requirement R9 each time the GMD Vulnerability Assessment is performed since, by definition, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes a documented evaluation of susceptibility to localized equipment damage due to GMD.

The maximum effective GIC value provided in Part 9.1 is used for the supplemental thermal impact assessment. Only those transformers that experience an effective GIC value of 85 A or greater per phase require evaluation in Requirement R10.

GIC(t) provided in Part 9.2 is used to convert the steady state GIC flows to time-series GIC data for the supplemental thermal impact assessment of transformers. This information may be

⁹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

¹⁰ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning</u> <u>%20Guide_approved.pdf</u>.

¹¹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/2012GMD.pdf.</u>

¹² http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning %20Guide_approved.pdf.

needed by one or more of the methods for performing a supplemental thermal impact assessment. Additional information is in the following section.

The peak GIC value of 85 Amps per phase has been shown through thermal modeling to be a conservative threshold below which the risk of exceeding known temperature limits established by technical organizations is low.

Requirement R10

The supplemental thermal impact assessment of a power transformer may be based on manufacturer-provided GIC capability curves, thermal response simulation, thermal impact screening, or other technically justified means. Approaches for conducting the assessment are presented in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper ERO Enterprise-Endorsed Implementation Guidance*¹³ discussed in the Requirement R6 section above. A later version of the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,¹⁴ October 2017, has been developed to include updated information pertinent to the supplemental GMD event and supplemental thermal impact assessment.

Transformers are exempt from the supplemental thermal impact assessment requirement if the effective GIC value for the transformer is less than 85 A per phase, as determined by a GIC analysis of the System. Justification for this criterion is provided in the revised *Screening Criterion for Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,¹⁵ October 2017. A documented design specification exceeding this value is also a justifiable threshold criterion that exempts a transformer from Requirement R10.

The supplemental threshold criteria and its associated transformer thermal impact must be evaluated on the basis of effective GIC. Refer to the white papers for additional information.

Requirement R11

Technical considerations for GIC monitoring are contained in Chapter 6 of the 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk-Power System, ¹⁶ February 2012. GIC monitoring is generally performed by Hall effect transducers that are attached to the neutral of the wye-grounded transformer. Data from GIC monitors is useful for model validation and situational awareness.

Responsible entities consider the following in developing a process for obtaining GIC monitor data:

• **Monitor locations.** An entity's operating process may be constrained by location of existing GIC monitors. However, when planning for additional GIC monitoring installations consider that data from monitors located in areas found to have high GIC based on system

¹³ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/guidance/EROEndorsedImplementationGuidance/TPL-007-1</u> Transformer Thermal Impact <u>Assessment White Paper.pdf</u>.

¹⁴ http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.

¹⁵ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

¹⁶ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/2012GMD.pdf</u>.


studies may provide more useful information for validation and situational awareness purposes. Conversely, data from GIC monitors that are located in the vicinity of transportation systems using direct current (e.g., subways or light rail) may be unreliable.

- Monitor specifications. Capabilities of Hall effect transducers, existing and planned, should be considered in the operating process. When planning new GIC monitor installations, consider monitor data range (e.g., -500 A through + 500 A) and ambient temperature ratings consistent with temperatures in the region in which the monitor will be installed.
- **Sampling Interval.** An entity's operating process may be constrained by capabilities of existing GIC monitors. However, when possible specify data sampling during periods of interest at a rate of 10 seconds or faster.
- Collection Periods. The process should specify when the entity expects GIC data to be collected. For example, collection could be required during periods where the Kp index is above a threshold, or when GIC values are above a threshold. Determining when to discontinue collecting GIC data should also be specified to maintain consistency in data collection.
- Data format. Specify time and value formats. For example, Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) (MM/DD/YYYY HH:MM:SS) and GIC Value (Ampere). Positive (+) and negative (-) signs indicate direction of GIC flow. Positive reference is flow from ground into transformer neutral. Time fields should indicate the sampled time rather than system or SCADA time if supported by the GIC monitor system.
- **Data retention.** The entity's process should specify data retention periods, for example 1 year. Data retention periods should be adequately long to support availability for the entity's model validation process and external reporting requirements, if any.
- Additional information. The entity's process should specify collection of other information necessary for making the data useful, for example monitor location and type of neutral connection (e.g., three-phase or single-phase).

Requirement R12

Magnetometers measure changes in the earth's magnetic field. Entities should obtain data from the nearest accessible magnetometer. Sources of magnetometer data include:

• Observatories such as those operated by U.S. Geological Survey and Natural Resources Canada, see figure below for locations:¹⁷



- Research institutions and academic universities;
- Entities with installed magnetometers.

Entities that choose to install magnetometers should consider equipment specifications and data format protocols contained in the latest version of the *INTERMAGNET Technical Reference Manual*, Version 4.6, 2012.¹⁸

¹⁷ <u>http://www.intermagnet.org/index-eng.php</u>.

¹⁸ http://www.intermagnet.org/publications/intermag_4-6.pdf.

Rationale

During development of TPL-007-1, text boxes were embedded within the standard to explain the rationale for various parts of the standard. The text from the rationale text boxes was moved to this section upon approval of TPL-007-1 by the NERC Board of Trustees. In developing TPL-007-2, the SDT has made changes to the sections below only when necessary for clarity. Changes are marked with brackets [].

Rationale for Applicability:

Instrumentation transformers and station service transformers do not have significant impact on geomagnetically-induced current (GIC) flows; therefore, these transformers are not included in the applicability for this standard.

Terminal voltage describes line-to-line voltage.

Rationale for R1:

In some areas, planning entities may determine that the most effective approach to conduct a GMD Vulnerability Assessment is through a regional planning organization. No requirement in the standard is intended to prohibit a collaborative approach where roles and responsibilities are determined by a planning organization made up of one or more Planning Coordinator(s).

Rationale for R2:

A GMD Vulnerability Assessment requires a GIC System model to calculate GIC flow which is used to determine transformer Reactive Power absorption and transformer thermal response. Guidance for developing the GIC System model is provided in the *Application Guide Computing Geomagnetically-Induced Current in the Bulk-Power System*,¹⁹ December 2013, developed by the NERC GMD Task Force.

The System model specified in Requirement R2 is used in conducting steady state power flow analysis that accounts for the Reactive Power absorption of power transformer(s) due to GIC in the System.

The GIC System model includes all power transformer(s) with a high side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV. The model is used to calculate GIC flow in the network.

The projected System condition for GMD planning may include adjustments to the System that are executable in response to space weather information. These adjustments could include, for example, recalling or postponing maintenance outages.

The Violation Risk Factor (VRF) for Requirement R2 is changed from Medium to High. This change is for consistency with the VRF for approved standard TPL-001-4 Requirement R1, which is proposed for revision in the NERC filing dated August 29, 2014 (Docket No. RM12-1-000). NERC guidelines require consistency among Reliability Standards.

¹⁹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GIC%20Application</u> <u>%20Guide%202013_approved.pdf</u>.

Rationale for R3:

Requirement R3 allows a responsible entity the flexibility to determine the System steady state voltage criteria for System steady state performance in Table 1. Steady state voltage limits are an example of System steady state performance criteria.

Rationale for R4:

The GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes steady state power flow analysis and the supporting study or studies using the models specified in Requirement R2 that account for the effects of GIC. Performance criteria are specified in Table 1.

At least one System On-Peak Load and at least one System Off-Peak Load must be examined in the analysis.

Distribution of GMD Vulnerability Assessment results provides a means for sharing relevant information with other entities responsible for planning reliability. Results of GIC studies may affect neighboring systems and should be taken into account by planners.

The *Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Guide*,²⁰ December 2013 developed by the NERC GMD Task Force provides technical information on GMD-specific considerations for planning studies. The provision of information in Requirement R4, Part 4.3, shall be subject to the legal and regulatory obligations for the disclosure of confidential and/or sensitive information.

Rationale for R5:

This GIC information is necessary for determining the thermal impact of GIC on transformers in the planning area and must be provided to entities responsible for performing the thermal impact assessment so that they can accurately perform the assessment. GIC information should be provided in accordance with Requirement R5 as part of the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process since, by definition, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment includes documented evaluation of susceptibility to localized equipment damage due to GMD.

The maximum effective GIC value provided in Part 5.1 is used for transformer thermal impact assessment.

GIC(t) provided in Part 5.2 can alternatively be used to convert the steady state GIC flows to timeseries GIC data for transformer thermal impact assessment. This information may be needed by one or more of the methods for performing a thermal impact assessment. Additional guidance is available in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,²¹ October 2017.

A Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that desires GIC(t) may request it from the planning entity. The planning entity shall provide GIC(t) upon request once GIC has been calculated, but

²⁰ <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/GMD%20Planning</u> <u>%20Guide_approved.pdf</u>.

²¹ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

no later than 90 calendar days after receipt of a request from the owner and after completion of Requirement R5, Part 5.1.

The provision of information in Requirement R5 shall be subject to the legal and regulatory obligations for the disclosure of confidential and/or sensitive information.

Rationale for R6:

The transformer thermal impact screening criterion has been revised from 15 A per phase to 75 A per phase [for the benchmark GMD event]. Only those transformers that experience an effective GIC value of 75 A per phase or greater require evaluation in Requirement R6. The justification is provided in the *Screening Criterion for Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,²² October 2017.

The thermal impact assessment may be based on manufacturer-provided GIC capability curves, thermal response simulation, thermal impact screening, or other technically justified means. The transformer thermal assessment will be repeated or reviewed using previous assessment results each time the planning entity performs a GMD Vulnerability Assessment and provides GIC information as specified in Requirement R5. Approaches for conducting the assessment are presented in the *Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment White Paper*,²³ October 2017.

Thermal impact assessments are provided to the planning entity, as determined in Requirement R1, so that identified issues can be included in the GMD Vulnerability Assessment (R4), and the Corrective Action Plan (R7) as necessary.

Thermal impact assessments of non-BES transformers are not required because those transformers do not have a wide-area effect on the reliability of the interconnected Transmission system.

The provision of information in Requirement R6, Part 6.4, shall be subject to the legal and regulatory obligations for the disclosure of confidential and/or sensitive information.

Rationale for R7:

The proposed requirement addresses directives in Order No. 830 for establishing Corrective Action Plan (CAP) deadlines associated with GMD Vulnerability Assessments. In Order No. 830, FERC directed revisions to TPL-007 such that CAPs are developed within one year from the completion of GMD Vulnerability Assessments (P 101). Furthermore, FERC directed establishment of implementation deadlines after the completion of the CAP as follows (P 102):

- Two years for non-hardware mitigation; and
- Four years for hardware mitigation.

The objective of Part 7.4 is to provide awareness to potentially impacted entities when implementation of planned mitigation is not achievable within the deadlines established in Part

²² http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.

²³ <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx.</u>

7.3. Examples of situations beyond the control of the responsible entity (see Section 7.4) include, but are not limited to:

- Delays resulting from regulatory/legal processes, such as permitting;
- Delays resulting from stakeholder processes required by tariff;
- Delays resulting from equipment lead times; or

Delays resulting from the inability to acquire necessary Right-of-Way.

Rationale for Table 3:

Table 3 has been revised to use the same ground model designation, FL1, as is being used by USGS. The calculated scaling factor for FL1 is 0.74. [The scaling factor associated with the benchmark GMD event for the Florida earth model (FL1) has been updated to 0.76 in TPL-007-2 based on the earth model published on the USGS public website.]

Rationale for R8 – R10:

The proposed requirements address directives in Order No. 830 for revising the benchmark GMD event used in GMD Vulnerability Assessments (P 44, P 47-49). The requirements add a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment based on the supplemental GMD event that accounts for localized peak geoelectric fields.

Rationale for R11 – R12:

The proposed requirements address directives in Order No. 830 for requiring responsible entities to collect GIC monitoring and magnetometer data as necessary to enable model validation and situational awareness (P 88; P. 90-92). GMD measurement data refers to GIC monitor data and geomagnetic field data in Requirements R11 and R12, respectively. See the Guidelines and Technical Basis section of this standard for technical information.

The objective of Requirement R11 is for entities to obtain GIC data for the Planning Coordinator's planning area or other part of the system included in the Planning Coordinator's GIC System model to inform GMD Vulnerability Assessments. Technical considerations for GIC monitoring are contained in Chapter 9 of the 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk-Power System (NERC 2012 GMD Report). GIC monitoring is generally performed by Hall effect transducers that are attached to the neutral of the transformer and measure dc current flowing through the neutral.

The objective of Requirement R12 is for entities to obtain geomagnetic field data for the Planning Coordinator's planning area to inform GMD Vulnerability Assessments. Magnetometers provide geomagnetic field data by measuring changes in the earth's magnetic field. Sources of geomagnetic field data include:

- Observatories such as those operated by U.S. Geological Survey, Natural Resources Canada, research organizations, or university research facilities;
- Installed magnetometers; and
- Commercial or third-party sources of geomagnetic field data.

Geomagnetic field data for a Planning Coordinator's planning area is obtained from one or more of the above data sources located in the Planning Coordinator's planning area, or by obtaining a geomagnetic field data product for the Planning Coordinator's planning area from a government or research organization. The geomagnetic field data product does not need to be derived from a magnetometer or observatory within the Planning Coordinator's planning area.

Exhibit D

Reliability Standards Criteria

Reliability Standards Criteria

The discussion below explains how the proposed Reliability Standard has met or exceeded the Reliability Standards criteria:

1. Proposed Reliability Standards must be designed to achieve a specified reliability goal and must contain a technically sound means to achieve that goal.

The purpose of proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-3 is to establish Transmission system planned performance during geomagnetic disturbance events.

Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 addresses the unique risks posed by a high impact, low-frequency geomagnetic disturbance ("GMD") event on the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System ("BPS"). The proposed standard builds upon the revisions reflected in TPL-007-2 and further improves the standard by including a new Variance for Canadian registered entities. This Variance provides an option by which Canadian registered entities may leverage operating experience, observed GMD effects, and ongoing research to define alternative, technically justified benchmark GMD events or supplemental GMD planning event(s) for their GMD Vulnerability Assessments. The reliability benefit of such an approach is that it would allow an entity to develop a better understanding of the system impacts it is likely to experience as a result of such an event and the types of corrective actions that would best address them.

This Variance also recognizes the unique regulatory frameworks specific to Canadian jurisdictions, particularly with respect to provincial processes for approving investments identified in Corrective Action Plans.

2. Proposed Reliability Standards must be applicable only to users, owners and operators of the bulk power system, and must be clear and unambiguous as to what is required and who is required to comply.

The proposed Reliability Standard is clear and unambiguous as to what is required and who is required to comply. Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-3 continues to apply to

Planning Coordinators and Transmission Planners. The proposed standard clearly articulates the actions that each entity must take to comply. The Variance would be applicable to entities in those Canadian jurisdictions where the Variance has become effective.

3. A proposed Reliability Standard must include clear and understandable consequences and a range of penalties (monetary and/or non-monetary) for a violation.

The Violation Risk Factors ("VRFs") and Violation Severity Levels ("VSLs") for

proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-3, as reflected in Exhibit A, are unchanged from

currently effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. The VRFs and VSLs comport with NERC

and FERC guidelines related to their assignment. The VSLs are consistent with the

corresponding Requirements and do not use any ambiguous terminology, thereby supporting

uniformity and consistency in the determination of similar penalties for similar violations. For

these reasons, the proposed Reliability Standard includes clear and understandable consequences.

4. A proposed Reliability Standard must identify clear and objective criterion or measure for compliance, so that it can be enforced in a consistent and non-preferential manner.

The proposed Reliability Standard includes Measures that support the proposed standard's Requirements by clearly identifying what is required and how the Requirements will be enforced. These Measures, which remain unchanged from the Measures in currently effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, help provide clarity regarding how the Requirements will be enforced, and help ensure that the Requirements will be enforced in a clear, consistent, and nonpreferential manner and without prejudice to any party.

5. Proposed Reliability Standards should achieve a reliability goal effectively and efficiently — but do not necessarily have to reflect "best practices" without regard to implementation cost or historical regional infrastructure design.

The proposed Reliability Standard achieves its reliability goals effectively and efficiently.

The proposed standard provides for more comprehensive GMD planning studies, thereby

contributing to a more reliable BES. The Variance option would allow registered entities in Canadian jurisdictions where the Variance has become effective to use Canada-specific data and research to define alternative GMD planning event(s) for their areas. Entities have flexibility to determine the best way to develop these goals, provided the means selected are technically justified and scientifically sound.

6. Proposed Reliability Standards cannot be "lowest common denominator," *i.e.*, cannot reflect a compromise that does not adequately protect Bulk-Power System reliability. Proposed Reliability Standards can consider costs to implement for smaller entities, but not at consequences of less than excellence in operating system reliability.

The proposed Reliability Standard does not reflect a "lowest common denominator" approach. To the contrary, the revisions reflected in proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-3 provide significant benefits for the reliability of the Bulk Power System by providing for more comprehensive GMD Vulnerability Assessments, including, where appropriate, the use of Canada-specific data and research in defining alternate GMD planning events for study. The proposed Reliability Standard does not sacrifice excellence in operating system reliability for costs associated with implementation of the Reliability Standard.

7. Proposed Reliability Standards must be designed to apply throughout North America to the maximum extent achievable with a single Reliability Standard while not favoring one geographic area or regional model. It should take into account regional variations in the organization and corporate structures of transmission owners and operators, variations in generation fuel type and ownership patterns, and regional variations in market design if these affect the proposed Reliability Standard.

The proposed Reliability Standard does not favor one geographic area or regional model.

The proposed standard would require entities across North America to perform GMD

Vulnerability Assessments to assess the impacts of a 1-in-100 year GMD storm on their systems

and to take appropriate action to mitigate identified vulnerabilities.

3

The Variance would provide an alternative option in those Canadian jurisdictions where the Variance has been approved by the applicable governmental authority or has otherwise become effective in the province. In such jurisdictions, registered entities may use the Variance to leverage operating experience, observed GMD effects, and ongoing research using Canadaspecific data to define alternative benchmark GMD events or supplemental GMD planning event(s) for their GMD Vulnerability Assessments. If the entity does not have sufficient data or information to use the alternative approach, the entity must use the GMD planning events defined in Attachment 1 to the proposed standard.

This Variance also recognizes the unique regulatory frameworks specific to Canadian jurisdictions, particularly with respect to provincial processes for approving investments identified in Corrective Action Plans.

8. Proposed Reliability Standards should cause no undue negative effect on competition or restriction of the grid beyond any restriction necessary for reliability.

The proposed Reliability Standard has no undue negative effect on competition. The proposed Reliability Standard requires the same performance by each of applicable entity, subject to differences outlined in the Variance. The proposed Reliability Standard does not unreasonably restrict the available generation or transmission capability or limit use of the Bulk-Power System in a preferential manner.

9. The implementation time for the proposed Reliability Standard is reasonable.

The proposed effective date for the proposed Reliability Standard is just and reasonable and appropriately balances the urgency in the need to implement the proposed Reliability Standard against the reasonableness of the time allowed for those who must comply to develop necessary procedures, software, facilities, staffing or other relevant capability. NERC proposes an effective date for TPL-007-3 as provided in the Implementation Plan (**Exhibit B**). Prior

4

versions of the TPL-007 standard would be retired immediately prior to the effective date of TPL-007-3. NERC intends for proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-3 to supersede proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 prior to the latter standard ever having become effective.

10. The Reliability Standard was developed in an open and fair manner and in accordance with the Reliability Standard development process.

The proposed Reliability Standard was developed in accordance with NERC's ANSIaccredited processes for developing and approving Reliability Standards. **Exhibit C** includes a summary of the Reliability Standard development proceedings, and details the processes followed to develop the proposed Reliability Standard. These processes included, among other things, comment periods, pre-ballot review periods, and balloting periods. Additionally, all meetings of the standard drafting team were properly noticed and open to the public.

11. NERC must explain any balancing of vital public interests in the development of proposed Reliability Standards.

NERC has identified no competing public interests regarding the request for approval of the proposed Reliability Standard. No comments were received indicating the proposed Reliability Standard is in conflict with other vital public interests.

12. Proposed Reliability Standards must consider any other appropriate factors.

No other factors relevant to whether the proposed Reliability Standard is just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential were identified.

Exhibit E

Standard Drafting Team Roster

NERC NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION

Project 2018-01 Canadian-specific Revisions to TPL-007-2 Roster

August 2018

Role	Name	Entity
Chair	Majid Fassi Fehri	Hydro-Québec TransÉnergie
Vice Chair	Stephen Burns	Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) of Ontario
Members	David Boteler	Natural Resources Canada
	Amr Eldamaty	SaskPower
	Louis Gibson	Hydro-Québec
	Phillip Hiusser	Ontario Power Generation Inc.
	Cynthia Yiu	Hydro One Networks Inc.
PMOS Liaison	Charles Yeung	Southwest Power Pool
NERC Staff	Mat Bunch, Standards Developer	North American Electric Reliability Corp
	Lauren Perotti, Counsel	North American Electric Reliability Corp
	Shamai Elstein	North American Electric Reliability Corp