A. Introduction

- 1. Title: System Performance Under Normal (No Contingency) Conditions (Category A)
- 2. Number: TPL-001-01
- **3. Purpose:** System simulations and associated assessments are needed periodically to ensure that reliable systems are developed that meet specified performance requirements with sufficient lead time, and continue to be modified or upgraded as necessary to meet present and future system needs.
- 4. Applicability:
 - **4.1.** Planning Authority
 - **4.2.** Transmission Planner
- 5. Effective Date: April 1, 2005
- 5. Effective Date: The application of revised Footnote 'b' in Table 1 will take effect on the first day of the first calendar quarter, 60 months after applicable regulatory approval. In those jurisdictions where no regulatory approval is required, the effective date will be the first day of the first calendar quarter, 60 months after Board of Trustees adoption. All other requirements remain in effect per previous approvals. The existing Footnote 'b' remains in effect until the revised Footnote 'b' becomes effective.

B. Requirements

- **R1.** The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall each demonstrate through a valid assessment that its portion of the interconnected transmission system is planned such that, with all transmission facilities in service and with normal (pre-contingency) operating procedures in effect, the Network can be operated to supply projected customer demands and projected Firm (non- recallable reserved) Transmission Services at all Demand levels over the range of forecast system demands, under the conditions defined in Category A of Table I. To be considered valid, the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner assessments shall:
 - **R1.1.** Be made annually.
 - **R1.2.** Be conducted for near-term (years one through five) and longer-term (years six through ten) planning horizons.
 - **R1.3.** Be supported by a current or past study and/or system simulation testing that addresses each of the following categories, showing system performance following Category A of Table 1 (no contingencies). The specific elements selected (from each of the following categories) shall be acceptable to the associated Regional Reliability Organization(s).
 - **R1.3.1.** Cover critical system conditions and study years as deemed appropriate by the entity performing the study.

- **R1.3.2.** Be conducted annually unless changes to system conditions do not warrant such analyses.
- **R1.3.3.** Be conducted beyond the five-year horizon only as needed to address identified marginal conditions that may have longer lead-time solutions.
- **R1.3.4.** Have established normal (pre-contingency) operating procedures in place.
- **R1.3.5.** Have all projected firm transfers modeled.
- **R1.3.6.** Be performed for selected demand levels over the range of forecast system demands.
- **R1.3.7.** Demonstrate that system performance meets Table 1 for Category A (no contingencies).
- **R1.3.8.** Include existing and planned facilities.
- **R1.3.9.** Include Reactive Power resources to ensure that adequate reactive resources are available to meet system performance.
- **R1.4.** Address any planned upgrades needed to meet the performance requirements of Category A.
- **R2.** When system simulations indicate an inability of the systems to respond as prescribed in Reliability Standard TPL-001-01_R1, the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall each:
 - **R2.1.** Provide a written summary of its plans to achieve the required system performance as described above throughout the planning horizon.
 - **R2.1.1.** Including a schedule for implementation.
 - **R2.1.2.** Including a discussion of expected required in-service dates of facilities.
 - **R2.1.3.** Consider lead times necessary to implement plans.
 - **R2.2.** Review, in subsequent annual assessments, (where sufficient lead time exists), the continuing need for identified system facilities. Detailed implementation plans are not needed.
- **R3.** The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall each document the results of these reliability assessments and corrective plans and shall annually provide these to its respective NERC Regional Reliability Organization(s), as required by the Regional Reliability Organization.

C. Measures

- M1. The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall have a valid assessment and corrective plans as specified in Reliability Standard TPL-001-0_R2.1_R1 and TPL-001-0_1_R2.2.
- **M2.** The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall have evidence it reported documentation of results of its Reliability Assessments and corrective plans per Reliability Standard TPL-001-01_R3.

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Compliance Monitor: Regional Reliability Organization.

Each Compliance Monitor shall report compliance and violations to NERC via the NERC Compliance Reporting Process.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Timeframe

Annually

1.3. Data Retention

None specified.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

2. Levels of Non-Compliance

- **2.1.** Level 1: Not applicable.
- **2.2.** Level 2: A valid assessment and corrective plan for the longer-term planning horizon is not available.
- **2.3.** Level 3: Not applicable.
- **2.4.** Level 4: A valid assessment and corrective plan for the near-term planning horizon is not available.

E. Regional Differences

1. None identified.

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
0	April 1, 2005	Effective Date	New
0	February 8, 2005	BOT Approval	Revised
0	June 3, 2005	Fixed reference in M1 to read TPL-001-0 R2.1 and TPL-001-0 R2.2	Errata
0	July 24, 2007	Corrected reference in M1. to read TPL-001-0 R1 and TPL-001-0 R2.	Errata

Standard TPL-001-<u>01</u> — System Performance Under Normal Conditions

0.1	October 29, 2008	BOT adopted errata changes; updated version number to "0.1"	Errata
0.1	May 13, 2009	FERC Approved – Updated Effective Date and Footer	Revised
<u>1</u>	TBD	Revised footnote 'b' pursuant to FERC Order RM06-16-009	Revised

Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees: February 8, 2005
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Table I. Transmission System Standards – Normal and Emergency Conditions

Category		System Limits or Impacts		
	Initiating Event(s) and Contingency Element(s)	System Stable and both Thermal and Voltage Limits within Applicable Rating a	Loss of Demand or Curtailed Firm Transfers	Cascading Outages
A No Contingencies	All Facilities in Service	Yes	No	No
B Event resulting in the loss of a single element.	Single Line Ground (SLG) or 3-Phase (3Ø) Fault, with Normal Clearing: 1. Generator 2. Transmission Circuit 3. Transformer Loss of an Element without a Fault Single Pole Block, Normal Clearing e:	Yes Yes Yes Yes	No b No b No b No b	No No No No
	4. Single Pole (dc) Line SLG Fault, with Normal Clearing ^e :	Yes	No ^b	No
Event(s) resulting in the loss of two or more (multiple)	Bus Section Breaker (failure or internal Fault)	Yes Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c Planned/ Controlled ^c	No No
elements.	SLG or 3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing e, Manual System Adjustments, followed by another SLG or 3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing e: 3. Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency, manual system adjustments, followed by another Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	Bipolar Block, with Normal Clearing ^e : 4. Bipolar (dc) Line Fault (non 3Ø), with Normal Clearing ^e :	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	Any two circuits of a multiple circuit towerline ^f	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	SLG Fault, with Delayed Clearing ^e (stuck breaker or protection system failure): 6. Generator	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	7. Transformer	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	8. Transmission Circuit	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No
	9. Bus Section	Yes	Planned/ Controlled ^c	No

Extreme event resulting in two or more (multiple) elements removed or Cascading out of service. 3Ø Fault, with Delayed Clearing ^e (stuck breaker or protection system failure):

- 1. Generator
- 3. Transformer
- 2. Transmission Circuit
- 4. Bus Section

3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing^e:

- 5. Breaker (failure or internal Fault)
- 6. Loss of towerline with three or more circuits
- 7. All transmission lines on a common right-of way
- 8. Loss of a substation (one voltage level plus transformers)
- Loss of a switching station (one voltage level plus transformers)
- 10. Loss of all generating units at a station
- 11. Loss of a large Load or major Load center
- Failure of a fully redundant Special Protection System (or remedial action scheme) to operate when required
- 13. Operation, partial operation, or misoperation of a fully redundant Special Protection System (or Remedial Action Scheme) in response to an event or abnormal system condition for which it was not intended to operate
- Impact of severe power swings or oscillations from Disturbances in another Regional Reliability Organization.

Evaluate for risks and consequences.

- May involve substantial loss of customer Demand and generation in a widespread area or areas.
- Portions or all of the interconnected systems may or may not achieve a new, stable operating point.
- Evaluation of these events may require joint studies with neighboring systems.

- a) Applicable rating refers to the applicable Normal and Emergency facility thermal Rating or system voltage limit as determined and consistently applied by the system or facility owner. Applicable Ratings may include Emergency Ratings applicable for short durations as required to permit operating steps necessary to maintain system control. All Ratings must be established consistent with applicable NERC Reliability Standards addressing Facility Ratings.
- b) Planned or controlled interruption of electric supply to radial customers or some local Network customers, connected to or supplied by the Faulted element or by the affected area, may occur in certain areas without impacting the overall reliability of the interconnected transmission systems. To prepare for the next contingency, system adjustments are permitted, including curtailments of contracted Firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power Transfers.
- b) An objective of the planning process should be to minimize the likelihood and magnitude of interruption of Demand following Contingency events. However, it is recognized that Demand will be interrupted if it is directly served by the Elements removed from service as a result of the Contingency. Furthermore, in limited circumstances Demand may need to be interrupted to address BES performance requirements. When interruption of Demand is utilized within the planning process to address BES performance requirements, such interruption is limited to:
 - O Interruptible Demand or Demand-Side Management
 - Circumstances where the uses of Demand interruption are documented, including alternatives evaluated; and where the Demand interruption is subject to review in an open and transparent stakeholder process that includes addressing stakeholder comments.

Curtailment of firm transfers is allowed, when coupled with the appropriate re-dispatch of resources obligated to re-dispatch, where it can be demonstrated that Facilities remain within applicable Facility Ratings and the redispatch does not result in the shedding of any firm Demand. Where Facilities external to the Transmission Planner's planning region are relied upon, Facility Ratings in those regions would also be respected.

c) Depending on system design and expected system impacts, the controlled interruption of electric supply to customers (load shedding), the planned removal from service of certain generators, and/or the curtailment of contracted Firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power Transfers may be necessary to maintain the overall reliability of the interconnected transmission systems.

- d) A number of extreme contingencies that are listed under Category D and judged to be critical by the transmission planning entity(ies) will be selected for evaluation. It is not expected that all possible facility outages under each listed contingency of Category D will be evaluated.
- e) Normal clearing is when the protection system operates as designed and the Fault is cleared in the time normally expected with proper functioning of the installed protection systems. Delayed clearing of a Fault is due to failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay.
- f) System assessments may exclude these events where multiple circuit towers are used over short distances (e.g., station entrance, river crossings) in accordance with Regional exemption criteria.