
**BEFORE THE
NOVA SCOTIA UTILITY AND REVIEW BOARD
OF THE PROVINCE OF NOVA SCOTIA**

**NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC)
RELIABILITY CORPORATION)**

**SECOND QUARTER 2013 APPLICATION
FOR APPROVAL OF RELIABILITY STANDARDS OF THE
NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION**

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August 28, 2013

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- 3.) Updated NERC Glossary of Terms for approval

Exhibit C – Informational Summary of Each Reliability Standard Applicable to Nova Scotia, Approved by FERC in Second Quarter 2013

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NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION**

The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (“NERC”) hereby submits to the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (“NSUARB”) an application for approval of the NERC Reliability Standards and an updated NERC Glossary of Terms approved by the United States Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or the “Commission”). This filing covers the time period from April 1, 2013 through June 30, 2013 and NERC requests that the Reliability Standards and updated NERC Glossary of Terms be made mandatory and enforceable for users, owners, and operators of the bulk-power system within the Province of Nova Scotia.

In support of this request for approval of the proposed Reliability Standards, NERC submits the following information: (1) an updated list of the currently-effective Reliability Standards as approved by FERC (*see Exhibit A*); (2) Reliability Standards approved by FERC in the second quarter of 2013 and the associated updated NERC Glossary of Terms (*see Exhibit B*); and (3) an informational summary for each Reliability Standard approved by FERC in the second quarter of 2013, including each Standard’s purpose, applicability, and ballot body approval percentages (*see Exhibit C*).

I. NOTICES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Notices and communications regarding this Application may be addressed to:

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II. REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF RELIABILITY STANDARDS

A. Background: NERC Quarterly Filing of Proposed Reliability Standards

On July 20, 2011, NSUARB issued a decision approving the Reliability Standards and NERC Glossary of Terms that NERC submitted to NSUARB on June 30, 2010, and accepted as guidance the Violation Risk Factors (“VRF”) and Violation Severity Levels (“VSL”) associated with the currently-effective Reliability Standards.¹

NERC has been certified as the Electric Reliability Organization (“ERO”)² in the United States under Section 215 of the Federal Power Act.³ The Reliability Standards

¹ *In the Matter of an Application by North American Electric Reliability Corporation for Approval of its Reliability Standards, and an application by Northeast Power Coordinating Council, Inc. for Approval of its Regional Reliability Criteria*, NSUARB-NERC-R-10 (July 20, 2011) (“NSUARB Decision”).

² Through enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the U.S. Congress entrusted FERC with the duties of approving and enforcing rules in the U.S. to ensure the reliability of the Nation’s bulk power system, and with the duties of certifying an ERO. On July 20, 2006, FERC certified NERC as the ERO,

contained in **Exhibit B** have been approved as mandatory and enforceable for users, owners, and operators within the United States by FERC.⁴ Some or all of NERC's Reliability Standards are now mandatory in the Canadian Provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Québec, and Saskatchewan.

NERC entered into a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") with the NSUARB⁵ and a separate MOU with Nova Scotia Power Incorporated ("NSPI"), and the Northeast Power Coordinating Council, Inc. ("NPCC"),⁶ which became effective on December 22, 2006 and May 11, 2010, respectively. The May 11, 2010 MOU sets forth the mutual understandings of NERC, NSPI, and NPCC regarding the approval and implementation of NERC Reliability Standards and NPCC Regional Reliability Criteria in Nova Scotia and other related matters.

In addition, the NSUARB Decision approved a "quarterly review" process for considering new and amended NERC standards and criteria.⁷ On September 2, 2011, NERC submitted its Second Quarter 2011 application filing to NSUARB, in which NERC committed to file a quarterly application with the NSUARB within sixty days after the end of each quarter for approval of all NERC Reliability Standards and updated Glossary of Terms approved by FERC during that quarter.

The NSUARB Decision also determined that quarterly "applications will not be processed by the Board until [FERC] has approved or remanded the standards in the

charged with developing mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards, which are subject to FERC review and approval.

³ 16 U.S.C. § 824o(f) (2006).

⁴ Those standards marked with an asterisk are not yet effective, but have been approved by FERC.

⁵ See Memorandum of Understanding between Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board and North American Electric Reliability Corporation (signed December 22, 2006).

⁶ See Memorandum of Understanding between Nova Scotia Power Incorporated and the Northeast Power Coordinating Council, Inc. and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (signed May 11, 2010).

⁷ NSUARB Decision at P 30.

United States.”⁸ Therefore, NERC is only requesting NSUARB approval for those Reliability Standards approved by FERC.

The NSUARB Decision also concluded that NSUARB approval is not required for VRFs and VSLs associated with proposed Reliability Standards.⁹ Thus, NERC does not seek formal approval of VRFs and VSLs associated with the Reliability Standards submitted in this quarterly application. However, because the NSUARB has determined that it will accept the VRFs and VSLs as guidance, NERC is providing a link to the associated FERC-approved VRFs and VSLs for the Reliability Standards for informational purposes.¹⁰

NERC has not included in this filing the full developmental record for the standards, which consists of the draft standards, comments received, responses to the comments by the drafting teams, and the full voting record, because the record for each standard may consist of several thousand pages. NERC will make the full developmental record available to the NSUARB or other interested parties upon request.

B. Overview of NERC Reliability Standards Development Process

NERC Reliability Standards define the requirements for reliably planning and operating the North American bulk-power system. These standards are developed by industry stakeholders using a balanced, open, fair and inclusive process managed by the NERC Standards Committee. The Standards Committee is facilitated by NERC staff and comprised of representatives from ten electricity stakeholder segments. Stakeholders,

⁸ NSUARB Decision at P 30.

⁹ *Id.* at P 33.

¹⁰ NERC’s VRF and VSL matrices can be found at: <http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/ReliabilityStandardsUnitedStates.aspx?jurisdiction=United States>. See left-hand side of webpage for downloadable documents.

through the balloting process, and the NERC Board of Trustees have approved the standards provided in **Exhibit B**.

NERC develops Reliability Standards in accordance with Section 300 (Reliability Standards Development) and Appendix 3A (Standards Processes Manual) of its Rules of Procedure.¹¹ NERC's Reliability Standards development process has been approved by the American National Standards Institute as being open, inclusive, balanced, and fair. The NERC Glossary of Terms used in Reliability Standards – most recently updated August 19, 2013 – lists each term that is defined for use in one or more of NERC's continent-wide or Regional Reliability Standards approved by the NERC Board of Trustees.

C. Description of Proposed Reliability Standards, Second Quarter 2013

As explained below, three FERC orders were issued in the second quarter of 2013 approving NERC Reliability Standards and related Glossary terms: (1) an order approving regional Reliability Standard VAR-002-2b¹² issued on April 16, 2013, an (2) an order approving EOP-004-2,¹³ issued on June 20, 2013 and (3) a letter order approving an interpretation to TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0.¹⁴ Additionally, on June 26, 2013, FERC approved revisions to the NERC Standard Processes Manual as set forth in Appendix 3A of NERC's Rules of Procedure.

¹¹ NERC's Rules of Procedure are available at: <http://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/Pages/Rules-of-Procedure.aspx>

¹² *North American Electric Reliability Corp.*, 143 FERC ¶ 61,1045 (2013).

¹³ *North American Electric Reliability Corp.*, 143 FERC ¶ 61,252 (2013).

¹⁴ *North American Electric Reliability Corp.*, Docket No. RD13-8-000, (June 20, 2013)(unpublished letter order).

Reliability Standard	Effective Date
Emergency Preparedness and Operations (EOP) Standards	
EOP-004-2*	1/1/2014
Transmission Planning (TPL) Standards	
TPL-003-0b	6/20/2013
TPL-004-0a	6/20/2013
Voltage and Reactive (VAR) Standards	
VAR-002-2b	7/1/2013

* At the time of this filing, all standards marked with an asterisk are not yet effective, but have been approved by FERC and have a future mandatory effective date.

1. VAR-002-2b

On April 16, 2013, FERC approved Reliability Standard VAR-002-2b – Generator Operation for Maintaining Network Voltage Schedules. Reliability Standard VAR-002-2b ensures that generators provide reactive and voltage control necessary to ensure voltage levels, reactive flows, and reactive resources are maintained within applicable facility ratings to protect equipment and the reliable operation of the interconnection.

2. EOP-004-2

On June 20, 2013, FERC approved Reliability Standard EOP-004-2 – Event Reporting. Reliability Standard EOP-004-2 identifies types of reportable events and thresholds for reporting, requires responsible entities to have an operating plan for reporting applicable events to NERC and other entities (including law enforcement), and requires reporting of threshold events within a 24 hour period.

3. Interpretation to TPL-003-0b and TPL-004-0a

On June 20, 2013, FERC approved an interpretation to certain requirements of two Reliability Standards: TPL-003-0a—System Performance Following Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category C) and TPL-004-0 – System Performance Following

Extreme Events Resulting in the Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements

(Category D). Interpretations do not change the substance or intent of the standard and provide clarification on the intent of a requirement. Upon FERC approval of the interpretation, the numbering of the Reliability Standards incrementally changed from TPL-003-0a to TPL-003-0b and from TPL-004-0 to TPL-004-0a.

III. CONCLUSION

NERC respectfully requests that the NSUARB approve the Reliability Standards and updated NERC Glossary of Terms Used in Reliability Standards, as set forth in

Exhibit B.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Stacey Tyrewala

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Exhibit A

List of Currently Effective NERC Reliability Standards

EXHIBIT A

Resource and Demand Balancing (BAL)

BAL-001-0.1a	Real Power Balancing Control Performance
BAL-002-1	Disturbance Control Performance
BAL-003-0.1b	Frequency Response and Bias
BAL-004-0	Time Error Correction
BAL-004-WECC-01	Automatic Time Error Correction
BAL-005-0.2b	Automatic Generation Control
BAL-006-2	Inadvertent Interchange
BAL-502-RFC-02	Planning Resource Adequacy Analysis, Assessment and Documentation
BAL-STD-002-0	Operating Reserves (WECC)

Communications (COM)

COM-001-1.1	Telecommunications
COM-002-2	Communications and Coordination

Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)

CIP-001-2a	Sabotage Reporting
CIP-002-3	Cyber Security — Critical Cyber Asset Identification
CIP-003-3	Cyber Security — Security Management Controls
CIP-004-3a	Cyber Security — Personnel & Training
CIP-005-3a	Cyber Security — Electronic Security Perimeter(s)
CIP-006-3c	Cyber Security — Physical Security of Critical Cyber Assets
CIP-007-3a	Cyber Security — Systems Security Management
CIP-008-3	Cyber Security — Incident Reporting and Response Planning
CIP-009-3	Cyber Security — Recovery Plans for Critical Cyber Assets

Emergency Preparedness and Operations (EOP)

EOP-001-2.1b	Emergency Operations Planning
EOP-002-3.1	Capacity and Energy Emergencies
EOP-003-1	Load Shedding Plans
EOP-004-1	Disturbance Reporting
EOP-005-2	System Restoration from Blackstart Resources
EOP-006-2	System Restoration Coordination
EOP-008-1	Loss of Control Center Functionality

Facilities Design, Connections, and Maintenance (FAC)

FAC-001-0	<u>Facility Connection Requirements</u>
FAC-002-1	<u>Coordination of Plans For New Generation, Transmission, and End-User Facilities</u>
FAC-003-1	<u>Transmission Vegetation Management Program</u>
FAC-008-3	<u>Facility Ratings</u>
FAC-010-2.1	<u>System Operating Limits Methodology for the Planning Horizon</u>
FAC-011-2	<u>System Operating Limits Methodology for the Operations Horizon</u>
FAC-013-2	<u>Assessment of Transfer Capability for the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon</u>
FAC-014-2	<u>Establish and Communicate System Operating Limits</u>
FAC-501-WECC-1	<u>Transmission Maintenance</u>

Interchange Scheduling and Coordination (INT)

INT-001-3	<u>Interchange Information</u>
INT-003-3	<u>Interchange Transaction Implementation</u>
INT-004-2	<u>Dynamic Interchange Transaction Modifications</u>
INT-005-3	<u>Interchange Authority Distributes Arranged Interchange</u>
INT-006-3	<u>Response to Interchange Authority</u>
INT-007-1	<u>Interchange Confirmation</u>
INT-008-3	<u>Interchange Authority Distributes Status</u>
INT-009-1	<u>Implementation of Interchange</u>
INT-010-1	<u>Interchange Coordination Exemptions</u>

Interconnection Reliability Operations and Coordination (IRO)

IRO-001-1.1	<u>Reliability Coordination — Responsibilities and Authorities</u>
IRO-002-2	<u>Reliability Coordination — Facilities</u>
IRO-003-2	<u>Reliability Coordination — Wide-Area View</u>
IRO-004-2	<u>Reliability Coordination — Operations Planning</u>
IRO-005-3.1a	<u>Reliability Coordination — Current Day Operations</u>
IRO-006-5	<u>Reliability Coordination — Transmission Loading Relief (TLR)</u>
IRO-006-EAST-1	<u>Transmission Loading Relief Procedure for the Eastern Interconnection</u>
IRO-006-TRE-1	<u>IROL and SOL Mitigation in the ERCOT Region</u>
IRO-006-WECC-1	<u>Qualified Transfer Path Unscheduled Flow (USF) Relief</u>
IRO-008-1	<u>Reliability Coordinator Operational Analyses and Real-time Assessments</u>
IRO-009-1	<u>Reliability Coordinator Actions to Operate Within IROLs</u>

IRO-010-1a	Reliability Coordinator Data Specification and Collection
IRO-014-1	Procedures, Processes, or Plans to Support Coordination Between Reliability Coordinators
IRO-015-1	Notifications and Information Exchange Between Reliability Coordinators
IRO-016-1	Coordination of Real-time Activities Between Reliability Coordinators

Modeling, Data, and Analysis (MOD)

MOD-001-1a	Available Transmission System Capability
MOD-004-1	Capacity Benefit Margin
MOD-008-1	Transmission Reliability Margin Calculation Methodology
MOD-010-0	Steady-State Data for Modeling and Simulation of the Interconnected Transmission System
MOD-012-0	Dynamics Data for Modeling and Simulation of the Interconnected Transmission System
MOD-016-1.1	Documentation of Data Reporting Requirements for Actual and Forecast Demands, Net Energy for Load, and Controllable Demand-Side Management
MOD-017-0.1	Aggregated Actual and Forecast Demands and Net Energy for Load
MOD-018-0	Treatment of Nonmember Demand Data and How Uncertainties are Addressed in the Forecasts of Demand and Net Energy for Load
MOD-019-0.1	Reporting of Interruptible Demands and Direct Control Load Management
MOD-020-0	Providing Interruptible Demands and Direct Control Load Management Data to System Operators and Reliability Coordinators
MOD-021-1	Documentation of the Accounting Methodology for the Effects of Demand-Side Management in Demand and Energy Forecasts
MOD-028-1	Area Interchange Methodology
MOD-029-1a	Rated System Path Methodology
MOD-030-2	Flowgate Methodology

Nuclear (NUC)

NUC-001-2	Nuclear Plant Interface Coordination
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Personnel Performance, Training, and Qualifications (PER)

PER-001-0.2	Operating Personnel Responsibility and Authority
PER-003-1	Operating Personnel Credentials
PER-004-2	Reliability Coordination — Staffing
PER-005-1	System Personnel Training

Protection and Control (PRC)

PRC-001-1	<u>System Protection Coordination</u>
PRC-002-NPCC-01	<u>Disturbance Monitoring</u>
PRC-004-2a	<u>Analysis and Mitigation of Transmission and Generation Protection System Misoperations</u>
PRC-004-WECC-1	<u>Protection System and Remedial Action Scheme Misoperation</u>
PRC-005-1b	<u>Transmission and Generation Protection System Maintenance and Testing</u>
PRC-007-0	<u>Assuring Consistency of Entity Underfrequency Load Shedding Programs with Regional Reliability Organization's Underfrequency Load Shedding Program Requirements</u>
PRC-008-0	<u>Implementation and Documentation of Underfrequency Load Shedding Equipment Maintenance Program</u>
PRC-009-0	<u>Analysis and Documentation of Underfrequency Load Shedding Performance Following an Underfrequency Event</u>
PRC-010-0	<u>Technical Assessment of the Design and Effectiveness of Undervoltage Load Shedding Program</u>
PRC-011-0	<u>Undervoltage Load Shedding System Maintenance and Testing</u>
PRC-015-0	<u>Special Protection System Data and Documentation</u>
PRC-016-0.1	<u>Special Protection System Misoperations</u>
PRC-017-0	<u>Special Protection System Maintenance and Testing</u>
PRC-018-1	<u>Disturbance Monitoring Equipment Installation and Data Reporting</u>
PRC-021-1	<u>Under-Voltage Load Shedding Program Data</u>
PRC-022-1	<u>Under-Voltage Load Shedding Program Performance</u>
PRC-023-1	<u>Transmission Relay Loadability</u>
PRC-023-2	<u>Transmission Relay Loadability</u>

Transmission Operations (TOP)

TOP-001-1a	<u>Reliability Responsibilities and Authorities</u>
TOP-002-2.1b	<u>Normal Operations Planning</u>
TOP-003-1	<u>Planned Outage Coordination</u>
TOP-004-2	<u>Transmission Operations</u>
TOP-005-2a	<u>Operational Reliability Information</u>
TOP-006-2	<u>Monitoring System Conditions</u>
TOP-007-0	<u>Reporting System Operating Limit (SOL) and Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit (IROL) Violations</u>

TOP-007-WECC-1 [System Operating Limits](#)
TOP-008-1 [Response to Transmission Limit Violations](#)

Transmission Planning (TPL)

TPL-001-0.1 [System Performance Under Normal \(No Contingency\) Conditions \(Category A\)](#)
TPL-002-0b [System Performance Following Loss of a Single Bulk Electric System Element \(Category B\)](#)
TPL-003-0b [System Performance Following Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements \(Category C\)](#)
TPL-004-0a [System Performance Following Extreme Events Resulting in the Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements \(Category D\)](#)

Voltage and Reactive (VAR)

VAR-001-2 [Voltage and Reactive Control](#)
VAR-002-2b [Generator Operation for Maintaining Network Voltage Schedules](#)
VAR-002-WECC-1 [Automatic Voltage Regulators \(AVR\)](#)
VAR-501-WECC-1 [Power System Stabilizer \(PSS\)](#)

Exhibit B

- 1.) NERC Reliability Standards Applicable to Nova Scotia, Approved by FERC in Second Quarter 2013**
- 2.) PDF Copies of Reliability Standards Submitted for Approval; and**
- 3.) Updated NERC Glossary of Terms for Approval**

**EXHIBIT B(1): NERC Reliability Standards Applicable to Nova Scotia,
Approved by FERC in Second Quarter 2013**

Reliability Standard	Effective Date
Emergency Preparedness and Operations (EOP) Standards	
EOP-004-2*	1/1/2014
Transmission Planning (TPL) Standards	
TPL-003-0b	6/20/2013
TPL-004-0a	6/20/2013
Voltage and Reactive (VAR) Standards	
VAR-002-2b	7/1/2013

* At the time of this filing, all standards marked with an asterisk are not yet effective, but have been approved by FERC and have a future mandatory effective date.

2.) PDF Copies of Reliability Standards being filed for approval

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Event Reporting
2. **Number:** EOP-004-2
3. **Purpose:** To improve the reliability of the Bulk Electric System by requiring the reporting of events by Responsible Entities.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. **Functional Entities:** For the purpose of the Requirements and the EOP-004 Attachment 1 contained herein, the following functional entities will be collectively referred to as “Responsible Entity.”
 - 4.1.1. Reliability Coordinator
 - 4.1.2. Balancing Authority
 - 4.1.3. Transmission Owner
 - 4.1.4. Transmission Operator
 - 4.1.5. Generator Owner
 - 4.1.6. Generator Operator
 - 4.1.7. Distribution Provider

5. Effective Dates:

The first day of the first calendar quarter that is six months beyond the date that this standard is approved by applicable regulatory authorities. In those jurisdictions where regulatory approval is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is six months beyond the date this standard is approved by the NERC Board of Trustees, or as otherwise made effective pursuant to the laws applicable to such ERO governmental authorities.

6. Background:

NERC established a SAR Team in 2009 to investigate and propose revisions to the CIP-001 and EOP-004 Reliability Standards. The team was asked to consider the following:

1. CIP-001 could be merged with EOP-004 to eliminate redundancies.
2. Acts of sabotage have to be reported to the DOE as part of EOP-004.
3. Specific references to the DOE form need to be eliminated.
4. EOP-004 had some ‘fill-in-the-blank’ components to eliminate.

The development included other improvements to the standards deemed appropriate by the drafting team, with the consensus of stakeholders, consistent with establishing high quality, enforceable and technically sufficient Bulk Electric System reliability standards.

The SAR for Project 2009-01, Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting was moved forward for standard drafting by the NERC Standards Committee in August of 2009. The Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting Standard Drafting Team (DSR SDT) was formed in late 2009.

The DSR SDT developed a concept paper to solicit stakeholder input regarding the proposed reporting concepts that the DSR SDT had developed. The posting of the concept paper sought comments from stakeholders on the “road map” that will be used by the DSR SDT in updating or revising CIP-001 and EOP-004. The concept paper provided stakeholders the background information and thought process of the DSR SDT. The DSR SDT has reviewed the existing standards, the SAR, issues from the NERC issues database and FERC Order 693 Directives in order to determine a prudent course of action with respect to revision of these standards.

B. Requirements and Measures

- R1.** Each Responsible Entity shall have an event reporting Operating Plan in accordance with EOP-004-2 Attachment 1 that includes the protocol(s) for reporting to the Electric Reliability Organization and other organizations (e.g., the Regional Entity, company personnel, the Responsible Entity’s Reliability Coordinator, law enforcement, or governmental authority). *[Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*

- M1.** Each Responsible Entity will have a dated event reporting Operating Plan that includes, but is not limited to the protocol(s) and each organization identified to receive an event report for event types specified in EOP-004-2 Attachment 1 and in accordance with the entity responsible for reporting.

- R2.** Each Responsible Entity shall report events per their Operating Plan within 24 hours of recognition of meeting an event type threshold for reporting or by the end of the next business day if the event occurs on a weekend (which is recognized to be 4 PM local time on Friday to 8 AM Monday local time). *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Assessment]*

- M2.** Each Responsible Entity will have as evidence of reporting an event, copy of the completed EOP-004-2 Attachment 2 form or a DOE-OE-417 form; and evidence of submittal (e.g., operator log or other operating documentation, voice recording, electronic mail message, or confirmation of facsimile) demonstrating the event report was submitted within 24 hours of recognition of meeting the threshold for reporting or by the

end of the next business day if the event occurs on a weekend (which is recognized to be 4 PM local time on Friday to 8 AM Monday local time). (R2)

- R3.** Each Responsible Entity shall validate all contact information contained in the Operating Plan pursuant to Requirement R1 each calendar year. [*Violation Risk Factor: Medium*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]
- M3.** Each Responsible Entity will have dated records to show that it validated all contact information contained in the Operating Plan each calendar year. Such evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated voice recordings and operating logs or other communication documentation. (R3)

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1 Compliance Enforcement Authority

The Regional Entity shall serve as the Compliance Enforcement Authority (CEA) unless the applicable entity is owned, operated, or controlled by the Regional Entity. In such cases the ERO or a Regional Entity approved by FERC or other applicable governmental authority shall serve as the CEA.

1.2 Evidence Retention

The Responsible Entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

- Each Responsible Entity shall retain the current Operating Plan plus each version issued since the last audit for Requirements R1, and Measure M1.
- Each Responsible Entity shall retain evidence of compliance since the last audit for Requirements R2, R3 and Measure M2, M3.

If a Responsible Entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved or for the duration specified above, whichever is longer.

The Compliance Enforcement Authority shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.3 Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Processes:

Compliance Audit

Self-Certification

Spot Checking

Compliance Investigation

Self-Reporting

Complaint

1.4 Additional Compliance Information

None

Table of Compliance Elements

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1	Operations Planning	Lower	The Responsible Entity had an Operating Plan, but failed to include one applicable event type.	The Responsible Entity had an Operating Plan, but failed to include two applicable event types.	The Responsible Entity had an Operating Plan, but failed to include three applicable event types.	The Responsible Entity had an Operating Plan, but failed to include four or more applicable event types. OR The Responsible Entity failed to have an event reporting Operating Plan.

EOP-004-2 — Event Reporting

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R2	Operations Assessment	Medium	<p>The Responsible Entity submitted an event report (e.g., written or verbal) to all required recipients more than 24 hours but less than or equal to 36 hours after meeting an event threshold for reporting.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to submit an event report (e.g., written or verbal) to one entity identified in its event reporting Operating Plan within 24 hours.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity submitted an event report (e.g., written or verbal) to all required recipients more than 36 hours but less than or equal to 48 hours after meeting an event threshold for reporting.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to submit an event report (e.g., written or verbal) to two entities identified in its event reporting Operating Plan within 24 hours.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity submitted an event report (e.g., written or verbal) to all required recipients more than 48 hours but less than or equal to 60 hours after meeting an event threshold for reporting.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to submit an event report (e.g., written or verbal) to three entities identified in its event reporting Operating Plan within 24 hours.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity submitted an event report (e.g., written or verbal) to all required recipients more than 60 hours after meeting an event threshold for reporting.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to submit an event report (e.g., written or verbal) to four or more entities identified in its event reporting Operating Plan within 24 hours.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to submit a report for an event in EOP-004 Attachment 1.</p>

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R3	Operations Planning	Medium	<p>The Responsible Entity validated all contact information contained in the Operating Plan but was late by less than one calendar month.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity validated 75% but less than 100% of the contact information contained in the Operating Plan.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity validated all contact information contained in the Operating Plan but was late by one calendar month or more but less than two calendar months.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity validated 50% and less than 75% of the contact information contained in the Operating Plan.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity validated all contact information contained in the Operating Plan but was late by two calendar months or more but less than three calendar months.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity validated 25% and less than 50% of the contact information contained in the Operating Plan.</p>	<p>The Responsible Entity validated all contact information contained in the Operating Plan but was late by three calendar months or more.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity validated less than 25% of contact information contained in the Operating Plan.</p>

D. Variances

None.

E. Interpretations

None.

F. References

Guideline and Technical Basis (attached)

EOP-004 - Attachment 1: Reportable Events

NOTE: Under certain adverse conditions (e.g. severe weather, multiple events) it may not be possible to report the damage caused by an event and issue a written Event Report within the timing in the standard. In such cases, the affected Responsible Entity shall notify parties per Requirement R2 and provide as much information as is available at the time of the notification. Submit reports to the ERO via one of the following: e-mail: systemawareness@nerc.net, Facsimile 404-446-9770 or Voice: 404-446-9780.

Submit EOP-004 Attachment 2 (or DOE-OE-417) pursuant to Requirements R1 and R2.

Event Type	Entity with Reporting Responsibility	Threshold for Reporting
Damage or destruction of a Facility	RC, BA, TOP	Damage or destruction of a Facility within its Reliability Coordinator Area, Balancing Authority Area or Transmission Operator Area that results in actions to avoid a BES Emergency.
Damage or destruction of a Facility	BA, TO, TOP, GO, GOP, DP	Damage or destruction of its Facility that results from actual or suspected intentional human action.
Physical threats to a Facility	BA, TO, TOP, GO, GOP, DP	Physical threat to its Facility excluding weather or natural disaster related threats, which has the potential to degrade the normal operation of the Facility. OR Suspicious device or activity at a Facility. Do not report theft unless it degrades normal operation of a Facility.

EOP-004-2 — Event Reporting

Event Type	Entity with Reporting Responsibility	Threshold for Reporting
Physical threats to a BES control center	RC, BA, TOP	Physical threat to its BES control center, excluding weather or natural disaster related threats, which has the potential to degrade the normal operation of the control center. OR Suspicious device or activity at a BES control center.
BES Emergency requiring public appeal for load reduction	Initiating entity is responsible for reporting	Public appeal for load reduction event.
BES Emergency requiring system-wide voltage reduction	Initiating entity is responsible for reporting	System wide voltage reduction of 3% or more.
BES Emergency requiring manual firm load shedding	Initiating entity is responsible for reporting	Manual firm load shedding \geq 100 MW.
BES Emergency resulting in automatic firm load shedding	DP, TOP	Automatic firm load shedding \geq 100 MW (via automatic undervoltage or underfrequency load shedding schemes, or SPS/RAS).
Voltage deviation on a Facility	TOP	Observed within its area a voltage deviation of \pm 10% of nominal voltage sustained for \geq 15 continuous minutes.

EOP-004-2 — Event Reporting

Event Type	Entity with Reporting Responsibility	Threshold for Reporting
IROL Violation (all Interconnections) or SOL Violation for Major WECC Transfer Paths (WECC only)	RC	Operate outside the IROL for time greater than IROL T_v (all Interconnections) or Operate outside the SOL for more than 30 minutes for Major WECC Transfer Paths (WECC only).
Loss of firm load	BA, TOP, DP	Loss of firm load for ≥ 15 Minutes: ≥ 300 MW for entities with previous year's demand $\geq 3,000$ OR ≥ 200 MW for all other entities
System separation (islanding)	RC, BA, TOP	Each separation resulting in an island ≥ 100 MW
Generation loss	BA, GOP	Total generation loss, within one minute, of : $\geq 2,000$ MW for entities in the Eastern or Western Interconnection OR $\geq 1,000$ MW for entities in the ERCOT or Quebec Interconnection
Complete loss of off-site power to a nuclear generating plant (grid supply)	TO, TOP	Complete loss of off-site power affecting a nuclear generating station per the Nuclear Plant Interface Requirement

EOP-004-2 — Event Reporting

Event Type	Entity with Reporting Responsibility	Threshold for Reporting
Transmission loss	TOP	Unexpected loss within its area, contrary to design, of three or more BES Elements caused by a common disturbance (excluding successful automatic reclosing).
Unplanned BES control center evacuation	RC, BA, TOP	Unplanned evacuation from BES control center facility for 30 continuous minutes or more.
Complete loss of voice communication capability	RC, BA, TOP	Complete loss of voice communication capability affecting a BES control center for 30 continuous minutes or more.
Complete loss of monitoring capability	RC, BA, TOP	Complete loss of monitoring capability affecting a BES control center for 30 continuous minutes or more such that analysis capability (i.e., State Estimator or Contingency Analysis) is rendered inoperable.

EOP-004 - Attachment 2: Event Reporting Form

EOP-004 Attachment 2: Event Reporting Form		
Use this form to report events. The Electric Reliability Organization will accept the DOE OE-417 form in lieu of this form if the entity is required to submit an OE-417 report. Submit reports to the ERO via one of the following: e-mail: systemawareness@nerc.net , Facsimile 404-446-9770 or voice: 404-446-9780.		
	Task	Comments
1.	Entity filing the report include: Company name: Name of contact person: Email address of contact person: Telephone Number: Submitted by (name):	
2.	Date and Time of recognized event. Date: (mm/dd/yyyy) Time: (hh:mm) Time/Zone:	
3.	Did the event originate in your system?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown <input type="checkbox"/>
4.	Event Identification and Description:	
	(Check applicable box) <input type="checkbox"/> Damage or destruction of a Facility <input type="checkbox"/> Physical Threat to a Facility <input type="checkbox"/> Physical Threat to a control center <input type="checkbox"/> BES Emergency: <input type="checkbox"/> public appeal for load reduction <input type="checkbox"/> system-wide voltage reduction <input type="checkbox"/> manual firm load shedding <input type="checkbox"/> automatic firm load shedding <input type="checkbox"/> Voltage deviation on a Facility <input type="checkbox"/> IROL Violation (all Interconnections) or SOL Violation for Major WECC Transfer Paths (WECC only) <input type="checkbox"/> Loss of firm load <input type="checkbox"/> System separation <input type="checkbox"/> Generation loss <input type="checkbox"/> Complete loss of off-site power to a nuclear generating plant (grid supply) <input type="checkbox"/> Transmission loss <input type="checkbox"/> unplanned control center evacuation <input type="checkbox"/> Complete loss of voice communication capability <input type="checkbox"/> Complete loss of monitoring capability	Written description (optional):

Guideline and Technical Basis

Distribution Provider Applicability Discussion

The DSR SDT has included Distribution Providers (DP) as an applicable entity under this standard. The team realizes that not all DPs will own BES Facilities and will not meet the “Threshold for Reporting” for any event listed in Attachment 1. These DPs will not have any reports to submit under Requirement R2. However, these DPs will be responsible for meeting Requirements R1 and R3. The DSR SDT does not intend for these entities to have a detailed Operating Plan to address events that are not applicable to them. In this instance, the DSR SDT intends for the DP to have a very simple Operating Plan that includes a statement that there are no applicable events in Attachment 1 (to meet R1) and that the DP will review the list of events in Attachment 1 each year (to meet R3). The team does not think this will be a burden on any entity as the development and annual validation of the Operating Plan should not take more than 30 minutes on an annual basis. If a DP discovers applicable events during the annual review, it is expected that the DP will develop a more detailed Operating Plan to comply with the requirements of the standard.

Multiple Reports for a Single Organization

For entities that have multiple registrations, the DSR SDT intends that these entities will only have to submit one report for any individual event. For example, if an entity is registered as a Reliability Coordinator, Balancing Authority and Transmission Operator, the entity would only submit one report for a particular event rather submitting three reports as each individual registered entity.

Summary of Key Concepts

The DSR SDT identified the following principles to assist them in developing the standard:

- Develop a single form to report disturbances and events that threaten the reliability of the Bulk Electric System
- Investigate other opportunities for efficiency, such as development of an electronic form and possible inclusion of regional reporting requirements
- Establish clear criteria for reporting
- Establish consistent reporting timelines
- Provide clarity around who will receive the information and how it will be used

During the development of concepts, the DSR SDT considered the FERC directive to “further define sabotage”. There was concern among stakeholders that a definition may be ambiguous and subject to interpretation. Consequently, the DSR SDT decided to eliminate the term sabotage from the standard. The team felt that it was almost impossible to determine if an act or event was sabotage or vandalism without the intervention of law enforcement. The DSR SDT felt that attempting to define sabotage would result in further ambiguity with respect to

reporting events. The term “sabotage” is no longer included in the standard. The events listed in EOP-004 Attachment 1 were developed to provide guidance for reporting both actual events as well as events which may have an impact on the Bulk Electric System. The DSR SDT believes that this is an equally effective and efficient means of addressing the FERC Directive.

The types of events that are required to be reported are contained within EOP-004 Attachment 1. The DSR SDT has coordinated with the NERC Events Analysis Working Group to develop the list of events that are to be reported under this standard. EOP-004 Attachment 1 pertains to those actions or events that have impacted the Bulk Electric System. These events were previously reported under EOP-004-1, CIP-001-1 or the Department of Energy form OE-417. EOP-004 Attachment 1 covers similar items that may have had an impact on the Bulk Electric System or has the potential to have an impact and should be reported.

The DSR SDT wishes to make clear that the proposed Standard does not include any real-time operating notifications for the events listed in EOP-004 Attachment 1. Real-time communication is achieved is covered in other standards. The proposed standard deals exclusively with after-the-fact reporting.

Data Gathering

The requirements of EOP-004-1 require that entities “promptly analyze Bulk Electric System disturbances on its system or facilities” (Requirement R2). The requirements of EOP-004-2 specify that certain types of events are to be reported but do not include provisions to analyze events. Events reported under EOP-004-2 may trigger further scrutiny by the ERO Events Analysis Program. If warranted, the Events Analysis Program personnel may request that more data for certain events be provided by the reporting entity or other entities that may have experienced the event. Entities are encouraged to become familiar with the Events Analysis Program and the NERC Rules of Procedure to learn more about with the expectations of the program.

Law Enforcement Reporting

The reliability objective of EOP-004-2 is to improve the reliability of the Bulk Electric System by requiring the reporting of events by Responsible Entities. Certain outages, such as those due to vandalism and terrorism, may not be reasonably preventable. These are the types of events that should be reported to law enforcement. Entities rely upon law enforcement agencies to respond to and investigate those events which have the potential to impact a wider area of the BES. The inclusion of reporting to law enforcement enables and supports reliability principles such as protection of Bulk Electric System from malicious physical attack. The importance of BES awareness of the threat around them is essential to the effective operation and planning to mitigate the potential risk to the BES.

Stakeholders in the Reporting Process

- Industry

- NERC (ERO), Regional Entity
- FERC
- DOE
- NRC
- DHS – Federal
- Homeland Security- State
- State Regulators
- Local Law Enforcement
- State or Provincial Law Enforcement
- FBI
- Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)

The above stakeholders have an interest in the timely notification, communication and response to an incident at a Facility. The stakeholders have various levels of accountability and have a vested interest in the protection and response to ensure the reliability of the BES.

Present expectations of the industry under CIP-001-1a:

It has been the understanding by industry participants that an occurrence of sabotage has to be reported to the FBI. The FBI has the jurisdictional requirements to investigate acts of sabotage and terrorism. The CIP-001-1-1a standard requires a liaison relationship on behalf of the industry and the FBI or RCMP. These requirements, under the standard, of the industry have not been clear and have lead to misunderstandings and confusion in the industry as to how to demonstrate that the liaison is in place and effective. As an example of proof of compliance with Requirement R4, Responsible Entities have asked FBI Office personnel to provide, on FBI letterhead, confirmation of the existence of a working relationship to report acts of sabotage, the number of years the liaison relationship has been in existence, and the validity of the telephone numbers for the FBI.

Coordination of Local and State Law Enforcement Agencies with the FBI

The Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) came into being with the first task force being established in 1980. JTTFs are small cells of highly trained, locally based, committed investigators, analysts, linguists, SWAT experts, and other specialists from dozens of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The JTTF is a multi-agency effort led by the Justice Department and FBI designed to combine the resources of federal, state, and local law enforcement. Coordination and communications largely through the interagency National Joint Terrorism Task Force, working out of FBI Headquarters, which makes sure that information and intelligence flows freely among the local JTTFs. This information flow can be most beneficial to the industry in analytical intelligence, incident response and investigation. Historically, the most immediate response to an industry incident has been local and state law enforcement agencies to suspected vandalism and criminal damages at industry facilities. Relying upon the JTTF

coordination between local, state and FBI law enforcement would be beneficial to effective communications and the appropriate level of investigative response.

Coordination of Local and Provincial Law Enforcement Agencies with the RCMP


A similar law enforcement coordination hierarchy exists in Canada. Local and Provincial law enforcement coordinate to investigate suspected acts of vandalism and sabotage. The Provincial law enforcement agency has a reporting relationship with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).

A Reporting Process Solution – EOP-004

A proposal discussed with the FBI, FERC Staff, NERC Standards Project Coordinator and the SDT Chair is reflected in the flowchart below (Reporting Hierarchy for Reportable Events). Essentially, reporting an event to law enforcement agencies will only require the industry to notify the state or provincial or local level law enforcement agency. The state or provincial or local level law enforcement agency will coordinate with law enforcement with jurisdiction to investigate. If the state or provincial or local level law enforcement agency decides federal agency law enforcement or the RCMP should respond and investigate, the state or provincial or local level law enforcement agency will notify and coordinate with the FBI or the RCMP.

Example of Reporting Process including Law Enforcement

Entity Experiencing An Event in Attachment 1



* Canadian entities will follow law enforcement protocols applicable in their jurisdictions

Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting Standard Drafting Team (Project 2009-01) - Reporting Concepts

Introduction

The SAR for Project 2009-01, Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting was moved forward for standard drafting by the NERC Standards Committee in August of 2009. The Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting Standard Drafting Team (DSR SDT) was formed in late 2009 and has developed updated standards based on the SAR.

The standards listed under the SAR are:

- CIP-001 — Sabotage Reporting
- EOP-004 — Disturbance Reporting

The changes do not include any real-time operating notifications for the types of events covered by CIP-001 and EOP-004. The real-time reporting requirements are achieved through the RCIS and are covered in other standards (e.g. EOP-002-Capacity and Energy Emergencies). These standards deal exclusively with after-the-fact reporting.

The DSR SDT has consolidated disturbance and sabotage event reporting under a single standard. These two components and other key concepts are discussed in the following sections.

Summary of Concepts and Assumptions:

The Standard:

- Requires reporting of “events” that impact or may impact the reliability of the Bulk Electric System
- Provides clear criteria for reporting
- Includes consistent reporting timelines
- Identifies appropriate applicability, including a reporting hierarchy in the case of disturbance reporting
- Provides clarity around of who will receive the information

Discussion of Disturbance Reporting

Disturbance reporting requirements existed in the previous version of EOP-004. The current approved definition of Disturbance from the NERC Glossary of Terms is:

1. An unplanned event that produces an abnormal system condition.
2. Any perturbation to the electric system.

3. The unexpected change in ACE that is caused by the sudden failure of generation or interruption of load.

Disturbance reporting requirements and criteria were in the previous EOP-004 standard and its attachments. The DSR SDT discussed the reliability needs for disturbance reporting and developed the list of events that are to be reported under this standard (EOP-004 Attachment 1).

Discussion of Event Reporting

There are situations worthy of reporting because they have the potential to impact reliability.

Event reporting facilitates industry awareness, which allows potentially impacted parties to prepare for and possibly mitigate any associated reliability risk. It also provides the raw material, in the case of certain potential reliability threats, to see emerging patterns.

Examples of such events include:

- Bolts removed from transmission line structures
- Train derailment adjacent to a Facility that either could have damaged a Facility directly or could indirectly damage a Facility (e.g. flammable or toxic cargo that could pose fire hazard or could cause evacuation of a control center)
- Destruction of Bulk Electric System equipment

What about sabotage?

One thing became clear in the DSR SDT's discussion concerning sabotage: everyone has a different definition. The current standard CIP-001 elicited the following response from FERC in FERC Order 693, paragraph 471 which states in part: *“ . . . the Commission directs the ERO to develop the following modifications to the Reliability Standard through the Reliability Standards development process: (1) further define sabotage and provide guidance as to the triggering events that would cause an entity to report a sabotage event.”*

Often, the underlying reason for an event is unknown or cannot be confirmed. The DSR SDT believes that by reporting material risks to the Bulk Electric System using the event categorization in this standard, it will be easier to get the relevant information for mitigation, awareness, and tracking, while removing the distracting element of motivation.

Certain types of events should be reported to NERC, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and/or Provincial or local law enforcement. Other types of events may have different reporting requirements. For example, an event that is related to copper theft may only need to be reported to the local law enforcement authorities.

Potential Uses of Reportable Information

Event analysis, correlation of data, and trend identification are a few potential uses for the information reported under this standard. The standard requires Functional entities to report the incidents and provide known information at the time of the report. Further data gathering necessary for event analysis is provided for under the Events Analysis Program and the NERC Rules of Procedure. Other entities (e.g. – NERC, Law Enforcement, etc) will be responsible for performing the analyses. The [NERC Rules of Procedure \(section 800\)](#) provide an overview of the responsibilities of the ERO in regards to analysis and dissemination of information for reliability. Jurisdictional agencies (which may include DHS, FBI, NERC, RE, FERC, Provincial Regulators, and DOE) have other duties and responsibilities.

Collection of Reportable Information or “One stop shopping”

The DSR SDT recognizes that some regions require reporting of additional information beyond what is in EOP-004. The DSR SDT has updated the listing of reportable events in EOP-004 Attachment 1 based on discussions with jurisdictional agencies, NERC, Regional Entities and stakeholder input. There is a possibility that regional differences still exist.

The reporting required by this standard is intended to meet the uses and purposes of NERC. The DSR SDT recognizes that other requirements for reporting exist (e.g., DOE-417 reporting), which may duplicate or overlap the information required by NERC. To the extent that other reporting is required, the DSR SDT envisions that duplicate entry of information should not be necessary, and the submission of the alternate report will be acceptable to NERC so long as all information required by NERC is submitted. For example, if the NERC Report duplicates information from the DOE form, the DOE report may be sent to the NERC in lieu of entering that information on the NERC report.

Rationale:

During development of this standard, text boxes were embedded within the standard to explain the rationale for various parts of the standard. Upon BOT approval, the text from the rationale text boxes was moved to this section.

Rationale for R1:

The requirement to have an Operating Plan for reporting specific types of events provides the entity with a method to have its operating personnel recognize events that affect reliability and to be able to report them to appropriate parties; e.g., Regional Entities, applicable Reliability Coordinators, and law enforcement and other jurisdictional agencies when so recognized. In addition, these event reports are an input to the NERC Events Analysis Program. These other parties use this information to promote reliability, develop a culture of reliability excellence, provide industry collaboration and promote a learning organization.

Every Registered Entity that owns or operates elements or devices on the grid has a formal or informal process, procedure, or steps it takes to gather information regarding what happened when events occur. This requirement has the Responsible Entity establish documentation on

how that procedure, process, or plan is organized. This documentation may be a single document or a combination of various documents that achieve the reliability objective. The communication protocol(s) could include a process flowchart, identification of internal and external personnel or entities to be notified, or a list of personnel by name and their associated contact information. An existing procedure that meets the requirements of CIP-001-2a may be included in this Operating Plan along with other processes, procedures or plans to meet this requirement.

Rationale for R2:

Each Responsible Entity must report and communicate events according to its Operating Plan based on the information in EOP-004-2 Attachment 1. By implementing the event reporting Operating Plan the Responsible Entity will assure situational awareness to the Electric Reliability Organization so that they may develop trends and prepare for a possible next event and mitigate the current event. This will assure that the BES remains secure and stable by mitigation actions that the Responsible Entity has within its function. By communicating events per the Operating Plan, the Responsible Entity will assure that people/agencies are aware of the current situation and they may prepare to mitigate current and further events.

Rationale for R3:

Requirement 3 calls for the Responsible Entity to validate the contact information contained in the Operating Plan each calendar year. This requirement helps ensure that the event reporting Operating Plan is up to date and entities will be able to effectively report events to assure situational awareness to the Electric Reliability Organization. If an entity experiences an actual event, communication evidence from the event may be used to show compliance with the validation requirement for the specific contacts used for the event.

Rationale for EOP-004 Attachment 1:

The DSR SDT used the defined term “Facility” to add clarity for several events listed in Attachment 1. A Facility is defined as:

“A set of electrical equipment that operates as a single Bulk Electric System Element (e.g., a line, a generator, a shunt compensator, transformer, etc.)”

The DSR SDT does not intend the use of the term Facility to mean a substation or any other facility (not a defined term) that one might consider in everyday discussions regarding the grid. This is intended to mean ONLY a Facility as defined above.

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
2		Merged CIP-001-2a Sabotage Reporting and EOP-004-1 Disturbance Reporting into EOP-004-2 Event Reporting; Retire CIP-001-2a Sabotage Reporting and Retired EOP-004-1 Disturbance Reporting.	Revision to entire standard (Project 2009-01)
2	November 7, 2012	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	
2	June 20, 2013	FERC approved	

*** FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY ***

Enforcement Dates: Standard EOP-004-2 — Event Reporting

United States

Standard	Requirement	Enforcement Date	Inactive Date
EOP-004-2	All	01/01/2014	

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** System Performance Following Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category C)
2. **Number:** TPL-003-0b
3. **Purpose:** System simulations and associated assessments are needed periodically to ensure that reliable systems are developed that meet specified performance requirements, with sufficient lead time and continue to be modified or upgraded as necessary to meet present and future System needs.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. Planning Authority
 - 4.2. Transmission Planner
5. **Effective Date:** April 23, 2010

B. Requirements

- R1.** The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall each demonstrate through a valid assessment that its portion of the interconnected transmission systems is planned such that the network can be operated to supply projected customer demands and projected Firm (non-recallable reserved) Transmission Services, at all demand Levels over the range of forecast system demands, under the contingency conditions as defined in Category C of Table I (attached). The controlled interruption of customer Demand, the planned removal of generators, or the Curtailment of firm (non-recallable reserved) power transfers may be necessary to meet this standard. To be valid, the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner assessments shall:
- R1.1.** Be made annually.
 - R1.2.** Be conducted for near-term (years one through five) and longer-term (years six through ten) planning horizons.
 - R1.3.** Be supported by a current or past study and/or system simulation testing that addresses each of the following categories, showing system performance following Category C of Table 1 (multiple contingencies). The specific elements selected (from each of the following categories) for inclusion in these studies and simulations shall be acceptable to the associated Regional Reliability Organization(s).
 - R1.3.1.** Be performed and evaluated only for those Category C contingencies that would produce the more severe system results or impacts. The rationale for the contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information. An explanation of why the remaining simulations would produce less severe system results shall be available as supporting information.
 - R1.3.2.** Cover critical system conditions and study years as deemed appropriate by the responsible entity.
 - R1.3.3.** Be conducted annually unless changes to system conditions do not warrant such analyses.
 - R1.3.4.** Be conducted beyond the five-year horizon only as needed to address identified marginal conditions that may have longer lead-time solutions.
 - R1.3.5.** Have all projected firm transfers modeled.

Standard TPL-003-0b — System Performance Following Loss of Two or More BES Elements

Compliance Monitor: Regional Reliability Organizations.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Timeframe

Annually.

1.3. Data Retention

None specified.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Levels of Non-Compliance

2.1. **Level 1:** Not applicable.

2.2. **Level 2:** A valid assessment and corrective plan for the longer-term planning horizon is not available.

2.3. **Level 3:** Not applicable.

2.4. **Level 4:** A valid assessment and corrective plan for the near-term planning horizon is not available.

E. Regional Differences

1. None identified.

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
0	February 8, 2005	Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees	New
0	April 1, 2005	Effective Date	New
0	April 1, 2005	Add parenthesis to item “e” on page 8.	Errata
0a	July 30, 2008	Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees	
0a	October 23, 2008	Added Appendix 1 – Interpretation of TPL-002-0 Requirements R1.3.2 and R1.3.12 and TPL-003-0 Requirements R1.3.2 and R1.3.12 for Ameren and MISO	Revised
0a	April 23, 2010	FERC approval of interpretation of TPL-003-0 R1.3.12	Interpretation
0b	February 7, 2013	Interpretation adopted by NERC Board of Trustees	
0b	June 20, 2013	FERC order issued approving Interpretation	

Standard TPL-003-0b — System Performance Following Loss of Two or More BES Elements

Table I. Transmission System Standards – Normal and Emergency Conditions

Category	Contingencies	System Limits or Impacts		
	Initiating Event(s) and Contingency Element(s)	System Stable and both Thermal and Voltage Limits within Applicable Rating ^a	Loss of Demand or Curtailed Firm Transfers	Cascading ^c Outages
A No Contingencies	All Facilities in Service	Yes	No	No
B Event resulting in the loss of a single element.	Single Line Ground (SLG) or 3-Phase (3Ø) Fault, with Normal Clearing: 1. Generator 2. Transmission Circuit 3. Transformer Loss of an Element without a Fault.	Yes Yes Yes Yes	No ^b No ^b No ^b No ^b	No No No No
	Single Pole Block, Normal Clearing ^c : 4. Single Pole (dc) Line	Yes	No ^b	No
C Event(s) resulting in the loss of two or more (multiple) elements.	SLG Fault, with Normal Clearing ^c : 1. Bus Section	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	2. Breaker (failure or internal Fault)	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	SLG or 3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing ^c , Manual System Adjustments, followed by another SLG or 3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing ^c : 3. Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency, manual system adjustments, followed by another Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	Bipolar Block, with Normal Clearing ^c : 4. Bipolar (dc) Line Fault (non 3Ø), with Normal Clearing ^c :	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	5. Any two circuits of a multiple circuit towerline ^f	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
SLG Fault, with Delayed Clearing ^c (stuck breaker or protection system failure):	6. Generator	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	7. Transformer	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	8. Transmission Circuit	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	9. Bus Section	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No

Standard TPL-003-0b — System Performance Following Loss of Two or More BES Elements

<p>D^d</p> <p>Extreme event resulting in two or more (multiple) elements removed or Cascading out of service</p>	<p>3Ø Fault, with Delayed Clearing^e (stuck breaker or protection system failure):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Generator 2. Transmission Circuit 3. Transformer 4. Bus Section <hr/> <p>3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing^e:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Breaker (failure or internal Fault) <hr/> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. Loss of towerline with three or more circuits 7. All transmission lines on a common right-of way 8. Loss of a substation (one voltage level plus transformers) 9. Loss of a switching station (one voltage level plus transformers) 10. Loss of all generating units at a station 11. Loss of a large Load or major Load center 12. Failure of a fully redundant Special Protection System (or remedial action scheme) to operate when required 13. Operation, partial operation, or misoperation of a fully redundant Special Protection System (or Remedial Action Scheme) in response to an event or abnormal system condition for which it was not intended to operate 14. Impact of severe power swings or oscillations from Disturbances in another Regional Reliability Organization. 	<p>Evaluate for risks and consequences.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ May involve substantial loss of customer Demand and generation in a widespread area or areas. ▪ Portions or all of the interconnected systems may or may not achieve a new, stable operating point. ▪ Evaluation of these events may require joint studies with neighboring systems.
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- a) Applicable rating refers to the applicable Normal and Emergency facility thermal Rating or system voltage limit as determined and consistently applied by the system or facility owner. Applicable Ratings may include Emergency Ratings applicable for short durations as required to permit operating steps necessary to maintain system control. All Ratings must be established consistent with applicable NERC Reliability Standards addressing Facility Ratings.
- b) Planned or controlled interruption of electric supply to radial customers or some local Network customers, connected to or supplied by the Faulted element or by the affected area, may occur in certain areas without impacting the overall reliability of the interconnected transmission systems. To prepare for the next contingency, system adjustments are permitted, including curtailments of contracted Firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power Transfers.
- c) Depending on system design and expected system impacts, the controlled interruption of electric supply to customers (load shedding), the planned removal from service of certain generators, and/or the curtailment of contracted Firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power transfers may be necessary to maintain the overall reliability of the interconnected transmission systems.
- d) A number of extreme contingencies that are listed under Category D and judged to be critical by the transmission planning entity(ies) will be selected for evaluation. It is not expected that all possible facility outages under each listed contingency of Category D will be evaluated.
- e) Normal clearing is when the protection system operates as designed and the Fault is cleared in the time normally expected with proper functioning of the installed protection systems. Delayed clearing of a Fault is due to failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay.
- f) System assessments may exclude these events where multiple circuit towers are used over short distances (e.g., station entrance, river crossings) in accordance with Regional exemption criteria.

Appendix 1

Interpretation of TPL-002-0 Requirements R1.3.2 and R1.3.12 and TPL-003-0 Requirements R1.3.2 and R1.3.12 for Ameren and MISO

NERC received two requests for interpretation of identical requirements (Requirements R1.3.2 and R1.3.12) in TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 from the Midwest ISO and Ameren. These requirements state:

TPL-002-0:

[To be valid, the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner assessments shall:]

- R1.3** Be supported by a current or past study and/or system simulation testing that addresses each of the following categories, showing system performance following Category B of Table 1 (single contingencies). The specific elements selected (from each of the following categories) for inclusion in these studies and simulations shall be acceptable to the associated Regional Reliability Organization(s).
 - R1.3.2** Cover critical system conditions and study years as deemed appropriate by the responsible entity.
 - R1.3.12** Include the planned (including maintenance) outage of any bulk electric equipment (including protection systems or their components) at those demand levels for which planned (including maintenance) outages are performed.

TPL-003-0:

[To be valid, the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner assessments shall:]

- R1.3** Be supported by a current or past study and/or system simulation testing that addresses each of the following categories, showing system performance following Category C of Table 1 (multiple contingencies). The specific elements selected (from each of the following categories) for inclusion in these studies and simulations shall be acceptable to the associated Regional Reliability Organization(s).
 - R1.3.2** Cover critical system conditions and study years as deemed appropriate by the responsible entity.
 - R1.3.12** Include the planned (including maintenance) outage of any bulk electric equipment (including protection systems or their components) at those demand levels for which planned (including maintenance) outages are performed.

Requirement R1.3.2

Request for Interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.2 Received from Ameren on July 25, 2007:

Ameren specifically requests clarification on the phrase, 'critical system conditions' in R1.3.2. Ameren asks if compliance with R1.3.2 requires multiple contingent generating unit Outages as part of possible generation dispatch scenarios describing critical system conditions for which the system shall be planned and modeled in accordance with the contingency definitions included in Table 1.

Standard TPL-003-0b — System Performance Following Loss of Two or More BES Elements

Request for Interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.2 Received from MISO on August 9, 2007:

MISO asks if the TPL standards require that any specific dispatch be applied, other than one that is representative of supply of firm demand and transmission service commitments, in the modeling of system contingencies specified in Table 1 in the TPL standards.

MISO then asks if a variety of possible dispatch patterns should be included in planning analyses including a probabilistically based dispatch that is representative of generation deficiency scenarios, would it be an appropriate application of the TPL standard to apply the transmission contingency conditions in Category B of Table 1 to these possible dispatch pattern.

The following interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.2 was developed by the NERC Planning Committee on March 13, 2008:

The selection of a credible generation dispatch for the modeling of critical system conditions is within the discretion of the Planning Authority. The Planning Authority was renamed “Planning Coordinator” (PC) in the Functional Model dated February 13, 2007. (TPL -002 and -003 use the former “Planning Authority” name, and the Functional Model terminology was a change in name only and did not affect responsibilities.)

- Under the Functional Model, the Planning Coordinator “Provides and informs Resource Planners, Transmission Planners, and adjacent Planning Coordinators of the methodologies and tools for the simulation of the transmission system” while the Transmission Planner “Receives from the Planning Coordinator methodologies and tools for the analysis and development of transmission expansion plans.” A PC’s selection of “critical system conditions” and its associated generation dispatch falls within the purview of “methodology.”

Furthermore, consistent with this interpretation, a Planning Coordinator would formulate critical system conditions that may involve a range of critical generator unit outages as part of the possible generator dispatch scenarios.

Both TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 have a similar measure M1:

- M1.** The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall have a valid assessment and corrective plans as specified in Reliability Standard TPL-002-0_R1 [or TPL-003-0_R1] and TPL-002-0_R2 [or TPL-003-0_R2].”

The Regional Reliability Organization (RRO) is named as the Compliance Monitor in both standards. Pursuant to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order 693, FERC eliminated the RRO as the appropriate Compliance Monitor for standards and replaced it with the Regional Entity (RE). See paragraph 157 of Order 693. Although the referenced TPL standards still include the reference to the RRO, to be consistent with Order 693, the RRO is replaced by the RE as the Compliance Monitor for this interpretation. As the Compliance Monitor, the RE determines what a “valid assessment” means when evaluating studies based upon specific sub-requirements in R1.3 selected by the Planning Coordinator and the Transmission Planner. If a PC has Transmission Planners in more than one region, the REs must coordinate among themselves on compliance matters.

Requirement R1.3.12

Request for Interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.12 Received from Ameren on July 25, 2007:

Ameren also asks how the inclusion of planned outages should be interpreted with respect to the contingency definitions specified in Table 1 for Categories B and C. Specifically, Ameren asks if R1.3.12 requires that the system be planned to be operated during those conditions associated with planned outages consistent with the performance requirements described in Table 1 plus any unidentified outage.

Request for Interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.12 Received from MISO on August 9, 2007:

MISO asks if the term “planned outages” means only already known/scheduled planned outages that may continue into the planning horizon, or does it include potential planned outages not yet scheduled that may occur at those demand levels for which planned (including maintenance) outages are performed?

If the requirement does include not yet scheduled but potential planned outages that could occur in the planning horizon, is the following a proper interpretation of this provision?

The system is adequately planned and in accordance with the standard if, in order for a system operator to potentially schedule such a planned outage on the future planned system, planning studies show that a system adjustment (load shed, re-dispatch of generating units in the interconnection, or system reconfiguration) would be required concurrent with taking such a planned outage in order to prepare for a Category B contingency (single element forced out of service)? In other words, should the system in effect be planned to be operated as for a Category C3 n-2 event, even though the first event is a planned base condition?

If the requirement is intended to mean only known and scheduled planned outages that will occur or may continue into the planning horizon, is this interpretation consistent with the original interpretation by NERC of the standard as provided by NERC in response to industry questions in the Phase I development of this standard?

The following interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.12 was developed by the NERC Planning Committee on March 13, 2008:

This provision was not previously interpreted by NERC since its approval by FERC and other regulatory authorities. TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 explicitly provide that the inclusion of planned (including maintenance) outages of any bulk electric equipment at demand levels for which the planned outages are required. For studies that include planned outages, compliance with the contingency assessment for TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 as outlined in Table 1 would include any necessary system adjustments which might be required to accommodate planned outages since a planned outage is not a “contingency” as defined in the *NERC Glossary of Terms Used in Standards*.

Standard TPL-003-0b — System Performance Following Loss of Two or More BES Elements

Appendix 2

Interpretation 2012-INT-02: Response to Request for Interpretation of TPL-003-0a, Requirements R1.3.1, R1.3.10 and R1.5 and TPL-004-0, Requirements R1.3.1, R1.3.7 and R1.4 for the System Protection and Control Subcommittee

Date submitted: December 12, 2011

The following interpretations of TPL-003-0a, System Performance Following Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category C), Requirements R1.3.1, R1.3.10 and R1.5 and TPL-004-0, System Performance Following Extreme Events Resulting in the Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category D), Requirements R1.3.1, R1.3.7 and R1.4 were developed by members of the Assess Transmission Future Needs Standard Drafting Team (ATFNSTD), Protection System Misoperations Standard Development Team (PSMSDT), and Protection System Maintenance and Testing Standard Drafting Team (PSMTSDT).

Standard	Requirement (and text)
TPL-003-0a	R1.3.1 Be performed and evaluated only for those Category C contingencies that would produce the more severe system results or impacts. The rationale for the contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information. An explanation of why the remaining simulations would produce less severe system results shall be available as supporting information.
TPL-003-0a	R1.3.10. Include the effects of existing and planned protection systems, including any backup or redundant systems.
TPL-003-0a	R1.5. Consider all contingencies applicable to Category C.
TPL-004-0	R1.3.1. Be performed and evaluated only for those Category D contingencies that would produce the more severe system results or impacts. The rationale for the contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information. An explanation of why the remaining simulations would produce less severe system results shall be available as supporting information.
TPL-004-0	R1.3.7. Include the effects of existing and planned protection systems, including any backup or redundant systems.
TPL-004-0	R1.4. Consider all contingencies applicable to Category D.

Please explain the clarification needed (as submitted).

This interpretation request has been developed to address Commission concerns related to the term “Single Point of Failure” and how it relates to system performance and contingency planning

Standard TPL-003-0b — System Performance Following Loss of Two or More BES Elements

clarification regarding the following questions about the listed standards, requirements and terms. More specifically, clarification is needed about the comprehensive study of system performance relating to Table 1's, Category C and D contingency of a "protection system failure" and specifically the impact of failed components (i.e., "Single Point of Failure"). It is not entirely clear whether a valid assessment of a protection system failure includes evaluation of shared or non-redundant protection system components. Protection systems that have a shared protection system component are not two independent protection systems, because both protection systems will be mutually impacted for a failure of a single shared component. A protection system component evaluation would include the evaluation of the consequences on system performance for the failure of any protection system component that is integral to the operation of the protection system being evaluated and to the operation of another protection system.

On March 30, 2009, NERC issued an [Industry Advisory — Protection System Single Point of Failure](#)¹ (i.e., NERC Alert) for three significant events. One of which, the Westwing outage (June 14, 2004) was caused by failure of a single auxiliary relay that initiated both breaker tripping and the breaker failure protection. Since breaker tripping and breaker failure protection both shared the same auxiliary relay, there was no independence between breaker tripping and breaker failure protection systems, therefore causing both protection systems to not operate for the single component failure of the auxiliary relay. The failure of this auxiliary relay is known as a "single point of failure." It is not clear whether this situation is comprehensively addressed by the applicable entities when making a valid assessment of system performance for both Category C and D contingencies.

Question 1: For the parenthetical "(stuck breaker or protection system failure)" in TPL-003-0a (Category C contingencies 6-9) and TPL-004-0 (Category D contingencies 1-4), does an entity have the option of evaluating the effects² of either "stuck breaker" or "protection system failure" contingency³, or does an applicable entity have to evaluate the contingency that produces the more severe system results or impacts as identified in R1.3.1 of both standards?

There is a lack of clarity whether R1.3.1⁴ requires an entity to assess which contingency causes the most severe system results or impacts (R1.3.1) and this ambiguity could result in a potential reliability gap. Whether the simulation of a stuck breaker or protection system failure will produce the worst result depends on the protection system design. For example when a protection system is fully redundant, a protection system failure will not affect fault clearing; therefore, a stuck breaker would result in more severe system results or impacts. However, when a protection system failure affects fault clearing, the fault clearing time may be longer than the breaker failure protection clearing time for a stuck breaker contingency and may result in tripping of additional system elements, resulting in a more severe system

¹ NERC Website: (<http://www.nerc.com/fileUploads/File/Events%20Analysis/A-2009-03-30-01.pdf>)

² As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.3.10. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.3.7.

³ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

⁴ "Be performed and evaluated only for those Category (TPL-003-0a Category C and TPL-004-0 Category D) contingencies that would produce the more severe system results or impacts."

response.

Question 2: For the phrase “Delayed Clearing⁵” used in Category C⁶ contingencies 6-9 and Category D⁷ contingencies 1-4, to what extent does the description in Table 1, footnote (e)⁸ require an entity to model a single point of failure of a protection system component that may prevent correct operation of a protection system, including other protection systems impacted by that failed component based on the as-built design of that protection system?

There is a lack of clarity whether footnote (e) in Table 1 requires the study and/or simulation of a failure of a protection system component (i.e., single point of failure) that may prevent correct operation of the protection system(s) impacted by the component failure. Protection systems that share a protection system component are fully dependent upon the correct operation of that single shared component and do not perform as two independent protection systems. This lack of clarity may result in a potential reliability gap.

Clarity is necessary as to whether (1) a valid assessment should include evaluation of delayed clearing due to failure of the protection system component (i.e., single point of failure), such as the failure of a shared protection system component, that produces the more severe system results or impacts; and (2) the study and/or simulation of the fault clearing sequence and protection system(s) operation should be based on the protection system(s) as-built design.

The lack of clarity is compounded by the similarity between the phrase “Delayed Clearing” used in TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0, footnote (e), and the NERC glossary term “Delayed Fault Clearing.” While TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0 do not use the glossary term, the similarity may lead to confusion and inconsistency in how entities apply footnote (e) to “stuck breaker” or “protection system failure” contingency assessments.

Question 1

For the parenthetical “(stuck breaker or protection system failure)” in TPL-003-0a (Category C contingencies 6-9) and TPL-004-0 (Category D contingencies 1-4), does an entity have the option of evaluating the effects⁹ of either “stuck breaker” or “protection system failure” contingency¹⁰, or does an applicable entity have to evaluate the contingency that produces the more severe system results or impacts as identified in R1.3.1 of both standards?

⁵ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

⁶ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5.

⁷ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

⁸ Footnote (e) Delayed Clearing: “failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay,”

⁹ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.3.10. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.3.7.

¹⁰ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

Standard TPL-003-0b — System Performance Following Loss of Two or More BES Elements

Response 1

The interpretation drafting team concludes that the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner must evaluate the situation that produces the more severe system results or impacts (i.e., TPL-003-0a, R1.3.1 and TPL-004-0, R1.3.1) due to a delayed clearing condition regardless of whether the condition resulted from a stuck breaker or protection system failure. The Reliability Standards TPL-003-0a (Table I, Category C contingencies 6-9) and TPL-004-0 (Table I, Category D contingencies 1-4) involve an assessment of the effects of either a stuck breaker or a protection system failure. The single line ground (SLG) (TPL-003-0a, Table I, Category C) Fault and 3-phase (3 ϕ) (TPL-004-0, Table I, Category D) Fault contingencies with delayed clearing are further defined by footnote (e) and the parenthetical phrase “(stuck breaker or protection system failure).” Footnote (e) explains that “Delayed clearing of a Fault is due to failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay.” The parenthetical further emphasizes that the failure may be a “stuck breaker or protection system failure” that causes the delayed clearing of the fault. The text in Table 1 in either standard explains that when selecting delayed clearing contingencies to evaluate, both conditions “(stuck breaker or protection system failure)” must be considered.

Question 2

For the phrase “Delayed Clearing¹¹” used in Category C¹² contingencies 6-9 and Category D¹³ contingencies 1-4, to what extent does the description in Table 1, footnote (e)¹⁴ require an entity to model a single point of failure of a protection system component that may prevent correct operation of a protection system, including other protection systems impacted by that failed component based on the as-built design of that protection system?

Response 2

The term “Delayed Clearing” that is described in Table I, footnote (e) refers to fault clearing that results from a failure to achieve the protection system’s normally expected clearing time. For Category C or D contingencies, each Planning Authority and Transmission Planner is permitted engineering judgment in its selection of the protection system component failures for evaluation that would produce the more severe system results or impact (i.e., TPL-003-0a, R1.3.1 and TPL-004-0, R1.3.1). The evaluation would include addressing all protection systems affected by the selected component.

A protection system component failure that impacts one or more protection systems and increases the total fault clearing time requires the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner to simulate the full

¹¹ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

¹² As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5.

¹³ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

¹⁴ Footnote (e) Delayed Clearing: “failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay,”

Standard TPL-003-0b — System Performance Following Loss of Two or More BES Elements

impact (clearing time and facilities removed) on the Bulk Electric System performance.

The interpretation drafting team bases this conclusion on the footnote (e) example “...any protection system component such as, relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer...” because the component “circuit breaker” is not addressed in the current or previously defined NERC glossary term. The interpretation drafting team initially believed the lowercase usage of “protection system” inferred the NERC glossary term and the components described therein; however, based on the interpretation drafting team’s further assessment of footnote (e), it concludes that the existing TPL standards (TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0) do not implicitly use the NERC glossary term. Without an explicit reference to the NERC glossary term, “Protection System,” the two standards do not prescribe the specific protection system components that must be addressed by the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner in performing the studies required in TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0.

*** FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY ***

Enforcement Dates: Standard TPL-003-0b — System Performance Following Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category C)

United States

Standard	Requirement	Enforcement Date	Inactive Date
TPL-003-0b	All	06/20/2013	

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** System Performance Following Extreme Events Resulting in the Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category D)
2. **Number:** TPL-004-0a
3. **Purpose:** System simulations and associated assessments are needed periodically to ensure that reliable systems are developed that meet specified performance requirements, with sufficient lead time and continue to be modified or upgraded as necessary to meet present and future System needs.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. Planning Authority
 - 4.2. Transmission Planner
5. **Effective Date:** April 1, 2005

B. Requirements

- R1. The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall each demonstrate through a valid assessment that its portion of the interconnected transmission system is evaluated for the risks and consequences of a number of each of the extreme contingencies that are listed under Category D of Table I. To be valid, the Planning Authority's and Transmission Planner's assessment shall:
 - R1.1. Be made annually.
 - R1.2. Be conducted for near-term (years one through five).
 - R1.3. Be supported by a current or past study and/or system simulation testing that addresses each of the following categories, showing system performance following Category D contingencies of Table I. The specific elements selected (from within each of the following categories) for inclusion in these studies and simulations shall be acceptable to the associated Regional Reliability Organization(s).
 - R1.3.1. Be performed and evaluated only for those Category D contingencies that would produce the more severe system results or impacts. The rationale for the contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information. An explanation of why the remaining simulations would produce less severe system results shall be available as supporting information.
 - R1.3.2. Cover critical system conditions and study years as deemed appropriate by the responsible entity.
 - R1.3.3. Be conducted annually unless changes to system conditions do not warrant such analyses.
 - R1.3.4. Have all projected firm transfers modeled.
 - R1.3.5. Include existing and planned facilities.
 - R1.3.6. Include Reactive Power resources to ensure that adequate reactive resources are available to meet system performance.
 - R1.3.7. Include the effects of existing and planned protection systems, including any backup or redundant systems.
 - R1.3.8. Include the effects of existing and planned control devices.

R1.3.9. Include the planned (including maintenance) outage of any bulk electric equipment (including protection systems or their components) at those demand levels for which planned (including maintenance) outages are performed.

R1.4. Consider all contingencies applicable to Category D.

R2. The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall each document the results of its reliability assessments and shall annually provide the results to its entities' respective NERC Regional Reliability Organization(s), as required by the Regional Reliability Organization.

C. Measures

M1. The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall have a valid assessment for its system responses as specified in Reliability Standard TPL-004-0_R1.

M2. The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall provide evidence to its Compliance Monitor that it reported documentation of results of its reliability assessments per Reliability Standard TPL-004-0_R1.

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Compliance Monitor: Regional Reliability Organization.

Each Compliance Monitor shall report compliance and violations to NERC via the NERC Compliance Reporting Process.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Timeframe

Annually.

1.3. Data Retention

None specified.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Levels of Non-Compliance

2.1. Level 1: A valid assessment, as defined above, for the near-term planning horizon is not available.

2.2. Level 2: Not applicable.

2.3. Level 3: Not applicable.

2.4. Level 4: Not applicable.

E. Regional Differences

1. None identified.

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
0	April 1, 2005	Effective Date	New
0a	February 7, 2013	Interpretation adopted by NERC Board of Trustees	

Standard TPL-004-0a— System Performance Following Extreme BES Events

0a	June 20, 2013	Interpretation approved in FERC order	
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Standard TPL-004-0a— System Performance Following Extreme BES Events

Table I. Transmission System Standards – Normal and Emergency Conditions

Category	Contingencies	System Limits or Impacts		
	Initiating Event(s) and Contingency Element(s)	System Stable and both Thermal and Voltage Limits within Applicable Rating ^a	Loss of Demand or Curtailed Firm Transfers	Cascading Outages
A No Contingencies	All Facilities in Service	Yes	No	No
B Event resulting in the loss of a single element.	Single Line Ground (SLG) or 3-Phase (3Ø) Fault, with Normal Clearing: 1. Generator 2. Transmission Circuit 3. Transformer Loss of an Element without a Fault.	Yes Yes Yes Yes	No ^b No ^b No ^b No ^b	No No No No
	Single Pole Block, Normal Clearing ^c : 4. Single Pole (dc) Line	Yes	No ^b	No
C Event(s) resulting in the loss of two or more (multiple) elements.	SLG Fault, with Normal Clearing ^c : 1. Bus Section	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	2. Breaker (failure or internal Fault)	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	SLG or 3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing ^c , Manual System Adjustments, followed by another SLG or 3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing ^c : 3. Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency, manual system adjustments, followed by another Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	Bipolar Block, with Normal Clearing ^c : 4. Bipolar (dc) Line Fault (non 3Ø), with Normal Clearing ^c :	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	5. Any two circuits of a multiple circuit towerline ^f	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	SLG Fault, with Delayed Clearing ^c (stuck breaker or protection system failure): 6. Generator	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
7. Transformer	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No	
8. Transmission Circuit	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No	
9. Bus Section	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No	

Standard TPL-004-0a— System Performance Following Extreme BES Events

<p>D^d</p> <p>Extreme event resulting in two or more (multiple) elements removed or Cascading out of service</p>	<p>3Ø Fault, with Delayed Clearing^e (stuck breaker or protection system failure):</p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>1. Generator</td> <td>3. Transformer</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2. Transmission Circuit</td> <td>4. Bus Section</td> </tr> </table> <hr/> <p>3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing^e:</p> <hr/> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Breaker (failure or internal Fault) 6. Loss of towerline with three or more circuits 7. All transmission lines on a common right-of way 8. Loss of a substation (one voltage level plus transformers) 9. Loss of a switching station (one voltage level plus transformers) 10. Loss of all generating units at a station 11. Loss of a large Load or major Load center 12. Failure of a fully redundant Special Protection System (or remedial action scheme) to operate when required 13. Operation, partial operation, or misoperation of a fully redundant Special Protection System (or Remedial Action Scheme) in response to an event or abnormal system condition for which it was not intended to operate 14. Impact of severe power swings or oscillations from Disturbances in another Regional Reliability Organization. 	1. Generator	3. Transformer	2. Transmission Circuit	4. Bus Section	<p>Evaluate for risks and consequences.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ May involve substantial loss of customer Demand and generation in a widespread area or areas. ▪ Portions or all of the interconnected systems may or may not achieve a new, stable operating point. ▪ Evaluation of these events may require joint studies with neighboring systems.
1. Generator	3. Transformer					
2. Transmission Circuit	4. Bus Section					

- a) Applicable rating refers to the applicable Normal and Emergency facility thermal Rating or System Voltage Limit as determined and consistently applied by the system or facility owner. Applicable Ratings may include Emergency Ratings applicable for short durations as required to permit operating steps necessary to maintain system control. All Ratings must be established consistent with applicable NERC Reliability Standards addressing Facility Ratings.
- b) Planned or controlled interruption of electric supply to radial customers or some local network customers, connected to or supplied by the Faulted element or by the affected area, may occur in certain areas without impacting the overall reliability of the interconnected transmission systems. To prepare for the next contingency, system adjustments are permitted, including curtailments of contracted Firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power Transfers.
- c) Depending on system design and expected system impacts, the controlled interruption of electric supply to customers (load shedding), the planned removal from service of certain generators, and/or the curtailment of contracted Firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power Transfers may be necessary to maintain the overall reliability of the interconnected transmission systems.
- d) A number of extreme contingencies that are listed under Category D and judged to be critical by the transmission planning entity(ies) will be selected for evaluation. It is not expected that all possible facility outages under each listed contingency of Category D will be evaluated.
- e) Normal clearing is when the protection system operates as designed and the Fault is cleared in the time normally expected with proper functioning of the installed protection systems. Delayed clearing of a Fault is due to failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay.
- f) System assessments may exclude these events where multiple circuit towers are used over short distances (e.g., station entrance, river crossings) in accordance with Regional exemption criteria.

Appendix 1

<p>Interpretation 2012-INT-02: Response to Request for Interpretation of TPL-003-0a, Requirements R1.3.1, R1.3.10 and R1.5 and TPL-004-0, Requirements R1.3.1, R1.3.7 and R1.4 for the System Protection and Control Subcommittee</p>	
<p>Date submitted:</p>	<p>December 12, 2011</p>
<p>The following interpretations of TPL-003-0a, System Performance Following Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category C), Requirements R1.3.1, R1.3.10 and R1.5 and TPL-004-0, System Performance Following Extreme Events Resulting in the Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category D), Requirements R1.3.1, R1.37 and R1.4 were developed by members of the Assess Transmission Future Needs Standard Drafting Team (ATFNSTD), Protection System Misoperations Standard Development Team (PSMSDT), and Protection System Maintenance and Testing Standard Drafting Team (PSMTSDT).</p>	
Standard	Requirement (and text)
TPL-003-0a	R1.3.1 Be performed and evaluated only for those Category C contingencies that would produce the more severe system results or impacts. The rationale for the contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information. An explanation of why the remaining simulations would produce less severe system results shall be available as supporting information.
TPL-003-0a	R1.3.10. Include the effects of existing and planned protection systems, including any backup or redundant systems.
TPL-003-0a	R1.5. Consider all contingencies applicable to Category C.
TPL-004-0	R1.3.1. Be performed and evaluated only for those Category D contingencies that would produce the more severe system results or impacts. The rationale for the contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information. An explanation of why the remaining simulations would produce less severe system results shall be available as supporting information.
TPL-004-0	R1.3.7. Include the effects of existing and planned protection systems, including any backup or redundant systems.
TPL-004-0	R1.4. Consider all contingencies applicable to Category D.
<p>Please explain the clarification needed (as submitted).</p>	
<p>This interpretation request has been developed to address Commission concerns related to the term “Single Point of Failure” and how it relates to system performance and contingency planning clarification regarding the following questions about the listed standards, requirements and terms.</p>	

More specifically, clarification is needed about the comprehensive study of system performance relating to Table 1's, Category C and D contingency of a "protection system failure" and specifically the impact of failed components (i.e., "Single Point of Failure"). It is not entirely clear whether a valid assessment of a protection system failure includes evaluation of shared or non-redundant protection system components. Protection systems that have a shared protection system component are not two independent protection systems, because both protection systems will be mutually impacted for a failure of a single shared component. A protection system component evaluation would include the evaluation of the consequences on system performance for the failure of any protection system component that is integral to the operation of the protection system being evaluated and to the operation of another protection system.

On March 30, 2009, NERC issued an [Industry Advisory — Protection System Single Point of Failure](#)¹ (i.e., NERC Alert) for three significant events. One of which, the Westwing outage (June 14, 2004) was caused by failure of a single auxiliary relay that initiated both breaker tripping and the breaker failure protection. Since breaker tripping and breaker failure protection both shared the same auxiliary relay, there was no independence between breaker tripping and breaker failure protection systems, therefore causing both protection systems to not operate for the single component failure of the auxiliary relay. The failure of this auxiliary relay is known as a "single point of failure." It is not clear whether this situation is comprehensively addressed by the applicable entities when making a valid assessment of system performance for both Category C and D contingencies.

Question 1: For the parenthetical "(stuck breaker or protection system failure)" in TPL-003-0a (Category C contingencies 6-9) and TPL-004-0 (Category D contingencies 1-4), does an entity have the option of evaluating the effects² of either "stuck breaker" or "protection system failure" contingency³, or does an applicable entity have to evaluate the contingency that produces the more severe system results or impacts as identified in R1.3.1 of both standards?

There is a lack of clarity whether R1.3.1⁴ requires an entity to assess which contingency causes the most severe system results or impacts (R1.3.1) and this ambiguity could result in a potential reliability gap. Whether the simulation of a stuck breaker or protection system failure will produce the worst result depends on the protection system design. For example when a protection system is fully redundant, a protection system failure will not affect fault clearing; therefore, a stuck breaker would result in more severe system results or impacts. However, when a protection system failure affects fault clearing, the fault clearing time may be longer than the breaker failure protection clearing time for a stuck breaker contingency and may result in tripping of additional system elements, resulting in a more severe system response.

Question 2: For the phrase "Delayed Clearing"⁵ used in Category C⁶ contingencies 6-9 and Category D⁷ contingencies 1-4, to what extent does the description in Table 1, footnote (e)⁸ require an entity to

¹ NERC Website: (<http://www.nerc.com/fileUploads/File/Events%20Analysis/A-2009-03-30-01.pdf>)

² As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.3.10. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.3.7.

³ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

⁴ "Be performed and evaluated only for those Category (TPL-003-0a Category C and TPL-004-0 Category D) contingencies that would produce the more severe system results or impacts."

⁵ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

model a single point of failure of a protection system component that may prevent correct operation of a protection system, including other protection systems impacted by that failed component based on the as-built design of that protection system?

There is a lack of clarity whether footnote (e) in Table 1 requires the study and/or simulation of a failure of a protection system component (i.e., single point of failure) that may prevent correct operation of the protection system(s) impacted by the component failure. Protection systems that share a protection system component are fully dependent upon the correct operation of that single shared component and do not perform as two independent protection systems. This lack of clarity may result in a potential reliability gap.

Clarity is necessary as to whether (1) a valid assessment should include evaluation of delayed clearing due to failure of the protection system component (i.e., single point of failure), such as the failure of a shared protection system component, that produces the more severe system results or impacts; and (2) the study and/or simulation of the fault clearing sequence and protection system(s) operation should be based on the protection system(s) as-built design.

The lack of clarity is compounded by the similarity between the phrase “Delayed Clearing” used in TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0, footnote (e), and the NERC glossary term “Delayed Fault Clearing.” While TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0 do not use the glossary term, the similarity may lead to confusion and inconsistency in how entities apply footnote (e) to “stuck breaker” or “protection system failure” contingency assessments.

Question 1

For the parenthetical “(stuck breaker or protection system failure)” in TPL-003-0a (Category C contingencies 6-9) and TPL-004-0 (Category D contingencies 1-4), does an entity have the option of evaluating the effects⁹ of either “stuck breaker” or “protection system failure” contingency¹⁰, or does an applicable entity have to evaluate the contingency that produces the more severe system results or impacts as identified in R1.3.1 of both standards?

Response 1

The interpretation drafting team concludes that the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner must evaluate the situation that produces the more severe system results or impacts (i.e., TPL-003-0a, R1.3.1 and TPL-004-0, R1.3.1) due to a delayed clearing condition regardless of whether the condition resulted

⁶ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5.

⁷ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

⁸ Footnote (e) Delayed Clearing: “failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay,”

⁹ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.3.10. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.3.7.

¹⁰ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

from a stuck breaker or protection system failure. The Reliability Standards TPL-003-0a (Table I, Category C contingencies 6-9) and TPL-004-0 (Table I, Category D contingencies 1-4) involve an assessment of the effects of either a stuck breaker or a protection system failure. The single line ground (SLG) (TPL-003-0a, Table I, Category C) Fault and 3-phase (3 ϕ) (TPL-004-0, Table I, Category D) Fault contingencies with delayed clearing are further defined by footnote (e) and the parenthetical phrase “(stuck breaker or protection system failure).” Footnote (e) explains that “Delayed clearing of a Fault is due to failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay.” The parenthetical further emphasizes that the failure may be a “stuck breaker or protection system failure” that causes the delayed clearing of the fault. The text in Table 1 in either standard explains that when selecting delayed clearing contingencies to evaluate, both conditions “(stuck breaker or protection system failure)” must be considered.

Question 2

For the phrase “Delayed Clearing¹¹” used in Category C¹² contingencies 6-9 and Category D¹³ contingencies 1-4, to what extent does the description in Table 1, footnote (e)¹⁴ require an entity to model a single point of failure of a protection system component that may prevent correct operation of a protection system, including other protection systems impacted by that failed component based on the as-built design of that protection system?

Response 2

The term “Delayed Clearing” that is described in Table I, footnote (e) refers to fault clearing that results from a failure to achieve the protection system’s normally expected clearing time. For Category C or D contingencies, each Planning Authority and Transmission Planner is permitted engineering judgment in its selection of the protection system component failures for evaluation that would produce the more severe system results or impact (i.e., TPL-003-0a, R1.3.1 and TPL-004-0, R1.3.1). The evaluation would include addressing all protection systems affected by the selected component.

A protection system component failure that impacts one or more protection systems and increases the total fault clearing time requires the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner to simulate the full impact (clearing time and facilities removed) on the Bulk Electric System performance.

The interpretation drafting team bases this conclusion on the footnote (e) example “...any protection system component such as, relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer...” because the component “circuit breaker” is not addressed in the current or previously defined NERC glossary term. The interpretation drafting team initially believed the lowercase usage of “protection system” inferred the

¹¹ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

¹² As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5.

¹³ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

¹⁴ Footnote (e) Delayed Clearing: “failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay,”

Standard TPL-004-0a— System Performance Following Extreme BES Events

NERC glossary term and the components described therein; however, based on the interpretation drafting team's further assessment of footnote (e), it concludes that the existing TPL standards (TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0) do not implicitly use the NERC glossary term. Without an explicit reference to the NERC glossary term, "Protection System," the two standards do not prescribe the specific protection system components that must be addressed by the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner in performing the studies required in TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0.

*** FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY ***

Enforcement Dates: Standard TPL-004-0a — System Performance Following Extreme Events Resulting in the Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category D)

United States

Standard	Requirement	Enforcement Date	Inactive Date
TPL-004-0a	All	06/20/2013	

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Generator Operation for Maintaining Network Voltage Schedules
2. **Number:** VAR-002-2b
3. **Purpose:** To ensure generators provide reactive and voltage control necessary to ensure voltage levels, reactive flows, and reactive resources are maintained within applicable Facility Ratings to protect equipment and the reliable operation of the Interconnection.
4. **Applicability**
 - 4.1. Generator Operator.
 - 4.2. Generator Owner.
5. **Effective Date:** In those jurisdictions where regulatory approval is required, this standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter after applicable regulatory approval or as otherwise made effective pursuant to the laws applicable to such ERO governmental authorities. In those jurisdictions where no regulatory approval is required, this standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter after Board of Trustees approval.

B. Requirements

- R1.** The Generator Operator shall operate each generator connected to the interconnected transmission system in the automatic voltage control mode (automatic voltage regulator in service and controlling voltage) unless the Generator Operator has notified the Transmission Operator of one of the following: [*Violation Risk Factor: Medium*] [*Time Horizon: Real-time Operations*]
- That the generator is being operated in start-up¹ or shutdown² mode pursuant to a Real-time communication or a procedure that was previously provided to the Transmission Operator; or
 - That the generator is not being operated in the automatic voltage control mode for a reason other than start-up or shutdown.
- R2.** Unless exempted by the Transmission Operator, each Generator Operator shall maintain the generator voltage or Reactive Power schedule³ (within applicable Facility Ratings⁴) as directed by the Transmission Operator. [*Violation Risk Factor: Medium*] [*Time Horizon: Real-time Operations*]
- R2.1.** When a generator's automatic voltage regulator is out of service, the Generator Operator shall use an alternative method to control the generator voltage and reactive

¹ Start-up is deemed to have ended when the generator is ramped up to its minimum continuously sustainable load and the generator is prepared for continuous operation.

² Shutdown is deemed to begin when the generator is ramped down to its minimum continuously sustainable load and the generator is prepared to go offline.

³ The voltage or Reactive Power schedule is a target value communicated by the Transmission Operator to the Generator Operator establishing a tolerance band within which the target value is to be maintained during a specified period.

⁴ When a Generator is operating in manual control, reactive power capability may change based on stability considerations and this may lead to a change in the associated Facility Ratings.

output to meet the voltage or Reactive Power schedule directed by the Transmission Operator.

- R2.2.** When directed to modify voltage, the Generator Operator shall comply or provide an explanation of why the schedule cannot be met.
- R3.** Each Generator Operator shall notify its associated Transmission Operator as soon as practical, but within 30 minutes of any of the following: *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Real-time Operations]*
 - R3.1.** A status or capability change on any generator Reactive Power resource, including the status of each automatic voltage regulator and power system stabilizer and the expected duration of the change in status or capability.
 - R3.2.** A status or capability change on any other Reactive Power resources under the Generator Operator's control and the expected duration of the change in status or capability.
- R4.** The Generator Owner shall provide the following to its associated Transmission Operator and Transmission Planner within 30 calendar days of a request. *[Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Real-time Operations]*
 - R4.1.** For generator step-up transformers and auxiliary transformers with primary voltages equal to or greater than the generator terminal voltage:
 - R4.1.1.** Tap settings.
 - R4.1.2.** Available fixed tap ranges.
 - R4.1.3.** Impedance data.
 - R4.1.4.** The +/- voltage range with step-change in % for load-tap changing transformers.
- R5.** After consultation with the Transmission Operator regarding necessary step-up transformer tap changes, the Generator Owner shall ensure that transformer tap positions are changed according to the specifications provided by the Transmission Operator, unless such action would violate safety, an equipment rating, a regulatory requirement, or a statutory requirement. *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Real-time Operations]*
 - R5.1.** If the Generator Operator can't comply with the Transmission Operator's specifications, the Generator Operator shall notify the Transmission Operator and shall provide the technical justification.

C. Measures

- M1.** The Generator Operator shall have evidence to show that it notified its associated Transmission Operator any time it failed to operate a generator in the automatic voltage control mode as specified in Requirement 1. If a generator is being started up or shut down with the automatic voltage control off and no notification of the automatic voltage regulator status is made to the Transmission Operator, the Generator Operator will have evidence that it notified the Transmission Operator of its procedure for placing the unit into automatic voltage control mode. Such evidence must include, but is not limited to, dated evidence of transmittal of the procedure such as an electronic message or a transmittal letter with the procedure included or attached.
- M2.** The Generator Operator shall have evidence to show that it controlled its generator voltage and reactive output to meet the voltage or Reactive Power schedule provided by its associated Transmission Operator as specified in Requirement 2.

- M3.** The Generator Operator shall have evidence to show that it responded to the Transmission Operator’s direction as identified in Requirement 2.1 and Requirement 2.2.
- M4.** The Generator Operator shall have evidence it notified its associated Transmission Operator within 30 minutes of any of the changes identified in Requirement 3.
- M5.** The Generator Owner shall have evidence it provided its associated Transmission Operator and Transmission Planner with information on its step-up transformers and auxiliary transformers as required in Requirements 4.1.1 through 4.1.4
- M6.** The Generator Owner shall have evidence that its step-up transformer taps were modified per the Transmission Operator’s documentation as identified in Requirement 5.
- M7.** The Generator Operator shall have evidence that it notified its associated Transmission Operator when it couldn’t comply with the Transmission Operator’s step-up transformer tap specifications as identified in Requirement 5.1.

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

For entities that do not work for the Regional Entity, the Regional Entity shall serve as the Compliance Enforcement Authority.

For functional entities that work for their Regional Entity, the ERO or a Regional Entity approved by the ERO and FERC or other applicable governmental authorities shall serve as the Compliance Enforcement Authority.

1.2. Data Retention

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Generator Operator shall maintain evidence needed for Measure 1 through Measure 4 and Measure 7 for the current and previous calendar year.

The Generator Owner shall keep its latest version of documentation on its step-up and auxiliary transformers. (Measures 5 and 6)

The Compliance Monitor shall retain any audit data for three years.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Processes:

The following processes may be used:

Compliance Audit

Self-Certification

Spot Checking

Compliance Investigation

Self-Reporting

Complaint

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None

2. Violation Severity Levels

R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not operate each generator in the automatic voltage control mode and failed to notify the Transmission Operator as identified in R1.
R2.	When directed by the Transmission Operator to maintain the generator voltage or reactive power schedule the Generator Operator failed to meet the directed values for up to and including 45 minutes.	When directed by the Transmission Operator to maintain the generator voltage or reactive power schedule the Generator Operator failed to meet the directed values for more than 45 minutes up to and including 60 minutes. OR When a generator's automatic voltage regulator is out of service, the Generator Operator failed to use an alternative method to control the generator voltage and reactive output to meet the voltage or Reactive Power schedule directed by the Transmission Operator. OR The Generator Operator failed to provide an explanation of why the voltage schedule could not be met.	When directed by the Transmission Operator to maintain the generator voltage or reactive power schedule the Generator Operator failed to meet the directed values for more than 60 minutes up to and including 75 minutes.	When directed by the Transmission Operator to maintain the generator voltage or reactive power schedule the Generator Operator failed to meet the directed values for more than 75 minutes. OR When a generator's automatic voltage regulator is out of service, the Generator Operator failed to use an alternative method to control the generator voltage and reactive output to meet the voltage or Reactive Power schedule directed by the Transmission Operator and the Generator Operator failed to provide an explanation of why the voltage schedule could not be met.
R3.	N/A	N/A	The Generator Operator failed to notify the Transmission Operator within 30 minutes of the information as specified in either	The Generator Operator failed to notify the Transmission Operator within 30 minutes of the information as specified in both R3.1

Standard VAR-002-2b — Generator Operation for Maintaining Network Voltage Schedules

			R3.1 or R3.2	and R3.2
R4.	The Responsible entity failed to provide to its associated Transmission Operator and Transmission Planner one of the types of data as specified in R4.1.1 or R 4.1.2 or 4.1.3 or 4.1.4 OR The information was provided in more than 30, but less than or equal to 35 calendar days of the request.	The Responsible entity failed to provide to its associated Transmission Operator and Transmission Planner two of the types of data as specified in R4.1.1 or R 4.1.2 or 4.1.3 or 4.1.4 OR The information was provided in more than 35, but less than or equal to 40 calendar days of the request.	The Responsible entity failed to provide to its associated Transmission Operator and Transmission Planner three of the types of data as specified in R4.1.1 or R 4.1.2 or 4.1.3 or 4.1.4 OR The information was provided in more than 40, but less than or equal to 45 calendar days of the request.	The Responsible entity failed to provide to its associated Transmission Operator and Transmission Planner any of the types of data as specified in R4.1.1 and R 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 and 4.1.4 OR The information was provided in more than 45 calendar days of the request.
R5.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity failed to ensure that transformer tap positions were changed according to the specifications provided by the Transmission Operator when said actions would not have violated safety, an equipment rating, a regulatory requirement, or a statutory requirement.
R5.1.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity failed to notify the Transmission Operator and to provide technical justification.

E. Regional Differences

None identified.

F. Associated Documents

1. Appendix 1 — Interpretation of Requirements R1 and R2 (August 1, 2007).

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	May 15, 2006	Added “(R2)” to the end of levels on non-compliance 2.1.2, 2.2.2, 2.3.2, and 2.4.3.	July 5, 2006
1a	December 19, 2007	Added Appendix 1 – Interpretation of R1 and R2 approved by BOT on August 1, 2007	Revised
1a	January 16, 2007	In Section A.2., Added “a” to end of standard number. Section F: added “1.”; and added date.	Errata
1.1a	October 29, 2008	BOT adopted errata changes; updated version number to “1.1a”	Errata
1.1b	March 3, 2009	Added Appendix 2 – Interpretation of VAR-002-1.1a approved by BOT on February 10, 2009	Revised
2b	TBD	Revised R1 to address an Interpretation Request. Also added previously approved VRFs, Time Horizons and VSLs. Revised R2 to address consistency issue with VAR-001-2, R4.	Revised
2b	August 16, 2012	Adopted by Board of Trustees	
2b	April 16, 2013	FERC Order issued approving VAR-002-2b	

Appendix 1

Interpretation of Requirements R1 and R2

Request:

Requirement R1 of Standard VAR-002-1 states that Generation Operators shall operate each generator connected to the interconnected transmission system in the automatic voltage control mode (*automatic voltage regulator in service and controlling voltage*) unless the Generator Operator has notified the Transmission Operator.

Requirement R2 goes on to state that each Generation Operator shall maintain the generator voltage *or Reactive Power output* as directed by the Transmission Operator.

The two underlined phrases are the reasons for this interpretation request.

Most generation excitation controls include a device known as the Automatic Voltage Regulator, or AVR. This is the device which is referred to by the R1 requirement above. Most AVR's have the option of being set in various operating modes, such as constant voltage, constant power factor, and constant Mvar.

In the course of helping members of the WECC insure that they are in full compliance with NERC Reliability Standards, I have discovered both Transmission Operators and Generation Operators who have interpreted this standard to mean that AVR operation in the constant power factor or constant Mvar modes complies with the R1 and R2 requirements cited above. Their rationale is as follows:

- The AVR is clearly in service because it is operating in one of its operating modes
- The AVR is clearly controlling voltage because to maintain constant PF or constant Mvar, it controls the generator terminal voltage
- R2 clearly gives the Transmission Operator the option of directing the Generation Operator to maintain a constant reactive power output rather than a constant voltage.

Other parties have interpreted this standard to require operation in the constant voltage mode only. Their rationale stems from the belief that the purpose of the VAR-002-1 standard is to insure the automatic delivery of additional reactive to the system whenever a voltage decline begins to occur.

The material impact of misinterpretation of these standards is twofold.

- First, misinterpretation may result in reduced reactive response during system disturbances, which in turn may contribute to voltage collapse.
- Second, misinterpretation may result in substantial financial penalties imposed on generation operators and transmission operators who believe that they are in full compliance with the standard.

In accordance with the NERC Reliability Standards Development Procedure, I am requesting that a formal interpretation of the VAR-002-1 standard be provided. Two specific questions need to be answered.

- First, does AVR operation in the constant PF or constant Mvar modes comply with R1?
- Second, does R2 give the Transmission Operator the option of directing the Generation Owner to operate the AVR in the constant Pf or constant Mvar modes rather than the constant voltage mode?

Interpretation:

1. First, does AVR operation in the constant PF or constant Mvar modes comply with R1?

Interpretation: No, only operation in constant voltage mode meets this requirement. This answer is predicated on the assumption that the generator has the physical equipment that will allow such operation and that the Transmission Operator has not directed the generator to run in a mode other than constant voltage.

2. Second, does R2 give the Transmission Operator the option of directing the Generation Owner (sic) to operate the AVR in the constant Pf or constant Mvar modes rather than the constant voltage mode?

Interpretation: Yes, if the Transmission Operator specifically directs a Generator Operator to operate the AVR in a mode other than constant voltage mode, then that directed mode of AVR operation is allowed.

Appendix 2

Interpretation of VAR-002-1a

Request:

VAR-002 — Generator Operation for Maintaining Network Voltage Schedules, addresses the generator's provision of voltage and VAR control. Confusion exists in the industry and regions as to which requirements in this standard apply to Generator Operators that operate generators that do not have automatic voltage regulation capability.

The Standard's requirements do not identify the subset of generator operators that need to comply – forcing some generator operators that do not have any automatic voltage regulation capability to demonstrate how they complied with the requirements, even when they aren't physically able to comply with the requirements. Generator owners want clarification to verify that they are not expected to acquire AVR devices to comply with the requirements in this standard.

Many generators do not have automatic voltage regulators and do not receive voltage schedules. These entities are at a loss as to how to comply with these requirements and are expending resources attempting to demonstrate compliance with these requirements. A clarification will avoid challenges and potential litigation stemming from sanctions and penalties applied to entities that are being audited for compliance with this standard, but who do not fall within the scope or intent of the standard itself.

Please identify which requirements apply to generators that do not operate generators equipped with AVRs.

Response: All the requirements and associated subrequirements in VAR-002-1a apply to Generator Owners and Generator Operators that own or operate generators whether equipped with an automatic voltage regulator or not. The standard is predicated on the assumption that the generator has the physical equipment (automatic voltage regulator) that is capable of automatic operation. A generator that is not equipped with an automatic voltage regulator results in a functionally equivalent condition to a generator equipped with an automatic voltage regulator that is out of service due to maintenance or failure.

There are no requirements in the standard that require a generator to have an automatic voltage regulator, nor are there any requirements for a Generator Owner to modify its generator to add an automatic voltage regulator. Unless exempted by the Transmission Operator, each Generator Operator shall maintain the generator voltage or Reactive Power output (within applicable Facility Ratings) as directed by the Transmission Operator.

*** FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY ***

Enforcement Dates: Standard VAR-002-2b — Generator Operation for Maintaining Network Voltage Schedules

United States

Standard	Requirement	Enforcement Date	Inactive Date
VAR-002-2b	All	07/01/2013	

3.) Updated NERC Glossary of Terms for approval

Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards

Updated August 19, 2013

Introduction:

This Glossary lists each term that was defined for use in one or more of NERC's continent-wide or Regional Reliability Standards and adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees from February 8, 2005 through August 19, 2013.

This reference is divided into two sections, and each section is organized in alphabetical order. The first section identifies all terms that have been adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees for use in continent-wide standards; the second section identifies all terms that have been adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees for use in regional standards. (WECC, NPCC and *ReliabilityFirst* are the only Regions that have definitions approved by the NERC Board of Trustees. If other Regions develop definitions for approved Regional Standards using a NERC-approved standards development process, those definitions will be added to the Regional Definitions section of this glossary.)

Most of the terms identified in this glossary were adopted as part of the development of NERC's initial set of reliability standards, called the "Version 0" standards. Subsequent to the development of Version 0 standards, new definitions have been developed and approved following NERC's Reliability Standards Development Process, and added to this glossary following board adoption, with the "FERC approved" date added following a final Order approving the definition.

Immediately under each term is a link to the archive for the development of that term.

Definitions that have been adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees but have not been approved by FERC, or FERC has not approved but has directed be modified, are shaded in blue. Definitions that have been remanded or retired are shaded in orange.

Any comments regarding this glossary should be reported to the following:
sarcomm@nerc.com with "Glossary Comment" in the subject line.

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Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approval Date	FERC Approval Date	Definition
Adequacy [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The ability of the electric system to supply the aggregate electrical demand and energy requirements of the end-use customers at all times, taking into account scheduled and reasonably expected unscheduled outages of system elements.
Adjacent Balancing Authority [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A Balancing Authority Area that is interconnected another Balancing Authority Area either directly or via a multi-party agreement or transmission tariff.
Adverse Reliability Impact [Archive]		2/7/2006	3/16/2007	The impact of an event that results in frequency-related instability; unplanned tripping of load or generation; or uncontrolled separation or cascading outages that affects a widespread area of the Interconnection.
Adverse Reliability Impact [Archive]		8/4/2011		The impact of an event that results in Bulk Electric System instability or Cascading.
After the Fact [Archive]	ATF	10/29/2008	12/17/2009	A time classification assigned to an RFI when the submittal time is greater than one hour after the start time of the RFI.
Agreement [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A contract or arrangement, either written or verbal and sometimes enforceable by law.
Alternative Interpersonal Communication [Archive]		11/7/2012		Any Interpersonal Communication that is able to serve as a substitute for, and does not utilize the same infrastructure (medium) as, Interpersonal Communication used for day-to-day operation.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approval Date	FERC Approval Date	Definition
Altitude Correction Factor [Archive]		2/7/2006	3/16/2007	A multiplier applied to specify distances, which adjusts the distances to account for the change in relative air density (RAD) due to altitude from the RAD used to determine the specified distance. Altitude correction factors apply to both minimum worker approach distances and to minimum vegetation clearance distances.
Ancillary Service [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	Those services that are necessary to support the transmission of capacity and energy from resources to loads while maintaining reliable operation of the Transmission Service Provider's transmission system in accordance with good utility practice. <i>(From FERC order 888-A.)</i>
Anti-Aliasing Filter [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	An analog filter installed at a metering point to remove the high frequency components of the signal over the AGC sample period.
Area Control Error [Archive]	ACE	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The instantaneous difference between a Balancing Authority's net actual and scheduled interchange, taking into account the effects of Frequency Bias and correction for meter error.
Area Control Error [Archive]	ACE	12/19/2012		The instantaneous difference between a Balancing Authority's net actual and scheduled interchange, taking into account the effects of Frequency Bias, correction for meter error, and Automatic Time Error Correction (ATEC), if operating in the ATEC mode. ATEC is only applicable to Balancing Authorities in the Western Interconnection.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approval Date	FERC Approval Date	Definition
Area Interchange Methodology [Archive]		08/22/2008	11/24/2009	The Area Interchange methodology is characterized by determination of incremental transfer capability via simulation, from which Total Transfer Capability (TTC) can be mathematically derived. Capacity Benefit Margin, Transmission Reliability Margin, and Existing Transmission Commitments are subtracted from the TTC, and Postbacks and counterflows are added, to derive Available Transfer Capability. Under the Area Interchange Methodology, TTC results are generally reported on an area to area basis.
Arranged Interchange [Archive]		5/2/2006	3/16/2007	The state where the Interchange Authority has received the Interchange information (initial or revised).
Automatic Generation Control [Archive]	AGC	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	Equipment that automatically adjusts generation in a Balancing Authority Area from a central location to maintain the Balancing Authority's interchange schedule plus Frequency Bias. AGC may also accommodate automatic inadvertent payback and time error correction.
Available Flowgate Capability [Archive]	AFC	08/22/2008	11/24/2009	A measure of the flow capability remaining on a Flowgate for further commercial activity over and above already committed uses. It is defined as TFC less Existing Transmission Commitments (ETC), less a Capacity Benefit Margin, less a Transmission Reliability Margin, plus Postbacks, and plus counterflows.
Available Transfer Capability [Archive]	ATC	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A measure of the transfer capability remaining in the physical transmission network for further commercial activity over and above already committed uses. It is defined as Total Transfer Capability less existing transmission commitments (including retail customer service), less a Capacity Benefit Margin, less a Transmission Reliability Margin.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approval Date	FERC Approval Date	Definition
Available Transfer Capability [Archive]	ATC	08/22/2008	11/24/2009	A measure of the transfer capability remaining in the physical transmission network for further commercial activity over and above already committed uses. It is defined as Total Transfer Capability less Existing Transmission Commitments (including retail customer service), less a Capacity Benefit Margin, less a Transmission Reliability Margin, plus Postbacks, plus counterflows.
Available Transfer Capability Implementation Document [Archive]	ATCID	08/22/2008	11/24/2009	A document that describes the implementation of a methodology for calculating ATC or AFC, and provides information related to a Transmission Service Provider's calculation of ATC or AFC.
ATC Path [Archive]		08/22/2008	Not approved; Modification directed 11/24/09	Any combination of Point of Receipt and Point of Delivery for which ATC is calculated; and any Posted Path ¹ .

¹ See 18 CFR 37.6(b)(1)

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Balancing Authority [Archive]	BA	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The responsible entity that integrates resource plans ahead of time, maintains load-interchange-generation balance within a Balancing Authority Area, and supports Interconnection frequency in real time.
Balancing Authority Area [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The collection of generation, transmission, and loads within the metered boundaries of the Balancing Authority. The Balancing Authority maintains load-resource balance within this area.
Base Load [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The minimum amount of electric power delivered or required over a given period at a constant rate.
BES Cyber Asset [Archive]		11/26/12		A Cyber Asset that if rendered unavailable, degraded, or misused would, within 15 minutes of its required operation, misoperation, or non-operation, adversely impact one or more Facilities, systems, or equipment, which, if destroyed, degraded, or otherwise rendered unavailable when needed, would affect the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System. Redundancy of affected Facilities, systems, and equipment shall not be considered when determining adverse impact. Each BES Cyber Asset is included in one or more BES Cyber Systems. (A Cyber Asset is not a BES Cyber Asset if, for 30 consecutive calendar days or less, it is directly connected to a network within an ESP, a Cyber Asset within an ESP, or to a BES Cyber Asset, and it is used for data transfer, vulnerability assessment, maintenance, or troubleshooting purposes.)

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
BES Cyber System [Archive]		11/26/12		One or more BES Cyber Assets logically grouped by a responsible entity to perform one or more reliability tasks for a functional entity.
BES Cyber System Information [Archive]		11/26/12		Information about the BES Cyber System that could be used to gain unauthorized access or pose a security threat to the BES Cyber System. BES Cyber System Information does not include individual pieces of information that by themselves do not pose a threat or could not be used to allow unauthorized access to BES Cyber Systems, such as, but not limited to, device names, individual IP addresses without context, ESP names, or policy statements. Examples of BES Cyber System Information may include, but are not limited to, security procedures or security information about BES Cyber Systems, Physical Access Control Systems, and Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems that is not publicly available and could be used to allow unauthorized access or unauthorized distribution; collections of network addresses; and network topology of the BES Cyber System.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Blackstart Capability Plan [Archive]		2/8/2005 Will be retired when EOP-005-2 becomes enforceable on (7/1/13)	3/16/2007	A documented procedure for a generating unit or station to go from a shutdown condition to an operating condition delivering electric power without assistance from the electric system. This procedure is only a portion of an overall system restoration plan.
Blackstart Resource [Archive]		8/5/2009	3/17/11	A generating unit(s) and its associated set of equipment which has the ability to be started without support from the System or is designed to remain energized without connection to the remainder of the System, with the ability to energize a bus, meeting the Transmission Operator's restoration plan needs for real and reactive power capability, frequency and voltage control, and that has been included in the Transmission Operator's restoration plan.
Block Dispatch [Archive]		08/22/2008	11/24/2009	A set of dispatch rules such that given a specific amount of load to serve, an approximate generation dispatch can be determined. To accomplish this, the capacity of a given generator is segmented into loadable "blocks," each of which is grouped and ordered relative to other blocks (based on characteristics including, but not limited to, efficiency, run of river or fuel supply considerations, and/or "must-run" status).

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Bulk Electric System [Archive]	BES	2/8/2005	3/16/2007 (Becomes inactive on 6/30/14)	As defined by the Regional Reliability Organization, the electrical generation resources, transmission lines, interconnections with neighboring systems, and associated equipment, generally operated at voltages of 100 kV or higher. Radial transmission facilities serving only load with one transmission source are generally not included in this definition.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Bulk Electric System ² [Archive]	BES	01/18/2012	6/14/13 (Becomes effective 7/1/14)	<p>Unless modified by the lists shown below, all Transmission Elements operated at 100 kV or higher and Real Power and Reactive Power resources connected at 100 kV or higher. This does not include facilities used in the local distribution of electric energy.</p> <p>Inclusions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I1 - Transformers with the primary terminal and at least one secondary terminal operated at 100 kV or higher unless excluded under Exclusion E1 or E3. • I2 - Generating resource(s) with gross individual nameplate rating greater than 20 MVA or gross plant/facility aggregate nameplate rating greater than 75 MVA including the generator terminals through the high-side of the step-up transformer(s) connected at a voltage of 100 kV or above. • I3 - Blackstart Resources identified in the Transmission Operator's restoration plan. • I4 - Dispersed power producing resources with aggregate capacity greater than 75 MVA (gross aggregate nameplate rating) utilizing a system designed primarily for aggregating capacity, connected at a common point at a voltage of 100 kV or above.

² FERC issued an order on April 18, 2013 approving the revised definition with an effective date of July 1, 2013. On June 14, 2013, FERC granted NERC's request to extend the effective date of the revised definition of the Bulk Electric System to July 1, 2014.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Bulk Electric System (Continued)	BES			<p>I5 –Static or dynamic devices (excluding generators) dedicated to supplying or absorbing Reactive Power that are connected at 100 kV or higher, or through a dedicated transformer with a high-side voltage of 100 kV or higher, or through a transformer that is designated in Inclusion I1.</p> <p>Exclusions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • E1 - Radial systems: A group of contiguous transmission Elements that emanates from a single point of connection of 100 kV or higher and: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Only serves Load. Or, b) Only includes generation resources, not identified in Inclusion I3, with an aggregate capacity less than or equal to 75 MVA (gross nameplate rating). Or, c) Where the radial system serves Load and includes generation resources, not identified in Inclusion I3, with an aggregate capacity of non-retail generation less than or equal to 75 MVA (gross nameplate rating). <p>Note – A normally open switching device between radial systems, as depicted on prints or one-line diagrams for example, does not affect this exclusion.</p>

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Bulk Electric System (Continued)	BES			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • E2 - A generating unit or multiple generating units on the customer’s side of the retail meter that serve all or part of the retail Load with electric energy if: (i) the net capacity provided to the BES does not exceed 75 MVA, and (ii) standby, back-up, and maintenance power services are provided to the generating unit or multiple generating units or to the retail Load by a Balancing Authority, or provided pursuant to a binding obligation with a Generator Owner or Generator Operator, or under terms approved by the applicable regulatory authority. • E3 - Local networks (LN): A group of contiguous transmission Elements operated at or above 100 kV but less than 300 kV that distribute power to Load rather than transfer bulk power across the interconnected system. LN’s emanate from multiple points of connection at 100 kV or higher to improve the level of service to retail customer Load and not to accommodate bulk power transfer across the interconnected system. The LN is characterized by all of the following:

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Bulk Electric System (Continued)	BES			<p>a) Limits on connected generation: The LN and its underlying Elements do not include generation resources identified in Inclusion I3 and do not have an aggregate capacity of non-retail generation greater than 75 MVA (gross nameplate rating);</p> <p>b) Power flows only into the LN and the LN does not transfer energy originating outside the LN for delivery through the LN; and</p> <p>c) Not part of a Flowgate or transfer path: The LN does not contain a monitored Facility of a permanent Flowgate in the Eastern Interconnection, a major transfer path within the Western Interconnection, or a comparable monitored Facility in the ERCOT or Quebec Interconnections, and is not a monitored Facility included in an Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit (IROL).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • E4 – Reactive Power devices owned and operated by the retail customer solely for its own use. Note - Elements may be included or excluded on a case-by-case basis through the Rules of Procedure exception process.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Bulk-Power System [Archive]		5/9/2013	7/9/2013	A) facilities and control systems necessary for operating an interconnected electric energy transmission network (or any portion thereof); and (B) electric energy from generation facilities needed to maintain transmission system reliability. The term does not include facilities used in the local distribution of electric energy.
Burden [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	Operation of the Bulk Electric System that violates or is expected to violate a System Operating Limit or Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit in the Interconnection, or that violates any other NERC, Regional Reliability Organization, or local operating reliability standards or criteria.
Business Practices [Archive]		8/22/2008	Not approved; Modification directed 11/24/09	Those business rules contained in the Transmission Service Provider's applicable tariff, rules, or procedures; associated Regional Reliability Organization or regional entity business practices; or NAESB Business Practices.
Bus-tie Breaker [Archive]		8/4/2011		A circuit breaker that is positioned to connect two individual substation bus configurations.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Capacity Benefit Margin [Archive]	CBM	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The amount of firm transmission transfer capability preserved by the transmission provider for Load-Serving Entities (LSEs), whose loads are located on that Transmission Service Provider's system, to enable access by the LSEs to generation from interconnected systems to meet generation reliability requirements. Preservation of CBM for an LSE allows that entity to reduce its installed generating capacity below that which may otherwise have been necessary without interconnections to meet its generation reliability requirements. The transmission transfer capability preserved as CBM is intended to be used by the LSE only in times of emergency generation deficiencies.
Capacity Benefit Margin Implementation Document [Archive]	CBMID	11/13/2008	11/24/2009	A document that describes the implementation of a Capacity Benefit Margin methodology.
Capacity Emergency [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A capacity emergency exists when a Balancing Authority Area's operating capacity, plus firm purchases from other systems, to the extent available or limited by transfer capability, is inadequate to meet its demand plus its regulating requirements.
Cascading [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The uncontrolled successive loss of system elements triggered by an incident at any location. Cascading results in widespread electric service interruption that cannot be restrained from sequentially spreading beyond an area predetermined by studies.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Cascading Outages [Archive]		11/1/2006 Withdrawn 2/12/2008	FERC Remanded 12/27/2007	The uncontrolled successive loss of Bulk Electric System Facilities triggered by an incident (or condition) at any location resulting in the interruption of electric service that cannot be restrained from spreading beyond a pre-determined area.
CIP Exceptional Circumstance [Archive]		11/26/12		A situation that involves or threatens to involve one or more of the following, or similar, conditions that impact safety or BES reliability: a risk of injury or death; a natural disaster; civil unrest; an imminent or existing hardware, software, or equipment failure; a Cyber Security Incident requiring emergency assistance; a response by emergency services; the enactment of a mutual assistance agreement; or an impediment of large scale workforce availability.
CIP Senior Manager [Archive]		11/26/12		A single senior management official with overall authority and responsibility for leading and managing implementation of and continuing adherence to the requirements within the NERC CIP Standards, CIP-002 through CIP-011.
Clock Hour [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The 60-minute period ending at :00. All surveys, measurements, and reports are based on Clock Hour periods unless specifically noted.
Cogeneration [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	Production of electricity from steam, heat, or other forms of energy produced as a by-product of another process.
Compliance Monitor [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The entity that monitors, reviews, and ensures compliance of responsible entities with reliability standards.
Confirmed Interchange [Archive]		5/2/2006	3/16/2007	The state where the Interchange Authority has verified the Arranged Interchange.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Congestion Management Report [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A report that the Interchange Distribution Calculator issues when a Reliability Coordinator initiates the Transmission Loading Relief procedure. This report identifies the transactions and native and network load curtailments that must be initiated to achieve the loading relief requested by the initiating Reliability Coordinator.
Consequential Load Loss [Archive]		8/4/2011		All Load that is no longer served by the Transmission system as a result of Transmission Facilities being removed from service by a Protection System operation designed to isolate the fault.
Constrained Facility [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A transmission facility (line, transformer, breaker, etc.) that is approaching, is at, or is beyond its System Operating Limit or Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit.
Contingency [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The unexpected failure or outage of a system component, such as a generator, transmission line, circuit breaker, switch or other electrical element.
Contingency Reserve [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The provision of capacity deployed by the Balancing Authority to meet the Disturbance Control Standard (DCS) and other NERC and Regional Reliability Organization contingency requirements.
Contract Path [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	An agreed upon electrical path for the continuous flow of electrical power between the parties of an Interchange Transaction.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Control Center [Archive]		11/26/12		One or more facilities hosting operating personnel that monitor and control the Bulk Electric System (BES) in real-time to perform the reliability tasks, including their associated data centers, of: 1) a Reliability Coordinator, 2) a Balancing Authority, 3) a Transmission Operator for transmission Facilities at two or more locations, or 4) a Generator Operator for generation Facilities at two or more locations.
Control Performance Standard [Archive]	CPS	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The reliability standard that sets the limits of a Balancing Authority's Area Control Error over a specified time period.
Corrective Action Plan [Archive]		2/7/2006	3/16/2007	A list of actions and an associated timetable for implementation to remedy a specific problem.
Cranking Path [Archive]		5/2/2006	3/16/2007	A portion of the electric system that can be isolated and then energized to deliver electric power from a generation source to enable the startup of one or more other generating units.
Critical Assets [Archive]		5/2/2006	1/18/2008	Facilities, systems, and equipment which, if destroyed, degraded, or otherwise rendered unavailable, would affect the reliability or operability of the Bulk Electric System.
Critical Cyber Assets [Archive]		5/2/2006	1/18/2008	Cyber Assets essential to the reliable operation of Critical Assets.
Curtailment [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A reduction in the scheduled capacity or energy delivery of an Interchange Transaction.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Curtailment Threshold [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The minimum Transfer Distribution Factor which, if exceeded, will subject an Interchange Transaction to curtailment to relieve a transmission facility constraint.
Cyber Assets [Archive]		5/2/2006	1/18/2008	Programmable electronic devices and communication networks including hardware, software, and data.
Cyber Assets [Archive]		11/26/12		Programmable electronic devices, including the hardware, software, and data in those devices.
Cyber Security Incident [Archive]		5/2/2006	1/18/2008	Any malicious act or suspicious event that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Compromises, or was an attempt to compromise, the Electronic Security Perimeter or Physical Security Perimeter of a Critical Cyber Asset, or, • Disrupts, or was an attempt to disrupt, the operation of a Critical Cyber Asset.
Cyber Security Incident [Archive]		11/26/12		A malicious act or suspicious event that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Compromises, or was an attempt to compromise, the Electronic Security Perimeter or Physical Security Perimeter or, • Disrupts, or was an attempt to disrupt, the operation of a BES Cyber System.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Delayed Fault Clearing [Archive]		11/1/2006	12/27/2007	Fault clearing consistent with correct operation of a breaker failure protection system and its associated breakers, or of a backup protection system with an intentional time delay.
Demand [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The rate at which electric energy is delivered to or by a system or part of a system, generally expressed in kilowatts or megawatts, at a given instant or averaged over any designated interval of time. 2. The rate at which energy is being used by the customer.
Demand-Side Management [Archive]	DSM	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The term for all activities or programs undertaken by Load-Serving Entity or its customers to influence the amount or timing of electricity they use.
Dial-up Connectivity [Archive]		11/26/12		A data communication link that is established when the communication equipment dials a phone number and negotiates a connection with the equipment on the other end of the link.
Direct Control Load Management [Archive]	DCLM	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	Demand-Side Management that is under the direct control of the system operator. DCLM may control the electric supply to individual appliances or equipment on customer premises. DCLM as defined here does not include Interruptible Demand.
Dispatch Order [Archive]		08/22/2008	11/24/2009	A set of dispatch rules such that given a specific amount of load to serve, an approximate generation dispatch can be determined. To accomplish this, each generator is ranked by priority.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Dispersed Load by Substations [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	Substation load information configured to represent a system for power flow or system dynamics modeling purposes, or both.
Distribution Factor [Archive]	DF	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The portion of an Interchange Transaction, typically expressed in per unit that flows across a transmission facility (Flowgate).
Distribution Provider [Archive]	DP	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	Provides and operates the “wires” between the transmission system and the end-use customer. For those end-use customers who are served at transmission voltages, the Transmission Owner also serves as the Distribution Provider. Thus, the Distribution Provider is not defined by a specific voltage, but rather as performing the Distribution function at any voltage.
Disturbance [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. An unplanned event that produces an abnormal system condition. 2. Any perturbation to the electric system. 3. The unexpected change in ACE that is caused by the sudden failure of generation or interruption of load.
Disturbance Control Standard [Archive]	DCS	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The reliability standard that sets the time limit following a Disturbance within which a Balancing Authority must return its Area Control Error to within a specified range.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Disturbance Monitoring Equipment [Archive]	DME	8/2/2006	3/16/2007	<p>Devices capable of monitoring and recording system data pertaining to a Disturbance. Such devices include the following categories of recorders³:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sequence of event recorders which record equipment response to the event • Fault recorders, which record actual waveform data replicating the system primary voltages and currents. This may include protective relays. • Dynamic Disturbance Recorders (DDRs), which record incidents that portray power system behavior during dynamic events such as low-frequency (0.1 Hz – 3 Hz) oscillations and abnormal frequency or voltage excursions
Dynamic Interchange Schedule or Dynamic Schedule [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A telemetered reading or value that is updated in real time and used as a schedule in the AGC/ACE equation and the integrated value of which is treated as a schedule for interchange accounting purposes. Commonly used for scheduling jointly owned generation to or from another Balancing Authority Area.
Dynamic Transfer [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The provision of the real-time monitoring, telemetering, computer software, hardware, communications, engineering, energy accounting (including inadvertent interchange), and administration required to electronically move all or a portion of the real energy services associated with a generator or load out of one Balancing Authority Area into another.

³ Phasor Measurement Units and any other equipment that meets the functional requirements of DMEs may qualify as DMEs.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Economic Dispatch [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The allocation of demand to individual generating units on line to effect the most economical production of electricity.
Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems [Archive]	EACMS	11/26/12		Cyber Assets that perform electronic access control or electronic access monitoring of the Electronic Security Perimeter(s) or BES Cyber Systems. This includes Intermediate Devices.
Electronic Access Point [Archive]	EAP	11/26/12		A Cyber Asset interface on an Electronic Security Perimeter that allows routable communication between Cyber Assets outside an Electronic Security Perimeter and Cyber Assets inside an Electronic Security Perimeter.
Electrical Energy [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The generation or use of electric power by a device over a period of time, expressed in kilowatthours (kWh), megawatthours (MWh), or gigawatthours (GWh).
Electronic Security Perimeter [Archive]	ESP	5/2/2006	1/18/2008	The logical border surrounding a network to which Critical Cyber Assets are connected and for which access is controlled.
Electronic Security Perimeter [Archive]	ESP	11/26/12		The logical border surrounding a network to which BES Cyber Systems are connected using a routable protocol.
Element [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	Any electrical device with terminals that may be connected to other electrical devices such as a generator, transformer, circuit breaker, bus section, or transmission line. An element may be comprised of one or more components.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Emergency or BES Emergency [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	Any abnormal system condition that requires automatic or immediate manual action to prevent or limit the failure of transmission facilities or generation supply that could adversely affect the reliability of the Bulk Electric System.
Emergency Rating [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The rating as defined by the equipment owner that specifies the level of electrical loading or output, usually expressed in megawatts (MW) or Mvar or other appropriate units, that a system, facility, or element can support, produce, or withstand for a finite period. The rating assumes acceptable loss of equipment life or other physical or safety limitations for the equipment involved.
Emergency Request for Interchange [Archive]	Emergency RFI	10/29/2008	12/17/2009	Request for Interchange to be initiated for Emergency or Energy Emergency conditions.
Energy Emergency [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A condition when a Load-Serving Entity has exhausted all other options and can no longer provide its customers' expected energy requirements.
Equipment Rating [Archive]		2/7/2006	3/16/2007	The maximum and minimum voltage, current, frequency, real and reactive power flows on individual equipment under steady state, short-circuit and transient conditions, as permitted or assigned by the equipment owner.
External Routable Connectivity [Archive]		11/26/12		The ability to access a BES Cyber System from a Cyber Asset that is outside of its associated Electronic Security Perimeter via a bi-directional routable protocol connection.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Existing Transmission Commitments [Archive]	ETC	08/22/2008	11/24/2009	Committed uses of a Transmission Service Provider's Transmission system considered when determining ATC or AFC.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Facility [Archive]		2/7/2006	3/16/2007	A set of electrical equipment that operates as a single Bulk Electric System Element (e.g., a line, a generator, a shunt compensator, transformer, etc.)
Facility Rating [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The maximum or minimum voltage, current, frequency, or real or reactive power flow through a facility that does not violate the applicable equipment rating of any equipment comprising the facility.
Fault [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	An event occurring on an electric system such as a short circuit, a broken wire, or an intermittent connection.
Fire Risk [Archive]		2/7/2006	3/16/2007	The likelihood that a fire will ignite or spread in a particular geographic area.
Firm Demand [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	That portion of the Demand that a power supplier is obligated to provide except when system reliability is threatened or during emergency conditions.
Firm Transmission Service [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The highest quality (priority) service offered to customers under a filed rate schedule that anticipates no planned interruption.
Flashover [Archive]		2/7/2006	3/16/2007	An electrical discharge through air around or over the surface of insulation, between objects of different potential, caused by placing a voltage across the air space that results in the ionization of the air space.
Flowgate [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A designated point on the transmission system through which the Interchange Distribution Calculator calculates the power flow from Interchange Transactions.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Flowgate [Archive]		08/22/2008	11/24/2009	<p>1.) A portion of the Transmission system through which the Interchange Distribution Calculator calculates the power flow from Interchange Transactions.</p> <p>2.) A mathematical construct, comprised of one or more monitored transmission Facilities and optionally one or more contingency Facilities, used to analyze the impact of power flows upon the Bulk Electric System.</p>
Flowgate Methodology [Archive]		08/22/2008	11/24/2009	The Flowgate methodology is characterized by identification of key Facilities as Flowgates. Total Flowgate Capabilities are determined based on Facility Ratings and voltage and stability limits. The impacts of Existing Transmission Commitments (ETCs) are determined by simulation. The impacts of ETC, Capacity Benefit Margin (CBM) and Transmission Reliability Margin (TRM) are subtracted from the Total Flowgate Capability, and Postbacks and counterflows are added, to determine the Available Flowgate Capability (AFC) value for that Flowgate. AFCs can be used to determine Available Transfer Capability (ATC).
Forced Outage [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	<p>1. The removal from service availability of a generating unit, transmission line, or other facility for emergency reasons.</p> <p>2. The condition in which the equipment is unavailable due to unanticipated failure.</p>
Frequency Bias [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A value, usually expressed in megawatts per 0.1 Hertz (MW/0.1 Hz), associated with a Balancing Authority Area that approximates the Balancing Authority Area's response to Interconnection frequency error.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Frequency Bias Setting [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A value, usually expressed in MW/0.1 Hz, set into a Balancing Authority ACE algorithm that allows the Balancing Authority to contribute its frequency response to the Interconnection.
Frequency Bias Setting [Archive]		2/7/2013		A number, either fixed or variable, usually expressed in MW/0.1 Hz, included in a Balancing Authority's Area Control Error equation to account for the Balancing Authority's inverse Frequency Response contribution to the Interconnection, and discourage response withdrawal through secondary control systems.
Frequency Deviation [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A change in Interconnection frequency.
Frequency Error [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The difference between the actual and scheduled frequency. ($F_A - F_S$)
Frequency Regulation [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The ability of a Balancing Authority to help the Interconnection maintain Scheduled Frequency. This assistance can include both turbine governor response and Automatic Generation Control.
Frequency Response [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	(Equipment) The ability of a system or elements of the system to react or respond to a change in system frequency. (System) The sum of the change in demand, plus the change in generation, divided by the change in frequency, expressed in megawatts per 0.1 Hertz (MW/0.1 Hz).

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Frequency Response Measure [Archive]	FRM	2/7/2013		The median of all the Frequency Response observations reported annually by Balancing Authorities or Frequency Response Sharing Groups for frequency events specified by the ERO. This will be calculated as MW/0.1Hz.
Frequency Response Obligation [Archive]	FRO	2/7/2013		The Balancing Authority's share of the required Frequency Response needed for the reliable operation of an Interconnection. This will be calculated as MW/0.1Hz.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Frequency Response Sharing Group [Archive]	FRSG	2/7/2013		A group whose members consist of two or more Balancing Authorities that collectively maintain, allocate, and supply operating resources required to jointly meet the sum of the Frequency Response Obligations of its members.
Generator Operator [Archive]	GOP	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The entity that operates generating unit(s) and performs the functions of supplying energy and Interconnected Operations Services.
Generator Owner [Archive]	GO	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	Entity that owns and maintains generating units.
Generator Shift Factor [Archive]	GSF	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A factor to be applied to a generator's expected change in output to determine the amount of flow contribution that change in output will impose on an identified transmission facility or Flowgate.
Generator-to-Load Distribution Factor [Archive]	GLDF	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The algebraic sum of a Generator Shift Factor and a Load Shift Factor to determine the total impact of an Interchange Transaction on an identified transmission facility or Flowgate.
Generation Capability Import Requirement [Archive]	GCIR	11/13/2008	11/24/2009	The amount of generation capability from external sources identified by a Load-Serving Entity (LSE) or Resource Planner (RP) to meet its generation reliability or resource adequacy requirements as an alternative to internal resources.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Host Balancing Authority [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A Balancing Authority that confirms and implements Interchange Transactions for a Purchasing Selling Entity that operates generation or serves customers directly within the Balancing Authority's metered boundaries. 2. The Balancing Authority within whose metered boundaries a jointly owned unit is physically located.
Hourly Value [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	Data measured on a Clock Hour basis.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Implemented Interchange [Archive]		5/2/2006	3/16/2007	The state where the Balancing Authority enters the Confirmed Interchange into its Area Control Error equation.
Inadvertent Interchange [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The difference between the Balancing Authority's Net Actual Interchange and Net Scheduled Interchange. ($I_A - I_S$)
Independent Power Producer [Archive]	IPP	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	Any entity that owns or operates an electricity generating facility that is not included in an electric utility's rate base. This term includes, but is not limited to, cogenerators and small power producers and all other nonutility electricity producers, such as exempt wholesale generators, who sell electricity.
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. [Archive]	IEEE	2/7/2006	3/16/2007	

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Interactive Remote Access [Archive]		11/26/12		User-initiated access by a person employing a remote access client or other remote access technology using a routable protocol. Remote access originates from a Cyber Asset that is not an Intermediate Device and not located within any of the Responsible Entity's Electronic Security Perimeter(s) or at a defined Electronic Access Point (EAP). Remote access may be initiated from: 1) Cyber Assets used or owned by the Responsible Entity, 2) Cyber Assets used or owned by employees, and 3) Cyber Assets used or owned by vendors, contractors, or consultants. Interactive remote access does not include system-to-system process communications.
Interchange [Archive]		5/2/2006	3/16/2007	Energy transfers that cross Balancing Authority boundaries.
Interchange Authority [Archive]	IA	5/2/2006	3/16/2007	The responsible entity that authorizes implementation of valid and balanced Interchange Schedules between Balancing Authority Areas, and ensures communication of Interchange information for reliability assessment purposes.
Interchange Distribution Calculator [Archive]	IDC	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The mechanism used by Reliability Coordinators in the Eastern Interconnection to calculate the distribution of Interchange Transactions over specific Flowgates. It includes a database of all Interchange Transactions and a matrix of the Distribution Factors for the Eastern Interconnection.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Interchange Schedule [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	An agreed-upon Interchange Transaction size (megawatts), start and end time, beginning and ending ramp times and rate, and type required for delivery and receipt of power and energy between the Source and Sink Balancing Authorities involved in the transaction.
Interchange Transaction [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	An agreement to transfer energy from a seller to a buyer that crosses one or more Balancing Authority Area boundaries.
Interchange Transaction Tag or Tag [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The details of an Interchange Transaction required for its physical implementation.
Interconnected Operations Service [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A service (exclusive of basic energy and transmission services) that is required to support the reliable operation of interconnected Bulk Electric Systems.
Interconnection [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	When capitalized, any one of the three major electric system networks in North America: Eastern, Western, and ERCOT.
Interconnection [Archive]		8/15/2013		When capitalized, any one of the four major electric system networks in North America: Eastern, Western, ERCOT and Quebec.
Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit [Archive]	IROL	2/8/2005	3/16/2007 Retired 12/27/2007	The value (such as MW, MVar, Amperes, Frequency or Volts) derived from, or a subset of the System Operating Limits, which if exceeded, could expose a widespread area of the Bulk Electric System to instability, uncontrolled separation(s) or cascading outages.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit [Archive]	IROL	11/1/2006	12/27/2007	A System Operating Limit that, if violated, could lead to instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading outages ⁴ that adversely impact the reliability of the Bulk Electric System.
Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit T _v [Archive]	IROL T _v	11/1/2006	12/27/2007	The maximum time that an Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit can be violated before the risk to the interconnection or other Reliability Coordinator Area(s) becomes greater than acceptable. Each Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit's T _v shall be less than or equal to 30 minutes.
Intermediate Balancing Authority [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A Balancing Authority Area that has connecting facilities in the Scheduling Path between the Sending Balancing Authority Area and Receiving Balancing Authority Area and operating agreements that establish the conditions for the use of such facilities.
Intermediate System [Archive]		11/26/12		A Cyber Asset or collection of Cyber Assets performing access control to restrict Interactive Remote Access to only authorized users. The Intermediate System must not be located inside the Electronic Security Perimeter.
Interpersonal Communication [Archive]		11/7/2012		Any medium that allows two or more individuals to interact, consult, or exchange information.

⁴ On September 13, 2012, FERC issued an Order approving NERC's request to modify the reference to "Cascading Outages" to "Cascading outages" within the definition of IROL due to the fact that the definition of "Cascading Outages" was previously remanded by FERC.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Interruptible Load or Interruptible Demand [Archive]		11/1/2006	3/16/2007	Demand that the end-use customer makes available to its Load-Serving Entity via contract or agreement for curtailment.
Joint Control [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	Automatic Generation Control of jointly owned units by two or more Balancing Authorities.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Limiting Element [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The element that is 1.)Either operating at its appropriate rating, or 2,) Would be following the limiting contingency. Thus, the Limiting Element establishes a system limit.
Load [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	An end-use device or customer that receives power from the electric system.
Load Shift Factor [Archive]	LSF	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A factor to be applied to a load’s expected change in demand to determine the amount of flow contribution that change in demand will impose on an identified transmission facility or monitored Flowgate.
Load-Serving Entity [Archive]	LSE	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	Secures energy and transmission service (and related Interconnected Operations Services) to serve the electrical demand and energy requirements of its end-use customers.
Long-Term Transmission Planning Horizon [Archive]		8/4/2011		Transmission planning period that covers years six through ten or beyond when required to accommodate any known longer lead time projects that may take longer than ten years to complete.
Market Flow [Archive]		11/4/2010	4/21/2011	The total amount of power flowing across a specified Facility or set of Facilities due to a market dispatch of generation internal to the market to serve load internal to the market.
Minimum Vegetation Clearance Distance [Archive]	MVCD	11/3/2011	3/21/2013 (Becomes effective 7/1/14)	The calculated minimum distance stated in feet (meters) to prevent flash-over between conductors and vegetation, for various altitudes and operating voltages.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Misoperation [Archive]		2/7/2006	3/16/2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Any failure of a Protection System element to operate within the specified time when a fault or abnormal condition occurs within a zone of protection. Any operation for a fault not within a zone of protection (other than operation as backup protection for a fault in an adjacent zone that is not cleared within a specified time for the protection for that zone). Any unintentional Protection System operation when no fault or other abnormal condition has occurred unrelated to on-site maintenance and testing activity.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Native Load [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The end-use customers that the Load-Serving Entity is obligated to serve.
Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon [Archive]		1/24/2011	11/17/2011	The transmission planning period that covers Year One through five.
Net Actual Interchange [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The algebraic sum of all metered interchange over all interconnections between two physically Adjacent Balancing Authority Areas.
Net Energy for Load [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	Net Balancing Authority Area generation, plus energy received from other Balancing Authority Areas, less energy delivered to Balancing Authority Areas through interchange. It includes Balancing Authority Area losses but excludes energy required for storage at energy storage facilities.
Net Interchange Schedule [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The algebraic sum of all Interchange Schedules with each Adjacent Balancing Authority.
Net Scheduled Interchange [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The algebraic sum of all Interchange Schedules across a given path or between Balancing Authorities for a given period or instant in time.
Network Integration Transmission Service [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	Service that allows an electric transmission customer to integrate, plan, economically dispatch and regulate its network reserves in a manner comparable to that in which the Transmission Owner serves Native Load customers.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Non-Consequential Load Loss [Archive]		8/4/2011		Non-Interruptible Load loss that does not include: (1) Consequential Load Loss, (2) the response of voltage sensitive Load, or (3) Load that is disconnected from the System by end-user equipment.
Non-Firm Transmission Service [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	Transmission service that is reserved on an as-available basis and is subject to curtailment or interruption.
Non-Spinning Reserve [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. That generating reserve not connected to the system but capable of serving demand within a specified time. 2. Interruptible load that can be removed from the system in a specified time.
Normal Clearing [Archive]		11/1/2006	12/27/2007	A protection system operates as designed and the fault is cleared in the time normally expected with proper functioning of the installed protection systems.
Normal Rating [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The rating as defined by the equipment owner that specifies the level of electrical loading, usually expressed in megawatts (MW) or other appropriate units that a system, facility, or element can support or withstand through the daily demand cycles without loss of equipment life.
Nuclear Plant Generator Operator [Archive]		5/2/2007	10/16/2008	Any Generator Operator or Generator Owner that is a Nuclear Plant Licensee responsible for operation of a nuclear facility licensed to produce commercial power.
Nuclear Plant Off-site Power Supply (Off-site Power) [Archive]		5/2/2007	10/16/2008	The electric power supply provided from the electric system to the nuclear power plant distribution system as required per the nuclear power plant license.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Nuclear Plant Licensing Requirements [Archive]	NPLRs	5/2/2007	10/16/2008	Requirements included in the design basis of the nuclear plant and statutorily mandated for the operation of the plant, including nuclear power plant licensing requirements for: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Off-site power supply to enable safe shutdown of the plant during an electric system or plant event; and 2) Avoiding preventable challenges to nuclear safety as a result of an electric system disturbance, transient, or condition.
Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements [Archive]	NPIRs	5/2/2007	10/16/2008	The requirements based on NPLRs and Bulk Electric System requirements that have been mutually agreed to by the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator and the applicable Transmission Entities.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Off-Peak [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	Those hours or other periods defined by NAESB business practices, contract, agreements, or guides as periods of lower electrical demand.
On-Peak [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	Those hours or other periods defined by NAESB business practices, contract, agreements, or guides as periods of higher electrical demand.
Open Access Same Time Information Service [Archive]	OASIS	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	An electronic posting system that the Transmission Service Provider maintains for transmission access data and that allows all transmission customers to view the data simultaneously.
Open Access Transmission Tariff [Archive]	OATT	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	Electronic transmission tariff accepted by the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission requiring the Transmission Service Provider to furnish to all shippers with non-discriminating service comparable to that provided by Transmission Owners to themselves.
Operating Plan [Archive]		2/7/2006	3/16/2007	A document that identifies a group of activities that may be used to achieve some goal. An Operating Plan may contain Operating Procedures and Operating Processes. A company-specific system restoration plan that includes an Operating Procedure for black-starting units, Operating Processes for communicating restoration progress with other entities, etc., is an example of an Operating Plan.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Operating Procedure [Archive]		2/7/2006	3/16/2007	A document that identifies specific steps or tasks that should be taken by one or more specific operating positions to achieve specific operating goal(s). The steps in an Operating Procedure should be followed in the order in which they are presented, and should be performed by the position(s) identified. A document that lists the specific steps for a system operator to take in removing a specific transmission line from service is an example of an Operating Procedure.
Operating Process [Archive]		2/7/2006	3/16/2007	A document that identifies general steps for achieving a generic operating goal. An Operating Process includes steps with options that may be selected depending upon Real-time conditions. A guideline for controlling high voltage is an example of an Operating Process.
Operating Reserve [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	That capability above firm system demand required to provide for regulation, load forecasting error, equipment forced and scheduled outages and local area protection. It consists of spinning and non-spinning reserve.
Operating Reserve – Spinning [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The portion of Operating Reserve consisting of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Generation synchronized to the system and fully available to serve load within the Disturbance Recovery Period following the contingency event; or • Load fully removable from the system within the Disturbance Recovery Period following the contingency event.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Operating Reserve – Supplemental [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The portion of Operating Reserve consisting of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Generation (synchronized or capable of being synchronized to the system) that is fully available to serve load within the Disturbance Recovery Period following the contingency event; or • Load fully removable from the system within the Disturbance Recovery Period following the contingency event.
Operating Voltage [Archive]		2/7/2006	3/16/2007	The voltage level by which an electrical system is designated and to which certain operating characteristics of the system are related; also, the effective (root-mean-square) potential difference between any two conductors or between a conductor and the ground. The actual voltage of the circuit may vary somewhat above or below this value.
Operational Planning Analysis [Archive]		10/17/2008	3/17/2011	An analysis of the expected system conditions for the next day's operation. (That analysis may be performed either a day ahead or as much as 12 months ahead.) Expected system conditions include things such as load forecast(s), generation output levels, and known system constraints (transmission facility outages, generator outages, equipment limitations, etc.).
Outage Transfer Distribution Factor [Archive]	OTDF	8/22/2008	11/24/2009	In the post-contingency configuration of a system under study, the electric Power Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) with one or more system Facilities removed from service (outaged).

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Overlap Regulation Service [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A method of providing regulation service in which the Balancing Authority providing the regulation service incorporates another Balancing Authority's actual interchange, frequency response, and schedules into providing Balancing Authority's AGC/ACE equation.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Participation Factors [Archive]		8/22/2008	11/24/2009	A set of dispatch rules such that given a specific amount of load to serve, an approximate generation dispatch can be determined. To accomplish this, generators are assigned a percentage that they will contribute to serve load.
Peak Demand [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The highest hourly integrated Net Energy For Load within a Balancing Authority Area occurring within a given period (e.g., day, month, season, or year). 2. The highest instantaneous demand within the Balancing Authority Area.
Performance-Reset Period [Archive]		2/7/2006	3/16/2007	The time period that the entity being assessed must operate without any violations to reset the level of non compliance to zero.
Physical Access Control Systems [Archive]	PACS	11/26/12		Cyber Assets that control, alert, or log access to the Physical Security Perimeter(s), exclusive of locally mounted hardware or devices at the Physical Security Perimeter such as motion sensors, electronic lock control mechanisms, and badge readers.
Physical Security Perimeter [Archive]	PSP	5/2/2006	1/18/2008	The physical, completely enclosed (“six-wall”) border surrounding computer rooms, telecommunications rooms, operations centers, and other locations in which Critical Cyber Assets are housed and for which access is controlled.
Physical Security Perimeter [Archive]	PSP	11/26/12		The physical border surrounding locations in which BES Cyber Assets, BES Cyber Systems, or Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems reside, and for which access is controlled.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Planning Assessment [Archive]		8/4/2011		Documented evaluation of future Transmission system performance and Corrective Action Plans to remedy identified deficiencies.
Planning Authority [Archive]	PA	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The responsible entity that coordinates and integrates transmission facility and service plans, resource plans, and protection systems.
Planning Coordinator [Archive]	PC	8/22/2008	11/24/2009	See Planning Authority.
Point of Delivery [Archive]	POD	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A location that the Transmission Service Provider specifies on its transmission system where an Interchange Transaction leaves or a Load-Serving Entity receives its energy.
Point of Receipt [Archive]	POR	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A location that the Transmission Service Provider specifies on its transmission system where an Interchange Transaction enters or a Generator delivers its output.
Point to Point Transmission Service [Archive]	PTP	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The reservation and transmission of capacity and energy on either a firm or non-firm basis from the Point(s) of Receipt to the Point(s) of Delivery.
Postback [Archive]		08/22/2008	Not approved; Modification directed 11/24/09	Positive adjustments to ATC or AFC as defined in Business Practices. Such Business Practices may include processing of redirects and unscheduled service.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Power Transfer Distribution Factor [Archive]	PTDF	08/22/2008	11/24/2009	In the pre-contingency configuration of a system under study, a measure of the responsiveness or change in electrical loadings on transmission system Facilities due to a change in electric power transfer from one area to another, expressed in percent (up to 100%) of the change in power transfer
Pro Forma Tariff [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	Usually refers to the standard OATT and/or associated transmission rights mandated by the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Order No. 888.
Protected Cyber Assets [Archive]	PCA	11/26/12		One or more Cyber Assets connected using a routable protocol within or on an Electronic Security Perimeter that is not part of the highest impact BES Cyber System within the same Electronic Security Perimeter. The impact rating of Protected Cyber Assets is equal to the highest rated BES Cyber System in the same ESP. A Cyber Asset is not a Protected Cyber Asset if, for 30 consecutive calendar days or less, it is connected either to a Cyber Asset within the ESP or to the network within the ESP, and it is used for data transfer, vulnerability assessment, maintenance, or troubleshooting purposes.
Protection System [Archive]		2/7/2006	3/17/2007 retired 4/1/2013	Protective relays, associated communication systems, voltage and current sensing devices, station batteries and DC control circuitry.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Protection System [Archive] [Implementation Plan]		11/19/2010	2/3/2012 (Became effective on 4/1/13)	Protection System – <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protective relays which respond to electrical quantities, • Communications systems necessary for correct operation of protective functions • Voltage and current sensing devices providing inputs to protective relays, • Station dc supply associated with protective functions (including batteries, battery chargers, and non-battery-based dc supply), and • Control circuitry associated with protective functions through the trip coil(s) of the circuit breakers or other interrupting devices.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Protection System Maintenance Program [Archive]	PSMP	11/7/2012		<p>An ongoing program by which Protection System components are kept in working order and proper operation of malfunctioning components is restored. A maintenance program for a specific component includes one or more of the following activities:</p> <p>Verify — Determine that the component is functioning correctly.</p> <p>Monitor — Observe the routine in-service operation of the component.</p> <p>Test — Apply signals to a component to observe functional performance or output behavior, or to diagnose problems.</p> <p>Inspect — Examine for signs of component failure, reduced performance or degradation.</p> <p>Calibrate — Adjust the operating threshold or measurement accuracy of a measuring element to meet the intended performance requirement.</p>
Pseudo-Tie [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A telemetered reading or value that is updated in real time and used as a “virtual” tie line flow in the AGC/ACE equation but for which no physical tie or energy metering actually exists. The integrated value is used as a metered MWh value for interchange accounting purposes.
Purchasing-Selling Entity [Archive]	PSE	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The entity that purchases or sells, and takes title to, energy, capacity, and Interconnected Operations Services. Purchasing-Selling Entities may be affiliated or unaffiliated merchants and may or may not own generating facilities.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Ramp Rate or Ramp [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	(Schedule) The rate, expressed in megawatts per minute, at which the interchange schedule is attained during the ramp period. (Generator) The rate, expressed in megawatts per minute, that a generator changes its output.
Rated Electrical Operating Conditions [Archive]		2/7/2006	3/16/2007	The specified or reasonably anticipated conditions under which the electrical system or an individual electrical circuit is intend/ designed to operate
Rating [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The operational limits of a transmission system element under a set of specified conditions.
Rated System Path Methodology [Archive]		08/22/2008	11/24/2009	The Rated System Path Methodology is characterized by an initial Total Transfer Capability (TTC), determined via simulation. Capacity Benefit Margin, Transmission Reliability Margin, and Existing Transmission Commitments are subtracted from TTC, and Postbacks and counterflows are added as applicable, to derive Available Transfer Capability. Under the Rated System Path Methodology, TTC results are generally reported as specific transmission path capabilities.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Reactive Power [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The portion of electricity that establishes and sustains the electric and magnetic fields of alternating-current equipment. Reactive power must be supplied to most types of magnetic equipment, such as motors and transformers. It also must supply the reactive losses on transmission facilities. Reactive power is provided by generators, synchronous condensers, or electrostatic equipment such as capacitors and directly influences electric system voltage. It is usually expressed in kilovars (kvar) or megavars (Mvar).
Real Power [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The portion of electricity that supplies energy to the load.
Reallocation [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The total or partial curtailment of Transactions during TLR Level 3a or 5a to allow Transactions using higher priority to be implemented.
Real-time [Archive]		2/7/2006	3/16/2007	Present time as opposed to future time. (From Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits standard.)
Real-time Assessment [Archive]		10/17/2008	3/17/2011	An examination of existing and expected system conditions, conducted by collecting and reviewing immediately available data
Receiving Balancing Authority [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The Balancing Authority importing the Interchange.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Regional Reliability Organization [Archive]	RRO	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. An entity that ensures that a defined area of the Bulk Electric System is reliable, adequate and secure. 2. A member of the North American Electric Reliability Council. The Regional Reliability Organization can serve as the Compliance Monitor.
Regional Reliability Plan [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The plan that specifies the Reliability Coordinators and Balancing Authorities within the Regional Reliability Organization, and explains how reliability coordination will be accomplished.
Regulating Reserve [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	An amount of reserve responsive to Automatic Generation Control, which is sufficient to provide normal regulating margin.
Regulation Reserve Sharing Group [Archive]		8/15/2013		A group whose members consist of two or more Balancing Authorities that collectively maintain, allocate, and supply the Regulating Reserve required for all member Balancing Authorities to use in meeting applicable regulating standards.
Regulation Service [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The process whereby one Balancing Authority contracts to provide corrective response to all or a portion of the ACE of another Balancing Authority. The Balancing Authority providing the response assumes the obligation of meeting all applicable control criteria as specified by NERC for itself and the Balancing Authority for which it is providing the Regulation Service.
Reliability Adjustment RFI [Archive]		10/29/2008	12/17/2009	Request to modify an Implemented Interchange Schedule for reliability purposes.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Reliability Coordinator [Archive]	RC	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The entity that is the highest level of authority who is responsible for the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System, has the Wide Area view of the Bulk Electric System, and has the operating tools, processes and procedures, including the authority to prevent or mitigate emergency operating situations in both next-day analysis and real-time operations. The Reliability Coordinator has the purview that is broad enough to enable the calculation of Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits, which may be based on the operating parameters of transmission systems beyond any Transmission Operator's vision.
Reliability Coordinator Area [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The collection of generation, transmission, and loads within the boundaries of the Reliability Coordinator. Its boundary coincides with one or more Balancing Authority Areas.
Reliability Coordinator Information System [Archive]	RCIS	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The system that Reliability Coordinators use to post messages and share operating information in real time.
Reliability Directive [Archive]		8/16/2012		A communication initiated by a Reliability Coordinator, Transmission Operator, or Balancing Authority where action by the recipient is necessary to address an Emergency or Adverse Reliability Impact.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Reliability Standard [Archive]		5/9/2013	7/9/2013	A requirement, approved by the United States Federal Energy Regulatory Commission under this Section 215 of the Federal Power Act, or approved or recognized by an applicable governmental authority in other jurisdictions, to provide for reliable operation [Reliable Operation] of the bulk-power system [Bulk-Power System]. The term includes requirements for the operation of existing bulk-power system [Bulk-Power System] facilities, including cybersecurity protection, and the design of planned additions or modifications to such facilities to the extent necessary to provide for reliable operation [Reliable Operation] of the bulk-power system [Bulk-Power System], but the term does not include any requirement to enlarge such facilities or to construct new transmission capacity or generation capacity.
Reliable Operation [Archive]		5/9/2013	7/9/2013	Operating the elements of the bulk-power system [Bulk-Power System] within equipment and electric system thermal, voltage, and stability limits so that instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures of such system will not occur as a result of a sudden disturbance, including a cybersecurity incident, or unanticipated failure of system elements.
Remedial Action Scheme [Archive]	RAS	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	See "Special Protection System"

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Reportable Cyber Security Incident [Archive]		11/26/12		A Cyber Security Incident that has compromised or disrupted one or more reliability tasks of a functional entity.
Reportable Disturbance [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	Any event that causes an ACE change greater than or equal to 80% of a Balancing Authority's or reserve sharing group's most severe contingency. The definition of a reportable disturbance is specified by each Regional Reliability Organization. This definition may not be retroactively adjusted in response to observed performance.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Reporting ACE [Archive]		8/15/2013		<p>The scan rate values of a Balancing Authority’s Area Control Error (ACE) measured in MW, which includes the difference between the Balancing Authority’s Net Actual Interchange and its Net Scheduled Interchange, plus its Frequency Bias obligation, plus any known meter error. In the Western Interconnection, Reporting ACE includes Automatic Time Error Correction (ATEC).</p> <p>Reporting ACE is calculated as follows:</p> $\text{Reporting ACE} = (\text{NI}_A - \text{NI}_S) - 10B (F_A - F_S) - I_{ME}$ <p>Reporting ACE is calculated in the Western Interconnection as follows:</p> $\text{Reporting ACE} = (\text{NI}_A - \text{NI}_S) - 10B (F_A - F_S) - I_{ME} + I_{ATEC}$ <p>Where:</p> <p>NI_A (Actual Net Interchange) is the algebraic sum of actual megawatt transfers across all Tie Lines and includes Pseudo-Ties. Balancing Authorities directly connected via asynchronous ties to another Interconnection may include or exclude megawatt transfers on those Tie lines in their actual interchange, provided they are implemented in the same manner for Net Interchange Schedule.</p> <p>NI_S (Scheduled Net Interchange) is the algebraic sum of all scheduled megawatt transfers, including Dynamic Schedules, with adjacent Balancing Authorities, and taking into account the effects of schedule ramps. Balancing Authorities directly connected via asynchronous ties to another Interconnection may include or exclude megawatt transfers on those Tie Lines in their scheduled Interchange, provided they are implemented in the same manner for Net</p>

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Reporting ACE (Continued)				<p>Interchange Actual.</p> <p>B (Frequency Bias Setting) is the Frequency Bias Setting (in negative MW/0.1 Hz) for the Balancing Authority.</p> <p>10 is the constant factor that converts the frequency bias setting units to MW/Hz.</p> <p>F_A (Actual Frequency) is the measured frequency in Hz.</p> <p>F_S (Scheduled Frequency) is 60.0 Hz, except during a time correction.</p> <p>I_{ME} (Interchange Meter Error) is the meter error correction factor and represents the difference between the integrated hourly average of the net interchange actual (NIA) and the cumulative hourly net Interchange energy measurement (in megawatt-hours).</p> <p>I_{ATEC} (Automatic Time Error Correction) is the addition of a component to the ACE equation for the Western Interconnection that modifies the control point for the purpose of continuously paying back Primary Inadvertent Interchange to correct accumulated time error. Automatic Time Error Correction is only applicable in the Western Interconnection.</p> $I_{ATEC} = \frac{PII_{accum}^{on/off\ peak}}{(1-Y)^*H}$ <p>when operating in Automatic Time Error Correction control mode.</p> <p>I_{ATEC} shall be zero when operating in any other AGC mode.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Y = B / BS. • H = Number of hours used to payback Primary Inadvertent Interchange energy. The value of H is set to 3. • BS = Frequency Bias for the Interconnection (MW / 0.1 Hz).

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Reporting ACE (Continued)				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Primary Inadvertent Interchange (PII_{hourly}) is $(1-Y) * (II_{actual} - B * \Delta TE/6)$ II_{actual} is the hourly Inadvertent Interchange for the last hour. ΔTE is the hourly change in system Time Error as distributed by the Interconnection Time Monitor. Where: $\Delta TE = TE_{end\ hour} - TE_{begin\ hour} - TD_{adj} - (t) * (TE_{offset})$ TD_{adj} is the Reliability Coordinator adjustment for differences with Interconnection Time Monitor control center clocks. t is the number of minutes of Manual Time Error Correction that occurred during the hour. TE_{offset} is 0.000 or +0.020 or -0.020. PII_{accum} is the Balancing Authority's accumulated PII_{hourly} in MWh. An On-Peak and Off-Peak accumulation accounting is required. <p>Where: $PII_{accum}^{on/off\ peak} = \text{last period's } PII_{accum}^{on/off\ peak} + PII_{hourly}$ </p> <p>All NERC Interconnections with multiple Balancing Authorities operate using the principles of Tie-line Bias (TLB) Control and require the use of an ACE equation similar to the Reporting ACE defined above. Any modification(s) to this specified Reporting ACE equation that is(are) implemented for all BAs on an Interconnection and is(are) consistent with the following four principles will provide a valid alternative Reporting ACE equation</p>

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Reporting ACE (Continued)				consistent with the measures included in this standard. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. All portions of the Interconnection are included in one area or another so that the sum of all area generation, loads and losses is the same as total system generation, load and losses. 2. The algebraic sum of all area Net Interchange Schedules and all Net Interchange actual values is equal to zero at all times. 3. The use of a common Scheduled Frequency FS for all areas at all times. 4. The absence of metering or computational errors. (The inclusion and use of the IME term to account for known metering or computational errors.)
Request for Interchange [Archive]	RFI	5/2/2006	3/16/2007	A collection of data as defined in the NAESB RFI Datasheet, to be submitted to the Interchange Authority for the purpose of implementing bilateral Interchange between a Source and Sink Balancing Authority.
Reserve Sharing Group [Archive]	RSG	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A group whose members consist of two or more Balancing Authorities that collectively maintain, allocate, and supply operating reserves required for each Balancing Authority's use in recovering from contingencies within the group. Scheduling energy from an Adjacent Balancing Authority to aid recovery need not constitute reserve sharing provided the transaction is ramped in over a period the supplying party could reasonably be expected to load generation in (e.g., ten minutes). If the transaction is ramped in quicker (e.g., between zero and ten minutes) then, for the purposes of Disturbance Control Performance, the Areas become a Reserve Sharing Group.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Reserve Sharing Group Reporting ACE [Archive]		8/15/2013		At any given time of measurement for the applicable Regulation Reserve Sharing Group, the algebraic sum of the Reporting ACEs (or equivalent as calculated at such time of measurement) of the Balancing Authorities participating in the Regulation Reserve Sharing Group at the time of measurement.
Resource Planner [Archive]	RP	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The entity that develops a long-term (generally one year and beyond) plan for the resource adequacy of specific loads (customer demand and energy requirements) within a Planning Authority Area.
Response Rate [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The Ramp Rate that a generating unit can achieve under normal operating conditions expressed in megawatts per minute (MW/Min).
Right-of-Way [Archive]	ROW	2/7/2006	3/16/2007	A corridor of land on which electric lines may be located. The Transmission Owner may own the land in fee, own an easement, or have certain franchise, prescription, or license rights to construct and maintain lines.
Right-of-Way [Archive]	ROW	11/3/2011	3/21/2013 (Becomes inactive 6/30/14)	The corridor of land under a transmission line(s) needed to operate the line(s). The width of the corridor is established by engineering or construction standards as documented in either construction documents, pre-2007 vegetation maintenance records, or by the blowout standard in effect when the line was built. The ROW width in no case exceeds the Transmission Owner's legal rights but may be less based on the aforementioned criteria.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Right-of-Way [Archive]	ROW	5/9/12	(Becomes effective 7/1/14)	The corridor of land under a transmission line(s) needed to operate the line(s). The width of the corridor is established by engineering or construction standards as documented in either construction documents, pre-2007 vegetation maintenance records, or by the blowout standard in effect when the line was built. The ROW width in no case exceeds the applicable Transmission Owner's or applicable Generator Owner's legal rights but may be less based on the aforementioned criteria.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Scenario [Archive]		2/7/2006	3/16/2007	Possible event.
Schedule [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	(Verb) To set up a plan or arrangement for an Interchange Transaction. (Noun) An Interchange Schedule.
Scheduled Frequency [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	60.0 Hertz, except during a time correction.
Scheduling Entity [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	An entity responsible for approving and implementing Interchange Schedules.
Scheduling Path [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The Transmission Service arrangements reserved by the Purchasing-Selling Entity for a Transaction.
Sending Balancing Authority [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The Balancing Authority exporting the Interchange.
Sink Balancing Authority [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The Balancing Authority in which the load (sink) is located for an Interchange Transaction. (This will also be a Receiving Balancing Authority for the resulting Interchange Schedule.)
Source Balancing Authority [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The Balancing Authority in which the generation (source) is located for an Interchange Transaction. (This will also be a Sending Balancing Authority for the resulting Interchange Schedule.)

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Special Protection System (Remedial Action Scheme) [Archive]	SPS	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	An automatic protection system designed to detect abnormal or predetermined system conditions, and take corrective actions other than and/or in addition to the isolation of faulted components to maintain system reliability. Such action may include changes in demand, generation (MW and Mvar), or system configuration to maintain system stability, acceptable voltage, or power flows. An SPS does not include (a) underfrequency or undervoltage load shedding or (b) fault conditions that must be isolated or (c) out-of-step relaying (not designed as an integral part of an SPS). Also called Remedial Action Scheme.
Spinning Reserve [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	Unloaded generation that is synchronized and ready to serve additional demand.
Stability [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The ability of an electric system to maintain a state of equilibrium during normal and abnormal conditions or disturbances.
Stability Limit [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The maximum power flow possible through some particular point in the system while maintaining stability in the entire system or the part of the system to which the stability limit refers.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition [Archive]	SCADA	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A system of remote control and telemetry used to monitor and control the transmission system.
Supplemental Regulation Service [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A method of providing regulation service in which the Balancing Authority providing the regulation service receives a signal representing all or a portion of the other Balancing Authority's ACE.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Surge [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A transient variation of current, voltage, or power flow in an electric circuit or across an electric system.
Sustained Outage [Archive]		2/7/2006	3/16/2007	The deenergized condition of a transmission line resulting from a fault or disturbance following an unsuccessful automatic reclosing sequence and/or unsuccessful manual reclosing procedure.
System [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A combination of generation, transmission, and distribution components.
System Operating Limit [Archive]	SOL	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The value (such as MW, MVar, Amperes, Frequency or Volts) that satisfies the most limiting of the prescribed operating criteria for a specified system configuration to ensure operation within acceptable reliability criteria. System Operating Limits are based upon certain operating criteria. These include, but are not limited to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Facility Ratings (Applicable pre- and post-Contingency equipment or facility ratings) • Transient Stability Ratings (Applicable pre- and post-Contingency Stability Limits) • Voltage Stability Ratings (Applicable pre- and post-Contingency Voltage Stability) • System Voltage Limits (Applicable pre- and post-Contingency Voltage Limits)
System Operator [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	An individual at a control center (Balancing Authority, Transmission Operator, Generator Operator, Reliability Coordinator) whose responsibility it is to monitor and control that electric system in real time.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Telemetry [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The process by which measurable electrical quantities from substations and generating stations are instantaneously transmitted to the control center, and by which operating commands from the control center are transmitted to the substations and generating stations.
Thermal Rating [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The maximum amount of electrical current that a transmission line or electrical facility can conduct over a specified time period before it sustains permanent damage by overheating or before it sags to the point that it violates public safety requirements.
Tie Line [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A circuit connecting two Balancing Authority Areas.
Tie Line Bias [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A mode of Automatic Generation Control that allows the Balancing Authority to 1.) maintain its Interchange Schedule and 2.) respond to Interconnection frequency error.
Time Error [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The difference between the Interconnection time measured at the Balancing Authority(ies) and the time specified by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Time error is caused by the accumulation of Frequency Error over a given period.
Time Error Correction [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	An offset to the Interconnection's scheduled frequency to return the Interconnection's Time Error to a predetermined value.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
TLR Log [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	Report required to be filed after every TLR Level 2 or higher in a specified format. The NERC IDC prepares the report for review by the issuing Reliability Coordinator. After approval by the issuing Reliability Coordinator, the report is electronically filed in a public area of the NERC Web site.
Total Flowgate Capability [Archive]	TFC	08/22/2008	11/24/2009	The maximum flow capability on a Flowgate, is not to exceed its thermal rating, or in the case of a flowgate used to represent a specific operating constraint (such as a voltage or stability limit), is not to exceed the associated System Operating Limit.
Total Transfer Capability [Archive]	TTC	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The amount of electric power that can be moved or transferred reliably from one area to another area of the interconnected transmission systems by way of all transmission lines (or paths) between those areas under specified system conditions.
Transaction [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	See Interchange Transaction.
Transfer Capability [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The measure of the ability of interconnected electric systems to move or transfer power <i>in a reliable manner</i> from one area to another over all transmission lines (or paths) between those areas under specified system conditions. The units of transfer capability are in terms of electric power, generally expressed in megawatts (MW). The transfer capability from "Area A" to "Area B" is <i>not</i> generally equal to the transfer capability from "Area B" to "Area A."

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Transfer Distribution Factor [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	See Distribution Factor.
Transmission [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	An interconnected group of lines and associated equipment for the movement or transfer of electric energy between points of supply and points at which it is transformed for delivery to customers or is delivered to other electric systems.
Transmission Constraint [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	A limitation on one or more transmission elements that may be reached during normal or contingency system operations.
Transmission Customer [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Any eligible customer (or its designated agent) that can or does execute a transmission service agreement or can or does receive transmission service. 2. Any of the following responsible entities: Generator Owner, Load-Serving Entity, or Purchasing-Selling Entity.
Transmission Line [Archive]		2/7/2006	3/16/2007	A system of structures, wires, insulators and associated hardware that carry electric energy from one point to another in an electric power system. Lines are operated at relatively high voltages varying from 69 kV up to 765 kV, and are capable of transmitting large quantities of electricity over long distances.
Transmission Operator [Archive]	TOP	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The entity responsible for the reliability of its "local" transmission system, and that operates or directs the operations of the transmission facilities.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Transmission Operator Area [Archive]		08/22/2008	11/24/2009	The collection of Transmission assets over which the Transmission Operator is responsible for operating.
Transmission Owner [Archive]	TO	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The entity that owns and maintains transmission facilities.
Transmission Planner [Archive]	TP	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The entity that develops a long-term (generally one year and beyond) plan for the reliability (adequacy) of the interconnected bulk electric transmission systems within its portion of the Planning Authority Area.
Transmission Reliability Margin [Archive]	TRM	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The amount of transmission transfer capability necessary to provide reasonable assurance that the interconnected transmission network will be secure. TRM accounts for the inherent uncertainty in system conditions and the need for operating flexibility to ensure reliable system operation as system conditions change.
Transmission Reliability Margin Implementation Document [Archive]	TRMID	08/22/2008	11/24/2009	A document that describes the implementation of a Transmission Reliability Margin methodology, and provides information related to a Transmission Operator's calculation of TRM.
Transmission Service [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	Services provided to the Transmission Customer by the Transmission Service Provider to move energy from a Point of Receipt to a Point of Delivery.
Transmission Service Provider [Archive]	TSP	2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The entity that administers the transmission tariff and provides Transmission Service to Transmission Customers under applicable transmission service agreements.

Continent-wide Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Vegetation [Archive]		2/7/2006	3/16/2007	All plant material, growing or not, living or dead.
Vegetation Inspection [Archive]		2/7/2006	3/16/2007	The systematic examination of a transmission corridor to document vegetation conditions.
Vegetation Inspection [Archive]		11/3/2011	3/21/2013 (Becomes inactive 6/30/14)	The systematic examination of vegetation conditions on a Right-of-Way and those vegetation conditions under the Transmission Owner’s control that are likely to pose a hazard to the line(s) prior to the next planned maintenance or inspection. This may be combined with a general line inspection.
Vegetation Inspection [Archive]		5/9/12	(Becomes effective 7/1/14)	The systematic examination of vegetation conditions on a Right-of-Way and those vegetation conditions under the applicable Transmission Owner’s or applicable Generator Owner’s control that are likely to pose a hazard to the line(s) prior to the next planned maintenance or inspection. This may be combined with a general line inspection.
Wide Area [Archive]		2/8/2005	3/16/2007	The entire Reliability Coordinator Area as well as the critical flow and status information from adjacent Reliability Coordinator Areas as determined by detailed system studies to allow the calculation of Interconnected Reliability Operating Limits.
Year One [Archive]		1/24/2011	11/17/2011	The first twelve month period that a Planning Coordinator or a Transmission Planner is responsible for assessing. For an assessment started in a given calendar year, Year One includes the forecasted peak Load period for one of the following two calendar years. For example, if a Planning Assessment was started in 2011, then Year One includes the forecasted peak Load period for either 2012 or 2013.

ERCOT Regional Definitions

The following terms were developed as regional definitions for the ERCOT region:

ERCOT Regional Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Frequency Measurable Event [Archive]	FME	8/15/2013		<p>An event that results in a Frequency Deviation, identified at the BA's sole discretion, and meeting one of the following conditions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i) a Frequency Deviation that has a pre-perturbation [the 16-second period of time before t(0)] average frequency to post-perturbation [the 32-second period of time starting 20 seconds after t(0)] average frequency absolute deviation greater than 100 mHz (the 100 mHz value may be adjusted by the BA to capture 30 to 40 events per year). <p>Or</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ii) a cumulative change in generating unit/generating facility, DC tie and/or firm load pre-perturbation megawatt value to post-perturbation megawatt value absolute deviation greater than 550 MW (the 550 MW value may be adjusted by the BA to capture 30 to 40 events per year).
Governor [Archive]		8/15/2013		The electronic, digital or mechanical device that implements Primary Frequency Response of generating units/generating facilities or other system elements.
Primary Frequency Response	PFR	8/15/2013		The immediate proportional increase or decrease in real power output provided by generating units/generating facilities and the natural real power dampening response

ERCOT Regional Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
[Archive]				provided by Load in response to system Frequency Deviations. This response is in the direction that stabilizes frequency.

NPCC Regional Definitions

The following definitions were developed for use in NPCC Regional Standards.

NPCC Regional Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Current Zero Time [Archive]		11/04/2010	10/20/2011	The time of the final current zero on the last phase to interrupt.
Generating Plant [Archive]		11/04/2010	10/20/2011	One or more generators at a single physical location whereby any single contingency can affect all the generators at that location.

ReliabilityFirst Regional Definitions

The following definitions were developed for use in ReliabilityFirst Regional Standards.

RFC Regional Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Resource Adequacy [Archive]		08/05/2009	03/17/2011	The ability of supply-side and demand-side resources to meet the aggregate electrical demand (including losses)
Net Internal Demand [Archive]		08/05/2009	03/17/2011	Total of all end-use customer demand and electric system losses within specified metered boundaries, less Direct Control Management and Interruptible Demand
Peak Period [Archive]		08/05/2009	03/17/2011	A period consisting of two (2) or more calendar months but less than seven (7) calendar months, which includes the period during which the responsible entity's annual peak demand is expected to occur
Wind Generating Station [Archive]		11/03/2011		A collection of wind turbines electrically connected together and injecting energy into the grid at one point, sometimes known as a "Wind Farm."
Year One [Archive]		08/05/2009	03/17/2011	The planning year that begins with the upcoming annual Peak Period

WECC Regional Definitions

The following definitions were developed for use in WECC Regional Standards.

WECC Regional Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Area Control Error [†] [Archive]	ACE	3/12/2007	6/8/2007	Means the instantaneous difference between net actual and scheduled interchange, taking into account the effects of Frequency Bias including correction for meter error.
Automatic Generation Control [†] [Archive]	AGC	3/12/2007	6/8/2007	Means equipment that automatically adjusts a Control Area's generation from a central location to maintain its interchange schedule plus Frequency Bias.
Automatic Time Error Correction [Archive]		3/26/2008	5/21/2009	A frequency control automatic action that a Balancing Authority uses to offset its frequency contribution to support the Interconnection's scheduled frequency.
Automatic Time Error Correction [Archive]		12/19/2012		The addition of a component to the ACE equation that modifies the control point for the purpose of continuously paying back Primary Inadvertent Interchange to correct accumulated time error.
Average Generation [†] [Archive]		3/12/2007	6/8/2007	Means the total MWh generated within the Balancing Authority Operator's Balancing Authority Area during the prior year divided by 8760 hours (8784 hours if the prior year had 366 days).
Business Day [†] [Archive]		3/12/2007	6/8/2007	Means any day other than Saturday, Sunday, or a legal public holiday as designated in section 6103 of title 5, U.S. Code.

WECC Regional Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Commercial Operation [Archive]		10/29/2008	4/21/2011	Achievement of this designation indicates that the Generator Operator or Transmission Operator of the synchronous generator or synchronous condenser has received all approvals necessary for operation after completion of initial start-up testing.
Contributing Schedule [Archive]		2/10/2009	3/17/2011	A Schedule not on the Qualified Transfer Path between a Source Balancing Authority and a Sink Balancing Authority that contributes unscheduled flow across the Qualified Transfer Path.
Dependability-Based Misoperation [Archive]		10/29/2008	4/21/2011	Is the absence of a Protection System or RAS operation when intended. Dependability is a component of reliability and is the measure of a device's certainty to operate when required.
Disturbance [†] [Archive]		3/12/2007	6/8/2007	Means (i) any perturbation to the electric system, or (ii) the unexpected change in ACE that is caused by the sudden loss of generation or interruption of load.

WECC Regional Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Extraordinary Contingency [†] [Archive]		3/12/2007	6/8/2007	Shall have the meaning set out in Excuse of Performance, section B.4.c. language in section B.4.c: <i>means any act of God, actions by a non-affiliated third party, labor disturbance, act of the public enemy, war, insurrection, riot, fire, storm or flood, earthquake, explosion, accident to or breakage, failure or malfunction of machinery or equipment, or any other cause beyond the Reliability Entity's reasonable control; provided that prudent industry standards (e.g. maintenance, design, operation) have been employed; and provided further that no act or cause shall be considered an Extraordinary Contingency if such act or cause results in any contingency contemplated in any WECC Reliability Standard (e.g., the "Most Severe Single Contingency" as defined in the WECC Reliability Criteria or any lesser contingency).</i>
Frequency Bias [†] [Archive]		3/12/2007	6/8/2007	Means a value, usually given in megawatts per 0.1 Hertz, associated with a Control Area that relates the difference between scheduled and actual frequency to the amount of generation required to correct the difference.
Functionally Equivalent Protection System [Archive]	FEPS	10/29/2008	4/21/2011	A Protection System that provides performance as follows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Each Protection System can detect the same faults within the zone of protection and provide the clearing times and coordination needed to comply with all Reliability Standards. • Each Protection System may have different components and operating characteristics.
Functionally Equivalent RAS [Archive]	FERAS	10/29/2008	4/21/2011	A Remedial Action Scheme ("RAS") that provides the same performance as follows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Each RAS can detect the same conditions and provide

WECC Regional Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
				mitigation to comply with all Reliability Standards. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Each RAS may have different components and operating characteristics.
Generating Unit Capability [†] [Archive]		3/12/2007	6/8/2007	Means the MVA nameplate rating of a generator.
Non-spinning Reserve [†] [Archive]		3/12/2007	6/8/2007	Means that Operating Reserve not connected to the system but capable of serving demand within a specified time, or interruptible load that can be removed from the system in a specified time.
Normal Path Rating [†] [Archive]		3/12/2007	6/8/2007	Is the maximum path rating in MW that has been demonstrated to WECC through study results or actual operation, whichever is greater. For a path with transfer capability limits that vary seasonally, it is the maximum of all the seasonal values.
Operating Reserve [†] [Archive]		3/12/2007	6/8/2007	Means that capability above firm system demand required to provide for regulation, load-forecasting error, equipment forced and scheduled outages and local area protection. Operating Reserve consists of Spinning Reserve and Nonspinning Reserve.
Operating Transfer Capability Limit [†] [Archive]	OTC	3/12/2007	6/8/2007	Means the maximum value of the most critical system operating parameter(s) which meets: (a) precontingency criteria as determined by equipment loading capability and acceptable voltage conditions, (b) transient criteria as determined by equipment loading capability and acceptable voltage conditions, (c) transient performance criteria, and (d) post-contingency loading and voltage criteria.

WECC Regional Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
Primary Inadvertent Interchange [Archive]		3/26/2008	5/21/2009	The component of area (n) inadvertent interchange caused by the regulating deficiencies of the area (n).
Qualified Controllable Device [Archive]		2/10/2009	3/17/2011	A controllable device installed in the Interconnection for controlling energy flow and the WECC Operating Committee has approved using the device for controlling the USF on the Qualified Transfer Paths.
Qualified Transfer Path [Archive]		2/10/2009	3/17/2011	A transfer path designated by the WECC Operating Committee as being qualified for WECC unscheduled flow mitigation.
Qualified Transfer Path Curtailment Event [Archive]		2/10/2009	3/17/2011	Each hour that a Transmission Operator calls for Step 4 or higher for one or more consecutive hours (See Attachment 1 IRO-006-WECC-1) during which the curtailment tool is functional.
Relief Requirement [Archive]		2/10/2009	3/17/2011	The expected amount of the unscheduled flow reduction on the Qualified Transfer Path that would result by curtailing each Sink Balancing Authority's Contributing Schedules by the percentages listed in the columns of WECC Unscheduled Flow Mitigation Summary of Actions Table in Attachment 1 WECC IRO-006-WECC-1.
Secondary Inadvertent Interchange [Archive]		3/26/2008	5/21/2009	The component of area (n) inadvertent interchange caused by the regulating deficiencies of area (i).
Security-Based Misoperation		10/29/2008	4/21/2011	A Misoperation caused by the incorrect operation of a Protection System or RAS. Security is a component of reliability

WECC Regional Term	Acronym	BOT Approved Date	FERC Approved Date	Definition
[Archive]				and is the measure of a device’s certainty not to operate falsely.
Spinning Reserve [†] [Archive]		3/12/2007	6/8/2007	Means unloaded generation which is synchronized and ready to serve additional demand. It consists of Regulating reserve and Contingency reserve (as each are described in Sections B.a.i and ii).
Transfer Distribution Factor [Archive]	TDF	2/10/2009	3/17/2011	The percentage of USF that flows across a Qualified Transfer Path when an Interchange Transaction (Contributing Schedule) is implemented. [See the WECC Unscheduled Flow Mitigation Summary of Actions Table (Attachment 1 WECC IRO-006-WECC-1).]
WECC Table 2 [†] [Archive]		3/12/2007	6/8/2007	Means the table maintained by the WECC identifying those transfer paths monitored by the WECC regional Reliability coordinators. As of the date set out therein, the transmission paths identified in Table 2 are as listed in Attachment A to this Standard.

Endnotes

[†] FERC approved the WECC Tier One Reliability Standards in the Order Approving Regional Reliability Standards for the Western Interconnection and Directing Modifications, 119 FERC ¶ 61,260 (June 8, 2007). In that Order, FERC directed WECC to address the inconsistencies between the regional definitions and the NERC Glossary in developing permanent replacement standards. The replacement standards designed to address the shortcomings were filed with FERC in 2009.

Exhibit C

**Informational Summary of Each Reliability Standard Applicable to Nova Scotia,
Approved by FERC in Second Quarter 2013**

EXHIBIT C: Informational Summary of Reliability Standard Applicable to Nova Scotia, Approved by FERC in Second Quarter 2013

EOP-004-2 - To improve the reliability of the Bulk Electric System by requiring the reporting of events by Responsible Entities.

Applicability: For the purpose of the Requirements and the EOP-004 Attachment 1, the following functional entities will be collectively referred to as “Responsible Entity.”

- Reliability Coordinator
- Balancing Authority
- Transmission Owner
- Transmission Operator
- Generator Owner
- Generator Operator
- Distribution Provider

On December 31, 2012, as amended on January 4, 2013, NERC submitted a petition for approval of EOP-004-2 to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) and on June 20, 2013, FERC approved the standard.

EXHIBIT C: Informational Summary of Reliability Standard Applicable to Nova Scotia, Approved by FERC in Second Quarter 2013

TPL-003-0b- System simulations and associated assessments are needed periodically to ensure that reliable systems are developed that meet specified performance requirements, with sufficient lead time and continue to be modified or upgraded as necessary to meet present and future System needs.

Applicability:

- Planning Authority
- Transmission Planner

TPL-004-0a- System simulations and associated assessments are needed periodically to ensure that reliable systems are developed that meet specified performance requirements, with sufficient lead time and continue to be modified or upgraded as necessary to meet present and future System needs.

Applicability:

- Planning Authority
- Transmission Planner

On April 12, 2013, NERC submitted a filing for approval of a proposed interpretation to certain requirements of two Reliability Standards: TPL-003-a and TPL-004-0 to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) and on June 20, 2013, FERC approved the interpretation.

The interpretation responds to two questions. The first question asks whether an entity has the option of evaluating the effects of either a stuck breaker or protection system failure contingency as presented in Table 1 of TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0, or must evaluate the contingency that produces the more severe system results or impacts. The interpretation response states that a planner must evaluate the situation that produces the more severe system results or impacts due to a delayed clearing condition regardless of whether the condition resulted from either a stuck breaker or protection system failure. The second question asks to what extent does Table 1, footnote (e) of TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0 require an entity to model a single point of failure of a protection system component that may prevent correct operation of a protection system, including other protection systems impacted by that failed component based on the as-built design of that protection system. The interpretation response states that a planner is permitted to use engineering judgment to select the protection system component failures for evaluation that would produce the more severe system results or impact, and the evaluation would address all protection systems affected by the selected component. The interpretation response further states that a protection system component failure that impacts one or more protection systems and increases the total fault clearing time requires a planner to simulate the full impact (clearing time and facilities removed) on the bulk electric system performance.

EXHIBIT C: Informational Summary of Reliability Standard Applicable to Nova Scotia, Approved by FERC in Second Quarter 2013

VAR-002-2b- To ensure generators provide reactive and voltage control necessary to ensure voltage levels, reactive flows, and reactive resources are maintained within applicable Facility Ratings to protect equipment and the reliable operation of the Interconnection.

Applicability:

- Generator Operator
- Generator Owner

On November 21, 2012, NERC submitted a petition for approval of a revision to the VAR-002-2b to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) and on April 16, 2013, FERC approved the standard.